VIKAS

6th Edition

Foreign Policy of India

V N Khanna

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Contents

Preface to the Sixth Edition v
Preface to the First Edition vii

1. Foreign Policy and National Interest 1
2. Factors Shaping India's Foreign Policy 13
3. Principles and Objectives of India's Foreign Policy 27
4. The Policy of Non-Alignment 42
5. India and Its Neighbours: Pakistan 61
6. India and Its Neighbours: China 111
7. India and Its Neighbours: Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 141
8. Disarmament, India's Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation 181
9. India and the United Nations 211
10. India and the SAARC 231
11. India and the United States of America 250
12. India and the Soviet Union 287
13. From Non-Alignment to Nuclear India 310

An Overview 330

An Overview

No mature nation allows its foreign policy to be radically altered whenever there is change of government or political leadership. India has clearly proved its maturity in this respect. Nehru's policy of non-alignment, peaceful co-existence and pacific settlement of international disputes remains the cornerstone of its policy even sixty years after its independence. In last chapter, we have highlighted the contribution of various Prime Ministers in the making of India's foreign policy. In this concluding section we will sum up the major foreign policy decisions and actions taken during nearly six decades since 1947. A retired officer of Indian Foreign Service, Eric Gonsalves had correctly said that foreign policy formulation is done according to the country's national interest. Its main objective, according to Gonsalves, is to create international environment to suit these interests and to maintain it. India's foreign policy-makers have tried to achieve this objective. Today, most nations of the world are generally concentrating on their regional problems. India has also made efforts in this direction since the 1960's. In the background of geographical, historical and cultural determinants, as also the international environment of late 1940's, Nehru had based India's foreign policy on independence of decision-making, and self-reliance. This basis was largely influenced by Mahatma Gandhi's ideals of peace and non-violence. It is in the light of these bases and ideals that India had decided to keep away from the power blocs and take independent decisions. This came to be identified as the policy of non-alignment.

India had begun to play limited role in international relations even before independence. Nehru had taken the initiative to convene, early in 1947, an Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, in which the programme for post-colonial Asia was discussed. A conference held in Delhi in 1949 helped Indonesia in its struggle against the Dutch who were trying to retain their colonial hold. India played significant role in regard to Korea and Indo-China in 1953 and 1954 respectively. India was chosen to head the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) for the repatriation of prisons of Korean War. India made

a valuable contribution in the settlement of Indo-Chinese problem at Geneva. Later, the Afro-Asian Nations Conference convened at Bandung (Indonesia) endorsed the famous five principles of *Panchsheel,* which had been enunciated by India and China in 1954 as the basis of friendly relations among nations. Nehru worked in close cooperation with Chinese Premier Chou En-lie at Bandung. Nehru's role in this conference was highly acclaimed. India was called upon by the United Nations to assist in its peace-keeping efforts in West Asia, the Congo and Cyprus. India successfully liberated Goa from the Portuguese colonial rule in 1961, though US was very unhappy at the use of armed forces by India for liberation of its own territory. Although the US and UK supported India in her border war with China in 1962, the humiliation suffered by India at the hands of the Chinese spoilt India's prestige in the world politics.

Earlier both India and Pakistan were invited to join the US sponsored military alliances, such as South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) to contain communism. India refused to join the western alliance system as Nehru considered non-alignment of vital importance for India's national interest. But, Pakistan joined SEATO and Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO) and received very impressive military assistance from the United States. In view of consistent support given to India by the Soviet Union on the question of Kashmir, India developed strategic relations with the USSR. Consequently, while India condemned the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression (1956) against Egypt, she remained virtually silent when a little later in 1956 itself, the Soviet Union made military intervention in the internal affairs of Hungary. Actually, India even supported the Soviet action, though quite indirectly by voting on its side in the UN General Assembly. Similarly, in 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was not condemned, though despite Mrs. Gandhi's protest, Soviet leadership had decided to supply armaments to Pakistan. America had supported Pakistan in the Indo-Pak War of 1965. Pakistan, in that war, had openly used the US weapons, although India had been assured that these weapons would not be used against India. Later, on the eve of 1971 Indo-Pak War on the question of Bangladesh, both China and the United States had pledged support to Pakistan. It is in this background that India was forced to sign a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with the USSR in August 1971. This treaty proved a deterrent and neither China nor the United States intervened in the war. Later, India under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership did not condemn the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, though soon after the USSR intervention, caretaker Prime Minister Charan Singh had told the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi to immediately pull out of Afghanistan. But, when Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in January 1980, she kept silent on the issue. This led critics to comment that India had compromised with, or given up, her policy of non-alignment. When Mrs. Gandhi presided over 1983 NAM summit in New Delhi, she only very indirectly told pressmen that India was against all foreign interventions without calling for Soviet withdrawal. India's argument was that in view of the then existing Pak-China-US Axis, India could take no other stand on Afghanistan.

Despite many similarities between India and the United States, the bilateral relations between the two largest democracies have generally been full of tension. India always opposed US policy of military alliances "against communism", and "in favour of freedom." For a long time, America remained a supporter of Pakistan, at the cost of friendship with India. The United States often adopted anti-India policy and even voted against her in the UN. Despite India's protests, repeated supplies of armaments were made to Pakistan. After nearly five decades of anti-India policy, it was only in 1996-97 that President Clinton sent out signals of change in US policy. For the first time the United States forcefully said in 1997 that India and Pakistan must resolve all their disputes, including Kashmir, through direct bilateral negotiations. Clinton and his Secretary of State Ms. Madeline Albright made it clear that the US would not mediate in Indo-Pak disputes unless both the countries wanted it. Important initiatives were taken in September 1997 during Clinton-Gujral meeting, for improvement in the bilateral relations of two largest democracies.

Both India and China had been victims of western imperialism, though in different ways. The two countries had close contacts for centuries. A new People's Republic of China was born in October 1949, after the successful completion of the revolution led by Mao. India was one of the first countries to have recognised the new regime. India consistently supported Chinese claim for representation in the United Nations, though she was kept out of the UN for over two decades because of American veto. Meanwhile, India and China had signed an agreement for trade in April 1954, and enunciated the five principles of *Panchsheel,* including the all-important ideal of peaceful co-existence. India had recognised full Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, and accepted it as "Tibet Region of China." But when India granted political asylum to Dalai Lama, China turned hostile towards India. In violation of the commitments contained in *Panchsheel,* China threatened territorial integrity of India, and launched a massive attack in 1962. India was humbled and humiliated. Encouraged by this, Pakistan decided to wage a war, and "defeat India" in order to annex Kashmir. Both China and the United States appeared to have encouraged Pakistan. China gave support to Pakistan not only in the war of 1965, but also in the decisive war of 1971 Ambassador level relations between India and China had remained suspended since 1962. Indira Gandhi Government took the initiative in 1976 to normalise the Sino-Indian relations, and ambassadors were exchanged but, no progress was made in the solution of border dispute. Eventually, late in 1980's on the suggestion of China's elder leader Deng Xiaoping, both countries initiated steps to normalise relations,

while leaving tile border dispute out of the negotiations *for* the time being. The visits of Vajpayee (1979) and later Rajiv Gandhi did make contribution in the process of normalisation of relations. Eventually an Agreement on Confidence Building Measures was signed in New Delhi in December 1996.

India-Pakistan relations have remained adversarial ever since the two states were created in 1947. Pakistan was carved out of British India when the British encouraged and accepted the Muslim League's theory of two nations. The process of murder, loot and rape of minorities in Pakistan had begun in August 1947 itself. Millions of people fled from Pakistan, and India had to handle the big task of rehabilitating the refugees. Reactions that took place in India were soon brought under control. The dispute regarding sharing of river waters, and canals, was resolved amicably, but Pakistan adopted permanently hostile attitude on the issue of Kashmir. Indecisiveness of Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir prompted Pakistan to attack the state through tile medium of tribals in 1947 itself. Indian army went into action to throw the aggressors out, only after Kashmir's accession to India was finalized. India had taken the issue to the UN Security Council. On its initiative a cease fire was finally arranged, a military observer group appointed, and provision for holding plebiscite in Jammu & Kashmir was made, but subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. Pakistan did not fulfill the first condition of withdrawal of its troops from the occupied part of the state, yet even 60 years after the crisis, she continues to harp on plebiscite.

A democratically elected Constituent Assembly of Jammu & Kashmir ratified the accession of State to India. Thus, Nehru's commitment to ascertain the wishes of the people of state was fulfilled in his own life time. Pakistan joined the US-sponsored military alliances, received massive military aid from the United States, and entered into friendship with China in common hostility to India. Despite this, India humbled Pakistan in the 1965 war, and in accordance with the Tashkent Agreement withdrew its troops in order to restore the *status quo ante.* Once again a war was fought in 1971. In this decisive war Pakistan army surrendered unconditionally to India in East Pakistan, and an independent Bangladesh was born. Peace terms were settled at Shimla Conference in 1972, where it was agreed that all bilateral issues between India and Pakistan, including Kashmir, would be resolved through bilateral negotiations. But, no progress was made in regard to Kashmir. Pakistan has spared no effort to internationalise the issue.

Having formally severed its relations with western military alliance, Pakistan joined Non-aligned Movement in 1979. She joined India in the establishment of SAARC in 1985. But, she continued her anti-India tirade and kept on assisting the separatist elements. Pakistan openly adopted anti-Soviet policy in regard to its intervention in Aghanistan, and gave shelter and full support to Afghan rebels. There was no change in Pakistan's anti-India policy even after the end of Cold War. India offered several unilateral facilities to Pakistan, under the

Gujral Doctrine during 1996-97. There was no positive response from Pakistan. On the contrary, Pakistan army kept on firing occasionally on Indian positions from across the Line of Control. Prime Minister I.K. Gujral met his counterpart Nawaz Sharif at Male (May 1997) and New York (September 1997) and discussed several measures for normalisation of relations. Gujral expressed India's keen desire to develop lasting friendship with Pakistan. Foreign Secretary-level talks were also continued to find ways and means of settlement of disputes. Despite all this, Pakistani troops began heavy shelling on Indian positions in September 1997 in the Kargil sector of Kashmir. Several people were killed or wounded. Pakistani shelling was targeted at a hospital, a mosque, and a market place. Consequently, several patients were injured; people offering prayers at the mosque were also hurt. Lakhs of rupees worth of goods were destroyed in the market. It appeared that the Nawaz Sharif Government had no real interest in peace.

India has always tried to maintain friendly relations with other neighbours including Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. Despite deep cultural affinity between India and Nepal occasional differences have been appearing in their relations. China made several efforts to bring Nepal under its influence. But, India spared no efforts to maintain cordial relations with Nepal. India has given considerable economic and technical assistance, constructed roads and airports, and cooperated with that country in the development of its hydro-electric power generation. With the establishment of multi-party democracy in Nepal in 1990, Indo-Nepalese relations have moved even closer. Both the countries are engaged in regional economic cooperation as member of SAARC, and both believe in non-alignment.

India had played a major role in the birth of Bangladesh as a sovereign country. Indo-Bangla relations remained very cordial till tile assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the creator of Bangladesh, in August 1975. Pakistan then entered the scene and tried to promote anti-India climate in the name of religion, even in Bangladesh. In the absence of any natural frontier, a large number of Bangladeshis have been arriving illegally, in India, in search of employment. This has adversely affected India's economy. Disputes have occurred between the two countries. For example, a small pocket of Teen Beegha on tile border developed into dispute, as also in regard to a new island that emerged in tile Bay of Bengal, and was named by British Admiralty as New Moor. It is question has remained unresolved. But, the main dispute between India and Bangladesh related to the sharing of Ganga waters. Water released from Farakka Barrage is not enough to meet the needs of both the countries particularly during the lean season. An important agreement was concluded between the two countries in 1977 to share the Ganga Waters in a way that Calcutta Port got enough water to keep it functional, and yet Bangladesh got sufficient quantity of water. It was renewed in 1982 for a short duration. Thereafter, India kept on releasing water to Bangladesh on ad hoc basis. The problem of sharing of water was a major hurdle in normal and friendly relations between the two countries. Finally, under the Gujral Doctrine, India signed a fresh agreement for a period of 30 years in 1996. This comprehensive agreement provided more water than ever before to Bangladesh, and tried to satisfy tile minimum needs of both the countries. This would help in building up of Indo-Bangla relations on lasting and friendly basis.

Close and intimate relations have existed for a long time between India and Sri Lanka. Both have had common historical and cultural background. India and Sri Lanka both were under British imperial rule and gained independence in 1947 and 1948 respectively. Both were newly decolonized, developing, third world countries. Democracy has successfully functioned in both the neighbouring countries for over half a century. Both are non-aligned, and are engaged in regional economic cooperation as founder members of SAARC. In the past, people of Tamil origin had gone from India from time to time and settled down in Sri Lanka. The ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese became a cause of unrest and later look violent turn in Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, the question of stateless persons of Indian origin was discussed by the leaders of two countriês to find an amicable settlement. The first attempt to find a solution to the ethnic problem was made when the Prime Minister of two countries, Nehru and John Katelawala signed an agreement in 1953. The question of granting citizenship to stateless persons was partially settled in 1964 by the agreement signed by Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike. They settled the fate of about 8 lakh 25 thousand stateless persons. The decision in regard to remaining one lakh and fifty thousand persons was taken in 1974 when Mrs. Gandhi and Mrs. Bandaranaike agreed to accommodate 0.50 percent each in the two countries.

The ethnic conflict between Tamils and Sinhalese took very serious turn in 1980s, when violent riots broke out mainly in Northern and Eastern parts of the island Republic. People of Tamil origin were demanding a separate homeland, or Eelam. This was not acceptable to the Sinhalese majority and the Government of Sri Lanka. An agreement concluded in 1987 between Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayawardene provided for the deployment of an Indian Peace Keeping Force to contain violence and maintain peace in Sri Lanka. The mission could not succeed, for the Sinhalese opposed the idea of Indian troops being posted in Sri Lanka. Secondly, it failed because the troops had to fight against people of Tamil Origin. The Indian soldiers suffered heavy casualties and were eventually recalled, without success, in 1990. In the meantime, India and Sri Lanka demarcated their maritime boundary, and India accepted the Sri Lankan sovereignty over the disputed island of Kacchativu. This question was resolved in 1974. The Sri Lankan President Ms. Chandrika Kumaratunga was trying for a peaceful solution of the problem ever since she came to power in 1994. She visited India in 1996, and discussed ways and means of establishing completely conflict-free relations between the two countries. But, even after a decade of Chandrika's visit there were no signs of peace in the Island.

India has always tried for peaceful and good neighbourly relations with Burma (Myanmar). Certain separatist and militant elements of North Eastern region of India have been smuggling into India, armaments from across the border, although the Burmese Government is not involved in assisting the insurgency in India. The smuggling of armaments and consequent militancy has been causing anxiety in India. Another matter of concern for India is suppression of pro-democracy leaders and their followers by the military rulers of Myanmar. But, India has never been interested in interference in the internal affairs of any country. Therefore, despite our natural sympathy with democratic elements, India has not provided any assistance to pro-democracy leadership. Myanmar (Burma) is located at the tri-junction of the Indian sub-continent, China and South-East Asia. As C. Raja Mohan rightly argues, "... the resource-rich Myanmar will always present itself at the centre of any serious Indian policy towards Asia." However, Myanmar has not received any serious attention from India's foreign policy-makers. It is high time India recognised the increasing strategic importance of Burma and elevated it in the country's foreign policy priorities. For too long, since early 1960s Burma has remained aloof. When in late 1980s military rule was challenged by pro-democracy forces, Government of India had to restrain itself, through the people of India wholeheartedly supported Aung San Suu Kyi, who returned from England in 1988 and took up the leadership of pro-democracy movement. Even the restrained support that India gave to Sui Kyi annoyed the military rulers of that country, particularly in a situation in which China, Japan and ASEAN countries stood by the military regime in the name of stability and economic development of Myanmar.

By early 1998, India had 'toned down' its support to pro-democracy forces. This resulted in "functional cooperation" between the two countries. Economic and commercial links were revived, and low-key political exchanges began. The Government of Myanmar fully cooperated with India in curbing insurgency around the border. "Indian security officials have been pleased", says Raja Mohan, "with the results from cooperation with Myanmar on curbing the flow of illicit arms, checking the narcotics trade and curbing cross-border insurgencies." As the troubles in the North-East continue to increase, the cooperation extended by Myanmar has been welcomed. But, Government of India has not yet elevated Myanmar in its foreign policy to the level that Rangoon (Yangon) expects. Although, Mr. Gujral suggested in 1996 inclusion of Myanmar in the SAARC, nothing much has been done to improve bilateral relations. Unfortunately, there has been practically no emphasis on Myanmar within the framework of the "Gujral Doctrine" the doctrine of good neighbourliness towards the smaller neighbours.

The United States argues that increased trade relations with Myanmar would encourage greater democratisation in that country, yet Clinton Administration also believed that economic sanctions will has ten political reforms. The ASEAN countries, however, felt that economic sanctions could lead to greater Chinese influence in Myanmar. Therefore, ASEAN granted its full membership to Myanmar in 1997 despite strong western oppositions. But, as far as India is concerned, it has to deal with Myanmar in a manner that will best serve its national interest. India can certainly have sympathy with pro-democracy movement, yet our national interest demands immediate elevation of Myanmar in India's foreign policy, irrespective of who is in power at Yangon. This will be in the interest not only of our bilateral relations, but also in the interest of regional peace and cooperation. India remained concerned at the continued detention of Ms. Sun Kyi, the Nobel Prize awardee, even till 2007.

India's foreign policy supports world peace and peaceful settlement of international disputes. India is opposed to all forms of violence, war and aggression. India has full faith in the ideals of the United Nations. It has cooperated with the UN in all its socio-economic and political activities. India supports disarmaments and advocates a nuclear-weapon free world. India is aware of its security concerns and wants to protect its national interests. Within the parameters of international peace and security, India seeks reduction in conventional weapons, and total ban on nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Nehru was the first to give a call for comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, in 1954. India has always supported non-discriminatory efforts for disarmament, and has played valuable role in the special sessions of the UN General Assembly for disarmament, in the 18-nation disarmament committee, and the Conference on Disarmament (CD). India welcomed and signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. India has been arguing for a non-discriminatory Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, India believed that Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 is discriminatory in nature, because it bans proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), without providing for elimination or reduction of nuclear weapons possessed by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). Despite all types of pressure, India has refused to sign the NPT until it is modified to become non-discriminatory. Similarly, while India has been a consistent supporter of total ban on nuclear tests, it opposed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the shape it was being finalised by the Conference on Disarmament in 1996. It was not acceptable to India in its discriminatory form. India asked the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to at least announce a time table for the elimination of their nuclear weapons. As India refused to approve the draft of CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva in 1996, it was considered and adopted by the UN General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. It was adopted on an Australian resolution in September 1996. The US President was the first to sign it. India did not sign it on the ground of its discriminatory nature. In any case, the CTBT has been virtually forgotten because US Senate refused to ratify it.

Like any other self-respecting nation, India has to protect its territorial integrity and ensure its security. With this aim in view, India's foreign policy emphasises an effective defence system. India maintains the process of modernisation of its Army, Navy and the Air Force. India has engaged itself in research and production of new and more sophisticated conventional weapons. It even exports some of these weapons, mainly to the Third World countries. More than 40 countries were engaged in development of nuclear capability at the end of twentieth century. Five big powers, including India's neighbour China, possess massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Pakistan also possesses nuclear capability. In this situation, India having nuclear capability, kept its nuclear option open. If need arose. India could manufacture nuclear weapons, though in principle it is against such weapons. It was in 1974 that India exploded its first nuclear device, though India believes only in peaceful use of nuclear energy. In view of growing threat to its security from its neighbourhood, India exercised its nuclear option in May 1998, carried out five tests and became a nuclear weapon state.

India recognises the utility of regional economic cooperation. All the nations of the world now realise that their individual economies would be gravely endangered if they did not organise themselves into regional economic cooperation. The nation-states have become so deeply interdependent that economic cooperation is now an essential necessity. Therefore, like the European Union, South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established by India and six other South Asian nations. India has been working for the success of SAARC, although Pakistan has been trying to raise the issue of Kashmir at SAARC forum. This is not only against the spirit of regional cooperation, but also against the Charter of SAARC which prohibits discussion on bilateral disputes. SAARC has taken a major step towards economic integration of South Asia by its decision to establish a free trading area (SAFTA) by the year 2001. SAARC was expanded in 2006 by the admission of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, India has been given the status of full Dialogue Partner of Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This will enable India to have greater trading facilities with the South East Asian countries.

On the initiative of India and South Africa, the countries of Indian Ocean Rim have started preparations for the setting up of an association, of Indian Ocean Rim Regional Cooperation. The vast region from South Africa to Australia, including India and several other countries of Indian Ocean Rim area, can easily establish an association that will make the regional cooperation and trading mutually beneficial to all. The total population of the countries of this Rim is about 2 billion, which constitutes nearly one-third of total his mankind. The total production of goods and services in this region is nearly of the value of 3 trillion US dollars per year. In the last decade of the twentieth century, only 6.5 percent of India's annual export went to the countries of Indian Ocean Rim This is less than the amount of import from these countries. Thus, we have unfavourable balance of trade in this vast region. South Africa's per capita income is about 10 times more than the per capita income in India, while the roads, communication, system and housing facilities are much less developed than India. If ever a regional organisation is set up for the Indian Ocean Rim, it will benefit all the countries of the region and help reduce regional imbalances.

India's Nuclear Doctrine: India's foreign and security policies took a new turn after Atal Behari Vajpayee took over as the Prime Minister in March 1998. India decided to exercise its nuclear option 24 years after Mrs. Gandhi had conducted a nuclear test in Pokhran in May 1974. Vajpayee Government gave a go-ahead signal to India's nuclear scientists who wanted to conduct fresh nuclear tests for the last several years. Five tests conducted in May 1998 at Pokhran (popularly called Pokhran II) established India as the sixth nuclear weapon state. India had not signed the CTBT. Therefore, it was not bound by the treaty. India was convinced that Pakistan possessed nuclear bombs which she had developed with the active assistance of China, a recognised nuclear weapons state (NWS). Thus, India was sure of the existence of nuclear threat to its security from China as well as Pakistan. In view of this, India conducted five tests and collected sufficient data to enable the Government to declare unilateral moratorium on further tests. Prime Minister Vajpayee came out with, what came to be known as his "Nuclear Doctrine". Meanwhile, Pakistan also conducted its nuclear tests, soon after Indian explosions, in May 1998. This proved India correct that Pakistan possessed the bomb which posed a serious threat to India's security. The nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan led to strong reaction from nuclear weapon states, except France who recognised India's "sovereign right" to conduct nuclear tests as deterrent in the interest of her security. The United States President imposed sanctions on India, as provided in the American laws. China also reacted very sharply. Japan followed suit.

The "Nuclear Doctrine" was propounded by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in a speech in the Lok Sabha in August 1998. Later, the three main elements of the doctrine were explained by the officials. These are: (a) India will maintain a minimum but credible nuclear deterrent; but India did not require to conduct any more tests to maintain this credibility; (b) the second element of the nuclear doctrine is that, like China, India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon countries, and that it will not be the "first" to use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon countries. The Prime Minister said, "We will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Having stated that there remains no basis for their use against countries which do not have nuclear weapons". Soon after the tests India had offered to sign the "no-first use" concept with other countries bilaterally or multi-laterally. But, later India declared this unilaterally; and (c) the Prime Minister announced that India was willing to move towards *de Jure* formalisation of adherence to CTBT itself“India reserves the right to review this decision if in its judgement extraordinary events take place that jeopardise India's supreme national interests. The CTBT also gives the same right to every country.

Commenting on Vajpayee's declaration (of nuclear doctrine) K. Subrahmanyam emphasised that India's doctrine was different from the NATO doctrine of using the nuclear weapon as the last resort of defence. That (NATO doctrine) implies use of nuclear weapons even against a conventional attack if the situation turns unfavourable and the country's defence calls for it. Vajpayee's nuclear doctrine does not envisage use of our nuclear weapons in any condition of conventional attack. It makes clear that India would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state; and would not be the first to use it even against a nuclear weapon state. It means India will use its nuclear weapons only if it is first subjected to a nuclear attack. Thus, India will use its nuclear weapons only by way of defence against a nuclear attack—never otherwise. To that extent our nuclear doctrine is an improvement over the NATO declaration, and should be welcomed. Thus, India's nuclear security strategy may be summed up as: A no-first use offer to Pakistan, a willingness to look again at the CTBT which it earlier declared unworthy of consideration, a moratorium on further nuclear tests, and a declaration that its nuclear weapons are only for defensive purposes.

Commenting on the policy of “minimum deterrence” and of “no-first use” of nuclear weapons, C. Raja Mohan expressed the view that “the only purpose of India's nuclear arsenal is to prevent blackmail from other nuclear powers. They also indicate that India has no interest in engaging other states in an arms race, and its arsenal will be pegged at the lowest possible level required for credible deterrence”. Possession of nuclear weapons as a deterrent is sufficient guarantee of India's security. As the former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once observed, a loaded gun is more potent than a legal brief. India now has a loaded gun which she may never use.

The Pokhran II and its aftermath have forced other countries to re-evaluate their basic assumptions about this country. India's image of being a Yogi, or a benign democracy is changing into an India that is “hawkish in the pursuit of its national interests”. As Jaswant Singh said, “The transformation has been from the moralistic to the realistic. It is one-sixth of humanity seeking its rightful place under the sun in the calculus of great powers”. It was pointed out that Gujral Doctrine was “a lot of toothless waffle” as it provided for India giving more than it takes. Narasimha Rao's policy of “nothing but the economy” has been modified by Vajpayee to “security first and the rest will follow”. As Professor Bharat Karnad opined, “What is emerging is a more self-centred India that is single-minded in its pursuit of national interests, rather than on abstract universal goals”.

Post-Pokhran II Diplomacy: The five nuclear tests, or Pokhran II, in May 1998 gave rise to instant euphoria in the country about India having acquired a deterrent to face any potential adversary. But, in an attempt to muscle its way into the big boys' club India initially committed certain over enthusiastic errors. Defence Minister George Fernandes had been saying that China was a potential security threat to India. The Chinese, who had signed with Deve Gowda Government, an agreement for confidence building having put the border dispute on the ice, were now once again uneasy and virtually hostile. As soon as India conducted its first three tests on May 11, 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote a letter to US President Clinton in which he gave rationale of the tests. But, the Prime Minister committed a diplomatic gaffe because while telling Clinton about “deteriorating security environment”, he wrote, “We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders ... a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962.” When the Chinese learnt about the contents, they described the tests as “outrageous contempt” for the international community and expressed their strong condemnation. If India had merely said that its tests were conducted in the “supreme interest of the country”, the Chinese would perhaps have been content with expressing serious concern. But, reference to 1962 aggression made them as agitated as the United States was. As soon as India realised its mistake, it began taking steps for controlling damage. But, by that time a Chinese official had declared that “From mutual confidence, we have now moved to mutual apprehension”. India took the corrective action, and the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary Brajesh Mishra (who once headed Indian Mission in Beijing) declared on May 21, that India “wants the best of relations with China and would like the dialogue to continue.”

Meanwhile, the United States had adopted a tough attitude and imposed economic sanctions against India and Pakistan. But, by October 1998, the US Congress had authorised the President to suspend the sanctions for a limited period as they hurt US friend Pakistan more than they harmed India. Clinton visited China in June and prompted the Chinese to take stiff actions against India. Meanwhile, the US had unsuccessfully tried to prevail upon all the five nuclear weapons states (P-5) to apply sanctions against India. President Clinton during a visit to Russia asked President Yeltsin to suspend defence cooperation with India, but the Russian President refused to oblige the Americans. The British Government had also strongly condemned Indian tests, but did not apply any sanctions. However, France was far more realistic than fellow nuclear powers. During Prime Minister Vajpayee's highly successful visit to France in September 1998, he was told, time and again by President Jacques Chirac, his Prime Minister and others, that while France is committed to non-proliferation, it respects India's “sovereign right” to exercise the nuclear option. The French clearly moved closer to India and said that India must get the respect that it deserves. The French were keen to increase their economic, scientific and technological ties with India. France was also willing to explore the possibilities of increasing defence cooperation between the two countries. This was likely to include supply of sophisticated French weapons as also nuclear reactors. The Indo-French relations were in 1998 in an upbeat position. Of particular interest and satisfaction to India was the possibility of an Indo-French nuclear understanding that could eventually include bilateral cooperation in the generation of nuclear power. The French emphasis was likely to be on finding a way to balance India's security interests with the need to sustain the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. There was commonality of views between France and India on the need and possibility of emergence of a multi-polar world, rather than the uni-polar world under the American hegemony. Vajpayee, President Chirac and French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin agreed to initiate a strategic dialogue. India needed the friendship of France, because that was the only P-5 (5 permanent members of the Security Council) country which did not condemn India for its nuclear tests.

Although Britain wrongly criticised India for its nuclear tests and refused to recognise this country as a nuclear weapon state, Tony Blair's Government had clearly declined to impose sanctions on India. However, India's relations with the Blair Government did not really take off. However, it took an unexpected step in October, 1998 when Foreign Secretary Robin Cook initiated discussions with Prime Minister's envoy Jaswant Singh, although the latter, was on a private visit to London. In view of, what Vajpayee said, a visible change in the way other countries viewed India, there was every possibility of further improvement in traditionally friendly Indo-British relations.

Relations between India and Pakistan had nose-dived after the nuclear explosions, and showed no signs of improvement during Vajpayee-Sharif meeting in Colombo during SAARC Summit in August. By the time the two Prime Ministers met in New York in September 1998 there was a complete change for the better as both India and Pakistan agreed to resume Foreign Secretary level talks to cover all bilateral issues. There were high hopes all the world over about the bilateral negotiations. As Vajpayee said there was "no other way for the two countries except to live as friends". He added, "Friends can change but not neighbours, who have to live together". So, why not live as good friendly neighbours.

It is elsewhere mentioned in this book that normally foreign policies do not undergo major changes with the change of government. That is as much true of India as of other countries. It is imperative for the Government of India, whatever its composition, that the favourable international climate should be fully utilized in India's national interest in the twenty-first century. As a nuclear weapon state and as a country that received wide international support on Kargil, India will have to build new relationships, both strategic and otherwise. With Indian economy on better standing, India should be in a very good position not only to bargain for non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime, but also to assert as power that cannot be ignored, and should find its rightful place in the Security Council and elsewhere. Dr C. Raja Mohan's following conclusion deserves careful consideration by India's foreign policy makers: "The time is now for India to give up its own *jehad* to restructure the world order. The foreign policy challenge lies not in seeking to change the world but in learning to live with it. A modest foreign policy and an ambitious domestic development agenda, with the former totally subservient to the latter, must be the guiding principles for India in the early decades of the new century." A major change took place in regional environment when Pakistan's civilian government was overthrown in October 1999 in a military *coup*.

By the end of twentieth century, Pakistan had once again come under military regime — of General Parvez Musharraf. India's so called isolation after May 1998 nuclear tests had already ended. The countries who had angrily condemned India's nuclear tests, and even those who had imposed economic sanctions, had come to realise that India was a determined nation which could not be humiliated or humbled. The sanctions had failed as India's vibrant economy continued to grow. The nuclear India was being befriended and sought by almost all the major powers of the world at the end of twentieth century.

During the first six months of new millennium India's foreign policy had moved so fast and so many countries were now willing not only to accept India's hand of friendship and its nuclear status, but also develop strategic relations with the sustained democratic India.

Soon after India had successfully conducted three nuclear tests on May 11, 1998 Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, then Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, turned poetic at Pokhran. He said on the occasion, "I rejoiced when we shook the earth and it broke under our feet. I also felt that we had broken the nuclear power domination. Now nobody could tell our nation of a billion people what to do. It is for us to decide". How prophetic it has proved. But in Washington D.C., the US Deputy Secretary to State, Strobe Talbott commented rather sadly, the same day that, "I felt sadness, dismay and discouragement when I heard the news". But, little did Talbott then realise that only a month later President Bill Clinton, who had described the Indian tests 'as a terrible mistake', would ask him to start a complex series of negotiations with Mr. Jaswant Singh to harmonise Indo-US views on nuclear issue ... Talbott who had come to India in 1994 to ask India to "cut, roll back and eliminate." Its nuclear weapon programme was now talking to nuclear India's Jaswant Singh. By early 2000, ten rounds of talks had already taken place between Talbott and Jaswant Singh.

Australia welcomed dialogue with India on a range of strategic issues. Australia also welcomed the commitment of "current Indian Government to pursue economic reforms and trade and investment liberalisation." It appeared that Australia was now seeking India. To strengthen the ongoing process of building up relations of friendly nature between the two countries, Australia's Prime Minister Mr. John Howard decided to visit India in July 2000. On the eve of the visit Howard said that he would not like the lingering bilateral differences over India's 1998 nuclear tests to 'contaminate' a new dialogue between the two countries.

Russia is one of India's all-season friends. India and Russia made it clear that they were determined to consolidate their friendship. Russia has openly supported India's claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Within just one week in June 2000 two senior Indian ministers visited Russia and held wide ranging discussions with the Russians. The dynamic President of Russia Valdimir Putin received External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh as well as Defence Minister George Fernandes. While India was keen to strengthen its diplomatic and military ties with Russia, the latter was equally keen on "strategic partnership" with India. President Putin told Fernandes: "We are interested in India being a strong and defence-capable nation for this corresponds to Russia's strategic and national interests." Mr. Putin declared that he was "the closest, dearest and best friend of India." As Russian defence Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev told his Indian counterpart, "Traditionally, close trust-based relations between our countries are one of Russia's top foreign policy priorities". Fernandes responded by saying, "Now that we have started a strategic dialogue, our friendship will grow with every passing day". Russia and India reiterated their resolve to combat international terrorism and religious extremism jointly and with third countries. It was also decided that Indo-Russian Joint Working Group would be upgraded, and converted into a ministerial level joint commission. This apex coordinating body for bilateral defence cooperation would be jointly chaired by Defence Minister Fernandes and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov. India and Russia signed a pact on nuclear cooperation in July 2000.

Britain, who had criticised India for its nuclear tests in 1998 but refused to apply sanctions, was also coming closer to India. The then British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, known for his radical hard-left Labour views, visited India shortly after President Clinton's visit. Cook echoed Clinton when he said "the modern world does not permit boundaries to be redrawn in blood." This was a clear message to Pakistan to shed violence. He suggested maintenance of *status quo* over the Indo-Pak Line of Control. Without making categorical announcement of support to India's claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council, the British Government declared that India was a 'natural contender' for a UN Security Council seat. It was expected that Prime Minister Tony Blair would be more forthcoming on this issue during his proposed visit to India or when Vajpayee visited the UK. Earlier Mr. Jaswant Singh had visited London and sought powerful and strategic relationship between India and Britain.

With an eye to the future, India and Britain launched in April 2000 a 'roundtable' of eminent persons which would brainstorm a multi-faceted relationship between two countries. It was jointly launched by Mr. Jaswant Singh and Mr. Robin Cook. The latter said on that occasion, "Our partnership is not just because of our shared history but because of our common approaches and perspectives". The "roundtable" was to be jointly chaired by Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and noted British industrialist (of Indian origin) and member of the House of Lords, Lord Swaraj Paul, India and Britain also decided to enhance relationship in trade and commerce. The appointment of Mr. Straw as Foreign Minister after June 2001 British elections was further proof of British desire to strengthen ties with India, for Straw was far more friendly to India than his predecessor Robin Cook was.

Two major European powers, namely Finance and Germany had taken significant steps to improve and consolidate their relationship with India. France, like Russia, never imposed sanctions on India in the wake of the nuclear test though both are members of G-8 where the issue was raised in all seriousness. In fact, France became the second country, after Russia, to declare, categorically and without ambiguity, that it supported India's claim to a permanent seat in the Security Council. President K.R. Narayanan paid a very successful visit to France in April 2000. French President Jacques Chirac made it abundantly clear that his country attached great importance to India. The French President declared that, "India is naturally destined to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. France supports and will support your candidature," Chirac told Narayanan. France promised to do all that it could to ensure that India got its rightful place in the world body. Chirac declared that, "it would be a very difficult issue in New York. But France clearly and openly supports India's candidature."

A senior French official explained his country's position on nuclear tests and CTBT. He said, "We would be very happy if India could sign and ratify the treaty. But we do not believe in threatening India with any kind of sanctions." Commenting on the President's talks in Paris, India's Ambassador Kanwal Sibal said, "The visit is a, consideration of the understanding that exists between India and France, and the creation of a more favourable atmosphere to develop our political, economic, strategic and cultural relations."

France was leading crusader for a change in the current uni-polar world order, dominated by the United States. France regarded the European Union as one of the new poles, and India as another. According to President Chirac, 'France is absolutely committed to the construction of Europe ... We have enabled democracy and peace to take root in our continent. Today, the European Union is the world's premier economic powerhouse ... (and) India is emerging as one of the foremost centres of power in the world of tomorrow. "France and India both were keen to improve bilateral trade that had remained more or less stagnant at 1.7 billion US dollars. France was one of the smallest trading partners of India, while ironically the European Union was India's biggest trading partners.

India, on its part, was keen to further improve ties with the European Union. The first ever India-EU Summit was held in June 2000 in Lisbon (Portugal). On the eve of the Summit, the Prime Minister, Mr. Vajpayee initiated the process for faster inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into India, through a proposed Joint Government-Industry Group. For the time being, the Group was to confine itself to proposals from European Union only, with the twin objective of resolving project specific difficulties and ensuring that the FDI approvals are realised in a much shorter time. India needed direct investment from European businessmen in several areas including national highway development project, power sector, and infrastructure areas such as telecommunication, civil aviation and hydrocarbons etc.

In the India-EU Summit Prime Minister Vajpayee told European Commission President Mr. Romano Prodi and top EU leaders that, "In an increasingly interdependent world, a plural security order alone can deal with the challenges of the new era. It is in this context that the development of our nuclear capability should be seen." India assured the EU that it was committed to sign the CTBT, but only after a national consensus was reached. India supported the French concept of a multi-polar world "where we have strategic space and autonomy in decision making." The European Union endorsed India's concern at terrorism. Mr. Vajpayee spoke of India facing cross-border terrorism for over a decade. EU response was positive. The EU-India joint statement declared that the two partners "share the conviction that terrorism remains a major threat to regional and international peace and security. We will bolster joint efforts to counter terrorism and meet all other challenges arising from it ...." India's position on initiating dialogue with Pakistan only after the latter ceased supporting terrorism fully was clearly supported by the EU President, the Prime Minister of Portugal Mr. Antonio Guterres. Speaking on behalf of all the 15 nation-members of EU, he said, "We support India's stand on this issue." The Summit made substantial progress on economic issues. It was emphasised that ongoing EU-India cooperation faced no threats, that there were no major outstanding issues and only irritants remained which were being worked out by the two partners. Thus, India's foreign policy and diplomacy had another success in securing entire European Union's support, not only for its economic development, but also in its policy towards Pakistan which was openly supporting *jehad* against India. India-EU summits have now become annual feature. India-EU trade and cooperation have been rapidly expanding.

France and **Germany** are two important members of European Union, as also (being highly industrialised) both are members of G-8. A reference has been made to positive French support to India, particularly after President Narayanan's visit to Paris. As regards Germany, its Foreign Minister visited India, a few weeks after Clinton came and bilateral warmth was evident in Indo-German relations. In the aftermath of Pokhran tests in May 1998, France had lost no time in announcing that it would have no difficulty in coming to terms with nuclear India, but Germany had expressed its anger by cancelling a scheduled round of discussion on development cooperation and for which an Indian delegation had already reached Bonn. By mid-2000 Germany's stand had pleasantly changed. Some commentators gave credit for this to Clinton visit, but as former Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit correctly put it, all recent diplomatic positives most not be linked to Clinton visit. The Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister Mr. Brajesh Mishra had detailed talks in Germany, followed by Jaswant Singh's philosophical conversation with German Foreign Minister Mr. Fischer, led to environmental changes. The German Foreign Minister then visited India and steady building up of friendly relations got momentum.

German position in regard to India in mid-2000 was that India deserved a much better deal. In regard to Security Council seat, Germany (itself a candidate) did not come out in categorical support. However, it said, "We strongly support India. It is one of the biggest and most important powers of the world and we rely on its support." Mr. Fischer expressed the hope that Germany expected a positive dialogue with India, and that it would like India to realise its responsibilities for international order as a nuclear power. Both France and Germany wanted India to sign CTBT, and nobody was any more asking India to destroy its nuclear weapons. The world had come round to realise the reality, and as Mr. J.N. Dixit said, "strength begets strength." As he said, "Russia and China are also focussing more attention on India to balance off competitive strategic potentialities of equations between India and US." Meanwhile, India continued to receive support on the issue of cross-border terrorism. German Foreign Minister Fischer was forthright, and said, "... condemnation of terrorist acts is a part of our policy. We understand not only the concern of our Indian partners but also their commitment to the dialogue ..."

A reference may be made here to **Israel** who has also been victim of terrorism. Although India had granted diplomatic recognition to Israel in 1948 itself, it did not establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish state till 1992. Ironically, Israel had been one consistent supporter of India's position on Kashmir, yet due to fear of reaction from a section of Indian people, India kept putting off diplomatic relations with that country. Finally, Narasimha Rao Government picked up courage and established normal relations with Israel. That small country has faced terrorism for a long time. In 2000, India decided to strengthen ties with Israel. Home minister L.K. Advani and External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited Israel in quick succession. India did not want improvement of relations with Israel at the cost of its traditional friendship with Palestinians. Both the Indian Ministers renewed contacts with P.L.O. leader Yasser Arafat. They met the Israeli President and the Prime Minister. The two countries decided to work together to fight cross-border terrorism, though the nature of terrorism faced by the two countries was not the same. Mr. Jaswant Singh said, "There is common ground and common consequences of terror and as such, this is a global challenge." Both countries decided to jointly fight the evil. Mr. Singh earlier told his Israeli counterpart, Mr. David Levy that there was a need to set up a global mechanism against terrorism, and asked for intelligence cooperation between the two governments.

The Indian External Affairs Minister's visit to Tel Aviv (Israel) resulted in advancing Indo-Israel relations in three specific directions. Firstly, India had been introduced to the "loop" of consultations on the West Asia peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Mr. Ehud Barak indicated that Israel was keen on India's involvement in taking the peace process forward because of its positive political equations with the Palestinian leadership. Thus, both India and Israel have emphasised the need of political engagement with each other. Secondly, the two countries decided to expand the institutional base of their relationship. Cooperation in the field of computer software was emphasised. Thirdly, as mentioned above, the two countries decided to fine tune their cooperation in combating international terrorism. Besides it was agreed in principle to set up an Indo-Israel Joint Commission covering issues related to trade, energy, service and technology.

India and **Portugal** had adversarial relations for a long time, both before and after Goa's liberation from Portuguese colonial rule in 1961. However, things have completely changed and during Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Lisbon in June 2000 (for EU-India Summit), deeper understanding was reached between him and the Portuguese Prime Minister Mr. Antonio Guterres. A clear gain for India was that Portugal announced its full support to India for a permanent seat in the Security Council. India and Portugal decided to consolidate their economic and political linkages by maintaining continuity in high level dialogue and mutual interaction. On economic front the two countries signed an agreement pertaining to bilateral investment promotions and protection, an agreement on avoidance of double taxation, an agreement on service and technology; and one on economic and industrial cooperation.

China and **India** were, as discussed in Chapter, 6 authors of the famous Panchsheel agreement of 1954, emphasising non-interference, non-aggression and peaceful coexistence. However, friendship between the two neighbours was turned into hostility, and border war of 1962 made the relations worse and

China moved closer to Pakistan. Sino-Indian relations began limping towards normality since 1976, and finally an agreement for confidence building was signed in 1996, and the border dispute put on ice. However, India's nuclear tests in May 1998 turned Chinese attitude into hostility, China, like the US, demanded that India destroy its nuclear weapons and become a non-nuclear weapon state. India refused to oblige. But, by mid-2000 both India and China were working hard for reconciliation and normality. In this endeavour very significant role was played by President Narayanan's visit to China in May 2000. Earlier the India-China Joint Working Group (JWG) had a detailed discussion in New Delhi on several issues. The JWG set up in 1988 mainly to resolve the long-standing border dispute, had become a forum for exchange of views on various matters of mutual concern. While India had been deeply concerned with China's support to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes, China was concerned with Dalai Lama's alleged "splitist activities". India denies any such activity.

In an attempt to revive confidence and trust between the armed forces of India and China, the JWG decided that the two countries would resume senior level military contacts, which were suspended after India's nuclear tests in May 1998. The renewal of military contacts was expected to complete the normalisation of relations that were disrupted after Pokhran II in 1998.

About a year before the Indian President's visit, External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh had gone to China (during the Kargil crisis), and that visit had helped to end the post-Pokhran chill in the bilateral relations. Efforts were made by both the sides then, to normalise relations. President Narayanan's visit in May 2000 turned a new pleasant chapter in the Sino-Indian relations. The President, an old friend of China, was warmly received by the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin and others. Referring to the border dispute, Narayanan called for early resolution of the dispute. He said that cooperation with China was "a historic necessity," and he suggested making Sino-Indian border as a "friendly border". On the whole, Mr. Narayanan succeeded in committing both the sides to a more productive engagement. C. Raja Mohan opined that "there appeared to be Chinese acceptance, if only implicit and indirect, of India's new economic and political standing in the international arena." The Chinese did not raise the issue of India's nuclear status, but that did not mean that the Chinese position had changed. However, like everyone else, Chinese appeared to acknowledge the reality of India's nuclear weapons. During the President's visit, intensive interaction resulted in the agreements between the two sides to maintain high-level political dialogue. As a follow-up, the Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Tang Jiaxuan decided to visit India in July 2000, to be followed by Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit later in the year. President Zemin paid a highly successful visit to India Mr. Tang, having good personal rapport with Mr. Jaswant Singh, was likely to work out a common ground on international issues, particularly the two countries' desire for a multi-polar world.

Sri Lanka and India share many common features and have generally had very friendly and cooperative relationship. The only problem that occasionally caused some tension was the problem of Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. The problem has been discussed in Chapter 7 of this book. Late in 1999 the problem again flared up when civil-war-like situation developed between LTTE and its Tamil supporters on one side and the government security forces on the other. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam had lost Jaffna Peninsula in 1995 when they were thrown out by the army. By 1999, the Tigers had regrouped themselves, and by April 2000 they had overrun key Sri Lankan military posts, including the strategic Elephant Pass that links the Peninsula with the main land. Large numbers of Sri Lankan troops were thus trapped in Jaffna. About 25,000 men of elite divisions of the army were struggling to stave off a determined push by just 7000 LTTE fighters. As the fight went on for the control of the Peninsula, with the LTTE demand for partition of the Island Republic and creation of Tamil Eelam, a senior military officer commented, "The difference is that our soldiers fight to live, the Tigers fight to die." The Tigers offer for ceasefire was not acceptable to Sri Lankan Government, till the troops were released or rescued and till the LTTE gave up the cult of the gun.

It is not only the fight for Jaffna that was of serious concern to international community, but also the terrorist acts in Sri Lanka against Sri Lankan leaders that caused anxiety. Early in 2000, a senior minister of Chandrika Kumaratunga's government had been killed, along with other, by a suicide bomber. President Chandrika Kumaratunga herself was attacked, which caused serious damage to one of her eyes. Such like acts of violence had further vitiated the situation.

India's response to the developing situation was very cautious and careful. People in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu, have natural sympathy with the ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka. A small section of people at times even supported the creation of Tamil Eelam. But, India cannot support such a demand. A suggestion by a senior leader in Tamil Nadu, that a peaceful division of Sri Lanka on the lines of partition of erstwhile Czechoslovakia was strongly resented because that would not only spoil India-Sri Lanka relations, but even encourage secessionist demands in some parts of India. As Prem Shankar Jha opined the victory of LTTE would create serious situation for India. Jha wrote, "In Tamil Nadu, the victory (LTTE) would create a halo around the LTTE and release a volcano of Tamil nationalist sentiments, especially among the impressionable youth of the state. These would become the LTTE's soldiers in the war of liberation against India." Thus, Government of India had to tread very carefully, not doing anything to hurt the Tamil feelings in India, nor sacrificing the interests of Tamils in Sri Lanka, yet not doing anything that would cause disintegration of Sri Lanka. That is why, India refused to send any type of military assistance or troops to assist the Sri Lankan authorities. India categorically stated that it would never repeat the IPKF experiment, the mistake of sending Indian troops to Sri "Lanka in 1987. This time (year 2000), India made it clear that it respected territorial integrity and sovereignty of Sri Lanka, and that it would like to do nothing that would ether harm the interests of Tamils or threaten the integrity of Sri Lanka. India suggested that it could only offer humanitarian assistance to Sri Lanka. As battles reached serious proportions in May 2000, Sri Lanka began receiving large quantities of armaments to reinforce to strength of its army. Key players who were reportedly involved in the transfer of arms were Pakistan, Israel, South Africa and North Korea. India followed a discreet policy of not supplying arms to Sri Lanka, nor encouraging the Tigers against the Island Republic. India stood for peaceful solution of the problem. The response of Government of India to the Sri Lankan crisis was generally regarded in India as the only correct decision in the circumstances. Summing up India's position, in early July 2000, Home Minister L.K. Advani told a gathering in Tamil Nadu that, "we are all concerned about the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka", he said that the Centre's endeavour was to ensure that peace prevailed in Sri Lanka, and 'justice' is done to Tamils so that they were able to live in peace and harmony. India welcomed the Norwegian mediation (2001-03) to restore peace in Sri Lanka, and yet protect the interests of both Tamils and Sinhalese.

Japan is the only country that experienced the destruction caused by the two atom bombs dropped by the United States in 1945 on two of its cities. Therefore, Japanese anger against all nuclear weapons is understandable. But, it had already established very friendly relations not only with the United States, but with other nuclear-weapon states also. However, Japan became one of the most hostile countries towards India after Pokhran tests in May 1998. But, in 2000 even though Japan still remained formally critical of India's nuclear testing and its weapons, it began improving trade ties with India. Not only former Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto visited India, but Defence Minister George Fernandes and Commerce Minister Murasoli Maran both went to Japan. Steps were initiated not only for increasing trade but also for improved political and strategic relations. There was every possibility of Japan and India having joint military exercises. Japan and India took several steps that enabled the two countries to establish cordial relations by 2003.

India was not only seeking better and friendlier relations with the Western developed countries, but was also reaching out to the countries in the Gulf and West Asian region. India had taken new initiative towards the Islamic world, which was widely welcomed. As C. Raja Mohan wrote in May 2000, India was reaching out and touching the Islamic World. The External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited Iran, and held wide ranging discussions. He said that Iran and India were 'natural partners'. This new thrust in India's foreign policy was said to be based on the belief that there was enormous scope for pragmatic and profitable engagement between India and the key Islamic nations. As part of Mr. Jaswant Singh's 'energy diplomacy', the Indo-Iranian Joint Working Group (JWG) was set up. This high-level forum was announced by Mr. Jaswant Singh and his Iranian counterpart Mr. Kamal Kharazi. It was aimed at long-term energy partnership, and was to identify the best possible means of transporting the vast natural gas reserves of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia to the sub-continent. Iran has huge reserves of natural gas and India was said to be "hungry for this source of energy and petrochemical industry." But, Pakistan factor remained a major handle, because the gas can easily be brought through an overland pipeline running through Pakistan, and an unfriendly Pakistan may not allow such a pipeline. Nevertheless, Indo-Iranian cooperation was welcome development.

President Clinton's visit to India and the events that followed changed international politics to India's advantage. This opportunity must not be lost. Former Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit, so correctly, said that, "After nine months of criticism for the nuclear tests, we opened lines of communication with everybody and while the Clinton visit has given it a push, the truth is that this is a culmination of months of efforts. Even a country like Japan, which remains formally critical of India's testing, is improving trade ties with India." Another former Foreign Secretary Muchkud Dubey believed that Clinton visit deserved credit for new developments, "yet ... we should not go overboard in our relation about it. It is a sobering change and the onus is on us to maintain our dynamism ..." C. Raja Mohan looked at it from another angle, "We are so used to having arguments and fights with everybody. We can't get used to the fact that we are being agreed with." But, we will have to realise that the world now needs us, just as we need the rest of the world.

The new US President George W. Bush announced that his administration had decided to unilaterally reduce American nuclear forces. India immediately welcomed this announcement made in May 2001. The US President also announced proposal to build a national missile defence (NMD) system. Indian Foreign office in a statement hailed Bush's proposals for deep cuts in nuclear arsenal as well as building the missile defence. Raja Mohan so rightly commented, "This is probably the first time in decades that India has extended such support to the US on any global nuclear issue." While most of the nations were cautions in their response, Indian response was guided "in the expectation of international cooperation in developing further defensive technologies".

Before making his announcement, President Bush had spoken with Russian President Putin, and reportedly suggested a probable joint development of defensive technologies with Russia. India was pleased that Russia and America might be moving away from a confrontation on missiles issue and moving towards a constructive dialogue. But Russia and China, remained quite sceptical about the US proposal of NMD.

In July 2005 President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh concluded a nuclear deal under which India would separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place 14 of its reactor under the supervision of International Atomic Energy Agency. On its part USA agreed to resume civil nuclear cooperation with India after approval by the Congress. As mentioned elsewhere, the formed agreement (123 Agreement) to implement the deal was still being negotiated in mid-2007. The main obstacle was US insistence that if India conducts another nuclear test then civilians' cooperation would end. India could not accept this restriction on its sovereignty.

Russian President Valdimir Putin's successful visit to India, within month of Clinton visit, reflected the importance that these two major powers attached to the democratic, developing, secular, nuclear India. With Indo-Russian relations being described as "problems free", the Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivonov's visit to India in May 2001 (soon after US announcement on NMD) was meant to ensure that the new warmth in India's relations with the US would not affect in any way New Delhi's ties with Moscow. It was stated by a Russian official that Russia's relations with India had "self-sufficient, intransient value" and did not depend on Moscow's relations with other countries. India also believed that its relations with one major power would never be at the cost of relations with other nations. India's relations with all major powers were never happier before. During Russian Foreign Minister's visit (May 2001) he was assured by India that its support to NMD would never affect Indo-Russian relations. India remained emphatic to Moscow's security concerns. On its part, Russia was not opposed to NMD *per se*, yet it has offered its own plans, for building missile defence, to Europe. Indian and Russian foreign ministers decided to meet annually for better cooperation.

THE "LOOK EAST" POLICY

After the conclusion of Vajpayee's visit to Vietnam and Indonesia, the Prime Minister said, "It is not Look East. It is relook east"'. The warmth towards India was visible everywhere. Vietnam has changed a lot since the days of Nehru and Ho Chi Minh, who together had laid strong foundations of friendship. Though clinging to communism, the open door policy now followed by Vietnam, has taken it from a centrally planned system to a market economy. The Vietnamese leaders fully backed India's stand on Kashmir as well as India's claim to a permanent seat in the Security Council. India supported Vietnam's bid to joins the WTO.

India's Look East Policy envisaged a high level engagement with the ASEAN of which both Vietnam and Indonesia are members, and India already enjoyed the status of a dialogue partner. Vajpayee's visit to Indonesia, the country with largest Muslim population, was highly significant. The signing of an agreement on defence cooperation was the highlight of the visit. The two countries also decided to give a boost to their bilateral trade. It is in this content that it was decided to set up a joint commission for increasing trade between the two countries. After 35 years of autocratic rule of Suharto, Indonesia was now limping back to democracy under the leadership of President Ms. Megawati Sukarnoputri.

The Look East policy first initiated by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao around 1993 was given new thrust by Prime Minister Vajpayee since 2001. When Mr. Rao outlined Look East policy, it was supposed to be "tentative" and as C. Raja Mohan opined, it was "greeted with some scepticism within the country and in Southeast Asia." During the Cold War, India and Southeastern countries had drifted apart, but the Look East policy "sought to reconnect economically to the region". Neither our nuclear tests nor the economic crisis in South East Asia in the late 1990s came in the way of rapid expansion of India's relations with the region. Mr. Vajpayee gave a new meaning to the policy, though it was supported by all the governments in India since Rao initiated it. Thus, the policy has national consensus behind it. Vajpayee visited seven of the ASEAN countries in three years and signed numerous agreements of far-reaching consequences, culminating with India-ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement of 2003 (see above). Although Nehru had constructed the path of Asian solidarity, nothing much was achieved, thanks to the Cold War and Nehru's larger goals in world politics. "Today that vision of Asian solidarity is being realised in an unexpected way through increased economic cooperation..." wrote Raja Mohan (*The Hindu*, October 9, 2003). Speaking at the Harvard University, earlier in 2003, the External Affairs Minister, Yashwant Sinha said, "In the past, India's engagement with much of Asia... was built on an idealistic cooperation of Asian brotherhood, based on shared experiences of colonialism and of cultural ties. The rhythm of the region today is determined, however, as much by trade, investment and production as by history and culture." The Look-East policy was continued by Dr. Manmohan Singh who exchanged several visits with ASEAN leaders, Indian ASEAN summits are being regularly held. Trade is increasing very fast, and strategic cooperation through ASEAN Regional Forums has been strengthened.

Trade between India and ASEAN countries has multiplied four-fold — from $3,1 billion in 1991 to about 12 billion dollars in 2002. Vajpayee set in 2003 an ambitious target of 30 billion US dollars by 2007. In addition to free trade agreement with ASEAN, India has separately signed free trade agreements with Thailand and Singapore also. Speaking at the first ever ASEAN Business and Investment Summit at Bali, the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra acknowledged the huge strides that India was making. He said, "In Asia, China and India are emerging as economic powerhouses of the region." Later during a visit to Thailand of Vajpayee, India signed several significant agreements with Thailand. The two countries signed a framework accord for free trade area, to be achieved by 2010. Besides, they also concluded agreements on agricultural cooperation, tourism and visa exemption for official and experts of biotechnology. India also offered to launch Thai satellites from its launch vehicles. Appreciating the growing Indo-Thai cooperation, Vajpayee spoke of the "quiet support" of Thai people to India's freedom struggle. Speaking at Bangkok, Vajpayee said, "Our great freedom fighter, Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, and before him, members of the revolutionary Ghadar Party found understanding, support and shelter in this city."

The Look East Policy, in short, is to lay much greater emphasis than ever before on multifaceted cooperation with India's eastern neighbours. India was working hard for building solid relationship with all the South Eastern countries, as also with China, Japan and South Korea. While in Bangkok, Vajpayee spelt out "panch ratna", or five areas of cooperation between the two economies. These were: Thailand providing a commercial bridge for making a foray in South East Asia, as India would provide large ready market, and high-skill manufacturing base; Thailand's competence in infrastructure can be used effectively for developing India's airports, roads and ports; India's biotech skill can be combined with Thailand's rich biodiversity; Thailand can utilise India's competence in developing and launching satellites; and lastly, the famous Thai hospitality industry can develop cultural and pilgrimage centres of common interest in India.

Thus, while India was busy in early 21st century to build and consolidate its relations with the United States on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, it was conscious of the need to strengthen our social, cultural and economic ties with our eastern neighbours. In pursuance of deeper cooperation with our South Eastern neighbours, India welcomed the proposal of Thai Prime Minister Shinawatra, during Vajpayee's visit in October 2003, to build a land bridge to link the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. This project would help India to develop oil and gas production in the Andaman Sea.

EMERGENCE OF THE TRILATERAL COOPERATION

India, like several other countries, is committed to a multi-lateral world. While India is cooperating with the United States in areas such as providing logistic support against international terrorism, and the two countries were engaged in even strategic partnership, there is still lot of hope for a multilateral approach to world politics. It is in this process, Russia suggested that India, China and Russia cooperate with each other to build a secure and peaceful Asia. No country was in a mood to create any new power bloc, yet economic cooperation, strategic partnership and combined efforts to fight the menace of terrorism are areas in which the three large countries, accounting for nearly half of the world population, can bring about transformation in international order. Initially, China was reluctant and India's response was lukewarm. But, since 2001, the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly sessions have been used for meetings of the Foreign Minister of the three countries. In 2002, Chinese Foreign Minister attended the meeting for a short time and raised the issue of South Asia being a nuclear flashpoint. That had totally changed by 2003. The three Foreign Ministers met in a very cordial atmosphere and they interacted as partners of building a new world order.

India's Minister of External Affairs, Yashwant Sinha commented that: "We have set the stage for greater understanding and cooperation. We agreed that on Iraq and United Nations reform our permanent Missions in New York will be in close touch and work together ...." No contentious issues were raised in 2003, and the atmospherics were very good. The three ministers agreed to meet some time later in Russia, and Chinese offered to be host at the 2004 meeting. Till 2003, the question of summit meeting of the three countries had not been considered. That may take some time. But, the triangular cooperation, not aimed against anyone, was on the cards. As Sinha said, "... we should move with caution, patience and deliberation". Meanwhile, during the ASEAN Summit, Prime Minister Vajpayee had very useful interaction, with positive results, with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. He also held useful meetings with leaders of ASEAN Japan and South Korea. Thus, Indian diplomacy was certainly moving towards a great power status, and Indo-Japanese relations were poised for a big leap forward.

CONSOLIDATION WITH WEST ASIA CONTINUES

India's Look East policy did not in any way adversely affect its continued friendship with West Asian countries. India began finding new friends also. India has traditional friendship with most of West Asian countries, with hardly any major differences, except this that at times some members of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) do raise their concern about Kashmir.

During the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, India was deeply concerned about the conflict. As both the countries were, like India, members of non-aligned movement, India was deeply concerned about the fighting and encouraged both the countries to restore peace. Later, when Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait in 1990, India fully supported the efforts of the United Nations to get the aggression vacated and sovereignty of Kuwait restored. With this aim in view, India without joining the US-led Force, supported the use of force and welcomed the liberation of Kuwait arid restoration of the regime of the Emir of the small Kingdom. However, when in 2003 the US led coalition decided to ignore the UN Security Council, and took military action against Iraq for the "regime change", and to liquidate the alleged Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, India not only opposed the US-led action, but our Parliament unanimously deplored it. India does not support any dictatorship, but it believes that it is for the people of the country concerned to change the regime, or the initiative

must come from the United Nations. Like Russia, India refused to send its troops after regime change in Iraq for the reconstruction and peace-keeping because the request came from the US, without any United Nations mandate.

India and Iran renewed their friendly contacts in 2001 when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited that country. Both Iran and India pledged their support to liquidate terrorism, and their commitment to enlarge bilateral cooperation. The two sides pledged to increase Indo-Iranian trade.

In another significant development, India fully supported the Hamid Karzai Government set up, after the Rome Accord in 2002, to restore normalcy in war-torn Afghanistan. India provided assistance to the interim administration to restore health services, revive education, particularly the education for women that was denied by the Taliban regime. India gave to Afghanistan buses and assisted in aviation services. A direct Delhi-Kabul air service was introduced on the initiative of India. Karzai administration expressed its gratitude for assistance in various spheres of reconstruction. Karzai regime had the mandate to hold elections as early as possible to establish democratic government chosen by the people. With Afghanistan joining SAARC in 2006 the depth of cooperation and understanding would further get strengthened.

Turkey, situated on the junction of Asia and Europe, though it is actually an Asiatic Muslim-secular country, has been a traditional friend of India since the days of Mustafa Kamal. However, during the Cold War, the warmth was compromised by the fact that Turkey was, and is a member of the NATO. However, in a fast developing multi-polar world, India and Turkey both sought each other out. In September 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee paid a highly rewarding visit to Turkey. Both the countries expressed total identity of views on the need to combat international terrorism. The two countries signed three agreements. The most important was the agreement to set up a joint working group on 'Combating Terrorism'. This was described by the Turkish Prime Minister Tayip Erdogan as "an example of new approach to the problem" of tackling the menace of terrorism. Vajpayee, in turn, said the joint working group was set up to "enhance our cooperation against this grave threat to democratic societies." Both India and Turkey had been victims of terror. The second agreement concluded at Ankara was to increase cooperation between India and Turkey in the field of science and technology. It was designed to promote joint research and development projects and exchange of scientists and other scholars. The third agreement was a protocol signed on cooperation in the field of information technology and computer science.

Earlier in September 2003, India received the Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon. This was the first-ever visit of an Israeli Prime Minister since we established diplomatic relations with that country in 1992. India has traditional friendship with the Palestinians, and we recognise the PLO and treated Yasser

Arafat with all the respect that a head of state deserves. India has always stood for independence and statehood of Palestine. India has always called for peace in the region. Notwithstanding our commitment to the Palestinians, India decided to enhance friendship and cooperation with Israel. The Jewish state has always stood by India on the question of Jammu & Kashmir. The visit by Israeli Prime Minister was described as an important landmark in bilateral relations. Sharon described India as "one of the most important countries in the world", and the two countries decided to cooperate to fight terrorism which has caused misery to both India and Israel. On terrorism, Vajpayee said that two countries shared common experience of the menace. He added: "Bilaterally and on the international plane, we are contributing to the global fight against terrorism. It is a menace that particularly targets democratic societies ..." India has already become one of Israel's strongest trading partners in Asia. Without making a direct reference to the Israel-Palestine conflict, India said that it would "very much like" to see an end to violence and restoration of "peace in these troubled lands."

India and Israel decided to cooperate in the sphere of space research and defence. While Israel was likely to sell to Indian defence forces the sophisticated Phalcon air-borne radars, India offered to assist Israel in space research which is an area in which India is far ahead of Israel. On defence cooperation, Israeli officials said that all obstacles to the transfer of Phalcon had been removed. The proposal was to integrate the Phalcon radar with the Russian transport aircraft for Indian use.

Both India and Israel called for just and durable peace in West Asia. They also called for decisive global action against terrorism. Talks were to be held between official of two countries for defence deals. These deals would include co-production of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and installation of electronic warfare systems. Thus, a beginning had been made in multidimensional cooperation between India and Israel. The United States welcomed this friendship and expressed willingness to constructively work with both the sides. The US-India-Israel cooperation, if it materialises will be a trilateral event just as Russia-China-India trilateral being simultaneously tried. India was in a very fortunate diplomatic position in early 21st century.

In a new development in the first decade of 21st century, the Group of 8 highly industrialised countries (G-8) began inviting India and certain other fast developing economies. This was done to have interaction between G-8 and invitees. In the 2007 Summit of G-8 five emerging *economies* who participated were India, China, South Africa, Brazil and Mexico. A suggestion was made that these five should interact among themselves independently is some sort of G-5. Initially Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was not enthusiastic about the G-5 proposal.

Chapter 1

Foreign Policy and National Interest

WHAT IS FOREIGN POLICY?

Foreign policy and diplomacy have been described as wheels with which the process of international relations operates. No state can live in isolation. Even before interdependence of states reached the present stage, the states had several types of relations among themselves. These included trade relations, cultural relations and, of course, political relations. Every state, like an individual, seeks to promote its own interests. These interests are called national interests. Foreign policy is formulated by every state so as to serve its national interests. The governments of states have to decide on a certain course of action and refrain from certain others. Accordingly, governments behave in a particular manner in relation to governments of other states. As Professor Mahendra Kumar says, "The study of this behaviour is, broadly speaking, the content of foreign policy."[1] The behaviour of each state affects the behaviour of others. Every state, keeping in view its national interests, tries to take maximum advantage of the actions of other states. Thus, the primary purpose of foreign policy is to seek adjustments in the behaviour of other states, in favour of oneself.

Foreign policy has been defined by Modelski as *"the system of activities evolved by communities for changing the behaviour of other states and for adjusting their own activities to the international environment.*[2] He adds that the most important task of foreign policy must be to "throw light on the ways in which states attempt to change, and succeed in changing, the behaviour of other states." Hugh Gibson has defined foreign policy as *"a well rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and experience, for conducting the business of government with the rest of the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nation."*[3] According to Northedge, *foreign policy is an interaction between forces originating outside the country's borders and those working within them.* Hartman has described the foreign policy thus: *"It is a systematic statement of deliberately selected national interests"*. Thus, the emphasis in every definition is on behaviour of states to regulate their own actions and, if possible, change or regulate the behaviour of other states, with the view of serving their national interests.

Rodee has also underlined the same point. He says that foreign policy involves the formulation and implementation of a group of principles which shape the behaviour pattern of a state while negotiating with other states to protect or further its vital interests. A very good definition of foreign policy is given by Cecil V. Crab, Jr. He says:

> *Reduced to its most fundamental ingredients, foreign policy consists of two elements: National objectives to be achieved and means for achieving them. The interaction between national goals and the resources for attaining them is the perennial subject of statecraft. In its ingredients the foreign policy of all nations, great or small, is the same.*

The idea of Crab Jr. is that foreign policy makers identify the national goals to be achieved and the means to achieve them. The interaction between the objectives and the means is foreign policy. Similar opinion is expressed by Couloumbis and Wolfe. They write that, "....*foreign policies are syntheses of the ends (national interests) and means (power and capabilities) of nation-states.*" In order to understand this definition, it will be proper to examine what is meant by national interest and power.

At this stage, full implications of Modelski's definition may be analyzed. As mentioned above, he says that foreign policy implies *'changing the behaviour of other states.'* This means, according to Modelski, a desirable change in the behaviour of other states is the end of foreign policy. But, according to Professor Mahendra Kumar, this is an incomplete and imperfect meaning of foreign policy. A change in behaviour of other states may not always be desirable. At times, it may be desirable to ensure continuation of the same behaviour of others. And, at yet another time, it may become necessary to make certain adjustments in one's own behaviour. Thus, "The aim of foreign policy should be to *regulate*, and not merely to change, the behaviour of other states. Regulation means adjusting the behaviour of other states to suit one's own interest as best as possible."[6] While during the Cold War period both the United States and the former Soviet Union attempted to alter the behaviour of other states to ensure maximum number of bloc followers, India sought to regulate the behaviour of maximum number of countries to build a strong non-aligned movement. The US policy of containment of communism was to change the likely course of events in its favour. The United States had unsuccessfully tried to persuade India to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 1996, while efforts were made to regulate the behaviour of India so as to ensure unanimous endorsement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), India on its part, tried to change the attitude of nuclear powers to declare a time-table for destruction of their nuclear weapons. Both the efforts failed. Thus, every attempt at change of behaviour of others may not succeed. Foreign policy, therefore, means deciding on certain goals and making efforts to regulate behaviour of others to achieve these goals. The goals are sought to be achieved with the help of power. Thus, national interest and power are vital ingredients of foreign policy.

We have seen that foreign policy is concerned both with change and *status quo*. There is another dimension also. As Feliks Gross says, even a decision *not to have* any relations with a state is also foreign policy. Each individual state has to decide the degree of its involvement in its relations with another country that would protect its interests. India's decision in 1949 not to have any relations with the racist regime of South Africa was a definite foreign policy. Similarly, the American decision not to recognize the Soviet Union, after Bolshevik Revolution till 1934, was clearly the US policy towards USSR. The foreign policy may be either positive or negative. It is positive when it aims at regulating the behaviour of other states by changing it, and negative when it seeks such a regulation by not changing that behaviour. Thus, to conclude, every state adopts certain principles to guide its relations with other states. These principles are based on interaction between national interests and means (power) to achieve them. As Bandopadhyaya says, "The formulation of foreign policy is essentially an exercise in the choice of ends and means on the part of a nation state in an international setting."[7]

In the making of foreign policy, the role of policy makers is indeed important. A lot depends on the perceptions and ideology of the foreign minister who guides the officials who identify the aims of foreign policy and determine the principles to be followed. Today the people and media also are playing an important role. Modelski calls the flow of actions from the community towards the policy makers as the "input" and the decisions of the policy makers as the "output". According to Mahendra Kumar, foreign policy includes (i) the policy makers, (ii) interests and objectives, (iii) principles of foreign policy, and (iv) means of foreign policy. He, therefore, defines the foreign policy as *"a thought-out course of action for achieving objectives in foreign relations as dictated by the ideology of national interest."*[8]

NATIONAL INTEREST

If foreign policy is the result of interaction between ends and means, national interest, the end, must be clearly understood. National interest is the keynote of international relations. It is said that "self interest is not only a legitimate, but a fundamental cause for national policy." According to Hans Morgenthau, the great realist scholar, who has been described as the twentieth century descendant of Kautilya, all politics is struggle for power, and, "as long as the world is politically organized into nations, the national interest is indeed the last word in world politics." No government can act contrary to the national interest of the country. No country, whatever its ideals, can afford to base its foreign policy on considerations other than the national interest. Lord Palmerston had very rightly opined, over a hundred years ago, that: "We have no eternal allies and we have no eternal enemies. Our interests are eternal and those interests it is our duty to follow." It is true. Friendship or enmity between nations keeps on changing as environmental changes occur and as every state seeks to promote its self-interests. If the interests of two countries clash, they either make adjustments after negotiations or go in for a policy of confrontation. George Washington, the first US President, had declared the universal truth that no country can be trusted further than it is bound by its interests; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it.

It is often seen that a particular government may have wrong or misplaced belief about the national interest of the country. Policies based on such beliefs are bound to fail, but so long as a leader is in power he tries to pursue the policy based on his perception of national interests. Thus, Napoleon had said that he was acting in the interest of France when he initiated his campaign against Russia, and later when he launched his desperate battle at Waterloo. Adolf Hitler justified his expansionist policies, including annexation of Austria and breakup of Czechoslovakia (1938) in Germany's national interest. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was determined to appease the dictators of Germany (Hitler) and Italy (Mussolini) because he assumed that that was in Britain's national interest. "Friendly" socialist governments were installed in East European countries in 1945 as that, according to Stalin, would best serve the Soviet national interest. In recent times Pakistan government appeared convinced that it was in that country's national interest to destabilize Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir. These exceptions apart, normally a well thought-out foreign policy is based on the genuine perception of the country's goals and objectives and, therefore, its national interests.

Jawaharlal Nehru had declared in 1947 in the Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative): "Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country ... whether a country is imperialistic or socialist or communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country." However, certain idealist statesmen deny the overriding role of national interest in foreign policy making. The US President, Woodrow Wilson who led the Allies to victory in the First World War, said: "It is perilous to determine the foreign policy of a nation in terms of national interest... We dare not turn from the principle that morality and not expediency is the thing that must guide us. We have no selfish ends to serve." This is an exceptional view which is not generally

shared by statesmen. However, Mahatma Gandhi, though he was never in the government, was one of those who insisted on the value of morality. For example, after independence when be went on fast unto death to press the Indian Government to pay Rs. 55 crore to Pakistan (his reasoning was that we owed it to that country), Gandhi was emphasizing morality even at the cost of national interest. But, what exactly is national interest?

National interest has been described as "the general and continuing ends for which a nation acts." Bandopadhyaya says: "every state aims at preserving its political independence and territorial integrity by safeguarding its international boundaries. The means may vary ... but the national interest in the preservation of territorial integrity is clear.[9] This idea has been explained in clearer terms by Spykman. He says: "Because territory is an inherent part of a state, self-preservation means defending its control over territory; and, because independence is the essence of state, self-preservation also means fighting for independent status... the basic objective of the foreign policy of all states is the preservation of territorial integrity and political independence."[10]

The idea of national interest can be, at times, quite vague. It assumes variety of meanings in different contexts. However, as Padelford and Lincoln observe: "Concepts of national interests are centered on core values of the society, which include the welfare of the nation, the security of its political beliefs, national way of life, territorial integrity and its self-preservation." According to Robert Osgood, national interest is "state of affairs valued solely for its benefit to the nations." And, Morgenthau maintains that the main requirement of a nation - state is to protect its physical, political and cultural identity against threat from other states. Foreign policy makers can never ignore the state's national interest. Its essential components are generally believed to be security, economic development and a peaceful world order. Defence of the state is naturally the primary concern of a foreign policy. Secondly, promotion of economic interest, including favourable conditions of trade, is another vital objective of foreign policy. Lastly, most modern states are also concerned with maintenance of international peace, respect for international law, pacific settlement of international disputes and strengthening of the system of international organization.

POWER

Detailed analysis of the concept of power is neither feasible nor intended in this introductory chapter on Foreign Policy. Since we have referred to foreign policy as synthesis between ends and means, and power has been identified as the means, it will be proper to briefly indicate the meaning and importance of power in foreign policy. Power is a phenomenon of all relationships. Power has been defined by various scholars, but the idea behind all the definitions is same. It has been described "as the ability or capacity to control others and get them to do what one wants them to do and also to see that they do not do what one does not want them to do." The concept of power is a central concept in international relations. The concept of power was discussed by Kautilya, the master of statecraft in ancient India. He interpreted it as "the possession of strength" derived from three elements namely, knowledge, military might and valour. In the twentieth century, Hans Morgenthau echoed the same feelings. He described all politics as struggle for power. Therefore, international politics is struggle for power among states. According to Morgenthau, power is "man's control over minds and actions of other men". In international relations power is the ability of a state to make its will prevail and to enforce respect and command obedience from other states. This definition of power by Professor Mahendra Kumar implies that power is an ability to get things done as Actor A wants Actor B to do. If 'A' succeeds, it has power. This ability, when exercised enables a state to control the behaviour of other states. Since foreign policy is aimed at regulation of behaviour of other states, power alone enables states to formulate and successfully implement their foreign policies.

Robert Dahl explained power by stating: 'A' has power over 'B' to the extent that it can get 'B' to do something that 'B' would not otherwise do. Thus, every state, big or small, has power to secure compliance from some other state. Power, as mentioned above, is a vital means of a state. Since every state desires more and more power, it often becomes an end in itself. Vernon Van Dyke concludes thus: Power is both "the capstone among the objectives which the states pursue and the cornerstone among the methods which they employ". Most states use power as means of attaining national objectives which are constituents of their foreign policies. Couloumbis and Wolfe define power as "an umbrella concept that denotes anything that establishes and maintains the control of Actor A over Actor B".[11] Power, according to Couloumbis and Wolfe, has three ingredients. They are: authority, influence and force. Together they constitute power. Authority means voluntary compliance by Actor B of the wishes of Actor A, out of respect, affection, etc. Influence has been defined as use of instruments of persuasion by Actor A to get its wishes accepted by Actor B, who might be initially reluctant to carry out wishes of Actor A. Finally, force means coercion of Actor B by Actor A in pursuit of its political objectives. Force may mean use of force, short of war, or threat thereof. Thus, Actor A may exercise power depending on the availability of authority (voluntary compliance), influence (compliance by persuasion) and force (use of coercive means).

In the present context, power is the means employed by states to change, adjust or regulate the behaviour of other states. Power, thus is the means of foreign policy, whereas national interest is the end or the goal.

DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy making is a dynamic process. Normally, change of government does not change the fundamentals of the foreign policy of a state, though a revolutionary change in political set-up may result in drastic changes. Why does it normally remain unchanged? It is because foreign policy of a state is determined by a number of factors, many of them are static. There are some factors that do change, but their impact in shaping a country's foreign policy is usually secondary. The foreign policy of a country is "compounded out of many factors and forces". All of them interact and determine the foreign policy. According to Paddleford and Lincoln: "Fundamentally, foreign policy has its roots in the unique historical "backgrounds, political institutions, traditions, economic needs, power factors, aspirations, peculiar geographical circumstances, and basic set of values held by a nation."[12] James Rosenau includes geography, size, economic development, culture and history, great power structure, alliances, technology, social structure, public opinion and governmental structure as inputs of foreign policy. Brecher refers to geography, external environment, personalities, economic and military position and public opinion as the determinants of foreign policy. According to J. Bandopadhyaya, the basic determinants of foreign policy include geography, economic development, political traditions, domestic milieu, international milieu, military strength and national character.

Professor Appadorai discussed two broad determinants which influence the making of foreign policy. These are called by him as domestic environment and international environment. Appadorai mentions these two environments in the context of Northedge's opinion that foreign policy is an interaction between forces originating outside the country's borders and those working within them. The factors shaping India's foreign policy will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Here a very brief mention will be made of the factors that generally determine foreign policies.

Firstly, geographical situation is a basic determinant. The size of the state large enough to support a population, a climate that is neither excessively cold nor very hot, a topography offering boundaries with natural barriers such as mountains, rivers and seas and a compact territory enable a country to make and implement independent foreign policy. Geography and terrain were very important assets, before modern military machinery came into existence. Like the size and topography, natural resources and size of population contribute to the power of the state, which in turn shapes its foreign policy. Of the geographical factors special attention must be drawn to location. Britain and Japan, though small in size, became great nations because of their ability to use the oceans as highways of commerce. The absence of natural frontiers as in case of Poland often threatens their security. As Appadorai wrote, "That Britain is separated from Europe by twenty miles of water gave her an advantage denied to several countries such as France and Germany, which had to spend much of their resources in fighting each other on border problems". He added that air power has indeed reduced the significance of this factor. The situation of a country can enable it, or deprive it, to have an independent foreign policy. The US with vast territory separated from other continents by the Atlantic and the Pacific gave her unprecedented importance. The United States could easily follow a policy of isolation for a long time, and finally emerge as a super power. It is her location and size that enabled America to remain free from any attack and battles on her territory during the Second World War. India's position in South Asia enables her to be a major power and adopt assertive foreign policy. The vast size of Russia and large populations of China and India are important determinants of their foreign policies. However, the mere size of a nation's population is not an index of its strength. There are cases, like that of Israel, of having very small size of territory as well as small population, yet having adopted very aggressive and effective foreign policy.

Secondly, history and traditions have significant influence on foreign policy making. Historical ties of the United States with Britain, the mother country, had an impact on "the US policy for a very long time. British imperialism in India, and our struggle for freedom against colonialism and imperialism, has had direct impact on India's foreign policy. India's full support to freedom struggles in Afro-Asian countries and fight against racial discrimination was the outcome of our history. Similarly, traditional values are of immense importance. According to Appadorai, "Traditional values may be described as those principles embodied in beliefs and practices which have been transmitted through successive generations and have been regarded as worthy of esteem and adoption."[13] Foreign Minister is a part of social milieu and he cannot disregard the basic values held in the society. Thus, democratic values in the US and secularism in India are so deep rooted that they cannot be ignored by any foreign policy maker in these countries.

Thirdly, the possession of raw materials and natural resources and compulsions of economic development also determine the course of a country's foreign policy. The political strength of a country is often measured in terms of economic strength. Hence, this factor cannot be ignored while shaping the foreign policy. A weak industrial base has adverse effect on the effectiveness of the country's foreign policy. After independence, India had to devote its attention to the process of development. For that purpose she needed not only foreign aid but also foreign technology. By adopting the policy of non-alignment India ensured aid from all quarters. The countries manufacturing large quantities of armaments look at their foreign policy options quite differently from those who are essentially oil producing and exporting countries. But the possession of natural resources, like oil in West Asian countries, itself is not enough, unless coupled with other factors such as an able and far-sighted government, technological organisation and military strength. Oil as a source of energy has become important for industry and war. "One drop of oil" said Clemenceau, the French Premier, "is worth one drop of blood of our soldiers". Its possession has direct impact on foreign policies of West Asian countries and its lack has another type of impact on the policies of others.

Fourthly, high national morale makes for a successful conduct of foreign policy. Obviously, a homogeneous society makes for strong national unity and high morale. Sharp divisions in the society — between rich and poor, between different classes, communities and castes — have adverse impact on foreign policy. Social cohesion, therefore, is another factor in the shaping of successful foreign policy.

Fifthly, political organisation, political tradition, structure of government and enlightened leadership also contribute to the shaping of an effective foreign policy. The traditions of peace, truth and non-violence enabled India to insist on peaceful settlement of international disputes and encourage disarmament. India's assertive and continued stand against signing the discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation treaty, NPT, as well as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (signed by several countries in 1996) is guided by our commitment to nuclear-weapons-free world without any discrimination. The quality of leadership is an important factor. A far-sighted Nehru who believed in democracy, an idealist Wilson who wanted to end all future wars, a determined Winston Churchill committed to win the Second World War, and a low-profile yet strong Lal Bahadur Shastri go a long way in formulating foreign policy that effectively protects the national interests. On the other hand, leaders like Hitler or Mussolini or Yahya Khan or Saddam Hussein promise a glorious future for their countries, but their policies often lead to disaster. A democratic regime is in the long run far more effective than a despotic system which shows only short term gains, but chaos in the end. Besides, domestic policies always influence the foreign policy. The perception of ruling elite, the imperatives of state-building and ideologies of political parties are important variables that influence foreign policy.

Sixthly, military strength of a country has direct impact on its foreign policy. Possession of large and powerful armed forces equipped with modern sophisticated weapons of warfare makes for an effective and aggressive foreign policy. A country with weak military machine will normally be at a disadvantage even at peaceful negotiations. But, it has been seen that an enlightened leadership and high morale of people and the army, as in the case of Israel make up for small size of army and make for a successful foreign policy. Ordinarily, a militarily superior country would try to pursue a bold policy to maximise its gains, and a weak country would try to minimise its disadvantages.

Seventhly, public opinion has lately become an important factor in the shaping of foreign policy. The foreign policy is no more made in the secrecy of

Foreign Offices. It is made in open, and public opinion can often force change in foreign policy and in its implementation. British public's annoyance led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Sir Samuel Hoare in 1935 because of his secret deal with his French counterpart to bail out the aggressor Italy. Again, it was public opinion against British adventure in Suez crisis that forced Eden Government to quit in 1957. It was because of fear of annoyance of a minority community that forced Indian foreign policy makers not to establish diplomatic relations with Israel for four decades. US involvement in Vietnam War and lately in Iraq had been strongly opposed by American people. All foreign policy makers are now very sensitive to public opinion.

Lastly, international milieu is one of the most important determinants of foreign policy. In any case, foreign policy is the sum total of decisions taken by a country to regulate the behaviour of other states. Therefore, the international system at any given point of time has direct impact on foreign policies. Appadorai sums up the position thus: "The complexity of foreign policy arises from the interaction of the desire of states within the international community to achieve their own national interests, and their consequent attitudes to international issues."[14] The difficulty in conducting the foreign policy arises because states do not have sure means of controlling the behaviour of other states. To quote Appadorai again, "It can persuade, promise or deny economic and military aid; it can threaten another state with the use of force; nevertheless, it cannot be certain the state will act in the way it desires". These views of Appadorai have their value. But, as far as shaping of foreign policy is concerned the role of international situation cannot be denied. During the Balance of Power System in the nineteenth century, conclusion of alliances, policy of buffer states and race of armaments all were guided by the place of a state in the system. Each weaker state always sought the help of an unattached power, generally known as the balancer. During the inter-war period (1919-39), the quest for French security, followed by rise of fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany and militarism in Japan had their impact on foreign policies. The US changed its policy towards the Soviet Union and recognised her because in 1933 Hitler's emergence in Germany posed a threat to the world order created after the War. Japanese aggression in Manchuria (China) in 1931 provided a common threat to USA as well as USSR in the Far East. The two powers gave up their hostility.

The Cold War system (1945-90) did not leave any country's foreign policy unaffected. The fear of US atom bomb made the Soviet Union leader of Eastern Europe, and all the countries in the region adopted socialism and came under Russian wings. The entire policy of containment of communism adopted by the US, setting up of NATO, SEATO, etc. everything was the result of the development of USSR as challenger to capitalist system advocated by the United States. The frequent use of Veto in the UN Security Council was a direct result of the Cold War politics. As far as India is concerned, the adoption and propagation of the policy of non-alignment was a clear response to the international milieu represented by a bipolar world and the Cold War.

The detente between the USA and China (1971), expulsion of Taiwan from the UN on the initiative of America, and strategic relationship that developed between USA and China since 1971 (Bangladesh war) had direct impact on the foreign policy of India. Several other countries also had to do reappraisal of their foreign policies in view of close links between China and the US. One of the immediate outcome of US-China-Pakistan strategic relationship was Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (1971) which further strengthened the relationship between India and the then Soviet Union.

Partition of British India caused by imperialist Britain's policy of divide and rule, encouraged by Muslim League's concept of two nations, created such hostility between India and Pakistan that we had to unwillingly spend large sums of money on defence as our neighbour was always out to damage our interests.

International organisations and the expression of world public opinion, in and outside the UN, also have powerful impact on foreign policies of various countries. Whether it was UK-France-Israel attack on Egypt (1956), American intervention in Vietnam conflict, Soviet action in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), Bangladesh crisis (1971), Cuban missile crisis (1962), Soviet occupation of Afghanistan for nearly nine years all such actions evoked strong public reaction all over the world. Such reactions and expression of opinion in various international fora also help in the formulation of foreign policy.

Later, the war between Iran and Iraq (two Muslim neighbours) in 1980s influenced the policies of several countries. Then in 1990 Iraq committed unprovoked aggression against its neighbour, oil-rich Kuwait and annexed it. Interestingly, Kuwait had given big help to Iraq during its war against Iran. The annexation of Kuwait brought the UN on the scene, and with its authorisation US-led forces launched attack on Iraq forcing it to surrender and also vacate Kuwait. The world opinion generally sided with Kuwait and approved UN action. But, when in 2003, the United States again attacked Iraq on the ground that it had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the UN did not support American action, and there was resentment against the US both by friends and foes. Britain was the only major power to support the US action. Foreign policies of most of the countries had to be reassessed in view of US action which defeated Iraq and brought change of regime with President Saddam Hussein hiding and then being arrested and hanged.

Foreign policy is the basis of all international relations. Some scholars even identify foreign policy with international relations. We do not subscribe to this view. Foreign policy is not synonym of international relations, yet such relations are conducted only through foreign policies of different countries, which are shaped as a result of interaction among numerous determinants.

NOTES

1. Mahendra Kumar, *Theoretical Aspects of International Politics*, Agra, p. 310.
2. George Modelski, *A Theory of Foreign Policy*, London, p. 3.
3. Huge Gibson, *The Road to Foreign Policy*, New York, p. 9.
4. Cecil V. Scrabb Jr., *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age*, New York, p. 1.
5. Couloumbis & Wolfe, *Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice*, New Delhi, p. 125.
6. Mahendra Kumar, *op. cit.*, p. 311.
7. J. Bandopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*, Allied, p. 1.
8. Mahendra Kumar, *op. cit.*, p. 315.
9. Bandopadhyaya, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
10. Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, New York, p. 17.
11. Couloumbis & Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
12. Padleford & Lincoln, *International Politics*, New York, p. 307.
13. A. Appadorai, *Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy*, Delhi, p. 11.
14. Appadorai, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

Chapter 2

Factors Shaping India's Foreign Policy

INTRODUCTION

We have explained in Chapter 1 that geography, history, traditions, culture, economic development, military strength and international environment are important determinants of the foreign policy. These factors have played important role in the formulation of India's foreign policy also. India has the heritage of an ancient civilization and culture. The foreign policy that India formulated after independence reflected our culture and political tradition. Our foreign policy makers had before them the teachings of Kautilya, the realist, who had recognized war as an important instrument of power and foreign policy. They were also impressed by the Buddhist traditions of Ashoka, the Great, who advocated peace, freedom and equality. Nehru opted for Ashoka's tradition and incorporated even in the Directive Principles of State Policy, the ideals of international peace, and pacific settlement of international disputes. India's foreign policy is determined largely in accordance with the ideals of our freedom struggle, Gandhian philosophy and the fundamental principle of Indian tradition of *Vasudhaiva Kutumbkam* (the world as one family). The personality of Nehru has had a direct impact. The domestic milieu reflecting communal, caste, regional and linguistic differences continues to dominate the policy making in the foreign office in South Block. Our neighbouring country is constantly working to destabilize India. We have a large common frontier with China with whom the long standing border dispute still exists. Cold War politics was also an important determinant of India's policy.

India achieved independence on August 15, 1947. That immediately necessitated foreign policy making by this country. India became a member of international community comprising sovereign countries. India's independence initiated the process of decolonization, and India decided to support all anti-colonial, anti-imperialist struggles. Yet, India's foreign policy is largely based on her history and culture. Speaking in the Lok Sabha, Prime Minister Nehru had said in March 1950: "It should not be supposed that we are starting on a clean slate. It is a policy which flowed from our recent history, and from our national movement and its development and from various ideals we have proclaimed." Even before the attainment of independence, India was given some voice in world affairs. This was done (a) by the British Government on behalf of India and (b) by the Indian National Congress by way of resolutions adopted from time to time. The India Office in London spoke for India on international developments.

Although a dependency of Britain, India was invited to become a Member of the League of Nations. The views of India were, of course, not reflective of Indian public opinion. The Secretary of State for India (a member of British cabinet) decided the position to be taken by India. Later, India was represented at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, and having signed the UN Charter became original member of the United Nations.

Indian National Congress in 1892 criticized the Government for increasing military expenditure for imperialist objectives. The Congress took an anti-British position on the Khilafat issue soon after the First World War. During 1920–27 Congress evolved its foreign policy approach thus: Indians would support freedom struggles of other dependent peoples; India would cooperate with all peace loving countries: India would oppose racial discrimination and apartheid; India would oppose colonialism and imperialism all over the world; and she would oppose imperialist wars, and would work for world peace. An independent foreign affairs department was set up by the Congress under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. He led it throughout. Nehru represented the Congress at the Brussels Conference (1927) against imperialism. He later visited the Soviet Union also. The Congress leadership opposed Japan for its aggression against Manchuria province of China. The Congress openly opposed Fascism and Nazism. In 1936, a resolution adopted by the Congress expressed solidarity with Abyssinia which had been attacked and later conquered by Italy. Similarly, Germany was criticized by the Congress in 1938 when she dismembered Czechoslovakia. The Munich Agreement (1938) that sealed the fate of Czechoslovakia was condemned by the Congress. Thus, the Congress as a representative of Indian nationalism had expressed the feelings of Indian people on various international problems even before independence. After independence the Congress in its 1948 session resolved that India's foreign policy would be aimed at friendship with all the countries, and it would keep away from military alliances in the context of the Cold War. Thus, the foreign policy makers of India had clearly spelt out ideas and programmes that guided them in their task.

Nehru and the Objectives of India's Foreign Policy: Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister from 1947 till his death in 1964. The foundations of India's foreign policy were firmly laid by him. Like any other foreign policy maker, Nehru underlined India's national interest as the basic guiding principle. But, even before he did that, Nehru, as head of the Interim Government, had declared as early as September 7, 1946 principal objectives of India's foreign policy. In a broadcast to the nation he had said:

> We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation. We hope to develop close and direct contacts with other nations and to cooperate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom... We are particularly interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races.[1]

In addition to the objectives indicated in the above-mentioned speech, namely, an independent policy, promotion of international peace, emancipation of colonial and dependent peoples, and promotion of racial equality, Nehru had also emphasized in other speeches rapid economic development of India, and the protection of legitimate interests of people of Indian origin living aboard. Nehru's personality was a major factor that shaped our foreign policy.

National Interest: India's national interest was indeed the most important governing principle of Nehru's foreign policy. He said in the Constituent Assembly on December 4, 1947. "We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifested to the disadvantage of the country." But, Nehru was not a realist of Kautilya-Morganthau school (See below). He was deeply impressed by his leader, Mahatma Gandhi who was an idealist and insisted on application of moral principles in the conduct of all politics. Nehru, therefore, did not find any incompatibility between India's national interest and the legitimate interests of other nations. He believed that a nation's self-interest may itself demand cooperation with other nations. He, therefore, told the Constituent Assembly: "We propose to look after India's interests in the context of world cooperation and world peace, insofar as world peace can be preserved."

Dealing with "national interest as an end", J. Bandopadhyaya refers to realism and idealism and concludes that, "on the whole it would be correct to say that there is a stronger accent on idealism in the modem Indian thinking on international relations… than in any other country in the world."[2] It will be appropriate at this stage to mention the difference between realism and idealism. The realist thinkers believe that national interest may be equated with power, that politics is struggle for power, and that war is a legitimate means of protecting national interest. The idealists, on the other hand, would identify national interest with universal moral aspirations like eternal peace and human brotherhood. Kautilya, the master of statecraft in India, in the 4th century B.C., considered politics as a game of power, and justified increase in the Prince's power through conquest by all means at his disposal. Among the modern Indian statesmen, "Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel is often regarded as a Realist *par excellence.*"[3] Idealism is symbolized with Emperor Ashoka in the past, and Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath Tagore in contemporary India.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, US President Wilson was a great idealist who advocated world peace as a goal and international organizations as the means to achieve it. When Nehru formulated free India's foreign policy, he indeed insisted on national interest but more in an idealist mood rather than as a realist. This was reflected in his policy of non-alignment in general, and in his decision to ascertain the wishes of people of Jammu & Kashmir on the question of State's merger with India (after Pak-led tribal invasion). His agreement with Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai in 1954 to allow full integration of Tibet with China was also an act of idealist statesman. Patel's death in late 1950 deprived Nehru of a realist check as none other dared oppose him. But, it would be wrong to come to the conclusion that Nehru ever sacrificed the national interest. Indeed, all his actions were guided generally by India's self-interest. Nehru had opined that it was his first duty to take care of India's national interests.

While analyzing the basic components of national interest in the context of India, Bandopadhyaya says:

> ... essential components of the national interest of any state are security, national development and world order. Security is the first guarantee of a state's international personality; national development is its categorical imperative; and an ordered pattern of international relations is a minimum pre-condition for its independent existence and free development, just as an ordered civil society is a minimum pre-condition for the independent existence and free development of an individual.[4]

The three components of national interest were fully comprehended by India's Foreign Office and sought to be protected and promoted by our foreign policy. It was guided by the country's internal as well as external security. India took effective measures for short term as well as long-term security, though it is doubtful if long-term measures were really effective because in 1962 China inflicted a humiliating defeat-like situation in the north-east. Secondly, there is an intimate relationship between security and development. Foreign policy is influenced by economic development, and national developments are influenced by foreign policy. In India, Nehru and his successors promoted rapid economic development. That is why India adopted the policy of nonalignment, keeping away from power politics, but welcoming aid, without strings, from wherever it

was available. Thirdly, national security depends on international peace, which in turn will be possible if a new world order based on cooperation is established. Right from the day India signed the UN Charter, India has been striving hard for a conflict-free world order based on peace, cooperation and understanding among sovereign members of international community.

DETERMINANTS OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Geography: India's size, climate, location and topography have played a vital role in shaping its foreign policy. Nehru had said in 1949 that India's position was strategic and that no power could ignore us. He said:

> Look at the map. If you have to consider any question affecting the Middle East, India inevitably comes into the picture. If you have to consider any question concerning South-East Asia, you cannot do so without India. So also with the Far-East. While the Middle-East may not be directly connected with South-East Asia, both are connected with. India. Even if you think in terms of regional organizations in India, you have to keep in touch with the other regions."[5]

Thus, India is the gateway of both South-East Asia and the Middle-East. India's security and vital interests are closely tied with the future of the region. Nehru had also stated that "India becomes a kind of meeting ground for various trends and forces and a meeting ground between what may be roughly called the East and the West."

Writing about compulsions of history and geography, Professor V.P. Dutt says: "... it can hardly be overlooked that India's size, potential and perceptions of her elite postulated an intense interest in world affairs..."[6] India is situated in South Asia. Its northern borders are generally protected by the mighty Himalayas. It has a vast sea coast on three sides. This factor cannot be ignored in foreign policy making. India's coastline is vital for its foreign policy. Indian Ocean was used as a route for penetration into India during 17th-19th centuries by the French, British, Dutch and the Portuguese. Most of the foreign trade of India goes through the Indian Ocean. Any foreign domination of the Indian Ocean is injurious to the national interest of this country. The defence of the vast sea coast requires a powerful Indian navy. Besides, India has been supporting the demand of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace because that is essentially vital for India's security.

India has common land frontiers, at places, with Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Myanmar (Burma) Nepal and Bhutan. Afghanistan touches northern part of Jammu & Kashmir. The former Soviet Union was also very near to the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Until the Chinese aggression in 1962, the Himalayas were known as the defenders (*prahari*) of India. That is not true any more. The air forces of all countries have changed the security perspective all over the world. India's vast coastline necessitates not only a powerful navy, but also friendly relations with other naval powers present in the Indian Ocean. These include Britain as well as the United States which have a powerful naval base at Diago Garcia. Although India has been victim of Chinese and Pakistani attacks, it is in our mutual interests that the disputes be peacefully resolved. India has always desired good neighbourly relations with all the above mentioned countries. Besides, other regional powers such as Iran, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos must maintain friendly conflict-free relations with India. With this aim in view India's attempt has been to avoid disputes with all the neighbours; and resolve the dispute peacefully in case a dispute does occur.

The presence of communist China in, the north, and till 1991 socialist USSR also in the neighbourhood, made it imperative for India to develop friendly relations with these countries, keep away from regional military alliances, yet avoid all conflicts with western countries (like UK and USA) with whom India had historical and strategically important relations, in addition to the common tradition of liberal democracy. The fact that Indian armed forces were trained on British pattern required closer ties with Britain, and the moral support the USA provided in our freedom struggle obliged us to that country. But, India's foreign policy makers have had the main worry on account of hostile attitude of Pakistan, which was carved out of British India as a result of the acceptance by Britain of the Muslim League's two-nation theory.

History and Tradition: India's historical development as victim of British colonialism and imperialism, and her non-violent freedom struggle under the leadership of Gandhi, Nehru, Patel and Azad were bound to have a share in the shaping of our foreign policy. Not only this, the legacy of an ancient civilization and culture also helped in foreign policy formulation. As V.P. Dutt says: "A proud civilization with the weight of centuries of tradition and the rich legacy of what appeared to Indians an abiding civilization, like China, she was too deeply conscious of her priceless heritage to accept the role of a client state."[7] India is too big a country to become anybody's camp follower. Nehru had himself said that two major aspects of our foreign policy, viz., the 'positive aspect of peace' and the desire to promote 'a larger degree of cooperation among nations' were partly due to India's traditional values and past thinking.

The first Prime Minister had said in 1958 that it was a privilege to be associated with world peace and added that "in our domestic sphere also we should work on lines which are compatible with peace." This emphasis on peace at home and abroad could be called *'positive aspect of peace'*. Nehru had acknowledged the influence of India's traditions on foreign policy. He said in the Lok Sabha:

> It is completely incorrect to call our policy 'Nehru Policy'. It is incorrect because all that I have done is to give voice to that policy. I have not originated it. It is a policy 'inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind during our struggle for freedom, and inherent in the circumstances of the world today.'[8]

The traditional values have come down to us from the scriptures like the *Vedas* and *Dharmashastras*, and the writings of great men like Swami Vivekananda, Tagore, Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi. The three values that have helped shaping India's foreign policy are: *tolerance, the equation of means and ends,* and *non-violence.*

Tolerance is the essence of Indian tradition. It is not necessary that views of others be the same as one's own views. To respect the views of others is a great virtue. As V. Raghavan said, "Tolerance is one of the most important, if not the most important, among the concepts which invest the Indian traditional culture with a distinction and distinctness." Based on the teachings of *Rigveda*, Mahatma Gandhi had said, "Hinduism tells everyone to worship God according to his own faith or dharma, and so it lives at peace with all the religions"[9] Emperor Ashoka's inscriptions on his rock pillars also advocated tolerance: "The King, beloved of the God, honours every form of religious faith ..." In our domestic policy, India is committed to secularism which is rooted in the above-mentioned philosophy of tolerance. In foreign policy also, India has adopted the ideal of tolerance. It is clearly demonstrated in the famous declaration of *Panchsheel* signed by Nehru and his Chinese counterpart in 1954. Mutual non-interference as well as peaceful co-existence[10] are the guiding principles of our foreign policy based on tolerance of the views of others. However, tolerance does not mean compromise with our national interest. That is why, after the rude shock of Chinese attack in 1962, India has gone ahead systematically to build an impressive defence system, and having tested five nuclear devices in 1998, India declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon state.

Equation of right means and right ends is another important Indian tradition. Mahatma Gandhi indeed insisted on the purity of means to achieve noble ends. He was deeply impressed by Manu's *Dharmashastra* which lays down: "one should not do a good thing by following a bad path." Indian tradition thus is: "To seek to further the welfare of the state by enriching it through fraud and falsehood, is like storing water in an unburnt pot and hoping to preserve it."[11] While the purity of means is the basic thrust of Indian philosophy, there is no dearth of realist approach either. As pointed out earlier, Kautilya, in his *Arthashastra,* had expressed the view that what produces unfavourable results is bad policy. For Kautilya, diplomacy was an art, not, concerned with ideals but with achieving practical result for the State. He wrote:

"A, weak king, should avert ... invasion by making a treaty of peace, or by a treacherous fight in the battlefield. He may reduce the enemy's men either by conciliation or by giving gifts ..."

This important technique of statecraft could not be ignored by our foreign policy makers. Thus, a reconciliation between the "purity of means" and "reduce the enemy's' men" had to be brought about. That is why Nehru frankly admitted that moral principles could be followed in statecraft only to a limit. The action which India took in Goa in 1961 and in Bangladesh crisis in 1971 were in accordance with the leadership's perception of national interest even if it compromised with the principle of purity of means.

The principle of non-violence, or *ahimsa,* was not only an uncompromising faith of the Mahatma, but is also deeply rooted in Indian tradition. *Ahimsa* does not merely mean non- killing or abstention from doing harm to others. It indicates harmlessness in thought, word and deed, and also promotion of bondless love in the entire universe.

Non-violence is a virtue, though perfect non-violence is not always possible. Gandhiji was of the view that the use of force by the democratic state is immoral. Democracy and violence cannot co-exist. Mahatma Gandhi would apply non-violence to international relations also. The acceptance of non-violent means was to ensure lasting world peace. Nehru took inspiration from the Mahatma, but followed him to the extent that it was possible. The application of the tradition of non-violence in India's foreign policy, according to Appadorai, was "the deliberate acceptance of a method of approach to foreign policy problems which emphasized reconciliation, and the temper of peace, as opposed to a spirit of revenge and hatred."[12] India is committed to world peace and has included in Part IV of the Constitution a directive to the state to seek pacific settlement of international disputes.

The impact of British, rule in India and the influence of national movement and freedom struggle is clearly evident in the shaping of India's foreign policy. According to Appadorai, the British rule in India had a three-fold impact on India's foreign policy. Firstly, it gave a stimulus to the national movement for freedom which in turn led to India's support for the freedom of dependent peoples; secondly, racial inequality that existed during the British rule made India realize the evils of racial discrimination and, in turn, led to India's emphasis on racial equality in her foreign policy; and thirdly, India voluntarily chose to remain a member of the Commonwealth even after becoming a Republic. Nehru secured change in the name of the Commonwealth and a re-definition of relationship between Britain and other sovereign members of the Commonwealth.

It is not intended to go into the ideals and achievements of India's national movement in this work on foreign policy. Nevertheless, it will not be out of place to recall that our freedom movement did not really begin with the establishment of Indian National Congress. It is wrong to assume that the Congress was set up to fight against the tyrannical rule of the British. To begin with, it was not a protest movement. But, as the movement progressed from Gokhale's moderate stand to Tilak and Lala Lajpatrai's active demand for self-rule and reached its climax under Gandhi and Nehru, it turned out to be a peaceful struggle for India's freedom based on the Mahatma's ideals of truth and non-violence. Gandhi told Indian people not to hate the sinner but to hate the sin. Most of the leaders of freedom movement were educated in Britain or according to Western pattern of education. They valued liberty, equality and democracy. These ideals were valued by the foreign policy makers of India. While cooperating with liberal democratic countries, India did not oppose the socialist countries either. The policy of non-alignment is not only an outcome of keeping aloof from bloc politics, but also in accordance with the goals and ideals of freedom struggle cherished by our people.

Indian National Congress, through its foreign policy department headed by Nehru, had clearly opposed dictatorship and racial discrimination. Nehru had said in 1946: "We repudiate utterly the Nazi doctrine of racialism wheresoever and in whatever form it may be practised." Therefore, he declared in 1949 in the Constituent Assembly, "One of the pillars of our foreign policy is to fight against racial discrimination." The idea of the above discussion is to underline the fact that traditional, values and historical developments have had distinct impact on India's foreign policy.

Economic and Military Factors: Most of international trade of India was limited to Western countries, particularly Britain and the United States. Many of the Commonwealth countries also had intimate trade relations with India. We depended on trade in food items also on liberal democratic countries of the west. It was natural for India to have favourable and friendly foreign policy towards these countries. But, even then India did not join the Western bloc during the Cold War. India did not even opt for capitalist pattern of development. India, on the other hand, decided to follow liberal democracy and evolutionary socialism. India adopted Soviet pattern of planned economic development but not Soviet type of government. India welcomed aid and assistance from both the blocs as well as the World Bank, but without entangling alliances with any one. A peaceful world order was desired by India, because only in that situation could India hope for its rapid development.

Foreign aid is required by a developing country like India in at least two forms. Firstly, capital is needed to rapidly modernize its economy, for which it also needs improved machinery. Secondly, the developing countries need technical know-how. A survey of the pace of development after the Second World War revealed those "countries which had a well- built foundation and supply of specialized training and skilled manpower, were the first to catch up and accomplish accelerated rates of growth." A developing country could get from the developed countries a number of experts who would impart specialized training for development. Transfer of technology to the Third World counties was cleverly avoided by most of the developed countries. In view of this situation, India tried to formulate her foreign policy in such a way that we get foreign economic aid without strings, that we get loans at reasonable rates of interest, that technology transfer was easily made possible and that we received economic assistance both from the West and the East. But, America and her allies were in a far better position to provide assistance than the countries of East. This factor also played its role in shaping India's foreign policy. Initially non-aligned India was said to be tilted towards the West. Such allegations were obliquely made by Soviet media. But, once India demonstrated strength of its will, and independence of decision making during Korean and Suez crises, the Eastern bloc began appreciating our position. In fact, in view of imminent war with Pakistan in 1971 when Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was concluded, the West became critical of our non-alignment and alleged pro-Soviet policy of India.

For sometime after independence, India was militarily a weak nation. Our armed forces followed British tradition and strategy. India's senior defence personnel were trained in Britain and our naval ships as well as weapons were mostly manufactured in Britain. India's security needs made us largely dependent on the West, particularly Britain. But, after the 1962 debacle in India-China border war, Indian foreign and defence policy could not remain complacent. We decided to be on our own in matters of defence. India broadened the scope of market to buy weapons. Our defence personnel were trained to meet any situation from any quarter. Within a short period of time, India's defence forces, using tanks and planes made in India, successfully repulsed the Pakistan attack in 1965. While Pakistani armed forces were mostly using American and other weapons obtained from the US as well as China, India showed that its officers, men and weapons had the capacity to meet any challenge. India did not seek any military alliances, and followed the policy of non-alignment as we became self-sufficient. India's decision to develop nuclear energy, gave it an opportunity to conduct a nuclear test in 1971, and tell the world that she could soon become a nuclear power, if she chose to do so.

After keeping its nuclear option open (1974–98) for several years, India finally conducted five nuclear tests in 1998. Prime Minister Vajpayee declared India to be a nuclear weapon state, and also committed India not to conduct any more tests. Vajpayee Government's bold decision surprised the international community, but India had exercised its sovereign right. Condemnation by many countries, including USA was short-lived and world powers came to terms with a nuclear India, whether or not counties formally recognised India as a nuclear

weapon state. Even after agreeing in 2005 on civilian nuclear deal with India, the US continued to describe India as a "state with advanced nuclear technology."

Ideological Factor: Shaping of foreign policies is generally influenced by the ideological commitment of the concerned leadership. For example, Hitler and Mussolini formulated their foreign policies, during inter-war period, in accordance with their common ideology for aggressive nationalism and anti-socialism. The formation of a bloc of three 'Fascist Powers', i.e., Italy, Germany and Japan, or Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis, was preceded by the signing of Anti-Comintern Pact. Similarly, involvement of Germany and Italy in the Spanish Civil War (1936–39) on the side of General Franco was aimed at defeating the pro-Soviet (pro-Communist) regime of President Azana. On the other hand, Azana and his Communist Prime Minister received Soviet support. This again was done on "ideological basis." Earlier, Comintern had encouraged the formation of popular fronts in France and Spain. In the Cold War period foreign policies of US Bloc countries were formulated on anti-communism, just as Soviet Bloc states shaped their policies on anti-capitalist ideology.

India is no exception. However, our leadership was never committed to any extreme ideology. Nehru, the founder of India's foreign policy, was deeply impressed by liberal democratic ideology of the Western countries, yet he was also influenced by the Soviet Union's economic policies. Nehru wanted to incorporate a synthesis of the virtues of Western liberal democracy and the Soviet socialism. He wanted to keep away from the evils of both. He, therefore, decided not to blindly follow the principles of foreign policy of either of the two. Nehru was deeply impressed by British Labour Party leader and a professor of Political Science H.J. Laski. Laski's ideology was a synthesis of Liberalism and Marxism. Nehru tried to follow Laski, and often gave indications of contradictions. Indirectly, the policy of non-alignment was also a result of the synthesis of Liberalism and Marxism.

But, it may be an oversimplification to believe that India's policy was only influenced by Nehru's ideology. It was also influenced by Indian philosophy of humanism and universal brotherhood. It is this ideology which must get credit for India's attempts at friendship with both the power blocs during the Cold War days.

As mentioned earlier, Gandhiji's ideals of truth and non-violence were also sought to be incorporated by Nehru while shaping India's foreign policy.

Charisma of Jawaharlal Nehru: The foregoing discussion on factors shaping India's foreign policy leads to the conclusion that, besides many other determinants, the personality of Nehru had a deep impact on our foreign policy. As the basic tenets of our foreign policy have generally remained unchanged during the last sixty years, the charisma of Nehru is all the more significant. What is charisma? It is defined as "the aggregate of those special gifts of mind and character which are the source of exceptional personal power, and upon which depends the capacity to secure the allegiance of, and exercise decisive authority over, large masses of people."[13] Jawaharlal Nehru was a leader of unusual stature who was not only the darling of Indian masses and chosen heir of Mahatma Gandhi, but also head of Foreign Affairs Department of Indian National Congress. He was a combination of patriotism and internationalism, of socialism and liberal democracy, and of Gandhian idealism and Churchill's realism. Michael Brecher wrote: "Few statesmen in the twentieth century have attained the stature of Jawaharlal Nehru. As the pre-eminent figure in India's era of transition he bears comparison with Roosevelt and Churchill, Lenin and Mao, men who towered above their colleagues and guided their peoples through a period of national crisis."[14] Nehru was said to have foreseen, helped to shape and form and lead the trend of the times. Nehru had great courage and charm. He was man of integrity who wanted power for a cause, not for himself. Even Winston Churchill described him thus: "Here is a man without malice and without fear."[15] Gandhi had said of him much before independence: "He is as pure as crystal; he is truthful beyond suspicion .... The nation is safe in his hands."[16]

Jawaharlal Nehru's leadership left its impact both on domestic policy and on foreign policy. But, while in internal policy and administration, he built essentially on an existing system that had evolved during the British rule, in foreign policy he had to lay the foundation and formulate its basic principles. He built up contacts with sovereign states, created a foreign service, formulated foreign policy and evolved India's relations with the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Nations. He cooperated with the peoples of the countries of Asia and Africa who were still under colonial masters.

An outstanding contribution of Nehru was the shaping of a foreign policy, above party considerations, which has grown into the "national policy." Its basic outlines had the approval and support of almost all the parties and indeed of thinking masses. In 1958, N.G. Ranga, the Swatantra Party leader, wrote: "India is today in a fortunate position that there is almost complete unity among all its political parties over its foreign policy. The *Panchsheel* approach towards international affairs is accepted by all." The basic principles of peace, anti-colonialism and non-alignment have been supported by the entire country.

Non-alignment with power-blocs in the Cold War context was India's distinctive contribution to international relations. Nehru originated it, and within years attracted well over 100 states to this policy. His second contribution, *Panchsheel*, meant that each country should carve out its own destiny without intervening with others. These and several other principles of India's foreign policy, essentially evolved during Nehru era, will be analysed in detail in the next chapter.

International Situation: References to the international situation have been made throughout this chapter. Even then, and at the risk of some repetition, broad framework of the prevailing international environment may be briefly mentioned here. When India attained independence, the Cold War had begun and the world was getting divided into two hostile power blocs. It had its direct impact on the shaping of India's policy of non-alignment. The process of decolonisation began simultaneously with India's independence. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism became the main focus of international milieu. India fell in line with the efforts for acceleration of the process of decolonisation, and opposition to all forms of colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination. Second World War had ruined the economies of several countries. Efforts were already initiated for economic reconstruction and development India took advantage and decided on its rapid economic development. For that purpose it freely sought help from the institutions like the World Bank and International Monitory Fund created towards the end of Second World War. Ideological conflicts were responsible for disputes, aggressions and wars. Conflict between Fascism, and Communism, between democracies and totalitarian states were replaced by ideological clashes between Liberal democracy and Marxism. India opted to remain out of these ideological conflicts of post-war period.

Later, when the Cold War ended and new international environment began to emerge with emphasis on liberalisation in economies even of countries like China, India was inspired to shift emphasis from public sector and partially controlled economy to liberalisation, reduction of state control and encouragement to foreign investments in private and joint sectors. The process of reconciliation that began after the Cold War in areas such as Israel-Palestine dispute opened the doors for negotiated solution of bilateral disputes in different parts of the world. India, also tried to accelerate resolution of its disputes with China, Bangladesh and even Pakistan. Thus international milieu had, and still has, its impact on the shaping of India's foreign policy.

There indeed was direct impact on India's foreign policy of the events of 1990s. The disintegration of the Soviet Union into 15 independent republics after the collapse of communism; fall of socialist (communist) governments in East European countries and their transition to democracy; reunification of Germany; emergence of the United States as the sole super power and end of bipolarity all these factors did influence India's foreign policy. One of the major development was India's veto to the CTBT at Conference on Disarmament (CD) and later refusal to sign the CTBT as adopted by the UN General Assembly. Finally, India conducted 5 nuclear tests in May 1998 (see Chapter 8) leading Pakistan also to conduct such tests.

NOTES

1. Jawaharlal Nehru's broadcast to the nation, September 7, 1946.
2. Bandopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy,* Allied, 1970, p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 4.
4. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
5. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 2, Pt II, 8 March 1949.
6. V.P. Dutt, *India's Foreign Policy,* Vikas, New Delhi, p. 3.
7. Ibid., p. 1.
8. Nehru, 'Lok Sabha Debate', December 9, 1958.
9. Mahatma Gandhi, *Hindu Dharma,* Ahmedabad, p. 8.
10. Implying peaceful co-existence despite different ideological commitments.
11. Rajagopalachari (Tr.), *The Sacred Book of Kural,* 1937 Madras.
12. Appadorai, *Domestic Roots of India's Foreign Policy,* Delhi, p. 37.
13. Ibid., p. 215.
14. Brecher, *Nehru,* p. 595.
15. Quoted by Appadorai, *op. cit.,* p. 219.
16. Ibid.

Chapter 3

Principles and Objectives of India's Foreign Policy

The foreign policy of a country is determined by a number of historical and domestic factors. In case of India also several such factors have been responsible for the shaping of principles and objectives of the foreign policy. These factors have been analysed in the last chapter. In this chapter we will discuss the objectives set out by the policy makers and the principles on which India's foreign relations are based. Every head of government and his foreign minister leave an impact of their personality, on the country's foreign policy. Nehru was not only the Prime Minister, but also Foreign Minister for over 17 years which were the formative years of independent India. A section has been devoted in the last chapter to Nehru's charisma in relation to India's foreign policy. While analyzing the objectives of India's foreign policy, a reference to Nehru appears to be unavoidable, even at the risk of some repetition.

At Cambridge, Nehru had come under the impact of Fabian Socialism. After the First World War, he came under the influence of Mahatma Gandhi and his doctrine of non-violence. In 1923 he had said: "Bolshevism and Fascism are the waves of the West today. They are real, alike and represent different phases of insensate violence and intolerance. The choice for us is between Lenin and Mussolini on one side, and Gandhi on the other."[1] In effect, he condemned both Marxism and Fascism. In 1927, he attended the Brussels Conference of Oppressed Nationalities and came in contact with various leftist elements. He developed the idea of close cooperation among the colonial peoples of Asia and Africa. He chose to condemn both British and American imperialism. Later in 1927, he visited Moscow where he was deeply impressed by the progress made by the Soviet Union in ten years. He came under the influence of Soviet Communism. His pro-Marxian attitude led to the resignation of six members of Congress Working Committee, in protest, in 1937. But, he was to be soon disillusioned. The signing of Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, Soviet occupation of Finland, and excessive use of violence under Stalin pained him greatly, yet he retained sympathy. for socialism. After 1950, however, Nehru came to reject communism completely. But, even when he was sympathetic to Soviet Union, he was very critical of Indian communists for their dependence on foreign guidance.

While in the jail, in forties, Nehru had come under the lasting influence of the *vedanta,* as he got an opportunity to make a deep study of Indian philosophy. Nehru insisted on being an atheist. He was also deeply influenced by modern European humanist philosophy. He was never a materialist. His personality is summed up by Bandopadhyaya: "A devout nationalist freedom fighter, and lover of the tradition and culture of his own society, he was at the same time a deeply committed internationalist, and visualised a unified mankind in a cooperative international order, often referred to, by him, as the ideal of one world."[2] Thus, there were different cross-currents in Nehru's intellectual make-up which, according to Michael Brecher, were because he was unable to synthesise into a coherent intellectual pattern.

A reference was made to 'realism' and 'idealism' in the last chapter. We have said that Nehru was largely under the impact of Gandhi's idealism. Nehru had opined that realism as such "leads to incessant conflict" and that the realist "looks it the tip of his nose and sees little beyond; the result is that he is stumbling all the time." Yet, he described idealism as the "realism of tomorrow", and said that the question of foreign policy ought to be approached "in a spirit of realism". He said: "It is easy to lay down principles, but the difficulty comes in when high principles have to be acted upon." It is in this 'background that Nehru's Government determined the objectives of India's foreign policy which have generally remained unchanged.

OBJECTIVES OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy makers set out certain objectives before they proceed to lay down basic principles and formulate the policy. Several of these objectives are common, though the degree of emphasis always varies. A former Foreign Secretary of India, Muchkund Dubey wrote:

> The primary purpose of any country's foreign policy is to promote its national interest—to ensure its security, safeguard its sovereignty, contribute to its growth and prosperity and generally enhance its stature, influence, and role in the comity of nations. A country's foreign policy should also .be able to serve the broader purpose of promoting peace, disarmament and development and of establishing a stable, fair, and equitable global order.[3]

The purpose of peace, disarmament and an equitable global order may at times be in conflict with national security, sovereignty and development. But, says Dubey, in the medium and long run the former may also serve the national

interest. The goals of India's foreign policy are simple and straightforward. The primary and overriding goal has always been the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security. The ideals and objectives of our domestic as well as foreign policy are enshrined in the Constitution. India's foreign policy, designed mainly by Nehru, combines national interest with broader objectives mentioned above. Continuity in foreign policy is a tribute to maturity of a nation and wisdom of its leadership. The objectives of India's foreign policy are so fundamental and generally accepted by the people and different parties that they are known as bases of a national policy. That has resulted in continuity in India's foreign policy; "for no Government of India can afford to abdicate independence of judgement and action and compromise the basic values enshrined in our Constitution."[4]

India, after independence, had to determine objectives of its foreign policy under very difficult circumstances. Internally, the partition of British India and creation of Pakistan left a deep wound of hatred and ill-will. India was till then one economic unit. Its division created many economic problems which were further complicated by the arrival of millions of Hindus and Sikhs displaced from Pakistan. They had to be rehabilitated.

Very soon the country was involved in a war in Kashmir imposed by Pakistan-backed tribals from North-West Frontier. Economy was further threatened by strikes organised by leftists. The country had to tackle the 'gigantic problem' of providing its vast population with the basic necessities of life, like food, clothing and shelter. Militarily, India was not strong. A hostile Pakistan compounded India's security problem. India did possess "vast potential resources and manpower with which it could, in course of time, greatly increase its economic and military strengths."[5] There was another problem. It was related to internal consolidation. Even after British left India in 1947, there were small pockets of French and Portuguese possessions. India's first efforts naturally were to negotiate with the two Powers. After prolonged negotiations, French agreed to withdraw, but military action had to be taken, in as late as 1961, to liberate Goa and other Portuguese pockets.

International situation was not very comfortable as the Cold War had begun and East-West relations were deteriorating very fast. It is in this situation that India decided that world peace would be a cardinal feature of India's foreign policy. India desired peace not merely as an ideal but also as an essential condition for its own security. Nehru had said: "Peace to us is not just a fervent hope; it is an emergent necessity" As M.S. Rajan said: "For a country like India which is in urgent need of all round development, peace (as much external as internal) is a primary desideratum." It is for this reason that India gave first priority to world peace. As Nehru opined, "India's approach to peace is a positive, constructive approach, not a passive, negative, neutral approach."

India's message to the world has been insistence on peaceful methods to solve all problems.

Peace meant not only avoidance of war, but also reduction of tension and if possible end of the Cold War. A world order based on understanding and cooperation would require an effective United Nations. Therefore, India decided to give unqualified support and allegiance to the United Nations. International peace is not possible so long as armaments are not reduced. All the efforts at the reduction of conventional weapons had already failed despite a clear mandate in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The problem was further complicated by the nuclear weapons which threatened peace more than ever before. Therefore, an important objective of India's foreign policy has been elimination of nuclear weapons and reduction of conventional armaments. In other words, comprehensive disarmament has been an objective of our foreign policy.

A related objective was to root out other causes of war by measures such as liberation of subject peoples and the elimination of racial discrimination. In order to achieve this goal, India would follow an independent foreign policy without being any big Power's camp follower. It would also require total faith in, and support to the United Nations. Thus, pursuit of peace became a primary objective of the foreign policy. India's goal of peace was not only directed by its self interest, but also by idealism imbibed from Mahatma Gandhi. Nehru once told an American audience that Gandhian ethics was the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. Emphasising the intimate connection between means and ends, Nehru said: "The great leader of my country, Mahatma Gandhi ... always laid stress on moral values and warned us never to subordinate means to ends." He insisted that "physical force need not necessarily be the arbiter of man's destiny and that the method of waging a struggle and the way of its termination are of paramount importance."[6]

Another objective of foreign policy was 'elimination of want, disease and illiteracy.' These are ills not only of Indian society, but also of most of the developing countries of Asia and Africa. While India's domestic policy was directed at removal of want and disease, it was closely related with the question of foreign aid and assistance. Besides, India chose to cooperate with various international agencies so that it could make its contribution in fighting disease, starvation, poverty, illiteracy and famine in various underdeveloped countries. Organisations like WHO, FAO, UNICEF and UNESCO not only benefit India, but India also wants to use these institutions to help the entire mankind.

India has voluntarily chosen to remain a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. This association of free and sovereign countries who were colonies in the erstwhile British Empire now recognises the British Queen only as Head of the Commonwealth, not as Crown of the Republics like India. Before 1949, only British Dominions were members of, what was then known as, the British Commonwealth. All the dominions had the British Crown as their monarch also. India did not want to leave the Commonwealth even after it decided to become a republic and ceased to accept the British monarch as the head of state. India owed, along with some other countries, common allegiance to a particular way of life. India considered the continued cooperation with the Commonwealth of mutual benefit to India and all other member countries.

Lastly, India's objective has been to maintain friendly relations with all, avoid military alliances, follow non-alignment as a moral principle, seek peaceful settlement of international disputes and promote universal brotherhood and humanism by following and advocating the five principles contained in *Panchsheel*. India has tried to faithfully observe the ideals of non-interference and peaceful co-existence. All these objectives have been sought to be achieved through principles and decisions of India's foreign policy. Although wars were imposed upon India by Pakistan and China, India has remained committed to pacific settlement of disputes between nations. India has been seeking to pursue friendly relations with all the countries, particularly with the neighbours. India still wishes to work in pursuit of world peace, and in search of that it has been insisting on complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and strengthening of the United Nations.

PRINCIPLES OF INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

1. Non-Alignment: The policy of non-alignment is the most important contribution of India to international community. Immediately after the hostilities ended with the Second World War, a new and unprecedented tension developed between the erstwhile friends and allies. The acute state of tension came to be called the Cold War.[7] The division of the world into two blocs led by the United States and the former Soviet Union respectively caused the Cold War. India made up its mind not to join any of the power blocs. India's decision to follow an independent foreign policy was dictated essentially by its national interest, and also by its belief in moral value attached to the ideal of friendship among all, and pursuit of world peace. India had decided to devote its energies to its economic development. For that, India needed not only friendship with neighbours and big powers, but also economic assistance from different quarters. India made it clear that it would reserve the right to freely express its opinion on international problems. If it would join any of the power blocs then it would lose this freedom.

India's geographical situation—its location at the junction of South East Asia and Middle East, and its strategic position in the Indian Ocean, and as a neighbour of Communist China in the North—made it imperative to keep away from military alliances. The policy of non-alignment is in accordance with Indian philosophy and tradition. A former US ambassador to India, Chester Bowels had said of Nehru and his policy of non-alignment: "If Nehru becomes a formal ally of the West in the Cold War, he would be going against the whole grain of Asian anti-colonial sentiment. He would be under constant and effective attack as a 'stooge of western imperialism'. By his independence of either bloc, he is able to draw on all the pride of Indian nationalism and to change convincingly that it is the Asian communists who are the foreign stooge."

India's policy of non-alignment is discussed at length. in the next chapter. Therefore, it is enough here to briefly mention it as the most important pillar of our foreign policy.

2. Panchsheel and Peaceful Co-existence: Peaceful co-existence of nations of diverse ideologies and interests is an important principle of our foreign policy. Indian philosophy of *Vasudhaiva Kutumbkam* promotes the feeling of 'one world'. In practice, it means that nations inhabited by peoples belonging to different religions and having different social systems can co-exist, live together in peace, while each follows its own system. This basic Indian philosophy was formally recognised when in 1954 India and China signed the famous declaration of five principles, or *Panchsheel*, as the bases of their mutual relationship. The five principles, detailed below, were formally enunciated in the Sino-Indian agreement of April 29, 1954 regarding trade and intercourse between the Tibetan Region of China and the Republic of India. The five principles mentioned in the Preamble of the agreement were:

(i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
(ii) mutual non-aggression;
(iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
(iv) equality and mutual benefit; and
(v) peaceful co-existence.

Speaking in the Parliament, Prime Minister Nehru had said: "I imagine that if these principles were adopted in the relations of various countries with each other, a great deal of the trouble of the present day world would probably disappear." Two months later, during Chinese Premier Chou En-lai's visit to India, Nehru and Chou, in a joint statement, said that if these principles were applied not only by Asian countries in their bilateral relations, but also "in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence." The term *Panchsheel* was formally used by Nehru at a state banquet given in honour of visiting Indonesian President in September 1954.

The term *Panchsheel* soon became so popular that Nehru called it an "international coin." These principles were incorporated in the Declaration on World Peace and Cooperation, adopted by the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung (Indonesia) in April 1955, as well as in a resolution of principles of co-existence adopted by Inter-Parliamentary Union at its Helsinki session in August 1955. By the end of 1956, many countries including Afghanistan, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Nepal, Poland, USSR, Saudi Arabia and Yugoslavia had endorsed the *Panchsheel.* In 1959, the UN General assembly also resolved to adopt the five principles. The term *Panchsheel* is found in ancient Buddhist literature, and refers to five principles of good conduct of the individuals. These are truth, non-violence, celibacy, refrain from drinking, and vow not to steal.

In 1945, President Soekarno of Indonesia had announced five principles of Indonesian national policy. These five principles, called *Panjashila*, were: faith in nationalism, faith in humanity, faith in independence, faith in social justice, and faith in God. But, the five principles of *Panchsheel* declared in 1954 were neither principles of good conduct of individual nor of nationalism. These are principles of behaviour of sovereign states in their foreign relations. These are normal expectations from civilised nations in their behaviour with each other. To respect the territorial integrity of others and not to commit aggression are vital objectives of friendly international relations. By stating them in India-China declaration (along with other principles) was only to emphasise the value that we attach to them. But, within a few years when China began encroaching upon our territory by building a road in Aksai Chin area, *Panchsheel* was threatened. When aggression was committed by China in 1962, it was a clear violation of 'mutual non-aggression'. The fifth principle; i.e., peaceful co-existence emphasises the importance of peaceful living by all nations irrespective of their ideology. A liberal democracy (India) and a Communist country (China) need not attempt to force their ideologies on the other. "In the context of 'cold war' ..., it means that it is both possible and necessary that countries with different political, economic or other systems should exist side by side and work together peacefully", says Prof. M.S. Rajan, "it also mans that, every nation has a right to its political and social order and to develop along its own line."[8] Peaceful co-existence is not "a misfortune to be endured, but a fact which enriches the diversity of human society," opined K.P.S. Menon, it was not just "co-endurance."[9]

The principles contained in *Panchsheel* were, according to Nehru, a consequence of democratic outlook. "The person who rejects the idea of co-existence rejects basically the democratic outlook." Although Nehru had opined that if a country violated the principles of *Panchsheel* it was "likely to find itself in a much more quandary". None other than China violated the principle of non-aggression. At one time Nehru was so enthusiastic about *Panchsheel* that, for him, the alternative was likely to be conflict and co-destruction.

The most important aspect of *Panchsheel* is peaceful co-existence. Ideology has often caused tensions, conflicts and wars. Thus, Fascism-Nazism played havoc by advocating anti-semitism, ultra-nationalism, war, rearmament and opposition to communism. Hatred was spread in the name of ideology, anti-commitern Pact concluded, aggressions and annexations took place. The ideology of Soviet Union supported anti-Fascist popular Fronts. The idea of peaceful co-existence is morally so correct that it allows all countries to follow their ideology without interfering in internal affairs of the other. Despite the 1962 border war, India has remained firmly committed to the principles of *Panchsheel*.

3. Freedom of Dependent Peoples: Anti-Imperialism. Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism has been a matter of faith with India's foreign policy makers. Having been a victim of British imperialism for a long time, India decided to oppose all forms of colonialism and imperialism. Therefore, it decided to extend full support to the cause of freedom of dependent peoples of Asia and Africa. One of the first decisions that Nehru's Interim Government took was to recall the Indian troops sent by the British to suppress the freedom struggles in the Dutch and French colonies. The Dutch colony of Indonesia had been taken by the Japanese during the Second World War. When after Japanese defeat, the Netherlands tried to establish its rule again, India opposed it even in the United Nations, and cooperated with Indonesia in its efforts to get independence. India fully supported the freedom struggles in Asian and African countries such as Indo-China, Malaya, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Gold Coast (now Ghana), etc. India fully supported the cause of independence of the people of Namibia who were under prolonged colonial rule of racist South Africa. Promotion of self-determination of all colonial peoples was, thus, an important objective and principle of India's foreign policy. India considered denial of freedom to colonial peoples as a violation of fundamental human rights, and a source of international conflicts. At times India adopted, as M.S. Rajan says, continuous and 'over-scrupulous' attitude as in case of Algerian and Cyprus questions.

The Western view in the context of Cold War was that international communism was a bigger threat than colonialism. India did not agree with this view. According to Nehru, the real-question in Asia was that of 'colonialism versus anti-colonialism'. In fact, India felt that if colonialism was not quickly abolished it was likely to encourage communism among the colonial peoples. Nehru had once said: "Colonialism represents the biggest threat to Asia and Africa and leads to communism." Both colonialism and communism are of European origin, and India emphasised that end of colonialism was urgently required.

Now that colonialism and imperialism have been terminated, one might think that there is no relevance of this principle any more. But, Western powers

have not given up their efforts to dominate their former colonies. Most of Afro-Asian countries, including India, were being subjected to a new form of colonialism, commonly known as 'neo-colonialism.' In its new incarnation, colonialism seeks to dominate independent developing countries of Asia and Africa through various instruments of exploitation.[10] India is determined to oppose neo-colonialism as it aims at economic exploitation which may eventually lead to political control. Various means such as economic assistance and multinational corporations are used for promotion of neo-colonialism. India's policy at freedom of dependent peoples has now acquired new dimensions as it seeks freedom from new form of economic slavery.

4. Opposition to Racial Discrimination: India firmly believes in equality of all human beings. Its policy is aimed at opposition to all form of racial discrimination. South Africa was the worst example of discrimination against and exploitation of, the coloured peoples including the people of Indian origin. India gave full support to the cause of victims of racial discrimination. Not only India had cut off diplomatic relation with South Africa in 1949, but also used her influence (later) in the application of comprehensive sanctions against the white minority racist regime of South Africa. India did not allow any facility to the racist regime, opposed the system both inside and outside the United Nations and stood by the demand of racial equality. Even Indian sportsmen and players of games like cricket fully boycotted racial discrimination, and its symbol South Africa. It is only in early 1994 that apartheid was finally given up and a majority government was duly elected and installed under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. Having achieved the goal of racial equality in South Africa, India re-established full relations with that country.

India has consistently supported the establishment of an egalitarian human society in which discrimination based on colour, race, class, etc. does not exist. India firmly believes that racialism is one of the sources of conflict in the world, and therefore a threat to international peace and security. India has supported the UN efforts leading to adoption of covenants of human rights and the observance of fundamental freedoms all over the world.

5. Foreign Economic Aid and India's Independent Policy: India firmly believed that economic development of the country was an urgent necessity. Soon after independence, India devoted its energies to a planned and rapid all-round development. India was painfully aware of the lack of adequate resources and technical know-how. India had already decided on non-alignment as basic policy. That implied the adoption of an independent foreign policy. But, if India was to develop, it needed funds, machinery and technical know-how. India needed economic assistance as well as loans for numerous projects that it wanted to start in the process of multi-faceted development of the country.

The financial and technological help that we needed could come either from the United States or the Soviet Union. It was generally believed that the

USSR would not help a non-communist country. The business community in India as well as our Government realised that the only country that could give substantial help was the United States of America. Still, the Government of India did not want to compromise with the principle of non-alignment, independence and sovereignty of the country. Nehru said in June 1948: "We would rather delay our development, industrial or otherwise, than submit to any kind of economic domination by any country." Despite India's firm decision not to accept any aid with strings, India had come quite close to the United States by 1949. Many sections of Indian industry were putting pressure on Indian Government to secure foreign capital as nationalisation of industry was not practicable. The success of communists in China made India realise that there was a danger of communism raising its head in India also unless our economic development was initiated in a big way, naturally with foreign aid. Even in the United States there was growing realisation of urgent need of helping India so as to avoid Chinese communist type success in this country. Thus, began the process of economic assistance to India from the United States.

As the process of development was accelerated, India began accepting aid from the World Bank and a number of other countries. In course of time, Soviet suspicion of India being a pro-West country was removed and we welcomed aid from Eastern Bloc also. Then two new economic powers began to emerge as Soviet Union experienced difficulties. Germany and Japan became industrially developed nations and are giving aid to many countries, including India. Unfortunately, the Western countries have been very reluctant to transfer technology to India and other developing countries.

India tried to maintain independence in decision-making and foreign policy. At times it was charged with being pro-West and at other times with a clear tilt towards the former Soviet Union. However, India tried to maintain balance and pursue independent policy. At one stage under Indira Gandhi's leadership, India chose to go in for large scale nationalization. As socialism was made a goal of Indian economy (Forty-Second Amendment, 1976), the Western countries began to disbelieve India's policy of independent decision-making and non-alignment As India decided to liberalise her economy in mid-1991, and as the Soviet Union disintegrated in the end of 1991, India's economy naturally moved closer to the capitalist world. In spite of India's assertion that it continues to follow an independent policy, critics have been charging of sell-out to the West-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund who are guiding India's economic policy and liberalisation process.

6. Support to the United Nations: India is one of the founder-Members of the United Nations, and many of its specialised agencies. It has full faith in the international organizations and agencies. India firmly believes in international

peace and security. Despite having required nuclear weapons, India does not support these weapons, wants their elimination and considerable reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces. India believes that these goals can be achieved by strengthening the United Nations. India is an important member of the group of Non-Aligned in the United Nations. She is also a prominent Afro-Asian Member of the world body. India has sponsored and supported several progressive measures in the UN and its agencies. India's Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit was elected President of the General Assembly in 1953. India has been a non-permanent member of the Security Council for a number of terms. Her contribution in the cause of world peace has been universally recognised. India has enthusiastically responded to the call of the United Nations to serve in collective security and peace-keeping efforts. India sent a medical unit in the Korean War, and participated actively in the repatriation of prisoners of war after Korean crisis. India has sent help at the call of the United Nations for peace-keeping to Egypt, Congo and Yugoslavia.

The Indian army generals have been given four responsibilities for peace-keeping activities. In 1953 India held the Chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) for Korea, charged with the custody and repatriation of the prisoners of war. In July 1954 India chaired the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indochina. During 1960-63 peace-keeping operations were organized in Congo by the Indian Independent Brigade. In 1992 the responsibility of heading the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia was also entrusted to an Indian General.

India continuously supported the efforts for universalisation of the United Nations. When applications of a number of countries for membership of the UN were being rejected in mid-1950s, as either the USSR or nationalist China used veto to bar their entry, India's V.K. Krishna Menon used his diplomatic skill and with the support of many other like-minded countries persuaded the big Powers to allow admission of 16 new Members in 1955. India was one of the first countries to recognise Communist China after the revolution in 1949. India consistently supported application of People's Republic of China for representation in the UN and expulsion of Nationalist China. India had taken a value-based stand on the question of Chinese representation. Even after Chinese attack on India, and the border war, in 1962 our stand did not change. Despite being a victim of Chinese aggression, India stood by its commitment that the UN could not really become a universal organization so long as one fifth of humanity remained out of it.

There are several other areas in which India has played significant role in the United Nations. For example, India has played a consistently positive and energetic role in arms control and disarmament. In the field of human rights, the issues which attracted India's attention quite early were racial discrimination and colonialism (as already discussed). India's contribution has also been significant in the areas of health, food, children's welfare and improvement of the conditions of working people. As Professor Satish Kumar says: "... notwithstanding occasional lapses, India's contribution to the promotion of the objectives of the United Nations cannot be regarded as inferior to, or less valuable than, that of any other Member of the United Nations, including any permanent Member of the Security Council."[11] In this background, India's claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is no less justified than that of countries like Germany and Japan.

7. Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes: Disputes among nations are unavoidable. There can be only two methods of settling international disputes: war, or peaceful settlement. War has been the most commonly used method of deciding disputes from the pre-historic days. War was considered the legitimate means of deciding disputes. It resulted in the victory of one nation over the other. By the end of First World War, destructiveness of this method had reached harrowing heights. Since then it has been increasingly realised by international community that peaceful settlement of disputes should be the goal of not only international organisation, but also of all states. This includes, besides direct negotiations, means such as mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial decisions. The last mentioned method is used only in cases of legal disputes, whereas political disputes can be sought to be settled through other means.

India's foreign policy goal is pacific (peaceful) settlement of disputes—here the emphasis is on "peaceful" rather than "settlement". Professor M.S. Rajan says that, "This is, of course, a corollary to the major and primary objective of promoting international peace and security ...."[12] Thus, if India's goal is international peace, pacific settlement of disputes is the natural means.

The founding fathers of the Constitution of India were keen to remind all future governments that India as a nation desired peaceful settlement of international disputes. That is why Article 51 of the Constitution (in Part IV, Directive Principles of State Policy) lays down that the state shall endeavour to seek peaceful settlement of international disputes. India does not believe in 'negotiation through strength' because that is illogical. As Nehru himself pointed out, "... the world had arrived at a stage when even if one party was relatively weaker, the effect on both was the same; they had reached a saturation point in regard to weapons of mass destruction." Thus, India has made it a matter of faith to help seek peaceful settlement of disputes. M.S. Rajan observes: "Even at the risk of being persistently taken as 'poking one's nose in other people's affairs', India reserved in her self-appointed role of conciliation in the settlement of international disputes and conflicts." Although India herself had to face wars imposed upon her, its faith in pacific means is not shaken.

Normally, in countries like Britain, basic principles of foreign policy do not radically change whenever there is change of government. We have adopted this tradition and even when Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers have changed, India's basic policy commitments have remained unaltered. Officials of Foreign Services make valuable input in the foreign policy-making, so that even when a leader like Atal Behari Vajpayee took charge of office as Foreign Minister (1977-79), despite his strong views on certain issues, no significant changes were made in the objectives and principles of India's foreign policy.

8. The Gujral Doctrine: This doctrine is expression of the foreign policy initiated by I.K. Gujral, the Foreign Minister in Deve Gowda Government which assumed office in June 1996. Gujral himself later became Prime Minister. The essence of Gujral Doctrine is that being the largest country in South Asia, India decided on 'extension of unilateral concessions to neighbours in the sub-continent'. Gujral advocated people to people contacts, particularly between India and Pakistan, to create an atmosphere that would enable the countries concerned to sort out their differences amicably. It is in pursuance of this policy that late in 1996 India concluded an agreement with Bangladesh on sharing of Ganga Waters. This agreement enabled Bangladesh to draw in lean season slightly more water than even the 1977 Agreement had provided. The confidence building measures agreed upon by India and China in November 1996 were also a part of efforts made by the two countries to improve bilateral relations, and freeze, for the time being' the border dispute. Gujral Doctrine was vigorously pursued when India unilaterally announced in 1997 several concessions to Pakistan tourists, particularly the elder citizens and cultural groups, in regard to visa fees and police reporting.

The Gujral Doctrine, summed up in one sentence as, the policy of giving unilateral concessions to neighbours and promoting people to people contact, is aimed at improving relations by friendly gestures. The Doctrine presents India as a big country willing to unilaterally help the smaller neighbours. It was widely believed that this doctrine was actually authored by Gujral's close friend and a 'Saturday Group' member Bhabani Sengupta. The "father" of Gujral Doctrine was charged by certain elements as being a so-called "CIA agent", because he had denounced India's nuclear test at Pokhran in 1974. His personal views on Pokhran test were made an object of condemnation in 1997. But Sengupta admitted to the media that if relations with neighbours like Pakistan were to be improved India would have to take initiatives such as demilitarising the Siachin glacier. This step would be central component of the "asymmetry" that marks the neighbourhood policy of the Gujral Doctrine. Thus, according to Swapan Dasgupta (*India Today*, May 31, 1997), Bhabani Sengupta "would probably have been even less squeamish about suggesting that the Line of Control in Kashmir be transformed into the international border. However, the

Gujral Doctrine was generally welcomed and appreciated not only within the country, but also by most of the neighbours and major powers. In the context of changed international environment in post-cold war world Gujral Doctrine became a new and important principle of India's foreign policy.

The Gujral Doctrine assumed significance when at Foreign Secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan in June 1997, the two countries identified eight areas for negotiation so as to build confidence and seek friendly resolution of all disputes.

9. India's Option of Nuclear Weapons: Jawaharlal Nehru had initiated research in atomic energy. Dr. Homi Bhabha headed the Atomic Energy Commission as its first Chairman. Although Nehru never said that he wanted India to ever acquire nuclear weapons, yet he did not specifically reject the idea. Initially, the idea was to develop atom for peace, or use the atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Later, at some stage India began working on the nuclear power. After the Bangladesh crisis (1971) when it became clear that China (an ally of Pakistan) could assist Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons, India had to seriously think of nuclear option. China had exploded its first bomb in 1964, and it had become the fifth nuclear-weapon-state. In view of China-US strategic relationship evolving, India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. But in view of hue and cry in international community, India declared that the 1974 test was only 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion'. India had consistently refused to sign the discriminatory Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) which recognised only five nuclear weapon states and bound the signatories not to proliferate nuclear weapons (see Chapter 8), Mrs. Gandhi had to abandon the idea of nuclear weapons for the time being, though India was getting enriched uranium and working on nuclear power, peaceful or otherwise. Successive governments maintained silence, but indicated that India was keeping its nuclear option open.

It was reported that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1991-96) was seriously thinking of nuclear explosions, but did not order the tests. Gujral Government (1997-98) was reportedly ready for nuclear testing when it went out of power. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee took the bold decision of ordering five nuclear tests in May 1998. The tests conducted in absolute secrecy enabled India to declare itself a nuclear weapon state. India boldly faced volley of criticism and severe sanctions imposed upon it by USA and its friends. Vajpayee declared categorically that India was a nuclear weapon state and that it did not need to conduct any more tests (voluntary moratorium) though India had not yet signed the NPT and CTBT.

NOTES

1. Collection of Nehru's Speeches, 1950, p. 4.
2. Bandopadhyaya, *The Making of India's Foreign Policy,* Allied, 1970, p. 231.
3. Muchkund Dubey, 'India's Foreign Policy in the Evolving Global Order', in *International Studies*, April-June, 1993, p. 117.
4. Ibid.
5. K.P. Karunakaran, pp. 22–23.
6. Nehru, *Inside America,* Delhi, p. 34.
7. See V.N. Khanna, *International Relations,* Vikas, New Delhi.
8. M.S. Rajan, *Studies in India's Foreign Policy,* New Delhi, p. 27.
9. Quoted by M.S. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
10. V.N. Khanna, *op. cit.*
11. Satish Kumar, 'Towards a Stronger and More Democratic United Nations: India's Role', in *International Studies*, April-June 1993, p. 188.
12. M.S. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

Chapter 4

The Policy of Non-Alignment

THE CONCEPT OF NON-ALIGNMENT

The concept of non-alignment is India's contribution to international relations. The policy that was announced by Jawaharlal Nehru, soon after taking over as interim Prime Minister, developed into the concept of non-alignment. It is said to be directly related to the Cold War which had commenced as soon as the Second World War ended. The term Cold War was used for acute tension that developed between two erstwhile allies, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The Second World War ended in 1945. Immediately thereafter, a conflict that was simmering within the Allied camp came out in the open. The Allies (Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union and others) won a decisive war against Germany, Italy and Japan. But, the victors could not permanently forget their ideological differences, and the Cold War was the outcome. It was a strange war, a war fought without weapons and armed forces, a war of nerves, a war diplomatically fought between two hostile camps. The two camps, or blocs, were known as (i) capitalist or western or democratic bloc, led by the United States; and (ii) the socialist or eastern or Soviet bloc, led by the Soviet Union.

The policy of non-alignment was to keep away from bloc politics, maintain friendship with both, and military alliance with none, and evolve an independent foreign policy. Nehru had made it clear on September 7, 1946 that, "we shall make history of our choice." He had added: "We propose, as far as possible to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on even vaster scale." Later, in 1947, he said that India did not belong to any of the power blocs. India's policy of non-alignment is a positive, or dynamic, neutralism-in which a country acts independently, and decides its position on each international issue on the merit of the case. Non-alignment, according to

Professor Mahendra Kumar, is one of those phenomena of international politics which appeared on international scene after the Second World War and which represents an important force in shaping the nature of international relations.[1]

Explaining the Indian view, Professor M.S. Rajan writes: "non-alignment essentially consists in the retention of a substantial measure of freedom of policy and action in international affairs... especially in relation to the policies and postures of the two Super Powers ..." He says that, "additionally non-alignment stands for abstention from power politics, for peaceful co-existence and for active international cooperation among all states — aligned and non-aligned."[2] The emphasis here is on enjoyment of freedom of policy and action by a non-aligned country. It promotes international peace, security and cooperation.

It has been stated above that non-alignment was directly related to the Cold War. It was a reaction to the Cold War which was known for "aggressive bloc building by the two Super Powers." Thus, says K.P. Misra, "dissociation from bloc politics or military alliances became the focal point of non-alignment." Now that the Cold War has ended, it is felt that there is no rationale or relevance of non-alignment. We will discuss this question in a subsequent section.

Non-alignment was adopted by India (and later by other countries) as an instrument, or means, of foreign policy in order to ensure fuller meaning and content to our newly achieved political independence. Freedom from colonial rule was important, but not enough achievement. Promotion of India's national interest depended largely on "accelerated socio-economic development" of the country. As K.P. Misra says: "They looked upon international peace as a prerequisite to the achievement of this objective, and upon the cold war, bloc politics, and power politics as injurious and hence as requiring to be opposed."[4] Thus, non-alignment was not a result of an *ad hoc* decision. It was well thought out and well planned policy. Its ultimate objective was promotion of national interest, which included not only protection of India's sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also socio-economic development of the Third World in general and India in particular, and international peace and security.

According to Professor V.P. Dutt, "Non-alignment became the logical framework of India's foreign policy. An independent foreign policy responded to the conscious and sub-conscious urges of the people, imported, a sense of pride and belonging and helped cement the unity of the country ..."[5] Such was the value of non-alignment that a large number of countries who became independent and desired, like India, to maintain their political freedom and accelerate their economic development readily adopted the policy of non-alignment. Commenting on the concept of non-alignment, as a principle of foreign policy, K. Subramanyan says that, "this doctrine of non-alignment was the response of a major nation just about to be decolonized to the preserves of the cold war. It was a pledge to work for decolonization, international peace and security and for a world order which was free of domination and racialism and which would assure equal opportunities to all peoples yet to be liberated." He adds: "Non-alignment was an assertion of autonomy in this international system dominated by the bipolar concept."[6]

Non-Alignment is Not Neutrality: Many people in the West use terms like neutrality or 'neutralism' for non-alignment. But, these terms do not correctly explain the concept of non-alignment. Neutrality as a concept refers to the status of a country during war. While the parties to a war are belligerents, and are engaged in fighting, neutral countries are those who are not parties to that particular war. For example, in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980s, India was neutral. It maintained friendly relations with both. Neutrality is the concept of aloofness in a war. The conduct of neutral countries is regulated by international law. The term neutrality is explained in the Oxford Dictionary thus: "one not assisting either side and specially lending no active support to either of the belligerents, remaining inactive in relation to either party in the case of war, and neutrality is a state of being inclined neither way during hostilities." M.S. Rajan says, "Non-alignment is riot the neutrality of a non-belligerent nation during a general war, nor is it the neutrality of the Swiss and the Austrian brand, guaranteed by other nations." However, in addition to the situation of war, Peter Lyon maintains that in modern international relations, neutrality may also have a general diplomatic or political connotation. This, according to Peter Lyon, means that in a conflict between two parties (in peace times), a third party decides to support none. This implication is fairly close to India's concept of non-alignment.

Non-Alignment is Not Neutralization or Isolationism: Neutralization is different both from neutrality and non-alignment. A neutral state is not a party to a war one day, but may become belligerent the next day. That state then ceases to be neutral. Neutralization, on the other hand, is a permanent status both in times of peace and war. Such a state is assured by other states that it will not be involved in any war and the neutralized state itself refrains from taking positions in international disputes. Switzerland has been a neutralized state for a long time. It does not have any standing army and its status was not disturbed during both the world wars. Austria's neutralized status was recognized in 1955. Non-aligned country is not committed to the neutralized status. Non-alignment is a Cold War related concept. A non-aligned country is not permanently aligned with any of the power blocs in the context of Cold War. India adopted non-alignment as a policy as soon as it became independent in 1947. A non-aligned country retains freedom to take independent foreign policy decisions. Such decisions may, in one situation, go in favour of one big or super power. In another situation, the same non-aligned country may take a decision favourable to the other power. A non-aligned country is not neutralized. It is free to be friendly with both the power blocs and take its decisions without

consideration of the wishes of super powers. Non-alignment gives freedom to vote in the United Nations and other international fora the way a country wants to. Its decisions are not dictated by any of the outside powers. National interest of a non-aligned country alone determines its decisions.

Non-alignment is different from isolationism also. Isolation means total aloofness from problems of other countries. It is neither neutrality, nor neutralization, nor non-commitment, nor non-alignment. The United States was known for its isolationism before the First World War. In accordance with Monroe Doctrine (1823), the United States had declared itself unconcerned with the European problems. Once again, for sometime after the Paris Peace Conference (1919), the United States tried to keep away from international relations of Europe. Non-aligned countries do not remain unconcerned with international relations. They actively participate in the politics among nations. The only thing they do not do is that they are not permanently tied down with any of the super powers. They do not give up their freedom of decision making, while those who were aligned with one super power or the other, during the Cold War, were virtually dictated by the bloc leader concerned. According to M.S. Rajan, non-alignment "is anything but isolationism. It means and demands an active, dynamic and positive role in world affairs."[8]

Non-alignment was defined by George Schwarzenberger as "a policy of keeping out of alliances." Elaborating this Prof. Mahendra Kumar says that non-alignment is "dissociation from the cold war." Schwarzenberger mentioned six concepts which are often used for non-alignment. They are neutrality, neutralization, isolationism, non-commitment, unilaterism and non-involvement. Peter Calvocoressi uses neutralism for non-alignment and says that "Neutralism and non-alignment were the expression of an attitude towards a particular and present conflict." According to him, they entailed "equivalent relations with both sides." This last mentioned statement gives the impression of what may be called policy of "equidistance." This again is not non-alignment. As explained above, non-alignment is freedom to take decisions in foreign policy which may not be equivalent relations with both sides, and may not keep a non-aligned country exactly at equidistance from both the Super Powers. K.P. Misra also insists that "non-blocism does not imply equidistance from blocs."

"If, in order to preserve independence, a closer relationship with one, bloc... is called for, such a relationship should be permissible provided the relationship is not allowed to be transformed into a commitment which circumscribes the exercise of sovereignty by the country concerned."

Even when we do not agree with the idea of equivalent relations, Calvocoressi's negative and positive phases of non-alignment must be clearly understood. He says that positive phase meant that the new (non-aligned) states wanted to evade the Cold War, but did not want to be left out of world politics. He refers to this phase as "positive neutralism" and says this was "an attempt to mediate and abate the dangerous quarrels of the great." In its negative phase "non-alignment involved a reprobation of the cold war, an assertion that there were more important matters in the world, an acknowledgement of the powerlessness of the new states and a refusal to judge between the two giant powers." We do not agree with the concept of "powerlessness" of non-aligned states. Actually, in its positive sense, non-alignment means freedom to decide the course of action that a country wishes to adopt in relation to world politics. In the negative sense, non-alignment implies keeping away from permanent alliances with the main actors participating in the Cold War. In the positive sense, it means refusal to allow military bases to any super power on one's territory and keep away from military entanglement of all types. Thus, non-alignment is a concept of independence of action.

Emphasising that non-alignment is a unique policy of India to protect its national interest as well as world peace, and that it is not an attitude that shirks from international responsibilities, Prof. M.S. Rajan says that it is not a policy of "sitting on the fence". A non-aligned country cannot be a mere spectator in the game of world politics, or be indifferent to the burning issues of the day. It seeks active cooperation and mutual friendship of nations of both the blocs. "For India, non-alignment is not, and has never been, a means of promoting her own stature in world affairs In order to become a Great Power."[9] Rajan rejects the view that it is idealistic policy. He calls it a "down-to-earth" policy, which originated in the realities of post-war international society.

INDIA'S POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

India, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, was the first country to have adopted the policy of non-alignment. India's policy is positive or dynamic neutralism in which a country acts independently and decides its policy on each issue on its merit. Non-alignment is based on positive reasoning. It is riot a negative, middle of the road reluctance to distinguish between right and wrong. It does not mean that a country just retires into a shell. Nehru had declared in the US Congress in 1948, "Where freedom is menaced, or justice is threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral … our policy is not neutralist, but one of active endeavour to preserve and, if possible, establish peace on firm foundations." Commenting on India's foreign policy, K.M. Panikkar had said, "She has been able to build up a position of independence and, in association with other states similarly placed, has been able to exercise considerable influence in the cause of international goodwill." In a way, this policy promotes Gandhiji's belief in non-violence. The critics in early days had said that India's policy was to remain, "neutral on the side of democracy."

Speaking in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative) on December 4, 1947, Nehru had sought to remove the impression that India's non-alignment also meant neutrality. He had said:

"We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. This has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it... We are not going to join a war if we can help it, and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice."

India wanted to prevent the third world war. Nehru said: "If and when disaster comes it will affect the world as a whole... Our first effort should be to prevent that disaster from happening." Reiterating India's resolve to keep away from power blocs, he said in 1949, "If by any chance we align ourselves definitely with one power group, we may perhaps from one point of view do some good, but I have not the shadow of doubt that from a larger point of view, not only of India but of world peace, it will do harm. Because then we lose that tremendous vantage ground that we have of using such influence as we possess … in the cause of world peace."

India's foreign policy has always had certain priorities, viz., economic development of the country, maintenance of independence of action in foreign affairs, safeguarding country's sovereignty and territorial integrity and world peace. India has firmly believed that these objectives can be achieved only by peace, keeping away from power blocs, and exercising freedom of taking foreign policy decisions.

Nehru was committed to western concept of liberalism and democracy. But, he did not approve of the military alliances like NATO and SEATO initiated by the United States to contain communism. He opposed western alliances on the ground that they encouraged new form of colonialism; and also because these were likely to promote countermoves and race for armaments between the two camps. Nehru was impressed by socialism and strongly advocated the idea of democratic socialism. But, he totally rejected the communist state as "monolithic" and described Marxism as an outmoded theory. Nehru was a combination of a socialist and a liberal democrat. He was opposed to the very idea of power blocs in international relations. India's policy of non-alignment, therefore, was not to promote a third bloc, but to ensure freedom of decision-making of the recently decolonized states. Non-alignment was promoted by India as a policy of peace, as against the policy of confrontation.

India's policy of non-alignment was against the *status quo* situation in international relations. That meant opposition of colonialism, imperialism, racial discrimination and now of neo-colonialism. India wants a world free from these evils. Secondly, non-alignment rejects the concept of superiority of Super Powers. It advocates sovereign equality of all states. Thirdly, non-alignment encourages friendly relations among countries. It is opposed to the alliances that divide the world into groups of states, or power blocs. Non-alignment advocates peaceful settlement of international disputes and rejects the use of force. It favours complete destruction of nuclear weapons and pleads for comprehensive disarmament. It supports all efforts to strengthen the United Nations. India's policy of non-alignment emphasises the social and economic problems of mankind. India has been fully supporting the demand for a new international economic order so that the unjust and unbalanced existing economic order may be changed into a new and just economic order.

Reasons for Non-Alignment

India had adopted the policy of non-alignment as it did not want to lose its freedom of decision-making, and because India's primary concern soon after independence was economic development. The policy has been sustained for five decades. Professor M.S. Rajan had mentioned seven reasons for adopting this policy initially. Firstly, it was felt that India's alignment with either the US or the USSR bloc would aggravate international tension, rather than promote international peace. Besides, the Indian Government felt later that in view of size, geopolitical importance and contribution to civilisation, India had "a positive role to play in reducing international tension, promoting peace and serving as a bridge between the two camps."

Secondly, India was neither a great power, nor could she allow herself to be treated as a nation of no consequence. India was, however, potentially a great power. Non-alignment suited India's "present needs to keep our national identity" and on the other hand not to compromise "our future role of an acknowledged Great Power."

Thirdly, India could not join either of the power blocs because of emotional and ideological reasons. We could not join the Western (American) Bloc because many of its member countries were colonial powers or ex-colonial powers, and some still practised racial discrimination. We could not join the Eastern (Soviet) Blot because communism, as an ideology, was completely alien to Indian thinking and way of life.

Fourthly, like any sovereign country, India, who had just become sovereign, wanted to retain and exercise independence of judgement, and not to "be tied to the apron-strings of another country." It meant that India wanted freedom to decide every issue on its merit.

Fifthly, according to Professor Rajan, once India launched economic development plans, we needed foreign economic aid "it was both desirable politically not to depend upon aid from one bloc only, and profitable to be able to get it from more than one source."

Sixthly, non-alignment is in accordance with India's traditional belief that "truth, right and goodness" are not the monopoly of anyone religion or

philosophy. India believes in tolerance. Therefore, the world situation, called for tolerance and peaceful co-existence of both the systems, with India not aligning with any of the blocs, nor being hostile to them.

Lastly, the domestic political situation was also responsible for the adoption of the policy of non-alignment. According to Professor Rajan, "By aligning India with either of the Blocs, the Indian Government would have sown seeds of political controversy and instability in the country ..."

Whatever the actual reasons that may have promoted Nehru and his Government to adopt the policy of non-alignment, it is obvious that the people of India by and large supported the policy. Many other countries found it in their national interest to adopt this policy which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement.

India was largely responsible for launching the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. It was initiated by Nehru, Yugoslav President Tito and Egyptian President Nasser. Twenty-five countries attended the first NAM Conference held at Belgrade and presided over by Tito. Invitations were sent out by Nehru, Nasser and Tito after careful scrutiny of foreign policies of proposed participants of the first NAM Summit. The five criteria for joining NAM were: (i) the country followed independent foreign policy based on non-alignment and peaceful co-existence; (ii) the country was opposed to colonialism and imperialism; (iii) it should not have been a member of a Cold War related military bloc; (iv) it should not have had a bilateral treaty with any of the Super Powers; and (v) NAM should not have allowed any foreign military base on its territory. It has grown both quantitatively and qualitatively. There were as many as 118 members of NAM in 2006. Its summits are periodically held in which issues concerning international politics are discussed, and attempts are made to evolve a common approach to various issues. Since the number of members has grown very large, it often becomes difficult to adopt an approach that all countries can follow. Fourteen summits were held between 1961 and 2006. The last five Summits were held after the end of Cold War, disintegration of the former USSR, completion of decolonisation with the independence of Namibia and the end of apartheid in South Africa. The NAM lost some of its fervour after the end of Cold War, though its relevance is claimed by various leaders.[10]

Different Phases of Non-Alignment

The history of India's policy of non-alignment may be broadly divided into five periods, viz., (i) 1946 to 1954; (ii) 1954 to 1962; (iii) 1962 to 1971; (iv) 1971 to 1990; and (v) post-Cold War period: 1990 onwards.

The First Phase (1946-1954): The policy of non-alignment was initiated and vigorously pursued by Nehru during 1946-54. It has been stated earlier in this chapter that soon after assuming office as interim Prime Minister, Nehru had announced in September 1946 the broad framework of the policy of non-alignment. He had made it clear that India had no desire of joining any of the two emerging power blocs. But, in the initial phase, our non-alignment was allegedly tilted towards the West, particularly the United States of America. India remained generally quiet on the ongoing anti-imperialist struggles in Malaya and Indo-China, and supported the UN decision that North Korea had committed the aggression (June 1950) against South Korea. The Soviet leader Stalin clearly expressed his displeasure on India's approach to international problems. The USSR was critical of India's support to UN on Korea, but when India criticised the United States for invading North Korea and menacingly moving towards China (after clearing south of the aggression), Soviet Union became appreciative of India's stand. Nehru had visited the United States in 1949, and had indicated his liking for Britain. There were a number of reasons for India being more inclined towards the American bloc during this phase. Firstly, India was largely dependent on Britain for its defence equipment; secondly, our armed forces had been organized on the British pattern; thirdly, the Indian intelligentsia as well as political leadership was influenced by the ideals of Westminster model of government; many of our national leaders, including Nehru, had been educated in British institutions of higher learning, and had received training in parliamentary democracy; fourthly, our trade relations were mostly limited to western countries and we depended on western economic assistance for our economic development; and lastly, the Soviet policy at that time was not very favourable to the developing countries, as all non-communist nations were considered to be anti-communist. Nehru admitted in the Parliament in 1952 that India's relations with Britain and the United States were more cordial, and that this was the outcome of our legacy.

Despite its pro-West attitude, India's policy was generally non-aligned. Nehru's India tried to act as a bridge between the East and the West. As mentioned above, India did accept the UN decision that North Korea was the aggressor, yet it opposed the entry of the UN forces into the North. India played appreciative role in bringing about an end to the Korean crisis. In 1949, India had recognised Communist China, yet so long as Stalin was living mutual understanding could not develop between India and the former Soviet Union. However, when India refused the US invitation to join (anti-communist) South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) the Socialist Bloc began seeking greater cooperation with India.

The Second Phase (1954-1962): By this time two important changes had taken place. The tenure of US President Truman had come to an end in early 1953. Soviet leader Stalin died (1953) and he was succeeded by Khrushchev as head of the Communist Party. Nehru's policy of friendship with all helped in reassessment of the policy of non-alignment both in the US and USSR. Meanwhile, relations with Communist China continued to develop smoothly and in 1954 India and China concluded the famous *Panchsheel* agreement (see

Chapter-3). India also played a significant role in the resolution of the Indo-Chinese conflict leading to India's appointment as Chairman of a Commission set up to restore normalcy there. Pakistan became a member of US-led military alliance SEATO (India had earlier declined joining it). This threatened India's security because an unfriendly Pakistan was likely to be militarily strengthened with the American backing and the US arms to be supplied to her. America rejected India's objection to the supply of US armaments to Pakistan. India was assured that US armaments would not be used by Pakistan against this country. This 'tilted' India towards the socialist bloc. After the *"Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai* agreement" of 1954, India got an opportunity to receive two top Soviet leaders: Party Leader Khrushchev and Prime Minister Bulganin. This was the first ever visit by any Soviet leader to India. The warm welcome given to them enabled the two countries to come closer in the spirit of peaceful co-existence. Two international crises occurred in 1956. Egypt was subjected to an aggression, on Suez Canal issue, by Britain, France and Israel; and a Hungarian uprising against Soviet domination was ruthlessly crushed by USSR after Soviet intervention in the fellow socialist neighbour. India condemned and bitterly criticised Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, but half-heartedly objected to the Soviet action in Hungary. This discriminatory attitude made the West unhappy.

As Nehru, Nasser and Tito were preparing to launch non-aligned movement, India had to act and get Goa liberated from the Portuguese colonial rule. Indian Army had to act to get Goa vacated and liberated, from the Portuguese, by force. Indian action in Goa was described as 'naked aggression' by West, but India's Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon said that colonialism was a permanent aggression and that Portuguese colonial aggression had to be fought with military action. Doing that was in India's national interest.

Despite the charge that India's non-alignment was being compromised with pro-Soviet stance, India continued to work hard to strengthen non-alignment. India played an active role in the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations in 1955 which become a forerunner of the first NAM Summit later (1961) held in Belgrade. India sent its troops for maintenance of peace in Congo on the request of the United Nations in 1960.

The Third Phase (1962-1971): The Chinese aggression against India proved to be a rude shock not only to India's international prestige, and morale of the people and armed forces of India, but also to the policy of non-alignment. The Soviet Union did not lend us support that we expected from a friend in the hour of need. Most of the fellow non-aligned countries did not condemn the Chinese aggression. But, unexpectedly Britain and the United States offered help and assistance to India. The Chinese betrayal of the *Panchsheel* raised a storm of protest against China in India. Also a large section of opinion builders in India seriously questioned the validity of non-alignment in the changed scenario. The policy was questioned by senior leaders like C. Rajagopalachari (former Governor-General and Home Minister of India), Acharya Kripalani and others. Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan was happy that India had now adopted a soft approach towards the West. The former Congress President and veteran leader Acharya J.B. Kripalani expressed satisfaction that India was no longer non-aligned "in favour of the Communist Bloc", mentally and emotionally, as India (according to him) was before the Chinese aggression. It was felt that India compromised non-alignment in favour of the West because of the acceptance of Western arms help. Rajaji went a step further and argued that India might formally abandon the policy of non-alignment and move closer to the West.

Michael Brecher drew two conclusions from, what he called, "non-alignment under stress" during 1962 war. For him, India's policy changed (a) from "equidistance" in relation to Super Powers to "equal proximity" to Moscow and Washington; and (b) "from an active, dynamic involvement in world politics, that is, 'neutralism' in its original Nehru-Menon conception, to a more passive ... non-alignment." He concluded that "non-alignment was almost toppled as the pillar of India's foreign policy. The term was retained but it became an empty shell ...."

It was pointed out by the critics of non-alignment that this policy was not a guarantee against aggression. This view was supported even by the British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan who said that the Chinese aggression on India demonstrated that "neutrality" was no guarantee against aggression and that "neutralism" was unrealistic as a policy of international affairs.

Nehru, even after the Chinese aggression, refused to give up the policy of non-alignment. He argued that India could take economic assistance from both the blocs, not in charity but as loan or on easy payment, only if we remained non-aligned. India would lose this freedom if she gave up the policy of non-alignment and joined one of the two blocs. The Prime Minister even went to the extent of saying that to give up non-alignment would be a "terrible moral failure." But, as M.S. Rajan rightly said, "To treat it as a moral principle is wholly an error; it is simply a political policy ...." It was indeed a mistake to confuse non-alignment, which is only an instrument of our foreign policy, as a moral imperative. Even as India stood solidly by non-alignment, once again there was a shift towards the West.

Nehru died in 1964. His successor Lal Bahadur Shastri appointed a regular Foreign Minister. During Shastri's brief tenure of 18 months, India passed through severe food shortage. America wanted India to support its Vietnam policy as a price for its help to India to meet the food shortage. When Shastri refused to oblige President Johnson, the latter insulted Indian Prime Minister by seeking postponement of Shastri's scheduled visit to the United States, which was to take place in response to Johnson's invitation to Indian leader. Shastri refused to be bullied and declined to agree to a visit on renewed invitation. Pakistan waged a war against India in September 1965 in which both USA and China gave moral support to Pakistan. This naturally moved India towards the USSR. India inflicted a crushing defeat on Pakistan. This enhanced India's prestige. Within three years of humiliation by China, India had shown to the world that she had the potential of becoming a big Power. Unfortunately, Prime Minister Shastri died soon after signing the Tashkent Agreement with Pakistan President Ayub Khan in the presence of Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin.

Indira Gandhi, who became Prime Minister in January 1966 (and remained at the helm of affairs for 11 years), tried to reorganise the unity of Afro-Asian countries. Later, a summit of three pioneers of NAM took place in Delhi when Tito, Nasser and Indira Gandhi discussed the progress of the movement. India gave full support to the Arab nations in their fight against Israel in 1967. This displeased the West. In 1968 despite India's protest, the Soviet Union supplied armaments to Pakistan. But, when Soviet intervention took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968 itself, India did not join the West in criticising the Soviet Union. The critics in India again demanded that the policy of non-alignment be given up. India was invited to attend the Rabat Conference of Islamic countries in November 1969, but, India's delegate Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed was not allowed to attend the conference. This was a severe blow to our foreign policy and humiliation of the country. Next two years were full of challenges for the Indira Gandhi Government.

The Fourth Phase (1971-1990): Mrs. Gandhi won a landslide victory in the Lok Sabha elections held in 1971. Immediately after that her government had to face a serious situation in Pakistan. In the parliamentary elections held in Pakistan, Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman won a clear majority. The Awami leader belonged to the then East Pakistan. He was denied the Prime Ministership of Pakistan and was arrested and detained in a jail in West Pakistan. This caused unprecedented uprising in East Pakistan. As the Pakistan Government began ruthless suppression in East (now Bangladesh), about one crore people entered India as refugees. The situation became so bad and Indo-Pakistan relations turned so hostile that eventually Pakistan forced a war on India, which Pakistan lost miserably. With the active help of India, Bangladesh was born as a sovereign state. Before the war, Pakistan was fully supported by the United States as well as China. US President Nixon even warned Mrs. Gandhi that US would intervene and support Pakistan in the war. India was left with no alternative but to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971. This treaty proved to be a deterrent for USA who threatened, but did not intervene, though it gave big moral as well as military assistance to Pakistan. Communist China also backed Pakistan on the Bangladesh issue.

The events of 1971 changed the course of India's foreign policy. India came as close to the Soviet Union as Pakistan was to the United States, although it did not sign any military pact or alliance. But Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 invited sharp criticism against India. It was said that non-alignment had been turned into alignment with the USSR as the latter pledged help to India which we badly needed. The treaty provided that both countries would respect the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the other; that no country shall "enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party"; and that each country undertook "to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other party." The critics of the Treaty could not carry the people with them. Indo-Soviet relations improved considerably and Indo-US relations reached an all time law. India remained non-aligned, but our tilt towards USSR became clear and apparent.

The Janata Government at the Centre in 1977-79, did net alter the policy of non-alignment. Foreign Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, in Morarji Desai Government, assured people of genuine non-alignment by correcting the unnecessary tilt towards USSR. But, even Vajpayee did not turn against the Soviet Union. In fact he tried to improve and normalise relations with China and Pakistan (see details in chapters 5 and 6), even as Prime Minister Desai refused to yield to the threat by US President Carter, and did not agree to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is discriminatory in nature. Signing it would have been against India's national interest.

India remained non-aligned even though Janata leaders were generally pro-West, but the Government gave no evidence of deviating from Indo-Soviet friendship. Indira Gandhi, in her second tenure (1980-84) and Rajiv Gandhi's Government (1984–1989) maintained very cordial relations with the Soviet Union, so much so that India's stand was often taken to be a compromise with non-alignment. India continued to adopt anti-Israel posture (which annoyed America), refused consistently to sign NPT, and did not criticise the Soviet Union during her intervention in and occupation of Afghanistan (1979-88). Nevertheless, India continued to actively participate in non-aligned movement, and hosted the 1983 summit in New Delhi. India was earlier criticised when she did not oppose Cuban President's announcement (at Havana Summit, 1979) that Soviet Union was a natural friend of the non-aligned movement. But, then in 1979 India had only a caretaker Government headed by Charan Singh, who did not attend the Havana Summit. By 1990 the Cold War had ended and a question mark was put on the continued relevance of non-alignment in the post-cold war period.

The Fifth Phase (Post-Cold War Period): The Cold War ended when US President George Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev met at Malta in December 1989. Its end was formally announced at Malta. Thus, the year 1990 commenced as the beginning of post-cold war period. India has been saying that non-alignment is still relevant as a policy aimed at economic development and international peace. While Warsaw Pact and other military alliances have been dissolved, NATO still exists. At foreign policy level, non-alignment continues to determine the attitude of 118 members of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). A new world order has not really emerged, though the world order created after Second World War has collapsed. In an emerging unipolar world, India continues to insist on the policy of non-alignment.

Relevance of Non-alignment in Post-Cold War Period

In view of the developments that took place in the world during the last decade of the twentieth century, students of international politics wondered as to what type of world order would emerge. The Cold War ended before January 1990. The process had begun soon after Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet Communist Party General Secretary in 1985. He introduced several changes in the domestic politics and economics, which misfired and led to disintegration of the USSR. But, he and US President Reagan also initiated talks that led to the end of Cold War. The two top leaders met four times in four years (1985-88), and in 1987 signed the INF Treaty for the elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Short Range Missiles. It was ratified at Moscow in 1988. When new US President Bush and President Gorbachev met in December 1989, the tension of Cold War had gone, and they formally declared the end of Cold War. The Berlin Wall, that had divided Berlin into two, was pulled down in November 1989, and next year the two Germanies were unified under the American umbrella. By the end of 1991, the once mighty Soviet Union had disintegrated, and 15 erstwhile Republics became sovereign states who joined the United Nations. Russian Federation was recognised as a successor state of USSR and consequently retained the permanent seat in the UN Security Council. By 1992, bipolar world had changed into a somewhat unipolar world with the United States remaining the only Super Power.

As Germany and Japan had emerged as economic giants and were likely to challenge the US Super Power status, the world was perhaps heading towards multipolarity. Professor Satish Kumar wrote in 1993: "The United States has emerged as the most dominant military and economic power, although Germany and Japan have seriously challenged its economic supremacy." He added: "The countries of the South have been marginalised in world politics, and the world is repolarised along the North-South Axis instead of the East-West Axis." Thus, international system is in a flux. Muchkund Dubey also expressed similar views. He wrote: "Although the United States is militarily the only Super Power, as far as economic matters are concerned, we are living in a multipolar world."

In this new emerging world order, serious doubts have emerged as to the relevance of India's policy of non-alignment. If, as is generally believed, Cold War gave rise to non-alignment, this policy should have become redundant when the Cold War ended. It has been often said that non-alignment was a specific response to a specific situation when the world was divided into two blocs. At that time it was courageous and pragmatic for India to adopt the third course. But, as was repeatedly said by Nehru and other Indian foreign policy experts and NAM supporters, the policy of non-alignment is in effect a policy of independent foreign policy decision-making, which means freedom to take foreign policy decisions in New Delhi, rather than receive dictation either from Washington or Moscow or London. Secondly, it also opened possibilities of getting aid from different quarters for economic development. Lastly, non-alignment is aimed at international peace and peaceful settlement of disputes. As all the three objectives still exist, the relevance of non-alignment remains undisturbed. It was a coincidence that non-alignment had emerged during the Cold War and bipolarity, its continued relevance even after these two contexts cease to exist is significant, for the three reasons mentioned above.

Narasimha Rao[12] had in June 1991, reaffirmed India's adherence to the policy of non-alignment. Later, in a speech made in Tokyo in 1992, Prime Minister Rao said:

"The pursuit of a non-aligned policy is even more relevant today than ever before. Non-alignment basically consists of the espousal of the rights of nations to independence and development, regardless of the bloc phenomenon. Whether there is one bloc or more at a given moment, the urge of a non-aligned country would continue to be to maintain its independence, to take decisions according to its rights, not tagging itself in advance to others."

Rao dared to assert that the "chimera of hegemony must not be pursued." M.S. Rajan argues that, "...whatever the world is — bipolar; multipolar or unipolar — non-alignment, as a foreign policy option of the small/weak states will remain continuously relevant or valid." Dealing with the question of continued relevance of the non-aligned movement (NAM) also, he wrote that it is as much relevant today as it was in 1960s. This is because "We are still continuing to suffer (as we have been since the birth of sovereign-nation-state system nearly four centuries ago) from Great Power hegemony." So long as this hegemony exists, non-alignment as the vital principle of India's foreign policy will remain relevant. Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral, in the Deve Gowda Government (1996-97), also confirmed India's continued belief in non-alignment. There is no possibility of the policy of non-alignment becoming irrelevant in the near future.

It is now generally believed that non-alignment has little relevance in political sense, because now every nation is indeed taking independent foreign policy decisions. India took very strong and independent stand on the question

of signing of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CTBT, in 1996 first at Geneva Conference on Disarmament, CD, and later in the UN General Assembly. India refused to sign the CTBT despite all kinds of pressures. However, in economic sphere, developing countries have to cooperate with each other to retain their leverage in the face of globalisation of economy. This cooperation can still be wonderfully provided in the NAM forum. Thus, non-alignment cannot be easily wished away even after the end of twentieth century. It remains valid as an instrument of economic development and social change, even if its relevance in the political context may be much less 45 years after NAM was launched and 60 years after India had adopted the policy of non-alignment.

According to J.N. Dixit, a former Foreign Secretary, "Being non-aligned means retaining the freedom to take decisions related to your interests without external influence to the extent possible." This implies a nation's freedom in the conduct of its foreign and defence policies. Thus, India continues to be non-aligned even if the relevance of NAM as a movement is being questioned. Dixit added, "Being part of non aligned movement ... presumes ideological and operational commitments to the concept of non-alignment based on the conviction that it is the most effective approach to meet individual and collective national interests."

Some of the issues that had united the non-aligned countries in the Movement were decolonisation, anti-imperialism, fight against racial discrimination and the question of Palestine. The first three are no more issues of concern. Palestine is being tackled outside NAM. Even during the Cold War, NAM's role in regard to these issues was limited "to focus attention and give general political and moral support to actions and impulses which led to the solutions." NAM as such did not solve them.

In the post-Cold War world, unity issues are not of same concern as they were till 1989. It is, therefore, believed that NAM should mainly concern itself with contemporary issues by creating global consensus on areas such as global violence and terrorism, global economic inequalities, global concern for human rights and human environment. Many of the objectives of NAM are now being pursued through regional organisations such SAARC (see Chapter 10), ASEAN and APEC.

The profound technological and economic changes that have taken place in the Third World are not uniform. This has resulted in inequalities and different levels of prosperity and quality of life amongst the non-aligned nations. According to J.N. Dixit, "If the Movement is to have a future role, it must move away from its orthodoxies and repetitive hortarory pronouncements. It must focus on new challenges to developing countries on transfer of technology and investments. social and educational issues, human rights, and about meeting the political implications of new strategic and power equations dominated by the great powers which affect the UN functioning, and evolving international economic arrangements."

Another former foreign Secretary M.K. Rasgotra felt that the world today is not really unipolar. The US was always a premier power even during the Cold War. Besides, Russia is bound to bounce back as a major Power once it sets its house in order. Germany and Japan are emerging as new economic giants. Thus, NAM may still be relevant. According to Rasgotra, since the essence of non-alignment is independence in decision-making, India would continue to follow the policy of non-alignment. But, as far as NAM is concerned it should now takeover issues like drug abuse, exploitation of women, poverty, disease and environmental degradation.

The doctrine of non-alignment, says K. Subrahmanyam, "had a contextual significance and was not an enduring ideology." It was relevant in the international power configuration at a particular point of time. Today that power configuration is undergoing a very radical transformation. Therefore, the non-aligned countries "have to assess very carefully the newly evolving international environment to update their strategy." The NAM Foreign Ministers Conference held in New Delhi in April 1997 applied its mind to the changed environment. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan represented the world body in the conference. It was agreed by 113-members NAM that it must playa more positive role in the international affairs and project the views of the developing world. NAM should not be denigrated, but it should be encouraged to tackle numerous socio-economic problems. "We have to tackle essentials, like putting bread on the table for the hungry millions of our countries" concluded Alfred Nzo, the Foreign Minister of South Africa. However, many people feel that NAM had not been able to achieve much. Some say that *NAM conferences are just talk shops.*

The twelfth NAM Summit held at Durban in September 1998 was attended by 113 countries, and was presided over by South African President Nelson Mandela. India was represented by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. India had certain anxious moments at the Summit. *First,* while talking about international disputes, President Mandela in his inaugural address mentioned Jammu & Kashmir and hinted at possible NAM mediation. India took strong exception at third party mediation offer. Consequently, South Africa assured India that it had no intention of interfering in Indo-Pak bilateral dispute. *Second,* an attempt was made to condemn India and Pakistan for their May 1998 nuclear tests. India resisted this. Eventually, only anxiety was expressed at the tests. The Summit gave a call for a universal, non-discriminatory nuclear regime, and adopted India's proposal for an international conference in 1999 to work for the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

The thirteenth Summit scheduled for 2001 at Dhaka could not take place. Instead NAM Summit was held in early 2003 at Kuala Lumpur under the

Chairmanship of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir Mohamed. Pakistani President Musharraf raised the question of so-called denial of self-determination in Kashmir and charged India of occupying the state. Vajpayee rebutted all charges forcefully, and said that it was Pakistan which was in illegal occupation of a part of the state, whereas people of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir had freely endorsed accession through their Constituent Assembly. India demanded immediate end to terrorism from across the border.

FOURTEENTH NAM SUMMIT, 2006

The fourteenth Summit of the Movement was held in September 2006 at Havana (Cuba). It was chaired by the Acting President Raul Castro (as President Fidel Castro had been hospitalised). India was represented by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who rejecting the concept of "Clash of Civilisations", called for a collective message to focus on urgent transnational issues such as terrorism, energy security and environment. Cuban leader launched a frontal attack on US for its monopolistic role in world politics. Cuba was supported by Venezuelan President Chavez in condemning the United States.

The Summit, attended by 118 nations, expressed its total opposition to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It asked the member-nations to fight the menace by all means including by prosecuting and extraditing its perpetrators. Without naming Pakistan, the Havana Declaration expressed deep concern that the terrorist groups, including former Taliban, were regrouping. Supporting India's campaign for reforms in the UN, especially the Security Council, the Summit expressed concern over lack or progress on the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council.

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon the members to strengthen the three pillars of development, security and human rights.

The Summit asked member countries to fulfill their obligations under international law and humanitarian law to combat terrorism. It called upon the mediators to remain actively involved to bring about resumption of direct talks between Palestine and Israel. The NAM hoped that the question of Iran's nuclear issue would be resolved through diplomacy and peaceful means. The 118-nation NAM reiterated the relevance of the Movement even as the world was rapidly changing from bipolarity to a new situation of fluidity.

NOTES

1. Mahendra Kumar, *Theoretical Aspects of International Politics,* Agra, p. 352.
2. M.S. Rajan, *Studies in India's Foreign Policy,* New Delhi, p. 286.
3. K.P. Misra, 'The Conceptual Profile of Non-Alignment', in Misra & Narayanan (ed.), *Non-Alignment in Contemporary International Relations,* p. 197.

4. Ibid., p. 198.
5. V.P. Dutt, *India's Foreign Policy*, Vikas, New Delhi, p. 4.
6. K. Subrahmanyan, 'Non-alignment and the Struggle for Peace and Security', in Misra, Narayanan (ed.), *Non-Alignment* in *Contemporary International Relations*, p. 122.
7. Switzerland does not maintain a standing army, is committed not to wage war against any state, and has been assured freedom from aggression.
8. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 287.
9. Ibid.
10. See V.N. Khanna, *International Relations*, Vikas, New Delhi.
11. Satish Kumar, *Towards a Stronger and Democratic United Nations: India's Role in International Studies*, April-June 1993, p. 174.
12. Foreign Minister of India during January 1980-July 1984 and 1988-89.

Chapter 5

India and Its Neighbours: Pakistan

INTRODUCTION

Two independent sovereign dominions were born in mid-August 1947[1]. "The two dominions, India and Pakistan, were created by a law enacted by British Parliament to grant independence to the then British India, and divide it. Both were to remain members of British Commonwealth of Nations, unless otherwise decided by them. Pakistan was carved out of British India because the Muslim League, led by M.A. Jinnah, insisted that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations, and therefore two states must be constituted for the two communities. Indian National Congress, and most of Indian people, did not subscribe to the concept of 'two nations'. But, the British Government would not free India until Pakistan was accepted by the Congress as a bitter pill to avoid bloodshed caused by Jinnah's call for direct action. Not only Indian sub-continent was divided into two sovereign countries, but well over 500 native (princely) states were also given freedom to decide their future. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 provided for the lapse of 'paramountcy' in respect of native states.[2] The rulers of the native states were given the power to decide whether their states would merge in India or Pakistan, or, by implication, would remain independent. The last was a very dangerous implication.

Although for centuries Hindus and Muslims had lived together in the sub-continent, the partition created unprecedented hostility between secular India and Islamic Pakistan. The partition has been described as the most unfortunate fact of post-war international politics. "The fact that territory with its people that historically, geographically and economically were for centuries one country and one nation, were partitioned somewhat arbitrarily into two sovereign nation-states, and the circumstances of that partition and its consequences made inevitable a certain amount of disharmony between the two new states."[3] But, it is not just disharmony; it is Pakistan's hatred for India and call for *jehad* that upset India's desire to live in peace with its neighbour.

In a message on August 15, 1947 Jawaharlal Nehru had said: "I want to say to all nations of the world, including our neighbour country that we stand for peace and friendship with them." This has been the main thrust of India's foreign policy for 60 years. In fact, Pakistan's Governor-General, and creator, M.A. Jinnah had also said that, "We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial friendly relations with our immediate neighbour and with the world at large." But, what actually happened between India and Pakistan was conflict, discord and even wars. Writing Nehru's biography, Michael Brecher had stated in 1959 that, "India and Pakistan have been in a state of undeclared war, with varying degrees of intensity..." The undeclared war took an ugly turn when India and Pakistan fought a war in 1965. Once again in 1971, Pakistan forced a war on India and got defeated. Since 1971, there has been no formal war, but border clashes along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir became a common feature. In 1999, Pakistan army occupied Kargil heights on the Indian side of Line of Control. India responded, and an undeclared war was fought. It resulted in Pakistanis being thrown out of Indian territory. Besides, Pakistan has been guiding and helping several elements that are determined to destabilise India.

India has consistently sought peaceful, cordial and friendly relations with Pakistan, and with all other countries in the world. However, Pakistan leadership has been harping on threats from India, and the alleged Indian desire to swallow her. India has repeatedly said that it wishes to respect Pakistan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. India has made it clear time and again that it does not have any intention whatsoever to undo the partition, and that it sincerely desires to settle all outstanding problems and disputes between the two countries by peaceful means, without resort to force. In the past, India has made several offers of "no-war pact" to Pakistan, but the latter has never responded favourably to India's offer. Pakistan's policy towards India has been one of persistent hostility. Nehru had once described Pakistan's policy as that of "India-baiting." The leadership of Pakistan has persistently accused India of not having reconciled to India's partition, and planning to undo it. A leading Pakistan newspaper, *Dawn* had once alleged that India's policy was "that Pakistan should be friendless and defenseless, so that we could be' perpetually held to ransom and at some future time swallowed up." This false and mischievous propaganda has gone on for decades. Thus, the basic problem between India and Pakistan is that while India wants friendship with its neighbour, that country has nothing but hatred for and hostility towards India.

The anti-India policy of Pakistan, blaming Hindu community for all the problems, is clearly reflected in what former Pakistan Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto wrote in *The Myth of Independence.* He wrote that the Muslims had ruled over the sub-continent for 700 years, and finally they succeeded (in 1947) in carving out their homeland. According to Bhutto, Hindu masses were disturbed by this historic "complex" and their defeat. He said that Muslim Pakistan was a

challenge to Hindu nationalism. He was of the opinion that Indian leadership was forced to accept Pakistan as they were left with no alternative. The anti-India attitude and campaign by Pakistan is always coloured by that country in communal shades. India has never believed in communalism. India has always advocated secularism and behaved in a secular manner. Despite gravest communal provocations from Pakistan, Indian people have generally maintained communal harmony, because India is not a Hindu state, whereas Pakistan takes pride in being an Islamic Republic. India believes in equality of all communities and full religious freedom to all its people. With this background Pakistan's charges against India are baseless, and aimed at maintaining conflict between the two neighbours.

The Problem of Native States: The question of the future of over 560 native states, ruled by princes under British paramountcy was one of the most complicated problems after independence. The announcement that paramountcy would lapse and choice given to respective rulers to decide the future of their states created the problem of integration of states with one of the Dominions. Most of the princely rulers were loyal to the British Crown and were instrumental in suppression of freedom movement and denial of rights to the people of states. Sardar Patel, who was Home Minister in Nehru Cabinet, used his persuasive as well as coercive power to bring about merger of 567 of the native states with India. Five of the states decided to join Pakistan. Three of the states failed to take any decision. These were Junagarh, Hyderabad and Jammu & Kashmir. The state of Junagarh, in Kathiawad region, was ruled by a Muslim Nawab, but had a majority of Hindu population. The Nawab was a fun loving person, who was more interested in seeking pleasure for himself than welfare of the people. He prolonged the decision on merger, and finally chose to join Pakistan. Since Junagarh is surrounded by Indian territory, Pakistan did not show any enthusiasm about the ruler's decision. Anarchic situation developed in the state. India was forced to take military action in Junagarh. The Nawab fled to Pakistan; the state became a part of India. But, Pakistan got an opportunity to blame India, and to prepare for an intervention in Jammu & Kashmir where (unlike Junagarh) bulk of the people were Muslim and the ruler was a Hindu Maharaja. After the Nawab fled to Pakistan, the Diwan of Junagarh requested for the state's merger with India. The wishes of the people were, however, ascertained in a plebiscite in February 1948. An overwhelming majority voted in favour of merger and only 91 votes were cast against it. Pakistan unsuccessfully tried to internationalise the issue.

The large-sized native state of Hyderabad presented a different problem. This state in South India was surrounded on all sides by Indian territory — the then Provinces of Bombay, Madras, Central Provinces and the state of Mysore which had already merged with India. The ruler of Hyderabad, the Nizam, was one of the wealthiest individuals in the world. He was given the title of His

Exalted Highness by the British Government. The Nizam was dreaming of an independent kingdom, though he had given the impression of his being in favour of Pakistan. The Nizam had given a loan of two crore rupees to Pakistan. Jinnah knew the Nizam too well. He told Indian Governor-General Lord Mountbatten that Hyderabad was the concern of the Nizam. Like Junagarh, vast majority of people in Hyderabad were Hindus, though the ruler was Muslim. The Nizam was planning to make his state a sovereign country, yet he was negotiating merger with India. Pakistan gave an indication that the Nizam could rely on that country in case of difficulty.

Meanwhile, the Nizam's aide Qasim Rizwi established an organisation of Muslim fundamentalists. Its members, known as Razakars, were given training to fight for their community. The Razakars let loose a reign of terror in the state, killing and looting people, and in the process entire law and order machinery collapsed. People allover the country became restless and demanded use of force to settle the problem of Hyderabad and restore peace. Earlier, on four occasions, police action was planned but could not be taken. Finally, the fifth attempt or 'Operation Polo' was drafted and implemented under the direct control of Home Minister Sardar Patel. Even Prime Minster Nehru was not taken into confidence for fear of his disapproval. Indian army brought the situation under control within 24 hours, but the task was completed in five days. Accepting Nizam's formal request for accession, India agreed to pay Rs. 50 lakhs per year as privy purse to the Nizam. Pakistan termed Indian action as aggression, and raised the issue thrice (October, November and December 1948) in the United Nations. But, it could not muster much support except that of the United States.

The third state that created problem was Jammu & Kashmir. This issue became so complicated that even 60 years after independence it remained a source of high tension and conflict between India and Pakistan. This issue will be discussed in details in a subsequent section.

The Problem of Displaced Persons and Minorities: The problem of refugees (or displaced persons) coming to India from Pakistan and those going from India to Pakistan was directly related to the problem of minorities in the two countries. Immediately after partition, large scale riots broke out in Pakistan. Hindus and Sikhs were not only forced to flee from that state leaving behind all their property, but large number of them were killed or wounded, their possessions looted, women raped and many of them kidnapped. It had its repercussions in India and anti-Muslim riots occurred at places on this side of the border. But, while Government of India took strong measures to check violence and provide maximum security to Muslim minority in India, the Government of Pakistan failed miserably in protecting non-Muslims in that country. Even train loads of dead bodies arrived from Pakistan causing very strong reaction on this side of the border. Eventually, both the countries had to face the problem of refugees who migrated to the other side. India maintained

its secular character and we are proud of that. But, Pakistan showed no real concern for its minorities.

The Inter-Dominion Agreement of April 1948 had clearly provided t that the responsibility for the protection of minorities rested on the governments of the two countries. But, both India and Pakistan accused each other of deliberately causing communal conflicts and riots. Pakistani charge against India certainly could not be substantiated. Prime Minister Nehru invited Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to Delhi to discuss the problem of minorities. An agreement between India and Pakistan, called the Nehru-Liaquat Agreement, was signed on April 8, 1950. It affirmed the rights of minorities in their respective countries. Despite this agreement, and India's very sincere efforts to protect minorities, protection of minorities in Pakistan remained only on paper. The agreement was never sincerely implemented in Pakistan. Meanwhile, two members of Indian Cabinet, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherji and K.C. Neogi, resigned by way of protest against the Agreement. In Pakistan, the only Hindu member of Cabinet, Jogendra Nath Mandal, resigned as a protest against ill-treatment of Hindus in that country. The problem of minorities remained a live issue between the two countries.

As mentioned above, as a result of partition millions of people were displaced and they crossed the border as refugees. India faced the problem of rehabilitating them on a much larger scale than Pakistan. It took India almost 15 years to fully rehabilitate millions of people who had come here. Jobs had to be found for them, financial assistance was to be given to those who decided to set up their business and a large number of houses had to be constructed. A major issue concerned the evacuee property, the property left behind by the refugees. It was both movable and immovable property, including houses, shops, factories and bank accounts. Hindus and Sikhs had left behind in Pakistan property worth over Rs. 3,000 crores, whereas the evacuee property left in India was only worth Rs. 300 crores. Therefore, the problem in India was more acute. Despite several rounds of talks between two countries, no worthwhile solution could be found.

At economic level, India was to make a cash payment of Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan, and the latter had to give a credit of Rs. 300 crores to India within five years. Pakistan did not fulfill its commitment. Mahatma Gandhi went on fast unto death in 1947 to compel Nehru Government to give the said amount of Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan. Nehru said that this payment was in accordance with high ideals of India and moral principles of Mahatma Gandhi.

The Sharing of River Waters: The undivided Punjab was known as the land of five rivers. The irrigation network of Punjab had made the province the "Granary of India." Partition of India left three rivers Ravi, Sutlej and Beas, mainly flowing in India; Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, mostly flowing in Pakistan.

Ravi, Sutlej and Beas are known as eastern rivers and the rest as western rivers. 20 out of 25 canals receiving water from eastern rivers irrigated Indian territory. If India wished to play mischief, it could have used all the water turning Pakistani Punjab into a desert. India never had such evil intentions. Even then the sharing of river waters became a major issue between India and Pakistan.

Under a standstill agreement India had agreed to supply water to the canals in Pakistan from the headworks in India against payment. This agreement lapsed on March 31, 1948 as Pakistan failed to renew it. A fresh agreement was concluded on May 4, 1948 whereby the two governments agreed to a progressive diminution of water supplies by India to Pakistan. India had to construct a dam at Bhakra to meet the irrigation needs of its territory. Pakistan unilaterally repudiated 1948 agreement in August 1950 saying that it was signed under 'duress'. Mr. Eugene Blake, President of the World Bank, agreed to mediate between India and Pakistan on the sharing of waters in 1951. An agreement on sharing of canal waters was eventually concluded on September 19, 1960. It was signed at Rawalpindi by Nehru and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. It was provided in the Agreement that after an interim period of ten years, which could be extended for another three years on the request of Pakistan, the waters of all the three eastern rivers would be used by India and of western rivers by Pakistan. But, during the interim period of ten years India would supply to Pakistan water in progressive diminution from its three rivers, viz., Ravi, Sutlej and Beas. India also agreed to give financial assistance to Pakistan for the construction of link canals. In case of extension of interim period by three years, the money to be given by India to Pakistan would be proportionately reduced.

This agreement was implemented with effect from January 12, 1961. The dispute regarding sharing of river/canal water was amicably settled. Nehru described it as a memorable event.

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE

The erstwhile native state of Jammu & Kashmir, having total area of 86,024 square miles, has been described as 'heaven on earth'. But, unfortunately it has been the cause of hostile relations between India and Pakistan ever since the partition in 1947. This northern state was populated predominantly by Muslims and was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja, Hari Singh. Maharaja Hari Singh did not take any decision regarding state's accession before, or immediately after, August 15, 1947. Pending final decision, the Maharaja concluded a standstill agreement with Pakistan. India did not accept such a temporary arrangement. The Maharaja was planning to declare his state an independent country. However, Pakistan began building pressure for accession of Kashmir to that country. Supply of several important requirements to Kashmir was stopped.

Earlier, in July 1947, the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten had visited Kashmir for four days. According to Mountbatten, he pleaded on each of these four days, with Hari Singh to quickly take a decision to accede either to India or Pakistan. The Maharaja did not realise gravity of the situation. He kept on evading discussion on accession. The Maharaja did not go to the airport to see Lord Mountbatten off when he was leaving for Delhi. The Maharaja sent a message that he was ill, but the Governor-General understood that Hari Singh was avoiding him. Mountbatten later regretted the Maharaja's indecision and said that had he decided before August 14, 1947 even to accede to Pakistan, India would have had no objection. Even Sardar Patel, the Home Minister, was reported to have told Mountbatten that India would have no objection if Kashmir voluntarily decided to join Pakistan. But Hari Singh's ambition and indecision created a dispute between India and Pakistan which is the gravest of international disputes in which India has ever been involved.

Immediately before the attack by Pakistan-sponsored tribals on Kashmir began, a senior official of Pakistan Foreign Office visited Kashmir and tried to persuade Hari Singh to agree to join Pakistan. Maharaja refused to take any decision in haste. Soon thereafter the aggression began. The invaders were tribesmen from North-Western Frontier Province. They launched the attack on October 22, 1947 in a number of sectors. They were well-trained and equipped. Within a short period of five days they reached Baramula, just 25 miles away from Srinagar. It is only after the commencement of aggression that a nervous Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession in favour of India.

Maharaja Hari Singh requested India to accept the accession and send armed forces immediately to repulse the attack and save the State of Jammu & Kashmir. He admitted that he had only two alternatives either to allow the aggressors to loot the state and kill its people or to join India as a part of the Dominion. He pleaded with the Government of India to accept his request immediately. The accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India was finalised by October 27, and the army was airlifted to clear the aggression. While accepting the accession of Jammu & Kashmir, India said that after the aggression is vacated wishes of the people of state would be ascertained on the question of accession. In a letter written by Lord Mountbatten to Hari Singh the latter was assured of all help for the security of the state, and promised that, "the question of state's accession would be settled by a reference to the people." But Pakistan refused to accept the accession. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan said that, "the accession of Kashmir to India is a fraud perpetrated on the people of Kashmir by its cowardly ruler with the aggressive help of the Government of India." It is strange that the aggressors chose to describe India's help, to victim of Pakistan's invasion, as aggression.

The Indian army moved rapidly and the invaders began to retreat, but because they were receiving all help and supplies from Pakistan the pace of success of Indian army was slow. India did not want an open war with Pakistan. On January 1, 1948 India brought the matter to the notice of the United Nations Security Council under Article 35 of the Charter. India sought UN assistance to have Pakistan-supported aggression vacated. India had tried earlier to reason with Pakistan, but to no avail. So, she now charged Pakistan with "an act of aggression against India." Pakistan denied India's allegations, framed several charges against it, and declared that Kashmir's accession to India was illegal. Meanwhile, Indian army had vacated about half of the area earlier taken by the tribals.

Pakistan had installed a so-called Azad Kashmir Government in the territory occupied by the invaders. Even today Pakistan insists that the area under its control is independent, or Azad Kashmir. In March 1948, a very popular leader of the Valley, and a friend of Nehru, Sheikh Abdullah took over as the Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir. During the pendency of the dispute in the Security Council, Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, announced that his government was willing to accept the proposal of plebiscite, but stipulated certain conditions on which Azad Kashmir Government could be persuaded to accept cease fire. Liaquat Ali wanted withdrawal of Indian troops and immobilisation of State's security forces, substitution of Sheikh Abdullah's government by a coalition including representatives of Azad Kashmir, and then holding of plebiscite under international supervision. These conditions were totally unacceptable to India. Thus, began a never-ending conflict between India and Pakistan.

The decision of Nehru and his Government to offer a plebiscite, to ascertain the wishes of the people, was a serious mistake. It has been responsible for prolonged dispute, occasional border clashes and terrorist attacks. Thousands of *jawans* and civilians have been killed even after the formal ceasefire on January 1, 1949.

After careful consideration, the Security Council appointed a three-member Commission on January 20, 1948. The Commission had one nominee each of India and Pakistan and the third member was to be chosen by the two nominees. India nominated Czechoslovakia and Pakistan's nominee was Argentina. As the two failed to agree on a third member, the Security Council nominated the United States as the third member. The Commission was to investigate and mediate in the dispute. The Security Council added two more members, Belgium and Colombia, by a resolution of April 21, 1948. The Commission was now called the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The Security Council also resolved that Indian troops as well as tribesmen should be withdrawn, that an interim government, representing major political groups, be set up, and that the UNCIP should visit Jammu and Kashmir to exercise its good offices in helping the two countries restore peace and arrange a fair plebiscite. This resolution did not please either India or Pakistan.

The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) conducted enquiry, met representatives of both India and Pakistan and finally submitted a report on December 11, 1948. This report contained the following recommendations aimed at ending the hostilities and holding of plebiscite. First, Pakistan should withdraw its troops from Jammu & Kashmir as soon as possible after the ceasefire, and that Pakistan should also try for withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who are not ordinary residents of Kashmir. Second, the territory thus vacated by Pakistani troops should be administered by local officials under the supervision of the Commission. Third, after these two conditions are fulfilled and India is informed about their compliance by the UNCIP, India should also withdraw substantial strength of its troops. Finally, pending a final agreement India should maintain only such limited troops as should be essential for law and order.

After initial reluctance, Pakistan accepted these proposals and a cease fire agreement was signed which was implemented by the two commanders on the midnight of January 1, 1949. The war ended and a cease fire became effective. A plebiscite was to be held in Jammu & Kashmir after all the conditions stipulated by UNCIP were met. The Indian army was in a position to push the invaders out, and liberate the whole of state when suddenly the cease fire was announced. If the army would have got some more time, the entire state would have become free from invaders.

The cease fire line (now called the Line of Control) was drawn where the fighting ended. An agreement on cease fire line was reached in Karachi on July 27, 1949. It left 32,000 sq. miles of J & K territory in possession of Pakistan which is called Azad Kashmir by Pakistan. It had 7 lakh (out of a total of 80 lakh) population. The UNCIP had recommended that disagreements between India and Pakistan over implementation of cease fire agreement would be brought to the notice of the Plebiscite Administrator, Admiral Chester Nimitz. India refused and the whole issue fell back on the Security Council. As Nimitz could not ensure compliance of UN resolutions regarding withdrawal of Pakistan troops, he resigned.

The McNaughton Plan: It became clear by the end of 1949 that Pakistan was not likely to pull out its troops from the occupied territory so as to facilitate the holding of plebiscite. General McNaughton of Canada who was President of the Security Council in December 1949 submitted a plan for the solution of Kashmir tangle. The plan prepared by McNaughton, the informal mediator, suggested withdrawal of both Pakistani and Indian troops from Kashmir. Thus, it proposed demilitarisation of Kashmir to prepare grounds for a plebiscite. This plan did not distinguish between the aggressor (Pakistan) and the victim

(India). Whereas Pakistan had sponsored (and later directly supported) the aggression, Indian troops were sent on request of the then Maharaja, and that also only after the State's formal accession to India. This plan was, therefore, rejected by India. Commenting on the McNaughton Plan, India's representative B.N. Rao said:

"Today the position is that Pakistan which throughout 1948 denied giving aid either to the invader or to the Azad Kashmir forces, is now itself not only an invader but in actual occupation of nearly half the area of the state without any lawful authority from any source. This is naked aggression of which no one can approve, but there is no sign of disapproval in the McNaughton proposal."

The Dixon Proposal: After the failure of McNaughton Plan, the Security Council resolved on February 24, 1950 that the troops of Pakistan as well as India should be withdrawn from Kashmir within five months so as to facilitate the holding of plebiscite. Sir Owen Dixon, a judge of the High Court of Australia, was appointed to ensure compliance of the Security Council Resolution. Dixon arrived in the sub-continent on May 27, 1950. His efforts failed as no agreement could be reached on pulling out of all the troops. India refused to withdraw its troops as they were not the aggressors; they were in a part of Indian territory gone there to repulse the aggression. Sir Owen Dixon himself accepted that the entry of tribesmen in October 1947, and of Pakistan's regular army in May 1948, was violation of international law. Even then he tried to put both India and Pakistan at par. Dixon proposed partition of Jammu & Kashmir along the cease fire line, and yet he suggested plebiscite in the valley to determine its future. This proposal was totally unacceptable to India. Dixon realised his failure and asked the Security Council to relieve him. He suggested direct negotiations between India and Pakistan.

The Graham Mission: After the failure of Dixon Mission, an attempt was made by the Commonwealth Conference held at Landon to find a solution to the Kashmir problem. It proposed demilitarisation followed by arbitration. No such proposal was acceptable to India. Meanwhile, it was decided by Sheikh Abdullah Government to hold elections for a Constituent Assembly to frame a Constitution for Jammu & Kashmir. This decision disturbed Pakistan, which raised the Kashmir issue again in the Security Council in February 1951. The Security Council adopted a joint Anglo-American resolution seeking to appoint a new mediator (in place of Sir Owen Dixon) who would ensure withdrawal of troops and arrange plebiscite in Kashmir. Accordingly, Dr Frank P. Graham of the United States was appointed to implement the decision. Frank P. Graham initiated negotiations with both the countries in June 1951. He presented a series of proposals aimed at demilitarisation of Jammu & Kashmir prior to holding the plebiscite. His efforts failed as no agreement was reached on the quantum of farces to be retained an each side. He admitted his failure in February 1953 and, like his predecessor, suggested direct negotiations between the two countries.

With this, the United Nations efforts to solve the Kashmir issue were suspended. In accordance with Dr. Graham's recommendations for a negotiated settlement, Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan held a number of meetings. They decided to hold plebiscite in 1954, but no agreement could be reached on who would be the plebiscite administrators. Thus, plebiscite could not be held.

Subsequently in 1957, UN representative Mr. Gunnar Jarring reported to the Security Council after a visit to India and Pakistan that the plebiscite resolution of 1948 had been so much 'overtaken by events' that its implementation was not possible. He reminded the Security Council of "the fact that the implementation of an international agreement of *ad hoc* character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may became progressively more, difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change." Even after nearly five decades the UN has not been able to secure withdrawal of Pakistani troops which was the first condition of cease fire agreement.

Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly of Jammu & Kashmir, elected on the basis of adult franchise, ratified the State's accession to India on February 6, 1954. A Constitution of the State was adapted on 19 November 1956 which declared Jammu & Kashmir to be an integral part of India. With the ratification of accession by directly elected Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, the promised "ascertaining of wishes" of the people had been accomplished. India finalised the accession on January 26, 1957. As far as India is concerned, wishes of the people were duly ascertained, and Pakistan's refusal to withdraw its troops from occupied Kashmir (POK) was responsible for not holding the plebiscite. India cannot be blamed for not ascertaining wishes of the people, though legally a decision of Maharaja was all that was required as plebiscite was nowhere stipulated in the Independence Act.

Nature of the Kashmir Dispute: The problem of Jammu & Kashmir is extremely complicated and no easy solution can be envisaged. As Werner Levi said, "The spiritual foundations of both states are involved in the conflict."[4] K. Raman Pillai rightly concludes, "To India, committed to a secular democratic state, the possession of Kashmir is a vital demonstration of the fact that Muslims and Hindus can live together in a peaceful community. To Pakistan, which claimed to be an Islamic Republic, the possession of Kashmir with its overwhelming Muslim population is vital as the fulfilment of the ideal upon which Pakistan rests: a national home and a nation state for the Muslims of the sub-continent."[5] For both India and Pakistan, the problem of Kashmir has become an issue of prestige.

The main concern of Pakistan is that promised plebiscite has not been held and it holds India exclusively responsible for this. For India, plebiscite could not be held because the very first condition, stipulated in 1948 cease fire agreement, that Pakistani troops would be withdrawn before other steps followed, has not been fulfilled. Pakistan alone is responsible for the present situation which was aggravated by the war imposed upon India by Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, acts of terrorism carried out in Kashmir since 1989 and the Kargil war of 1999. As far as India is concerned, as explained above, wishes of the people were ascertained by direct election of State Constituent Assembly and confirmation of the State's accession by the Constituent Assembly.

The nature of problem from Pakistan's angle is that plebiscite must be held, though it would not pull out its troops from occupied territory. Having promoted fundamentalism in all possible ways Pakistan expects that after the plebiscite Kashmir would become a part of Pakistan. India's case is simple. The only problem that exists and may be called Kashmir dispute is that Pakistan is in illegal occupation of a part of Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir, which it must vacate. Also, India has been drawing the attention of the world to the conclusively proved evidence of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India, which must end. These are the only two issues which constitute the Kashmir dispute from India's point of view. India's Foreign Secretary Salman Haider pointed this out clearly after Indo-Pak talks in June 1997. He said that Pakistan must vacate occupied part of Kashmir and must step insurgency supported from other side of the border.

Pakistan's Arguments: In support of its demand for Kashmir's accession to Pakistan, Islamabad has been advancing a number of arguments. Firstly, based on its two-nation theory, Pakistan argues that since Kashmir is predominantly a Muslim populated state its natural place is in Pakistan. Since partition was based on the concept of Muslim majority provinces of British India constituting Pakistan, the natural corollary was Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Secondly, it was argued that Pakistan's three main rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab originate in Kashmir; the very health of Pakistan's agriculture depends on Kashmir being a part of Pakistan. If a hostile regime in Kashmir stops the flow of rivers into Pakistan, the latter's economy would be ruined. Waters of these rivers provide life to Pakistan, and their sources could not be left with India. But, in view of the River Waters Agreement implemented in 1961 as already discussed, this argument has lost its validity. Thirdly, Pakistan argued that Kashmir's economy was mostly dependent on that country. Most of the natural products, including timber of Kashmir had their markets in what became Pakistan. Most of the food items were supplied to Kashmir by Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan (the then West Pakistan) and Jammu & Kashmir were economically interdependent. To separate the two would be economically disastrous for both. Fourthly, it is argued that geographically Kashmir is much closer to Pakistan. Most of the area of Kashmir's borders is adjacent to Pakistan, but there is only a thirty mile strip that links Kashmir with India. Therefore, Kashmir's geopolitical requirement is that it should be a part of Pakistan. Finally, Kashmir is highly useful for Pakistan's military might. Not only large number of Kashmiri *jawans* was in the Pakistan army, but Kashmir is strategically vital for the defence of Pakistan. It would be dangerous to leave Kashmir in the hands of India.[6]

India's Response: India's position is clear. It never accepted Jinnah's two-nation theory. Indian leadership never accepted that the believers of Hinduism and Islam were necessarily to live in separate states. India's commitment is to secularism. Voluntary transfer of population was never visualised in the scheme of partition. Most of the people were forced to leave their homes and migrate. In the opinion of Indian leadership, if religion were to be the basis of partition then four crore Muslims who then stayed back in India (after partition) should have been asked to go to Pakistan. But India totally rejects the idea of religion as the basis of states. India was faced with a very peculiar situation in 1947 on account of Muslim League's call of direct action resulting in serious communal riots. There were two options (a) independence with partition; or (b) united, but slave, India. Our leadership opted for independence and hoped for lasting peace between two neighbours. But, that was not to be.

Pakistan's argument about source of its three main rivers is untenable. Actually, only Jhelum originates in Kashmir. Indus and Sutlej have their source in China. Besides, territories of countries are not decided on the basis of origin of rivers. There are a number of rivers in Europe which flow through different countries. Thus, this claim of Pakistan is of no significance.

The argument of economic interdependence cannot justify Pakistan's claim on Kashmir. Economic dependence of Pakistan and India is far more existent than between Kashmir and Pakistan. In any case, economic interdependence is rapidly increasing all over the world.

Similarly, Pakistan's argument of geographical proximity is absurd. If that argument is applied in general then many sovereign countries may lose their independence. The question of military dependence is equally untenable. Pakistan can build and has built a powerful army. For that a sparsely populated Kashmir cannot be major source.

Kashmir Tangle: A Continuing Problem. As mentioned above, India maintains that the only dispute with Pakistan is continued occupation of nearly 1/3 of Indian territory of Jammu & Kashmir by Pakistan. In 1947, the problem was created essentially by the Kashmir Maharaja's ambition and indecisiveness. India never wanted to grab Kashmir. When Lord Mountbatten had visited Kashmir in July 1947, he only pleaded with Hari Singh to take a decision one way or the other. In fact, according to Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, even

India's strong man Sardar Patel was willing to concede that, in view of Muslim majority, Kashmir would perhaps opt for Pakistan. According to Sheikh Abudllah, quoted by Kuldip Nayar, when the Maharaja sent the duly signed Instrument of Accession, Patel had suggested to Nehru not to get involved in the tangle.[7] Therefore, Pakistan's charges against India are baseless.

The decision of Maharaja Hari Singh was prompted by tribesmen's invasion of Jammu & Kashmir. By the time India conveyed its acceptance of accession, the invaders were virtually knocking at the doors of Srinagar. V.P. Menon was rushed to meet Hari Singh as soon as accession request was received by Patel. Nehru was busy entertaining visiting Thai Foreign Minister. Maharaja of Kashmir pleaded desperately for Indian army. He was reported to have begged V.P. Menon to take Kashmir, but rush the troops, otherwise he would be compelled to accept Jinnah's offer. Menon explained the gravity of situation. Troops were sent only after accession formalities were completed. The accession was later confirmed by Constituent Assembly of the State. However, due to political difficulties and UN intervention, Indian army was not allowed to complete its mission of throwing all the invaders out. India accepted cease fire when the army was just about to solve the problem. This was India's second major mistake, the first being the offer to hold plebiscite despite the fact that ascertaining wishes of the people was not compulsory in the Indian Independence Act. These two major mistakes of Nehru Government have kept the issue alive 60 years from then. In the intervening period two major, and one limited, wars were fought by India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan had joined the West-sponsored military alliance, SEATO and Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO).

Pakistan perhaps did not anticipate India's reaction in 1947. It probably expected that Kashmir would easily become a part of Pakistan once force was demonstrated by it. Pakistan had described Indian army's help to Kashmir as unfriendly and aggressive. Jinnah was reported to have said that if Indian troops were withdrawn, he would ensue that tribesmen left within 24 hours.

When Indian army was sent to Kashmir, Mahatma Gandhi had said that he would not regret if entire Indian army was used to defend Jammu & Kashmir, but he was very unhappy at India's decision to go to the Security Council. This step was opposed by many other people in India.

The Kashmir issue has been raised time and again by Pakistan in the United Nations and other international fora. It has been harping on religion of majority of people as the basis for Kashmir becoming a part of Pakistan. But, for India it is a matter of faith that religion should not be the basis of political actions. Michael Brecher wrote, "Here lies the last field of battle over the ideological cleavage which rent the sub-continent as under in 1947. Here is the final test of the validity of the two nation theory, the basis of Pakistan and its continuing *raison'd etre*".[8] That is why M.S. Rajan concluded that because of the vital nature of this dispute "the Indian government has been sensitive to trends in world affairs likely to affect the Indian stand adversely. Perhaps, largely because of Pakistan and the Kashmir dispute, there is a persistent emphasis in Indian publicity abroad on the secular basis and policies abroad."[9] Professor V.P. Dutt expressed similar views. He wrote, "For Pakistan it is the axiomatic that the Muslim Majority area should become a part of the Islamic Republic; for India her entire secular system and way of life and thinking appeared to be at stake". Kashmir dispute has continuously haunted India-Pakistan relations since 1947.

When Kashmir issue was once again raised by Pakistan in 1957, its representative Feroze Khan Noon described the Kashmir Constituent Assembly as a fraud on democracy, and said that India had no right to integrate Kashmir with itself. He called Kashmir "a military base of India", where one soldier was posted for every 12 adults. India's representative V.K. Krishna Menon delivered a record 8-hour hard hitting speech in the Security Council. He said that Kashmir dispute is a question of aggression having been committed on an Indian State. It was a problem between aggressor and the victim of aggression. This was not a question of role of this country or that India wanted vacation of aggression. India, he said, was a secular state where Islam was one of several religions. Simply because Muslims were in majority in one of our states, Pakistan could not claim it. Menon emphasised that there were more Muslims in India than in West Pakistan. Pakistan has been harping on plebiscite. Two wars have been fought, and during 1989-96 thousands of people have been killed and made homeless in terrorist activities in India, supported from across the border.

INDO-PAK RELATIONS TILL THE 1965 WAR

Pakistan had joined the western bloc in 1954. It concluded a military pact with the United States and later joined the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact. These organisations were aimed at, what Americans called, containment of communism. The military aid that the United States gave to Pakistan was meant for defence against communism. India was assured by the United States that the weapons given to Pakistan would not be used against India. In practice, Pakistan used the American weapons only against India. One of India's objections to US giving military aid to Pakistan was that it would further complicate the Kashmir dispute. However, India's objections were brushed aside. Pakistan's main thrust in its foreign policy was hatred towards India and seeking Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. As M.S. Rajan wrote: "Pakistan has sought to judge many an issue in world affairs by the test of whether or not and how far they contribute to the support of the Pakistani stand on the dispute."[11]

Pakistan at one stage tried to bully the western countries by raising the bogey of communism and threatening to walk over to communist bloc. It was propagated that non-settlement of Kashmir dispute (to the satisfaction of Pakistan) would encourage spread of communism in Kashmir and even in whole of India. Pakistan Prime Minister Feroze Khan Noon, speaking in the National Assembly in March 1958 said: "Nehru is making a gift of the whole of this sub-continent to communism by not solving the Kashmir case." He warned the Western Powers that, " … if the democracies of Europe and America do not solve this problem of the freedom of Kashmir to the satisfaction of Kashmiri people, the only solution for Kashmir will be to walk into the Communist camp."

Pakistan's sole aim in foreign policy was to beat India, or at least to get even with it. Thus, when India tried to block foreign intervention in the region, Pakistan encouraged it; in order to keep India weak, Pakistan made an alliance first with one big power, later sent feelers to another, made common cause with still another. It joined American military network apparently directed against communism, and procured fire-arms worth nearly 3 billion dollars. These included modern aircrafts and sophisticated tanks. When that did not help Pakistan beat India and get Kashmir," Pakistan welcomed the Chinese embrace and was rewarded with economic and military aid … Islamabad even sent overtures to the Soviets, conveying the impression of its willingness to lean on Moscow if only India could be taken care of …." V.P. Dutt adds, "Pakistan's urge for standing on the same mountain top as India and its continuing crisis of identity lent a particular explosive dimension to the two neighbours' mutual dealings."[12]

When Pakistan realised that India would not surrender to its unreasonable demands, and balance of power in the sub-continent was in favour of India, Pakistan sought artificial strength by her alliance with America and through SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (see above). When Pakistan further realised in early 1960's that the Western alliance alone would not serve its purpose, it began to seek friendly relations with the Soviet Union. The USSR also encouraged Pakistan to believe that the latter had a friend and well-wisher in the Soviet Union. But Pakistan overreacted itself by trying to wean the Soviet Union away from India. It did not succeed. Having failed in its plan Pakistan sought friendship with China. The relations between India and China had considerably deteriorated as the Chinese had occupied several thousand square miles of the territory of Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan saw a wonderful opportunity of aligning itself with China. This naturally delighted China and "the two opportunistic friends" started pressuring India. China changed its earlier stand on Kashmir and began supporting Pakistani position against India.

During Chinese aggression on India in 1962 Pakistan fully supported its newly acquired friend and tried to prove that India was in the wrong. When Britain and the US offered armaments to India, Pakistan openly opposed this assistance. India, despite Pakistan's opposition, did receive considerable moral and military support not only from the West but also from the Soviet Union. This frustrated Pakistan. Pakistan President Field Marshal Ayub Khan (who had established his dictatorship in 1958) appealed to President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan of Britain not to give any assistance to India. In a letter dated November 5, 1962 Ayub Khan said that the critical situation prevailing in the sub-continent was the direct outcome of the foreign policy of Nehru and his supporters. He argued that Nehru's foreign policy was largely directed towards the following four points: (a) to please the communists; (b) to raise the banner of non-alignment in order to confuse the non-communist countries and to please the socialist nations; (c) to threaten Pakistan, to politically isolate her and economically weaken her; and (d) to criticise the Western countries particularly the United States, even when there was no occasion for such criticism.

A joint statement was issued on November, 29, 1962 by Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan which said that the two leaders would initiate negotiations to find a solution to Indo-Pak disputes. A ministerial level meeting held in December 1962 and February 1963 decided that an Indo-Pak Summit would be held at Calcutta in March 1963. But on the eve of Calcutta meeting Pakistan and China concluded an agreement whereby Pakistan agreed to transfer to China certain Indian territories in Kashmir which had been under Pakistan occupation since 1949. Pakistan had no legal right whatsoever to conclude the so-called border settlement with China at the cost of Indian territory in Kashmir.

The National Conference leader of Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah, who had been under detention since 1953, was released in May 1964. The Sheikh who was the architect of Kashmir's close links with the rest of India now turned hostile, and demanded the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. He was openly supported by Pakistan. He met Nehru and went to Pakistan to meet Ayub Khan. He argued that Kashmir dispute could be solved only if relations between India and Pakistan were normalised. Soon afterwards Nehru died, and nothing further was heard of the efforts of Abdullah.

The Dispute of Rann of Kutch: The Rann of Kutch is situated on Gujarat-Sindh border. The Rann was a part of native state of Kutch and with the accession of the State to India it naturally became a part of India. But Pakistan refused to accept this position. Pakistan said that an area of about 3500 square miles north of 24th parallel, was actually part of Sindh and should have been given to Pakistan. India refused to accept this position. An armed clash occurred in April 1965 when two divisions of the Pakistan army crossed the border and occupied parts of the Rann of Kutch. India had not anticipated this aggression. Fighting went on till June-end. As a result of the mediation by British Prime Minister Wilson, cease-fire took place and it was agreed that both the armies would go back to the position of January 1, 1965. It was also decided to refer the dispute to a tribunal comprising three arbitrators. The award of the tribunal came in 1968. About 90 percent of the Rann of Kutch was allotted to India and the remaining about 300 square miles went to Pakistan. The award was strongly criticised in India but in view of the commitment made in 1965, India agreed to the implementation of the award. During the Pakistani attack on Rann of Kutch the arms supplied to Pakistan by the United States, the SEATO and CENTO were freely used against India. When Pakistan was made to agree to cease-fire it felt frustrated and decided on one more gamble. This time the target was Kashmir.

The India-Pakistan War of 1965: The war between India and Pakistan in September 1965 proved that India was superior in many respects. The Soviet Union had adopted neutral attitude during the crisis in Rann of Kutch. For the first time after 18 years, President of Pakistan was invited to pay a visit to the Soviet Union. Ayub Khan told the Soviet leaders that there was similarity between the US and Soviet policies towards India, which were encouraging India's expansionist adventures. The Soviet Prime Minister Koysgin tried to win Pakistan over. He said that the main cause of Indo-Pakistan conflict was not the supply of armaments, but the policy of imperialism (of the West).

Indian leadership was naturally disturbed. The Soviet attitude towards Pakistan was now friendlier, and USSR was contemplating supply of armaments to Islamabad. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri undertook a visit to the Soviet Union. He tried to explain the actual position of South Asia and sought continued Soviet support to India. But, the Soviet leadership said that their improving and friendly relations with Pakistan would not adversely affect the traditional Indo-Soviet friendship. Shastri's Moscow visit was not a big diplomatic success. It was in this background that Pakistan put into operation the plan to disturb peace and wage a war.

Beginning August 5, 1965, Pakistan sent in Kashmir, across the cease fire line, between 3000 and 5000 regular Pakistani troops in civilian clothes. These infiltrators were trained in guerilla warfare with the assistance of China. They were sent to Indian side to provoke large scale violence, sabotage the state machinery and overthrow the lawfully established government of the State. The infiltrators were to eventually assist the Pakistan troops in uniform. They were to wage "a war of independence of Kashmir." As soon as infiltrators entered Kashmir, Radio Pakistan announced that the people of Kashmir had revolted on a large scale, the Srinagar Radio Station and the Airport had been captured by the Mujahiddins, and that Srinagar itself was about to fall. These were lies except the fact that the infiltrators were indulging in inciting violence. Indian army took the matter into its hands, arrested or killed large number of infiltrators. Having located the bases of infiltrators in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, India decided to capture them. By the third week of August three bases of Pakistan in the Kargil sector were seized, two bases in Tithwal sector were captured on August 25, and finally, Indian army captured the Hajipir Pass in the Uri-Pooch sector. This blocked all entry points of Pakistan infiltrators. General Nimmo, the chief military observer of the United Nations reported all the developments to the Secretary-General.

When India requested the UN Secretary-General U. Thant to ensure withdrawal of Pakistani infiltrators, Pak Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto denied that his government was in any way concerned with the infiltrators.

When the Pakistan gamble failed disastrously, a formal attack was launched on Kashmir by Pakistan on September 1, 1965. This time Pakistan army crossed the international border and forced a war on India. India made it clear to the United Nations that peace was not possible until Pakistan withdrew its regular army as well as the infiltrators. Anticipating a massive attack by Pakistan, India counter attacked West Punjab on September 5, 1965 in three sectors. Indian army began moving towards Lahore. Meanwhile Pakistan air force had bombarded Amritsar and consequently Indian air force provided cover to the army. Throughout the period of India-Pakistan war the Security Council was seized of the crisis. A number of proposals were considered, resolutions were passed and efforts were made by Secretary-General U. Thant who visited Pakistan and then came to India. Pakistan's conditions for cease-fire included (a) the troops of India as well as Pakistan would be withdrawn from the entire Kashmir after the cease-fire; (b) an Afro-Asian peace keeping force would be stationed in Kashmir till plebiscite was held; and (c) the plebiscite would be held within three months. India rejected these three conditions. India's representative M.C. Chagla asked the Security Council to first decide who the aggressor was. He pointed out that the UN observers had clearly indicated that Pakistani infiltrators had entered on August 5. Meanwhile, China expressed its solidarity with Pakistan and gave an ultimatum to India to close down its military bases on Tibet–Sikkim border. This ultimatum was meant to boost the Pakistani morale. Mr. Chagla made it clear that India opposed the deployment of any foreign forces in Kashmir. India also rejected the plea for plebiscite, as the accession had already been confirmed by the elected Constituent Assembly of Kashmir.

A resolution was adopted by the Security Council on September 20, 1965 calling upon India and Pakistan to cease-fire and withdraw all their "armed personnel" back to the position held by the two countries before August 5, 1965. This was the date when Pakistan had sent its infiltrators. As Indian troops were pushing the Pakistanis back to their territory, Pakistan was forced to accept the cease-fire which became effective on September 23, 1965 at 3.10 a.m. The Indo-Pak war ended. Pakistani aggression was halted and its political aspirations were frustrated.

The war proved superiority of Indian might and the morale of the army went high. India's defeat in 1962 by China had demoralised the Indian troops. The position was now rectified.

The war lasted for 23 days. The cease-fire in accordance with the Security Council resolution of September 20, 1965, was accepted by both the countries on 22nd and enforced on 23rd of September. Indian troops fought valiantly. They destroyed several sophisticated Patton Tanks supplied to Pakistan by the United States. Despite assurance given to the US that its arms would not be used against India they were freely used against it. Indian troops captured or knocked out large number of US-made and China-made weapons from retreating Pakistanis and those taken prisoners of war. According to official record of New Delhi, as many as 2226 Indian *jawans* and officers were killed in action and 7780 were injured. Pakistan lost 5900 of its troops 300 of Indian tanks were damaged. Both the countries lost about 50 aircrafts each. The war was not decisive but, as V.P. Dutt wrote, "it gave an edge to India and restored her morale shattered earlier by the reverses in the India-China conflict of 1962".

Indian army's main objective in the war was to prove its superiority and destroy as much of Pakistani weaponry as possible. This aim was achieved. The war tired Pakistan. But, Indian *jawans* as well as masses were very unhappy that just when victory was in sight in Lahore as well as Sialkot sectors the cease-fire was accepted. Thus Pakistan was saved of a humiliating defeat. India's gains in the war included 750 square miles of Pakistani territory. But, the Tashkent Agreement brokered by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin provided for withdrawal of both the sides so as to restore the *status quo ante.* This was not to the liking of Indian people, but the anger gave way to grief because within hours of signing the agreement Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the hero of the war, died in Tashkent.

The Tashkent Agreement: A meeting was held at Tashkent in the erstwhile Soviet Union from January 3 to 10, 1966 to formalise peace between India and Pakistan. The Tashkent Summit was held at the initiative of the Soviet Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin, and was attended by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India and President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan. During the Indo-Pak war, efforts for peace were made by both the Super Powers in the context of their respective national interests. China had openly supported Pakistan and even given ultimatum to India, but did not intervene in the war for fear of Soviet reaction. Even after cease-fire became effective, tension prevailed. Britain and the United States were trying to pressurise India. Eventually, Soviet Union's invitation was accepted by both the countries. The Soviet Prime Minister had taken initiative in early September when the war had just begun. It was repeated on 13 September. The invitation was accepted in principle by Shastri, but Pakistan felt that no useful purpose was likely to be served. Ayub was expecting US intervention which never occurred because American President Johnson did not show any enthusiasm in view of China's growing friendship with Pakistan. It was only in November 1965 that Ayub Khan accepted the Soviet proposal for a Summit at Tashkent. Soviet Prime Minister was personally present to render such assistance as the two heads might require.

Both India and Pakistan had made their objectives and expectations clear before Shastri and Ayub Khan went to Tashkent. The President of Pakistan had repeatedly announced that he would agree to a "just" settlement of the Kashmir dispute. India's Prime Minister had, however, made it clear that Kashmir's accession was not negotiable and that it was an integral part of India. Indian Prime Minister had hoped that in future force would not be used between India and Pakistan. He had also reiterated that "we unreservedly accept Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity". The Tashkent meeting was unusual because it was for the first time that Soviet Union had taken initiative for the settlement of a conflict between two non-communist countries. The Soviet effort was blessed by all major powers including the United States. In fact, the whole world, except China, desired success at the Tashkent Summit. In the meeting both countries stood by their rigid positions. There was no progress for 6 days. Finally, after strenuous negotiations, which were often on the verge of collapse, the Tashkent Declaration was signed by the two countries with the hope and promise of a peaceful future. It was signed by Shastri and Ayub in the presence of Soviet Prime Minister on January 10, 1966. Within a few hours, Shastri died of a massive heart attack.

The nine-point Tashkent Declaration contained the resolve by India and Pakistan to restore normal and peaceful relations between themselves and to promote friendly relations between their peoples. With these objectives in view, the following nine points were agreed upon.

1. India and Pakistan would make all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between themselves, and affirmed their obligations under the UN Charter not to resort to force, but settle their disputes through peaceful means.
2. All armed personnel of India and Pakistan were to be withdrawn latest by February 25, 1966 to the positions they held prior to August 5, 1965.
3. The relations between India and Pakistan would be based on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other.
4. Both sides would discourage propaganda directed against each other, and encourage propaganda for promotion of friendly relations between the two.
5. Normal diplomatic activity was to be restored and the High Commissioners of India and Pakistan were to resume their duties.
6. Economic and trade relations, communication as well as cultural exchanges would be restored between India and Pakistan.

7. Repatriation of prisoners of war would be carried out by the officials of two counties.
8. Two sides would continue discussions relating to problems of refugees, illegal immigrations, and would take steps to prevent exodus of people, and return the property and assets taken over during the conflict.
9. There was need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies to recommend further steps on matters of direct concern to the two countries.

Public in India generally welcomed the Tashkent Agreement in the hope that it would lead to normalisation of relations between the two countries. Prime Minister Shastri remarked, after signing the Declaration that, it was "a unique experiment in international diplomacy." The German leader Konard Adenauer, a critic of USSR, welcomed the Soviet initiative for normalisation of Indo-Pak relations. The new Prime Minister of Israel Abba Aabn hoped that Tashkent principles and attitudes would be applied to Arab-Israel conflict also.

G.L. Nanda, who temporarily succeeded Shastri as Prime Minister, promptly declared that Indian Government would stand by the Declaration and implement it fully and faithfully. In Pakistan, however, there was lot of criticism of Tashkent agreement as surrender to Indian demands and Soviet pressures. Pakistani Foreign Minister could not reconcile to the fact that an agreement was signed with India before the settlement of "Kashmir dispute". Ayub Khan told his people that obligations under the UN Charter did not mean no war at all. It only meant not to resort to force so long as avenues of peace were open. However, within a weak, steps were taken for restoration of full diplomatic relations. But, the "Tashkent Spirit" began to evaporate fairly soon. Meanwhile, for the Soviet Union this was a moment of unmitigated triumph. The Declaration was an achievement of great significance for that country. To the United States and its bloc, it meant, as Rajan wrote, "the end of their monopolistic influence and role in the settlement of international disputes." It was described as a big loss to Britain. Its political influence, through the Commonwealth, and otherwise, had already been tried. China was another loser. "That a rival communist state with which it has a running ideological dispute and whom it had stubbornly refused to recognise as an Asian Power should have arranged a meeting between two Asian States... must be highly galling to China."[13]

The Tashkent Declaration was indeed a historic document. For the first time it was hoped that India and Pakistan might turn away from the path of conflict, and strive to live in peace. But the hopes were soon belied. Pakistan kept on arming itself and making violent anti-India propaganda. Z.A. Bhutto made an outburst. He said that "Hindu culture" was determined to "devour" Islamic culture, and that "all the imperialist powers are backing India." India continued to work hard to implement the Tashkent Agreement. While its provisions regarding withdrawal of troops and repatriation of prisoners of war were implemented, the efforts for friendship, cooperation and understanding did not bear fruits. India wanted the two countries to discard the use of force, but Pakistan's only objective was to obtain Kashmir.

Meanwhile, Pakistan began improving relations with the Soviet Union. The idea being to create a wedge between India and USSR, Ayub Khan invited Kosygin to visit Pakistan in 1968. The Soviet Union's interest was to reduce Pakistan's dependence on the United States and China. As V.P. Dutt wrote, by this time "The Tashkent edifice lay in shambles. The promise was aborted. The issues were too intractable, the standpoints too opposite, the gulf of suspicion and jealously and rivalry too wide to make any lasting breakthrough possible."[14] During 1966-69 Pakistan made several moves towards USSR. It held out the bait that if Moscow would show greater regard for Pakistan's concerns, Pakistan would stop depending on the West. This objective was partially fulfilled when in April 1968, Soviet Prime Minister agreed to supply non-lethal weapons to Pakistan. But contrary to Soviet expectations its move, its instead of bringing India and Pakistan closer, created new tensions in their relations. There was a marked deterioration during 1966-69. India believed that Soviet Union's economic assistance and military supplies to Pakistan were responsible for Islamabad's hardened attitude. Pakistan held the view that peace in the sub-continent was possible only if Kashmir issue was solved (to its satisfaction) or if that country became militarily superior to India.

A number of other issues were also responsible for increasing tension. Firstly, Pakistan's agreement with China to open the road between Gilgit and Sinkiang was not only an unfriendly act but also an illegal decision because the concerned Indian territory was under unlawful occupation of Pakistan. Secondly, Pakistan continued to seek the help of the United States, Soviet Union and China to pressurise India to concede to its demands on Kashmir. Thirdly, there was tension regarding utilisation of Ganga waters and the Farakka Barrage being constructed by India. Pakistan's objection was that the barrage, if constructed, would leave East Bengal 'dry and desolate'.

India once again suggested a no-war pact which was, as usual, turned down by Pakistan. Ayub called Mrs. Gandhi's offer as an attempt to hoodwink the world. India released photocopies of a number of documents which were evidence of Pakistan's aid to Mizo and Naga rebels for insurgency in North-East India. Meanwhile, Pakistan succeeded in getting additional weapon supply from the United States. The India-Pakistan relations reached an all time low in 1971 with the emergence of crisis in East Pakistan resulting in a civil war in that country. There was an exodus of millions of people from East Pakistan to India, and finally a war took place between India and Pakistan in December 1971 leading to the defeat of Pakistan and its disintegration resulting in the creation of independent state of Bangladesh.

THE CRISIS OF BANGLADESH: INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1971

The crisis in India-Pakistan relations over the upsurge in East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh has been described as the most critical crisis. The background of the crisis was essentially an internal matter of Pakistan, but its consequences became vital for Indo-Pak relations. When India was partitioned in 1947, the basis for partition was religion. The Muslim majority areas in the West as well as East constituted the new state of Pakistan. Eastern wing was carved out of Bengal. Between the two wings of Pakistan there was about 1200 miles of Indian territory. Professor Dutt wrote: "Psychologically, emotionally and even physically, East Bengal's participation in the Muslim League's concepts of politics even before partition and in the emergence of Pakistan was minimal." The demand of Pakistan was largely made by the Muslims of U.P. and Bombay. The majority of Pakistani population lived in the East, but the country's politics was largely controlled by leadership in the West, particularly Punjab. The notion that Islam would unite the two parts and that it was one nation proved to be a myth. Languages and cultural traditions in the two parts of Pakistan were different. Rather than bringing about emotional integration, Pakistan's bureaucratic-military rulers sought to dominate East Bengal. Imposition of Urdu was totally unacceptable to people of East Pakistan. The immediate cause of conflict was denial of the office of Prime Minister of Pakistan to the leader of Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, even when his party had won 160 out of 300 seats in Pakistan National Assembly elections held in December 1970. Meanwhile, President Ayub Khan had been replaced, in March 1969, by another army general Yahya Khan. The new President, in connivance with Pakistan People's Party leader Z.A. Bhutto, opted to crush the voice and choice of the people. This denial of the right to govern to democratically elected leadership became the cause of civil war in Pakistan leading to its breakup.

The details of developments leading to the Bangladesh crisis and Indo-Pak war are explained in Chapter 7 dealing with India's relations with Bangladesh. In the present section it will be sufficient to deal with matters directly concerned with India-Pakistan relations, the war of 1971 and Shimla Agreement. The National Assembly of Pakistan, elected in December 1970, was to frame a new Constitution within 120 days, but the Assembly session scheduled for March 3, 1971 was put off after President Yahya Khan realised that Mujib's six-point programme would be adopted and this would be a setback to Yahya-Bhutto team.

Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was arrested and detained, rather than allowed to form the government. Unprecedented violence erupted in East Bengal where Pakistani Security forces let loose a reign of terror. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed and wounded and women in very large numbers were raped. About one crore people arrived in India as refugees. This brought India into the picture. In April 1971, people of East Bengal declared themselves as belonging to Bangladesh, an independent country. India could not remain a silent spectator when there was violence on its borders and millions of Bangladeshis were pouring in as refugees. Pakistan decided to wage a war against India both in eastern and western sectors.

The Awami League leadership in East Pakistan declared independence of Bangladesh on April 12, 1971. But, no country granted formal recognition to Bangladesh. This was the success of Pakistani diplomacy. Even India did not recognise Bangladesh because it did not want to provoke Pakistan. The Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan based in Calcutta and 70 members of his staff cut off their relations with Pakistan, and declared themselves to be mission of independent Bangladesh. The new High Commissioner of Pakistan was greeted in Calcutta with demonstrations against him. India wanted to pull out its staff from Dhaka, but Pakistan created many difficulties. As diplomatic tension mounted and Bangla youth established a force, for independent state, called *Mukti Bahini*, Pakistan charged that India was responsible for the rebellion, and that Indian troops were being sent in the garb of *Mukti Bahini*.

Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi established contacts with all major Powers of the world to pressurise Pakistan to stop massacre of people in East Bengal so that Bangla refugees could be sent back to their homes. Mrs. Gandhi's visits to western capitals were not fruitful. The United States made it clear that if a war broke out between India and Pakistan and even if China supported Pakistan, India should not expect any aid from the United States. Pakistan President Yahya Khan repeatedly said that if India continued to encourage Bangla rebels, a war would soon commence. He said that Pakistan would not be alone in such a war. In such a situation India had to seek some powerful friend.

Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation: By April 1971 Soviet Union had abandoned the policy of simultaneous friendship with India and Pakistan. Soviet President Podgorny had written to Yahya Khan on April 3, 1971 that, "... the reports that the talks in Dacca had been broken off and that the military administration had used armed forces against the population of East Pakistan was received with great alarm in the Soviet Union ..." He appealed for peaceful solution, but Pakistan was not in a mood to listen to such advice. Pakistan was sure of the American and Chinese support. Yahya Khan described the supporters of Bangla movement as "anti-national and unpatriotic" people. For India the situation had become unbearable. By August 1971, about 10 million refugees had crossed the borders. They were a serious burden on Indian economy.

Early in August 1971, the former Indian Envoy to Soviet Union D.P. Dhar was rushed to Moscow. Immediately afterwards a high level Soviet delegation arrived in New Delhi. A Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed, for 20 years, on August 9, 1971 by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and India's Minister of External Affairs Sardar Swaran Singh. It was the first treaty of its kind that India signed after independence. A treaty with a Super Power was considered as not in conformity with non-alignment. But, in view of US-China-Pakistan nexus, India was left with no alternative. It proved a valuable deterrent which kept both USA and China away when the war actually took place in December 1971. The main provision of the Indo-Soviet Treaty may be summarised as under.

India and the Soviet Union declared that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries, and both would respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other, and both would refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other. They would consolidate relations based on friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation. Secondly, the two countries declared their determination to continue their efforts to preserve peace in Asia and throughout the world, and to work for general and comprehensive disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. Thirdly, India and Soviet Union reiterated their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality of all peoples and condemned colonialism and racialism in all forms. Fourthly, India expressed appreciation of the peace-loving policy of the USSR, and the Soviet Union appreciated India's policy of non-alignment and affirmed that it would ensure universal peace. Fifthly, being committed to universal peace and security both the parties promised regular contact with each other on major international problems affecting the two. Sixthly, the two countries pledged to continue, consolidate and expand mutual cooperation in the fields of economy, science and technology, and also expand trade, transport and communication between them. Seventhly, they would further develop contacts between themselves in the fields of art, science, literature, education, public health, media, tourism and sports. Eighthly, the all important provision made in the treaty was a promise by the two countries not to enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other party, and the two undertook to abstain from committing aggression against the other. Ninthly, both countries undertook not to provide any assistance to any third party that was engaged in armed conflict with the other party; the two countries would consult with each other in case of an aggression, or threat thereof, against any one of them. Lastly, they declared not to enter into any obligation, secret or public, with other countries incompatible with this treaty.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty generated confidence in India that it would be able to face any Pakistani challenge. Even if the treaty was a sort of a compromise with strict non-alignment, yet it was essential, and it raised India's prestige in diplomatic circles. It was a definite setback to Pakistan, China and the United States. The Treaty was widely welcomed by eminent people in the country. A former Congress President K. Kamaraj said, "It would not only consolidate the friendship between the two countries but also help the cause of peace in Asia and the world." The former Governor-General C. Rajagopalachari hoped that Pakistan President would not fail to be impressed by this development. Lok Nayak Jayaprakash Narayan hailed the treaty "as the surest possible guarantee of peace". M.C. Chagla, an eminent jurist and a former Foreign Minister, described it as "the best news we have had for a long time." The opposition stalwart (and later a Foreign Minister) Atal Behari Vajpayee welcomed it and said that it should not prevent India from taking its own decisions on Bangladesh.

Professor V.P. Dutt (*India's Foreign Policy*) wrote: "The Treaty lent a new dimension to the Indo-Soviet relationship wherein Soviet backing came to be crucial for warding off the most serious threat to India's integrity and socio-economic polity." Soviet Union's backing of India at that juncture was valuable.

The India-Pakistan War and Recognition of Bangladesh: The war between two neighbours formally began with a gazette notification of Pakistan on December 4, 1971 that there was a state of war between India and Pakistan. Earlier, the situation had become explosive on eastern sector on India-Pakistan border on November 11, when Pakistani tanks, while fighting with *Mukti Bahini* entered the Indian territory. In retaliation, Indian *jawans* destroyed 13 of Pakistani tanks. The next day four Pakistani Sabre Jet fighter planes entered India's air space east of Calcutta. India's Gnat aircrafts engaged them in an air-battle and shot three of them and arrested three air force officers of Pakistan within Indian territory. Indian army destroyed three more Pakistani tanks within Indian borders on November 18, 1971. India-Pakistan war was now clearly in sight. President Yahya Khan declared on November 25 that he would handle India within ten days. On the evening of December 3, 1971 Pakistan army began aggression on our western borders. They attacked several Indian posts on our side of cease fire line in Kashmir. Pakistan Air Force indulged in heavy bombardment on ten air force stations from Srinagar to Agra in Northern India. However, Pakistan did not achieve much success because in anticipation of Pakistani air attack our aircraft had been placed in other stations.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi rushed to New Delhi from Calcutta. The President declared state of emergency and Indian authorities decided to destroy Pakistan's war machinery. Indian army units based in Agartala were directed to march into East Pakistan and defeat the enemy. By midnight of 3rd December Indian aircraft organised several air attacks on Pakistan air force bases and inflicted heavy damage. Yahya Khan described it as the last and decisive war in which Pakistani troops would teach a permanent lesson to India. Indeed, it proved to be a decisive war, but it was Indian Army and Air Force that taught Pakistan a lesson. The war lasted only till December 16, 1971. The US President Nixon ordered his all-powerful Seventh Fleet of the Navy to move into the Bay of Bengal. This was to bully India with the threat of a nuclear attack. But, in view of Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971, neither China nor USA intervened. Pakistan only received their moral support and used conventional weapons supplied by them. Pakistan suffered heavy losses both in Western and Eastern sectors.

Lt. Gen. Niazi was commanding Pakistani troops in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Indian Army in that sector was under the command of Lt. Gen. J.S. Aurora. Indian army was supported by the air force and navy as well. Pakistan army had lost its morale by December 15, but Niazi was still not prepared to surrender, though his forces were surrounded by the Indian troops. They were not in a position to escape. Niazi wanted India's permission to go to West Pakistan. It was denied by India's Chief of Army Staff General Manekshaw. Late on December 15, Niazi sent a message for cease fire. But, Indian authorities told him to surrender unconditionally. After some hesitation, Pakistani forces agreed to surrender. On December 16, 1971 Gen. Niazi surrendered unconditionally to Gen. Aurora in the same ground in which Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had raised the banner of revolt 9 months earlier. Niazi had tears in his eyes as he signed surrender documents and handed over his colours to his one-time fellow-cadet, Lt. Gen. Aurora. About 93 thousand Pakistani troops who surrendered were brought to India as Prisoners of War (POWs).

India decided on unilateral cease fire in the western sector on 16th night. By this time Bangladesh had become a reality, yet Yahya Khan was still talking of throwing the enemy (India) out of every inch of Pakistani territory. But, the international community had recognised India's victory, and pleaded for immediate cease fire. Within a few hours of his resolve to go on fighting, Yahya Khan accepted cease fire and said that he had always believed that war was no solution of international disputes. America tried to take credit for cease fire in the western sector claiming that it had applied pressure on India through the Soviet Union. However, India denied any such pressure. In any case, India's decision of unilateral cease fire in the west was criticised in many circles within the country. The argument was that once again when the army was on the verge of inflicting total defeat on the enemy, declaring cease fire was against the best interests of the country.

The net result of the war was division of Pakistan and creation of sovereign state of Bangladesh which was recognised by India in December 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was released from Pakistani jail, but only after power was transferred in Pakistan from Yahya Khan to Z.A. Bhutto. The new President took credit for the release of Sheikh, though he himself was largely responsible for his arrest and detention. While going to Dhaka, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman stopped in Delhi and thanked India for its role in the independence of Bangladesh.

The Shimla Accord: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed office of Chief Marshal Law Administrator and President on December 20, 1971. He was leader of

Pakistan People's Party which had won 80 seats in the National Assembly elections held a year earlier. He inherited a mutilated Pakistan. As President, Bhutto made numerous promises including his 'determination' to reunite Bangladesh with Pakistan. Several army commanders held responsible for Pakistan's defeat were removed from services and passports of many industrialists were seized. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was released on January 8, 1972.

After diplomatic level negotiations for several months, India-Pakistan Summit was held at Shimla in the end of June 1972. Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, assisted by their high-level delegations, held complex and extensive discussions on various issues arising out of the war, as well as on general bilateral relations. The issues ranged from the repatriation of prisoners of war, the recognition of Bangladesh by Pakistan, normalisation of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, resumption of trade and fixation of international line of control in Kashmir. After prolonged negotiations, Bhutto agreed on essentially a bilateral approach to Indo-Pakistan relations. The accord signed at the end of Shimla Conference provided that both the countries would work to end the conflicts and disputes between them and pledged to work for lasting friendship in the sub-continent. With these objectives in view Indira Gandhi and Bhutto agreed to (i) seek peaceful solutions to disputes and problems through bilateral negotiations, and neither India nor Pakistan would unilaterally change the existing situation, and (ii) not to use force against each other, nor violate the territorial integrity, nor interfere in political freedom of each other.

Both the governments would discourage all propaganda against each other, and encourage such news items as would promote friendly relations. In order to normalise the relations between two countries: (i) all communication links would be re-established; (ii) transit facilities would be provided to enable the peoples of two countries to have closer contacts; (iii) as far as possible, trade and economic cooperation would be re-established; and (iv) mutual exchange in the fields of science and culture would be promoted. Both the governments agreed in the interest of permanent peace that (i) the armies of both the countries would return within their respective international borders; (ii) both countries would recognise the line of control as at the time of cease fire on December 17, 1971; and (iii) the armies would go back to their respective territories within 20 days of enforcement of this agreement. Finally, it was agreed that heads of two governments would meet in future and the officials of two countries would in the meantime confer among themselves to normalise their relations.

The critics of Shimla Accord maintained that it was surrender to Pakistan in so far as our troops were told to withdraw from the areas that they had captured. But, the value of Shimla Agreement lies in the commitment of two countries to resolve all their disputes only through bilateral negotiations. Thus, Kashmir dispute would not be internationalised just as other disputes would also be resolved through direct negotiations.

It was widely believed that an understanding had been worked out in regard to a settlement of Kashmir problem centering around the existing realities with certain adjustments. Even if an understanding was reached to find a lasting solution to Kashmir dispute by accepting the line of control as international border, it was felt that Bhutto could not be expected to commit himself publicly at that stage. If line of control was to become international border, implying division of Jammu & Kashmir along the line of control, time would have to be given to the leaders of two countries to prepare public opinion in favour of such an arrangement.

The repatriation of over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in India was linked with Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh. It was not until late 1973 that these POWs were returned. Besides, no decision about POWs could be taken without the agreement of Bangladesh. In addition to POWs, there were about 30,000 Bangladeshis forcibly detained in Pakistan and 2,60,000 Pakistanis in Bangladesh. There were many hindrances in the implementation of provision of restoring communication and other links. An agreement was reached in August 1973 for the repatriation of all prisoners of war except 195 POWs whom Bangladesh wanted to try for war crimes. Pakistan recognised Bangladesh on the appeal of an Islamic conclave in February 1974. An agreement was concluded between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh on August 9, 1974 whereby Bangla Government agreed to hand over these 195 POWs to India, as Pakistan issued a statement condemning war crimes.

Indo-Pakistan Relations after Shimla: The philosophy underlying Shimla Accord is bilateral approach to all the disputes between India and Pakistan. This point has been repeated an innumerable time since the Agreement was signed. But, that has not deterred Pakistan from raising the Kashmir issue in several international fora including NAM Summits, UN bodies, Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings and even SAARC Summits, though all its attempts proved futile. Nevertheless, Pakistan did gain some ground after Shimla Accord. For example, Bhutto recovered the West Pakistani territory lost in the war. He had a line of control fixed in Kashmir "that did not hurt him" he got the prisoners of war back without making much concession.

But, Pakistan did get a setback in May 1974. India conducted its first nuclear test in the Rajasthan desert in May 1974. India did not detonate a nuclear bomb. It was explosion of a device for peaceful use of nuclear energy, but it established India's capability to acquire a nuclear bomb. Z.A. Bhutto was shocked at India's nuclear test and said that Pakistan would never succumb to India's 'nuclear blackmail'. He said that this test had put an end to the possibility of a no-war pact, between India and Pakistan. But, India has been trying to

convince the world that its nuclear programme is only for peaceful purposes. India has been asking the nuclear powers to destroy their nuclear weapons as well.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was thrown out of power in 1977 in a military *coup* led by General Zia-ul-Haq. Zia became President of Pakistan and held the office for over a decade. He was killed in an air crash in 1988. When he had come to power, Zia had promised to hold elections for a new Parliament within 90 days, but the elections were repeatedly put off. Zia regime had put Bhutto under detention. He was tried for conspiracy and hanged to death. It was only after Zia's death that democracy was restored in Pakistan. The Morarji Desai Government which came to power in 1977 tried hard to improve India's relations with all neighbours, particularly Pakistan. Several welcome gestures were made by both sides. Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan in 1978 was highly successful and ice was broken. Pakistan later admitted that its relations with India were never better than those during 1977-79.

During Mrs. Gandhi's second tenure as Prime Minister (1980-84) and Rajiv Gandhi period (1984-89) several initiatives were taken but the Zia regime cleverly avoided to build confidence. On the contrary, it was widely believed that Zia regime took upon itself the task of destabilising India by encouraging and assisting terrorism in Punjab for several years. Insurgency cost thousands of innocent lives in India. Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated in 1984, and this was also related to insurgency in Punjab. Rajiv Gandhi and Zia-ul-Haq and later Rajiv and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto initiated direct negotiations. Both sides referred to Shimla Accord and its commitment to bilateral approach. Nothing concrete resulted.

The situation took a very serious turn when Pakistan-sponsored insurgency disturbed peace in the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The kidnapping of Rubaina Sayeed, daughter of the then Union Home Minister in late 1989, was the beginning of prolonged militancy in Kashmir. Rubaina's father Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, who hails from Kashmir, could get his daughter released only after hard bargaining with the militants. For nearly seven years there was no elected government in the state. Only the gun ruled the state, whether it was the gun of the militant or the gun of security man. It was only in summer 1996 that, despite all efforts made by Pakistan, voters came out in large numbers and voted in the Lok Sabha election. Since 1991, there was no representation of Jammu & Kashmir in the Lok Sabha as elections could not be held during this period of insurgency. Later, in 1996 itself, Legislative Assembly elections were also held and, after several years, people elected an Assembly in which National Conference led by Dr. Farooq Abdullah emerged victorious. Dr. Abdullah's Government installed in October 1996 vowed to end militancy, ensure full autonomy for the state within Indian Union and strengthen centre-state relations; and also provide for autonomy for three regions (Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh) within the state.

Several rounds of talks at Foreign Secretary-level were held between India and Pakistan during the Prime Ministership of P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991-96). But Pakistan continued to encourage the separatist elements in Kashmir, and her hardened view on so-called violation of human rights in Kashmir by Indian security forces made any success impossible. The return to power of Benazir Bhutto in late 1993, created both hopes and despairs for Indo-Pak relations. New Delhi suggested several confidence-building measures, but Pakistan continued to insist on the resolution of Kashmir problem and that also in accordance with the wishes of Pakistan and the UN resolutions of 1948-49. This was not acceptable to India. The militants and their Pakistani supporters were frustrated by their repeated failures to provoke mass insurgency. As a desperate move they entered the holiest of shrines in Kashmir, the Hazratbal Mosque in 1993. Islamabad lauded their efforts, while India condemned it as a hostage-taking activity. The crisis was finally resolved without firing a single shot by India's security forces. This was a setback to Pakistan, and nothing could be expected from periodic talks between officials of India and Pakistan, as Benazir Bhutto Government had many internal compulsions to keep Kashmir as the single most important foreign policy issue without any sign of compromise. Pakistan's attitude was "all or nothing". Commenting on Indo-Pak relations, Abha Dixit wrote (1995) that, "Political hostility, intransigence, a virtual shut-out of any dialogue and repeated attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue characterised bilateral relations..." during Benazir Bhutto regime.

The relations between India and Pakistan have been far more adversarial than either country's relations with any other country. This is how Pran Chopra commented on Indo-Pak relations. He added, "The gulf between India and Pakistan has been made deeper and wider since 1990 by a new poison entering the Kashmir dispute ...." During seven year period (1989-96) of militancy, the economy of Kashmir has been badly ruined. Tourist industry has completely ceased to function; only some rare foreign tourists ventured into Kashmir. Some of them were kidnapped, even killed. Local commercial activity was at a standstill as every now and then militants gave call for strike. Pakistan has been interested only in chaos. Pakistan was just not interested in the well-being and prosperity of Kashmir people. It talks of protection of Muslims, but militancy resulted in killing of several prominent Muslims as also large number of non-Muslims. The ruined economy affected the Muslims just as thousands of Pandits fled from Kashmir and stayed as refugees in their own country in places like Jammu, Delhi, etc.

Meanwhile relations between India and China, and India and the United States have considerably improved. India and China have realised that border

dispute can be, for the time being, shelved and efforts initiated in several other areas to improve bilateral ties. If only such an approach can be adopted by India and Pakistan! There is no lack of goodwill on the part of India, but Pakistan's determination to perpetuate Kashmir crisis and its unending call for plebiscite may not let the situation normalise.

THE GUJRAL DOCTRINE AND PAKISTAN

When India initiated the policy of taking unilateral action to improve relations with the neighbours, the then Foreign Minister Gujral had gone virtually out of the way in the interest of lasting peace. India was aware of the fact that the sub-continent had been locked-up in a dangerous nuclear face off, amassed our armies on both sides of the border and drained our scarce resources. As Raj Chengappa wrote (*India Today*, April 15, 1997), "The continuing hostility is one of the main reasons why we find ourselves amongst the poorest of poor countries in the world." Numerous rounds of bilateral talks till 1994 had borne no fruits. A new initiative was taken when fresh Foreign Secretary-level talks were convened in March 1997. But a former Pakistan diplomat Abdus Sattar said that the same record had been played again and again. Similarly, India's former Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit opined that it had been the dialogue of the deaf where both sides were talking at each other rather than to each other.

A number of vital points of disagreement persisted. Firstly, India insists that legally and constitutionally Kashmir is a part of its territory, but Pakistan continued to insist that it is a disputed territory, and only a plebiscite can determine its status. Secondly, Kashmir is also a "battle of antithetical ideologies". For Pakistan, it is the specimen of its two nation theory and that Muslims cannot live as equals in a *Hindu-dominated* India. For India, Kashmir is critical for maintaining its secular national character. Thirdly, at diplomatic plane, Pakistan defines Kashmir as the core issue and insists on its solution before any other bilateral dispute is taken up. However, India believes that normalisation of relations, including better trade and confidence-building measures, should precede discussion on Kashmir. A suggestion is at times made, which envisages Line of Control in Kashmir to become international border. This suggestion was also made by Kashmir Chief Minister Dr. Farooq Abdullah, but political leadership in both countries is allergic to this proposal for fear of public revolt.

Commenting on Gujral Doctrine of "larger neighbour giving more", I.K. Gujral said (before he took over as Prime Minister) in March 1997 that, "I am willing to make concessions on anything, except the sovereignty or secular character of our nation. That is non-negotiable. There will not be another partition of India." Very high hopes were raised by the friendly meeting that Prime Minister I.K. Gujral had with his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif in

May 1997 at Male during ninth SAARC summit. The two leaders appeared to be determined to work seriously to find a solution to all the outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan. The two Prime Ministers carefully avoided mention of Kashmir in all public statements and comments.

The Gujral Doctrine was clearly sought to be applied by India in order to ease India-Pakistan relations and promote people to people contact between the two countries when, as Foreign Minister, I.K. Gujral had announced certain measures unilaterally in March 1997. A series of measures easing visa restrictions for Pakistani nationals were announced as a "unilateral gesture of goodwill".

According to Gujral, for the first time, Pakistani businessmen coming to India would be issued one-year multiple-entry visa, and those coming by air can enter either through Delhi or Mumbai. Travel was made easier for Pakistani pilgrims and tourists also. Senior citizens (older Pakistanis) as well as young were exempted from reporting to the police on arrival in India. India announced that visa fees would no more be charged from senior citizens, students, journalists and cultural groups. Free flow of books and journals would be encouraged. The number of shrines in India which could be visited by Pakistani pilgrims was increased. Announcing exemption from police reporting, Gujral said that the measure would be a relief from a troublesome requirement. India hoped to expand cultural contacts with Pakistan by promoting exchange of cultural groups comprising artistes, poets and writers. Commenting on the measures, Foreign Minister Gujral told the Parliament, "... these measures are an emblem of India's earnest desire to establish and maintain relations of friendship and cooperation with our neighbour, Pakistan."

The measures announced by Gujral evoked protest from the opposition, as it wanted to know what was India doing to secure release of Indian Army officers and soldiers detained for long in Pakistani jails. There was mixed reaction from the intellectuals, former diplomats and the press. The *Times of India* in its editorial described these "imaginative measures" as steps "calculated to tell the world that India understands the emotional trauma of families divided by partition, families which have been unable to keep in touch on account of restrictive visa policies." The behaviour of Pakistani authorities was compared to that of East Germany before the collapse of the Berlin Wall. East German authorities had treated their fellow Germans in the West as their enemies.

While India initiated steps to promote friendly relations with Pakistan, President Leghari of Pakistan in his national day (March 23, 1997) speech continued to talk of Kashmir as a "matter of Pakistan's survival". He extended full support to separatist elements, in Jammu & Kashmir, and called for help of Muslim countries to end what he described as, "repression and human rights violations in Kashmir". He said that Pakistan stood fully with separatists "to achieve their cause". This attitude of Pakistan was in line with its decades old "hate India" policy, and sought to negate India's approach in accordance with the Gujral Doctrine. While Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had begun talking of solution of all outstanding disputes between the two countries soon after he assumed office, his Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub Khan insisted on Kashmir being the core issue. Even on the eve of SAARC Summit at Male (Maldives) in May 1997, where Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers met (see above), Gauhar had said, "You can't sustain the talks if the core issue of Kashmir is ignored". He went on to allege that, "Human rights are being violated in Kashmir. Houses are being burnt and the army and other security forces have gone berserk." These are parrot-like repeated allegations which have no reality. However, after Gujral-Sharif meeting at Male in May 1997, Gauhar also avoided talking of Kashmir as the core issue.

The two hour Male meeting between Gujral and Nawaz Sharif did not bear much fruit, but the two agreed to continue the dialogue and decided to appoint working groups to study various problems that have been troubling the two countries. It was decided to continue with the Foreign Secretary-level talks to prepare ground for formal Indo-Pak summit. A good beginning was made, but nobody could predict in mid-1997 what shape the fresh talks would take.

Pakistani leadership had come to realise that notwithstanding the occasional "supportive noises" in Organisation of Islamic Countries and the European Union, there was increasing Pakistani isolation in international community on Kashmir question. This was a compulsion of Nawaz Sharif to initiate certain confidence building measures. Normal economic relations with India were surely going to alleviate Pakistan's economic burden. International funding agencies were putting pressure on Pakistan to reduce defence expenditure and build confidence with India. In this situation, India could not allow initiative to slip into the hands of Pakistan. Unless India retained diplomatic initiative, the situation would become incompatible with the Gujral Doctrine. India was aware of Pakistani armed forces' role in trying to keep Kashmir issue alive and high on the agenda. Therefore, as Professor S.D. Muni opined, "India should adopt cautious but constructive approach to Pakistan, which seeks to strengthen forces and popular aspirations".

A new initiative was taken in 1997 in the direction of Indo-Pak economic cooperation in the spirit of regional cooperation. At Male SAARC Summit, an agreement was reached for sharing of natural resources of South Asian region. Accordingly, India and Pakistan agreed, in principle, that India would purchase 30000 MW of surplus power generated from hydel resources of the Indus river basin in Pakistan. The World Bank had also asked Pakistan to share its surplus power with neighbours like India. A proposal was made for setting up a SAARC power grid for exchange of power between countries like India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. The power generated in Pakistan and purchased by

India would set a good example of friendly cooperation in regard to sharing of natural resources. This was likely to help better political cooperation.

Post-Nuclear Tests Developments: India's adversarial relations with Pakistan were worsened after the two countries conducted their nuclear tests in May 1998. After Pakistan's explosions at Chagai Hills, both countries were subjected to economic sanctions mainly by the United States. However, by the time the Prime Ministers of the two countries met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York in September 1998, hostility had considerably subsided, and Vajpayee-Sharif meeting broke the ice as informal confidence building measures were initiated. It was agreed, among other things, that a regular bus service would be started between Delhi and Lahore to facilitate the peoples of two countries to travel easily and economically. A proposal that the Prime Minister Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee might travel in the first bus to go to Lahore was wholeheartedly accepted by India's Prime Minister. The idea of bus service itself had surfaced, as a random thought, at a luncheon meeting between the two Prime Ministers in New York in September 1998. The media guess that the emerging thaw in Indo-Pak relations was the handiwork of the Clinton Administration, was rejected by the official account of the "bus diplomacy". In fact, as C. Raja Mohan wrote, "... the current dynamism in Indo-Pakistan ties can be traced back to some innovative diplomatic initiatives of the two sides ..."

Mr. Vajpayee's decision was a symbolic gesture, yet full, of potential. Commenting on sudden successful attempts of the Vajpayee Government, the well-known journalist Prem Shankar Jha wrote in mid-February 1999, "Mr. Vajpayee's masterstroke has been his decision to go on the inaugural bus to Lahore to meet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. If there was ever a gesture that would touch ordinary people on both sides of the unhappy frontier, it is this..."

When Mr. Vajpayee decided to go to Lahore by the inaugural bus on February 20, 1999 he expected that his Pakistani counterpart would come to India in a reciprocal gesture. However, that did not happen.

Mr. Vajpayee's visit created a nation-wide euphoria. It was expected to dawn a new era in South Asia. Nobody expected miracles to happen, as Pakistan was not likely to give up its obsession with Kashmir, though it had not succeeded in its game-plan for over 50 years. K. Subrahmanyam wrote on the eve of the visit that India should bear to live with 'Pakistani Kashmir rhetoric'. He hoped that, "Once both countries, now nuclear weapon states decide to live as equal sovereign states in a mutually beneficial economic and security framework there are endless possibilities of progress for both." But, as explained below, Pakistan did not make use of India's friendly gestures and committed aggression soon afterwards by occupying Kargil heights on our side of Line of Control. Earlier, Prime Minister Vajpayee had admitted that Kashmir issue was definitely going to be discussed. He referred to Shimla Agreement providing for dialogues to solve all the bilateral issues, and said, "We are ready" for talks.

Indian media was very hopeful of substantial improvement in the Indo-Pak relations. As Asghar Ali Engineer wrote, "The animosity between India and Pakistan has gone too far and now there is an urgent need for reconciliation. The people on both sides of the border are eager for a better relationship. Partition is now history and should not embitter us any longer." By early 1999 both the Prime Ministers had shown spirit of friendship and reconciliation. Pakistani Prime Minister declared, "Let us discuss the n-issue, the missile issue ... let us talk directly." He added, "India does not want third party intervention in Kashmir, so why a third party role in the nuclear issue..." Thus, not only Mr. Vajpayee had extended his hand of friendship, supported by Indian people, but even Pak Prime Minister was apparently reciprocating. However, on the eve of the visit, Pakistani Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz sent out highly negative signal. He launched a tirade against India and attacked this country on all points: Kashmir, Siachen, Tulbul navigation project and Sir Creek. After roundly criticising India, Mr. Aziz said, "It is in this spirit that we look forward to the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to this country". Taking all credit for new atmosphere, Pakistani Foreign Minister told visiting Indian parliamentarians, "India must go beyond its present emphasis on peripheral areas of our bilateral relationship... unless we can move towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute ... peace will continue to elude South Asia. This is the obvious lesson of last 50 years".

It is in this background of mixed signals from Pakistan, and excitement and enthusiasm in India, that Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee travelled by the bus at its inaugural run. He was warmly received on the other side of Wagah border, though the three Service Chiefs of Pakistan did not attend the welcome ceremony. The fundamentalists demonstrated against the visit in near-violent manner. Even then, India's Prime Minister, accompanied by several important personalities from different walks of life, went to Lahore and held useful talks with his counterpart. To set at rest the often-repeated Pakistani allegation that India was still not reconciled to the partition, Mr. Vajpayee visited the Minar-e-Pakistan. While Indian leader made this highly appreciative gesture of goodwill and friendship, the Pakistani fundamentalists later washed the spot where Mr. Vajpayee had stood on the Minar to purify the "polluted" Minar. K.K. Katyal reported from Lahore: "Mr. Sharif, perhaps, has the backing of the armed forces but because of the totality of public and political mood, he could not involve the people in the welcoming ceremonies..." which at official level "were marked by extreme warmth and cordiality".

At the formal and official level the two Prime Ministers signed the famous Lahore Declaration reaffirming the two countries' desire to open new chapter in their relationship. The Declaration gave rise to, what came to be known as the Lahore Process and created the Lahore Spirit.

The Lahore Declaration: The Lahore Declaration emphasised that the two Prime Ministers shared "a vision of peace and stability between their countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples". They reiterated the determination of both the countries to implementing the Shimla Agreement 'in letter and spirit'; their commitment to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter; and their commitment to the objective of universal nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In the background of these commitments, the two Prime Ministers agreed that their governments, "shall intensify their efforts, to resolve all issues, including the issue of Jammu & Kashmir"; "shall refrain from intervention and interference in each other's internal affairs". They agreed to intensify their composite and integrated dialogue; they reaffirmed their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations; and to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. They also agreed to take immediate steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.

Thus, the Lahore Declaration contained all noble ideals of friendship, cooperation, non-interference, curbing terrorism and of good neighbours. However, Pakistan adopted the path of confrontation and aggression even before the ink on Lahore Declaration became dry. The Lahore process was generally welcomed in India and by the international community. It was rightly said that the responsibilities of the two Prime Ministers in building bridges over troubled borders had only just begun. Besides the Lahore Declaration, the two Prime Ministers issued a joint statement, and the two Foreign Secretaries signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The two Prime Ministers decided that, "The two Foreign Ministers will meet periodically to discuss all issues of mutual concern, including nuclear related issues". The process of such a dialogue was specially a welcome development. In the MoU, bilateral consultations, on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, were emphasised. In a significant provision the two sides undertook "to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests" and to conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard. In addition, the two countries agreed that they "shall periodically review the implementation of existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMS) and where necessary, set up appropriate consultative mechanisms to monitor and ensure effective implementation of these CBMS".

The President Mr. K.R. Narayanan expressed the hope, soon after Mr. Vajpayee's return, that his visit would "mark a new chapter in bilateral ties." Addressing the Parliament, the President described the 'Lahore Declaration' as a landmark for peace and security of the two countries, and said that the Prime Minister had conveyed to the government and people of Pakistan India's

deep desire for peace and friendship with them and to develop a comprehensive structure of cooperation. *The Hindu*, in a lead article, paid compliments to the two Prime Ministers and appreciated their sincere efforts. It wrote, "Mr. Nawaz Sharif and Mr. Vajpayee have demonstrated commendable determination to tread a new path of reconciliation and good neighbourliness, displaying rare courage to depart from scripts that had till now reduced the scope for positive action to improve bilateral relations". It described the low key Lahore Declaration as 'a step forward', yet it cautioned stating, "The hurdles ahead are innumerable, the violence on the streets of Lahore and the protests organised by fundamental elements giving but a hint of these."

International community was also appreciative of the Lahore process. For example, the British Foreign Office said: "We are encouraged that the issues are being addressed through consultations and bilateral discussion. The talks have made an important contribution to the process of building confidence between the two countries." Dr. Gerald Segal, Director of Studies at the International Institute for Strategic Studies said that India and Pakistan were moving towards a stable balance of power and friendly relationship. He cautioned the outside world to refrain from giving any advice to the two countries. The Prime Minister of Japan Keizo Obuchi hailed the Lahore Declaration, but said, "The two neighbours should proceed together to ease political tension". The "bus diplomacy" and Lahore Declaration were also applauded by Clinton Administration of the US as well as by Russia and France.

Prime Minister Vajpayee assured Pakistan, during his Lahore trip, that India would not be found wanting in taking bold steps in creating an atmosphere conducive to resolving all outstanding issues. He called for "enduring peace, stability, progress and prosperity." The Prime Minister said, "We can change history but not geography; we can change our friends but not neighbours." However, he cautioned that a little spark could result in disastrous consequences and stressed the need for creating an atmosphere of confidence and mutual trust. He proved to be so correct. The Kargil conflict begun by Pakistan, soon after the Lahore visit, proved disastrous to the Indo-Pak efforts for friendship.

The War of Kargil: The cease fire line drawn at the end of first Indo-Pak conflict (1947-48), in early 1949, had left a large part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir in the possession of Pakistan. At the end of 1971 War, when Bangladesh was created and Pakistan was 'mutilated', India had unilaterally declared cease-fire on the western sector on December 16, 1971. The Shimla Conference held in June 1972 was attended by Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Z.A. Bhutto to restore normalcy in the relation of two countries. The agreement signed at the conclusion of the Summit (see above) provided, besides other things, that the cease fire line, with certain modifications, would be known as Line of Control (LoC). The armies of two countries would respect the LoC. The Shimla Accord provided that the two countries would seek peaceful solutions to disputes and problems through bilateral negotiations, and neither India nor Pakistan would unilaterally change the existing situation. This provision implied (a) that the LoC would be respected by both countries and that it would not be violated; and (b) all disputes would be resolved by the two countries through bilateral negotiations. This would include solution of Kashmir tangle through direct negotiation without any third party mediation.

The Line of Control was identified by senior military officers of India and Pakistan in 1972. The maps on which LoC was marked were duly signed by the officers of the two countries. For almost 27 years, the Line of Control was never violated. Indian authorities could not anticipate that Pakistan had the game-plan of sending militants as well as its army regulars, in civilian clothes, to occupy the heights on Indian side of LoC in the Kargil sector. It included the Drass and Batalik sub-sectors also. It was discovered by India that the Pakistani intruders were well-entrenched on the Indian side at places up to about 10 km deep in the entire Kargil sector of about 100 km in length. This was officially stated to have been discovered in early May 1999 and the Indian army was immediately instructed to throw the intruders out. It was not an easy task. The Pakistanis were occupying the hill tops at the height of 15,000 to 16,000 feet covered with snow, or in the snow-melting situation.

Indian authorities said that, since 1972 the practice was that the heights on Indian side of LoC were occupied by our troops during summer, but with the onset of severe winter and snowfall the troops would return to their base. The army bunkers on the heights were left unmanned till the snow began melting and the troops returned to occupy them. This was done in 1998 also. But, during the winter of 1998-99 Pakistan put its game-plan in operation. While apparently Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was giving 'warm welcome' to Prime Minister Vajpayee, secretly Pakistani regulars and other intruders were busy occupying the Kargil heights on Indian side of Line of Control. It was not only an aggression against India, but was also treacherous. As Mr. Vajpayee said, while he took message of goodwill and friendship, Pakistan stabbed India at its back.

Pakistan's aim was not merely to sit on the Kargil heights, but to cut the overlooking Srinagar-Leh highway so that the Ladakh region would have no connection with the Valley. This would enable Pakistan to build pressure on Kashmir, encourage unrest and terror through increased militancy so that eventually it could capture the entire State of Jammu & Kashmir, or at least the Valley. At least four immediate objectives were set out by Pakistan for itself These were: (a) to internationalise the Kashmir problem; (b) to score a decisive military victory and permanently capture some locations on our side of the Line of Control; (c) to foment trouble on the Indian side of LoC; and (d) to win support of the Muslims in India. But, Pakistan failed in its entire game plan as Indian army demonstrated unprecedented determination and courage, and

defeated the Pakistani intruders which included large number of regulars. The only thing that Pakistan could perhaps claim as success was that Kargil conflict received world-wide attention. But, surely Kashmir was not internationalised. Actually, for the first time since its creation in 1947, Pakistan was completely isolated. The international community gave full support to Indian position. Pakistan's closest allies viz. the United States and China also favoured Pakistan's withdrawal from Kargil and restoration of *status quo ante,* which meant complete vacation of Indian side of Line of Control by Pakistani intruders — militants as well as army regulars. International community wanted India to exercise restraint, which India did on its own choice. It did not cross the Line of Control, even though it meant heavy casualties as more than 400 Indian troops were killed. Pakistan suffered much heavier loss of its soldiers. As its troops were beaten back, they left behind several hundred dead bodies including those of their regular troops. These bodies were then buried by Indian troops with proper religious rites.

It is true that our intelligence agencies failed to expect Pakistani entry into Kargil.[15] Critics even said that the government ignored the warning signals. In any case, it was later learnt that Pakistan army was preparing elaborately for the assault since October 1998. But, its calculations went completely wrong since May 1999 when India army, supported by the air force, launched "Operation Vijay" and finally defeated the enemy decisively. As *India Today* summed up, "Lulled by the Lahore Declaration, Indian intelligence agencies had failed miserably in detecting the intrusions, but the Vajpayee government's tough response thereafter stunned Pakistan. Vajpayee immediately upped the ante by ordering the Indian Air Force to bombard enemy posts in Kargil and signalled that he would take all possible steps to throw out the intruders."

India maintained restraint, yet succeeded in forcing the enemy to retreat. Pakistanis were told to leave or be killed. Indian forces kept their promise and killed those who did not run away. Pakistan's diplomacy failed; India achieved highest level of diplomatic victory along with military success. Earlier, Pakistan's Foreign Minister had come back empty handed from China. He visited India and tried to sell the story that those occupying Kargil heights were neither Pakistani regulars nor mercenaries; that they were Kashmir's own "freedom fighters". Nobody believed this Pakistani version. India's Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh firmly told his Pakistani counterpart Sartaj Aziz that the only issue was that Pakistanis were occupying Indian territory and that it must be vacated. There was nothing else to negotiate.

Pakistan's Prime Minister rushed to the United States when Indian troops were moving ahead, despite a hostile terrain, and regaining Indian positions. US President refused to help Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif was clearly told to pull out his men from Kargil, respect the LoC and then resolve Indo-Pak disputes through bilateral negotiations. Friendless, Pakistan had to vacate every inch of Indian territory if it had not already been regained by brave Indian *jawans*. India achieved political-diplomatic-military victory. Our armed forces showed "exemplary, sometimes suicidal, courage in below zero temperature". *Outlook* wrote in a cover story, "The tales of valour reported in the media contain less hype and more substance". In nearly two months of battle in very difficult terrain India lost 413 brave men and 584 were wounded. The estimated cost of vacating the aggression was more than Rs. 5000 crores.

Nobody had expected that Pakistan would have to yield to the pressure of international community so soon. In May 1999 Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had breathed fire when his army took India by surprise by surreptitiously crossing the Line of Control and occupying the commanding heights in Kargil. Pakistan's initial move was tactically brilliant. They had caught the Indian army napping as the political leadership was said to be in "suspended animation" after the government's defeat in the Lok Sabha by one vote. Pakistan wanted to deal India a stunning blow in Kashmir, cut the Srinagar-Leh road, trap the Indian forces on the Siachin glacier, question the sanctity of the LoC, and cause widespread unrest in the Valley. But, what actually happened was Pakistan's humiliating military defeat as its intruders were either killed, or thrown out, or were forced to leave under President Clinton's clear 'directive' to Nawaz Sharif to withdraw from the entire area of Kargil, respect the sanctity of LoC and initiate direct negotiations with India to sort out the two countries' bilateral relations. The United States clearly ruled out any mediation. The only 'ray of hope' for Sharif was Clinton's assurance that once normalcy was restored, he would take 'personal interest'. This certainly was neither an offer of help nor of mediation. Thus, Pakistan was forced to make a complete turnaround, and suffer a diplomatic snub.

Army Coup in Pakistan: Pakistan once again came under army rule in October 1999. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had sacked the Chief of Army Staff, General Parvez Musharraf, when he was away to Sri Lanka, on October 12, 1999. The army immediately revolted in support of its Chief. The General returned to Pakistan in the evening, and announced dismissal of Nawaz Sharif and his government. Sharif was put under house arrest, television stations and airports brought under army control. General Musharraf was in control of the situation. He declared himself to be the Chief Executive of Pakistan. This fourth *coup* in Pakistan was the outcome of ongoing tussle between armed forces and the Nawaz Sharif Government. This, yet another failure of democracy in Pakistan, is a matter of serious concern for India. Even the United States expressed unease at the *coup*. The US had, reportedly warned the Sharif Government of likely civil-military confrontation and of a possible *coup*. Sharif was tried, sentenced for 25 years imprisonment, but later allowed to go to Saudi Arabia to live in exile.

Kargil and International Community: The response of the international community to Pakistan's invasion in Kargil was clearly against the expectations of the aggressor country. As the Indian Army and the Air Force began action to defeat the enemy designs, almost every country saw through the sinister designs of Pakistan. It was realised by the international community that Pakistan had violated the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir by sending the intruders in Kargil Sector of the State. No country, bought the Pakistani argument that those who occupied the heights were Kashmiri *Mujahideens*, or "freedom fighters". Why should the so-called 'freedom fighters' go and occupy the bunkers in the snow-covered heights in their own state. India produced unimpeachable evidence before the world to prove that the heights were occupied by the armed Pakistani regular troops in civilian clothes and other intruders fully trained and armed by Pakistan. Even Pakistan's closest allies, China and the United States were convinced that it were Pakistanis who were in unlawful occupation of heights in the Kargil area on the Indian side of Line of Control. Pressure was put on Pakistan to vacate this illegal occupation and end the aggression. Pakistan was told by all major powers to restore the sanctity of the Line of Control. Pakistan kept on harping on the occupation by the 'freedom fighters' till the United States categorically told Pakistani leadership to withdraw its regulars and other intruders.

When Pakistanis were already on the run, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's sudden dash to America was seen as a desperate attempt to save his face. The US President took the unusual step of meeting Sharif on America's national day, July 4, 1999. This was the first time in five decades when the United States gave to India political support on any major issue concerning national security. India immediately sought to dispel the impression of emerging American mediation in Indo-Pakistan disputes. This was made clear by the Americans themselves. Pakistan had never before been so clearly isolated, and India had never before received such universal Support.

By the end of 1999 cross-border terrorism assumed new dimensions. It became very active in Jammu & Kashmir as even military posts inside India (in J & K state) began to be attacked by armed terrorists. In December an Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu to Delhi was hijacked by five armed men. This plane was eventually taken to Kandahar in Afghanistan. The area was then controlled by Pakistan-supported Taliban. For seven long days more than 150 passengers and members of the crew were kept hostage on gun point. The hostages were released only when India agreed to release three of the militants detained in Indian jails. The hijackers were Pakistani nationals and they managed to go back to their country. India had enough evidence to show Pakistan's involvement in this crime. This further spoilt India-Pakistan relations.

INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The Lahore Declaration was torn into pieces by the new military ruler of Pakistan. Prime Minister Vajpayee's goodwill gesture was returned with betrayal at Kargil. As cross-border terrorism remained unabated, India took the position that it would not talk to Pakistan till democracy was restored in that country, even as General Musharraf kept on harping on dialogue with India to resolve, what he called the core issue of Kashmir, and international pressure was mounted on India to initiate talk with the troublesome neighbour.

Vajpayee's Second Gamble: Setting aside his opposition to talk to a military ruler, Vajpayee decided to invite General Parvez Musharraf to India for talks. This was "Vajpayee's second gamble in about two years on changing India's relationship with Pakistan." Musharraf, who was Chief Executive, in addition to being Chief of Army Staff, made the Pakistani President resign on the eve of his visit to India, and he assumed the Presidency of Pakistan himself. General Musharraf was warmly welcomed in India, with lot of media hype in the hope of the beginning of a new chapter in the bilateral relations. The talks between Vajpayee and Musharraf, assisted by their respective high power delegations, took place in Agra. The Pakistani President insisted on right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir which, according to him, was denied by India. He talked of the "core issue" of Kashmir, and harped on "repression of the people of state by India." He refused to accept that there was any cross-border terrorism from Pakistani side. He told, not only his Indian hosts, but even the media in a directly telecast press conference, that the violence in Kashmir was nothing but "freedom struggle" by the suppressed people of the state. This was totally untrue and unacceptable to India. The talks failed, and even a joint declaration could not be issued.

C. Raja Mohan summed up the outcome of Agra talks thus: "July 2001 is likely to go down as the cruelest month Atal Behari Vajpayee ever endured in his foreign policy endeavour ... After two days and nights of negotiations at Agra, Vajpayee realised his attempt at finding a breakthrough with Pakistan had collapsed, yet again.[16] Indian Prime Minister refused to sign the joint declaration. Whatever was contained in the draft declaration was destroyed by Musharraf in his press conference in the morning by publicly blaming India for 1971 events leading to independence of Bangladesh, blaming India for, so called, suppression in Kashmir and denial of self-determination, and by supporting Pak-sponsored *jihadis* as "freedom fighters". As Raja Mohan concluded, "Vajpayee's famous silence became even longer as the voluble general kept pushing the piece of paper in front of him. Vajpayee had made up his mind. The general had overplayed his hand and undermined the prospects for a broad agreement on initiating a comprehensive dialogue between the two nations."[17]

Prime Minister Vajpayee's Lahore initiative had been, as already mentioned, destroyed by Musharraf as Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan. Vajpayee's second gamble again met with Pakistani leader's adamant and provocative attitude. The quote C. Raja Mohan again:

> Vajpayee thought he was being generous in his hospitality and the political substance that he was offering. The swaggering general saw this generosity as weakness, and he was determined to collect as much as he could for the investments his army had made in bleeding India for more than a decade in Jammu and Kashmir. Vajpayee's peace initiative turned to ashes ...[18]

While the then US President Clinton was opposed to the military dictatorship in Pakistan, his successor George W. Bush was placed in a situation in which he decided to befriend Pakistan and go out of the way to please the military ruler. A massive terrorist strike took place on the US territory on September 11, 2001. Well-trained suicide-bombers hijacked four American aircraft full of fuel and large numbers of passengers and crew. Two of these aircraft were struck against the 108-storied twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York. The Centre was fully destroyed and over 7000 innocent people were killed. This included hundreds of people of Indian origin. A third plane was struck, the same morning, against a portion of Pentagon building in Washington D.C. The fourth plane was saved by a vigilant lady passenger and made to miss its target, the US President's residence the White House. The US intelligence had completely failed, and the airport security proved to be totally ineffective. President Bush and his administration concluded that the unprecedented terrorist attacks were the work of Afghanistan-based Al Qaeda, a fundamentalist organisation led by Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, who had earlier been sheltered and supported by Pakistan, the Al Qaeda leadership were guests of the then Afghan fundamentalist rulers, the Taliban trained by Pakistan initially to fight against the Soviet forces, but later they had imposed severe rules, particularly on Afghan women, and were fighting against the government of President Rabbani. The Rabbani Government, recognised worldwide, had been forced to flee into the North with just five per cent territory left in its hands.

President Bush decided to organise an international coalition to attack the Taliban regime and its Al Qaeda supporters. Bush sought and got full support from Pakistan President Musharraf. Pakistan was the creator of Taliban and had been ignored by Clinton Administration. Musharraf grabbed the opportunity of winning over the support and friendship of the United States. Musharraf provided all assistance to Bush. Within short period of two months, beginning October 8, 2001, the Talibans were defeated, and their leaders as well as Osama were on the run. But the leaders could not be arrested. Afghanistan was apparently freed from terrorists. In the process Pakistan was the biggest beneficiary. It was emboldened and cross-border terrorism against India was increased so much that India had to prepare itself for a war against Pakistan.

India-Pakistan Stand-Off: Large number of innocent men, women and children, as also the men of security forces were killed in the renewed terrorism against India. Thus, on October 1, 2001 an attempt was made to destroy the Kashmir State Secretariat in Srinagar through a car-bomb explosion. The worst happened on December 13, 2001 when five very-well armed terrorists (all Pakistani nationals) tried to sneak into the Parliament House in New Delhi, when the Parliament was in session. Alert security men posted outside the Parliament House building challenged and engaged the terrorists in a big gun battle. Eventually all the five terrorists, including one human bomb, were killed. Seven of brave Indian security personnel lost their lives, but they saved India's top political leadership and the Parliament House. Indian martyrs included one brave police woman.

There was clear proof of the terrorists being Pakistani nationals, yet Pakistan shamelessly called them Kashmiri freedom fighters. A number of persons arrested by police in Delhi as conspirators in this crime also gave evidence of Pakistani involvement. However, Pakistan refused to claim the bodies of killed terrorists just as many bodies of enemy killed in Kargil conflict earlier (1999) were not claimed. India could not tolerate this direct threat to its democracy. India withdrew its High Commissioner from Islamabad, and later asked Pakistan to recall its Deputy High Commissioner Gilani when his involvement in supplying money to terrorists was established after the arrest of a woman terrorist coming out of the High Commission of Pakistan in New Delhi. Soon after December 13 attack, India refused over flights of Pakistani aircraft, and cancelled its own flights using Pakistani airspace. The Delhi-Lahore bus service and *Samjhauta* Express were cancelled. India mobilised its troops on the international border as well as the Line of Control. Pakistan too mobilised its troops. By the summer of 2002 a war between the two neighbours appeared imminent, but international concern and slight improvement in environment led India to withdraw its forces after they remained mobilised for almost ten months.

Even when the two armies stood face to face and international concern was being daily expressed Pakistan-sponsored terrorism kept bleeding innocent Indians. For example, terrorists managed to sneak into the famous Akshardham Temple in Ahmedabad. They fired indiscriminately, killing and wounding innocent Indians. Later, however, police managed to kill the terrorists. A similar incident took place in Raghunath Temple, in Jammu. On several occasions terrorists managed to take shelter in one mosque or the other. In practically all cases, the police had the last laugh as the security forces killed the terrorists without damaging the places of worship. In other incidents, the alert security forces killed two terrorists in the parking lot of New Delhi's Hans Plaza Complex before they could succeed in exploding the bombs and killing large number of shoppers. Their lives were saved. Intelligence sources were getting reports of terrorist plans to kill the Prime Minister and other leaders; and blow up places like the India Gate in Delhi, the Parliament House and the Gateway of India in Mumbai. In March 2003, Uttar Pradesh police arrested two terrorists in Muzaffarnagar after the intelligence report of their plan to make a bid on India Gate and other places in the capital through *fidayeen* attacks. A dreaded terrorist was killed in Noida on the outskirts of Delhi.

Meanwhile, free and fair elections were conducted in the State of Jammu & Kashmir in 2002. Pakistan carried out massive propaganda through its modules in the State in asking people to boycott the elections. Violence was also taken to high pitch. But, people of Jammu & Kashmir braved all threats and use of force and came out in large numbers to vote. International community all over acclaimed the fairness of the elections. People voted freely and without fear and changed the state government. Participation of people in the elections was universally recognised as willing participation of people in democratic process, giving a lie to Pakistani propaganda that the right of self-determination was being denied to the people of the State. The Prime Minister Mr. Vajpayee highlighted this point at NAM Summit at Kuala Lumpur in February 2003 in reply to General Musharraf's parrot-like allegation of suppression of Kashmiri people by India, denial of their rights and freedom and torture by the Indian security forces. Vajpayee gave a fitting reply in very strong words to Pakistani President's false allegations even in the 58th session of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2003. Indian Prime Minister reiterated that the people of the State had confirmed the accession of the State way back in 1956 through their freely framed Constitution, and frequent elections held including the Assembly election held in 2002. Prime Minister Vajpayee described this as proof of "determination and self-determination" of the people of Kashmir.

Meanwhile, the world leaders have been directly or indirectly condemning the cross-border terrorism. The Russian President Mr. Putin in December 2002, through the New Delhi Declaration, directly called upon Pakistan to end the cross-border terrorism. France, Germany, Vietnam are among many nations who see the reality of terror against India. The NAM Summit at Kuala Lumpur in February 2003 deplored the proxy war, and refused to endorse Pakistani President's argument that that freedom struggle must be distinguished from terrorism. The former US Ambassador to India Mr. Rober Blackwill (who returned home in mid-2003 to take up an important assignment in Bush Administration) made no secret of his conviction that militancy from across the border was continuing, and that it must end. Even President Bush was reported to have told Musharraf on the sidelines of UN General Assembly in September 2003 that he would have to stop terrorism both against India and Afghanistan. The Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, was very critical of the continued support to Taliban from certain quarters in Pakistan, though he did not directly blame the government of Pakistan.

The Third Initiative

India has always been keen for friendship with Pakistan. Even in April 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee once again extended his hand of friendship during his visit to Kashmir. India agreed to exchange High Commissioners, encourage people to people contacts by liberating visa facilities, reintroduction of Delhi-Lahore bus service, and initiate dialogue for resumption of over-flights. But, Pakistan created difficulties in resumption of over-flights. As Pakistan did not stop harping on "denial of rights to the people of Kashmir", nor did the cross-border terrorism stop, India felt disgusted and disappointed. Vajpayee, therefore, told the international community in his address to the General Assembly in September 2003, that India would not talk to the terror. He said that the world did not talk to Al Qaeda and Taliban before taking action against them, then why did the world expect India to talk to the sponsors of terrorism. He said that India would talk to Pakistan on 'other issues' after the cross-border terrorism ended or after 'we crush' this. Vajpayee's third peace initiative appeared to be heading to yet another road-block, but Vajpayee-Musharraf Joint Statement of January 6, 2004, on the sidelines of SAARC Summit, again pledged to renew the peace process.

The U.P.A. Government headed by Dr. Manmohan Singh not only pursued vigorously the normalisation process, but also initiated several other measures for people-to-people contact, and for resolution of several outstanding problems between India and Pakistan, including, what Pakistan calls, the core issue of Kashmir. Dr. Singh and President Musharraf had a number of meetings, for example on the sidelines of UN General Assembly sessions, and when Indian Prime Minister invited President of Pakistan to watch the India-Pakistan one-day cricket in New Delhi in April 2005. Commenting on the discussion and the joint statement issued by the two leaders, Manmohan Singh told the Parliament that good progress had been made through "confidence building measures, people-to-people contacts, and enhancing areas of interactions ..." The two countries had agreed on enhanced bilateral economic and commercial cooperation. India and Pakistan agreed to restore the rail link between Khokhrapar and Munnabai to facilitate people of Sind (Pakistan) and Rajasthan to visit their relatives and friends and improve trade and commerce.

Earlier, a Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service was started (April 2005) to link the capital of Jammu & Kashmir with the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).

Pakistan has always insisted on resolution of the problem of Kashmir, and President Musharraf even suggested division of the state on the basis of religion with *Tehsil* being the unit of determination of the future of a territory. The suggestion was to have the Muslim majority areas of Kashmir and Muslim Majority *Tehsils* of Jammu to constitute one unit, the Hindu majority *tehsils* of Jammu and Buddhist majority *tehsils* of Ladakh to be separate units. This yet another partition of the state on communal lines was totally unacceptable to India, and was rejected. Manmohan Singh made it clear to Musharraf that redrawing of boundaries was out of the question.

In an interesting development, former deposed Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif alleged in 2006, that during Kargil conflict in 1999, when he was the Prime Minister, Parvez Musharraf (then Chief of Army Staff) had even deployed nuclear weapons to be used against India. This highly provocative action was taken by Musharraf without the consent, or even, knowledge of the then Prime Minister. The former Prime Minister, living in exile, said that he did not know anything about deployment of nuclear weapons, by Pakistan army chief, till this information was given to him by the then US President Bill Clinton.

It is not easy to trust a person (Musharraf) who could plan a nuclear attack on India (in his own creation of Kargil crisis), and who could keep his own Prime Minister in the dark about it, and later depose and arrest him.

Meanwhile, despite commitment made to Vajpayee by Pakistan in January 2004 that the territories under its control would not be allowed to be used for the promotion of terrorism, cross-border terrorism has continued unabated both in Kashmir and elsewhere in the country line Delhi, Mumbai, Varanasi, and other places. The bombing in Delhi on Diwali eve in Delhi in 2005, and serial bombing in Mumbai on July 11, 2006 in the local trains had devastating effect on the peace process between India and Pakistan. Expulsion of an innocent Indian diplomat by Pakistan in August 2006 further aggravated the situation.

Surprisingly, President Musharraf and his foreign Minister Kasuri have been arguing that until the Kashmir dispute was resolved (meaning until Pakistan got Kashmir), militancy could not be checked. On the one hand Pakistan kept on saying that it had no hand in terrorist activities in India, on the other it implies continuation of terrorism (and killing of hundreds of innocent people) against India would end only if Kashmir issue is solved. This argument is enough to convince the impartial observers that terror in India had direct links and roots in Pakistan.

In mid-2006 Indo-Pak relations were in peculiar situation of formal peace process, including composite dialogue, not being abandoned, yet terrorism not being destroyed by Pakistan. After Mumbai serial bombing 11/7 India decided to postpone scheduled Foreign Secretary level talks, without calling off the peace process. Public anger forced the government in India to adopt tough stance on the question of terrorism.

The Pakistani President was asking proof of its agencies' role in serial bombings in Mumbai in July 2006, yet on a number of occasions in the past India had provided proof of continued terrorist training camps in Pakistan and POK with no evidence of Pakistan taking any steps to end cross-border terrorism, killings of security forces' personnel and civilians in Jammu & Kashmir and repeated terrorist attacks in other parts of the country including Delhi and Mumbai.

Meanwhile, composite dialogue at the officials' level to find solution to problems like Kashmir issue, peace and security, demilitarisation of Siachin Glacier, demarcation of border of Sir Creek in Rann of Kutch, terrorism and militancy and, economic and commercial cooperation, border issues and Tulbul Project etc. was off and on going on. Just as Kashmir issue eluded a settlement, the other 'lesser important' problems also remained unsolved. Pakistan's insistence on the solution of "core" issue of Kashmir and its alleged support to terrorism were at the root of continued stalemate, in spite of confidence building measures and repeated attempts at peace process by India.

NOTES

1. A British Dominion is an independent sovereign country which recognises the British King or Queen as its monarch. Dominions were earlier British Colonies.
2. The British monarch enjoyed this power in respect of native states. Their rulers were under the ultimate supreme power (paramountcy) of the King.
3. M.S. Rajan, *Studies in India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, p. 78.
4. Werner Levi, *Free India in Asia*, p. 67.
5. K. Raman Pillai, *India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, p. 70.
6. Arguments analysed by Sri Ram Sharma, in *India's Foreign Policy* (Hindi), pp. 166-167.
7. Kuldip Nayar, *Distant Neighbours*, pp. 61-62.
8. Michael Brecher, *Nehru: A Political Biography*, 1959, p. 577.
9. M.S. Rajan, *Studies in India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, p. 82.
10. V.P. Dutt, *India's Foreign Policy*, Vikas, New Delhi, p. 186.
11. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
12. Dutt, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-187.
13. Rajan, *op. cit.*, p. 147.
14. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
15. The Subrahmanyam Committee, appointed by the government to look into the causes of Kargil crisis, reported that there was major failure of intelligence on the part of *all* agencies, including RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) and the military intelligence. The report was laid on the table of the Parliament in February 2000.
16. C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*, Viking, New Delhi, 2003, p. 173.
17. Ibid.
18. C. Raja Mohan, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

Chapter 6

India and Its Neighbours: China

INTRODUCTION

India's relations with China have been a major factor in India's foreign policy. Since India was so preoccupied in her post-partition problems and China was so deeply involved in the civil war that, as Werner Levi wrote: "direct relations between the two countries, apart from contacts in international bodies were mostly restricted to the formalities and routine of the usual international contact."[1] But, soon the two countries were to develop intimate and friendly bilateral relations. This meant revival of age old friendship between the two largest countries of Asia. The arrival of western imperialism in Asia had disturbed the traditional friendship. In population, human resources and potential, India and China, the two giants of Asia, far outstrip any other country of Asia. "They carry the weight of proud history stretching into mythology and appear to be both ageless and timeless."[2] Cultural exchanges between the two countries had taken place even more than 2000 years back. But, in modern times it was at the Brussels Conference of 1927, where several depressed nations had assembled, a joint statement was issued by the representatives of China and India. It underlined the need for Sino-Indian cooperation in the task of liberation of Asia from western imperialism. During the Japanese attack on Manchuria province of China in 1931 not only "China Day" was observed in India but a call was also given by Indian nationalists for boycott of Japanese goods.

The Asian Relations Conference was convened in New Delhi in March 1947. At that time India was not yet independent, but Jawaharlal Nehru was the Interim Prime Minister. The Chinese delegates, sent by Chiang Kai-Shek's KMT (Kuomintang) Government, objected to a map in which Tibet was not shown as part of China. The Chinese also protested against India's recognition of the Tibetan delegation. However, KMT China did not show any concern when Pakistan-supported tribesmen committed aggression on Kashmir.

Meanwhile civil war in China was gradually eroding the authority of KMT Government and communist hold was increasing. By the end of September 1949 Kuomintang Government lost its hold completely. It fled to Taiwan (Formosa), and mainland China came under the control of Communist Party of China.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) was officially proclaimed in Peking on October 1, 1949. K.M. Panikkar who was India's Ambassador to China opined shortly before he was accredited to PRC that, "with a Communist China cordial and intimate relations were out of question." But, he hoped that an area of cooperation would be worked out. He added: "The only area where our interests overlapped was in Tibet." India was among the first countries to have recognised the People's Republic of China. It was done on December 30, 1949. Later Prime Minister Nehru commented on the Communist Revolution and India's recognition. He told the Lok Sabha: "It was a basic revolution involving millions and millions of human beings... It produced a perfectly stable government, strongly entrenched and popular. That has nothing to do with our liking it or disliking it ... Naturally we came to the decision that the government should be recognised."

India fully supported Communist China's claim for representation in the United Nations. Efforts were made to establish cordial relations between New Delhi and Peking. In view of India's support to China, several non-communist countries particularly the United States, expressed their displeasure. However, India's stand was based on merit of the Chinese case. India's positive response to UN decision declaring North Korea as aggressor in June 1950 caused unpleasantness in Peking, but when US wanted to censure China for its role in Korean crisis India stood by China, and this was fully appreciated.

In a letter to Ambassador K.M. Panikkar, Prime Minister Nehru had said that whenever China had a strong government, it had tended to expand beyond its frontiers. This tendency would again be visible in a "vigorously pulsating and dynamic new China." Nehru had noted that what had happened in China in 1949 was not a palace revolution; it was a grass root revolution. Therefore, as Professor V.P. Dutt wrote, "Nehru advocated the policy of befriending the Chinese revolution, bringing new China into the main stream of the world community, encouraging contacts, lessening hostilities and suspicions ...." Nehru hoped to avoid conflicts with China. But this could not be achieved.

THE PROBLEM OF TIBET

Tibet touches the Indian borders in the north. Besides India, its southern borders touch Nepal and Burma, and in its north is Sinkiang, a province of China. It covers an area of about 47,000 sq. miles and is located so high in the Himalayas that it is often described as the roof, or terrace, of the world. Its political system was based on Buddhist faith. Its spiritual head, the Dalai Lama was also the temporal or political chief of the country. Tibet's social system resembled feudal order and its political connections with China were vague and varied from time to time.

Tibet was a powerful state for a long time. However, during the eighteenth century a conflict on the succession of the sixth Dalai Lama occurred between the Tibetans and the Mongols. China occupied Lhasa, the capital of Tibet and selected the seventh Dalai Lama of its choice. Tibet was recognised as part of China during most of the nineteenth century. In 1890, British rulers of India concluded a treaty with China demarcating the Indo-Tibetan border. This treaty was rejected by Tibetan rulers. Meanwhile, Russia had begun to interfere in Tibetan affairs with a view to bring it under its influence. Lord Curzon, who was Governor-General of India, sent British Indian troops, under the command of Young Husband, in 1904 to check Russian influence and bring Tibet under the British umbrella. The Dalai Lama fled to China. In 1906 British India concluded a treaty with China whereby Britain accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. This 'dictated' treaty also provided that a British Agent would be posted in Lhasa and India would construct postal system up to Gyangtse. India also acquired the right to maintain troops in Tibet for the protection of trade routes. Anglo-Russian differences pertaining to Tibet were sorted out by an Entente signed in 1907, whereby both Britain and Russia accepted Chinese suzerainty in Tibet. Both the Powers also agreed that they would deal with Tibet only through China.

After the Chinese revolution of 1911, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Tibet forced the Chinese troops to leave the plateau. Subsequent attempts by China to reestablish its authority failed. A meeting was held at Shimla in 1914 which was attended by the representatives of Britain, China and Tibet. This meeting confirmed the Chinese suzerainty, but divided Tibet into two parts — Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet. The autonomy of Outer Tibet was accepted, and China agreed not to interfere in its internal affairs, nor give it representation in Chinese parliament, nor station its troops nor appoint its civil servants, nor to turn it into a Chinese colony. During 1933-39 KMT China made repeated attempts to regulate Tibet's foreign affairs and even to regulate its domestic policy.

At the end of the Second World War, Chinese were unable to exercise their control over Tibet. Tibet insisted that it was an autonomous country. India was interested in an autonomous Tibet, which could be treated as a buffer state between British India and China. As civil war began in China between the KMT and the communists, Tibet's status remained rather vague.

The government of newly established People's Republic of China (PRC) announced on January 1, 1950 that one of the basic tasks of People's Liberation Army would be to 'liberate' Tibet. This determination was later reiterated by prominent Chinese leaders. When the Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar met Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to seek clarification, the Chinese Prime Minister made it clear that the 'liberation' of Tibet was 'a sacred duty' of China, but his government would seek its goal through negotiations, not by military action. India was satisfied with this assurance and suggested direct China-Tibet talks, when Dalai Lama sought India's assistance.

In October 1950, India learnt that China had launched a full scale invasion of Tibet. India protested and expressed 'surprise' and 'regret' at the Chinese action, particularly in view of Chinese assurance that the issue would be peacefully resolved. The Chinese Government rejected India's protest, and accused India of being influenced by the imperialist Powers. India, in turn, recognised Chinese suzerainty and said that it had no intention of interfering in China's internal affairs. The Dalai Lama left Tibet and then made unsuccessful attempts to raise the Tibetan issue in the United Nations. China refused to accept Tibetan autonomy. Eventually an agreement was signed by China and Tibet on May 23, 1951, which recognised full Chinese sovereignty over Tibet with limited Tibetan autonomy in certain matters. India's desire of full Tibetan autonomy within Chinese suzerainty was not fulfilled.[3] The agreement promised Tibetan 'autonomy' but provided that China would regulate Tibet's external relations; that Chinese army would be posted in Tibet for its meaningful defence, for reorganisation of the Tibetan army and to eventually merge it in the Chinese Army; that full respect would be given to the Dalai Lama who would return to Lhasa; that there would be full religious freedom in Tibet; that China would cooperate in Tibet's development; and that an administrative and military mission of China would be based in Tibet. Thus, Tibet became, for all purposes, a Chinese territory.

India was criticised in several quarters both at home and abroad for having abdicated its legitimate interests in Tibet and for having sacrificed Tibetan autonomy in order to please the Communist rulers of China. India's Tibet policy has still remained an item of severe criticism.

The Panchsheel Agreement: India was disappointed at China's Tibet policy. But, it did not allow its friendship with China to be adversely affected. India continued to support China's demand for representation in the United Nations, not only at this stage but even during and after China's aggression on India in 1962. During the latter part of Korean crisis (1950-53) China appreciated India's principled stand. Negotiations started for a comprehensive trade agreement between India and China. These resulted in the signing of an agreement by India and China concerning trade and intercourse between the "Tibet Region of China" and India. This agreement was signed on 29 April 1954, for a period of eight years. India surrendered its extra-territorial rights in Tibet, and accepted China's full sovereignty over Tibet. Thus, it was accepted that Tibet was a region of China. India gave up the right to station Indian army units in Yatung and Gyangtse, rationalised arrangement for border trade and pilgrimage. India also surrendered its control over post and telegraph administration in Tibet. The five principles of *Panchsheel* (see below) were also incorporated in the agreement. The Trade Agreement was followed by visits of Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai to India in June 1954 and of Prime Minister Nehru to China in October. The two Prime Ministers were warmly received in the host countries.

At the end of Premier Chou's visit to New Delhi (June 1954), the Prime Ministers of India and China issued a joint statement emphasising the five principles to guide and regulate the bilateral relations between the two neighbours. It formalised the famous five principles popularly known as the *Panchsheel.* The five principles are:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

Nehru and Chou, besides reaffirming their faith in the five principles of *Panchsheel,* agreed that Tibet was a part of People's Republic of China. The five principles of *Panchsheel* were adopted by the Bandung Conference (1955) with minor modifications. The principles were later adopted by many countries as the basis of their bilateral relations.

The four year period after signing the *Panchsheel* has been described as the years of 'Sino-Indian honeymoon' and of "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai". Premier Chou En-lai paid four visits to India during the period 1954 to 1957. The friendship between China and India reached its zenith at the Bandung (Indonesia) Conference of Afro-Asian nations in April 1955. Chou and Nehru worked in closest cooperation at Bandung.

After the Conference of Afro-Asian Nations (Bandung), India gave full moral and diplomatic support to China's claim to Formosa and the off shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The KMT Government of China had shifted to Formosa in 1949 and PRC wanted to liberate it. China supported India's claim to Portuguese possession of Goa. But, Sino-Indian relations had first taste of conflict when in July 1958 maps of China, published in *China Pictorial,* showed certain Indian territories as part of China. In those maps, about 36,000 square miles of Indian territory in North-East, and about 12,000 square miles in North-West was shown as part of China. When India drew the attention of China to these improper maps, Peking told New Delhi that these were reproductions of old (KMT) maps and that China had no time to undertake a survey of China's borders. Pending such survey, Chinese Government would not make changes 'in the boundary. This was the beginning of the dispute over borders between India and China.

Commenting on the 1954-58 period of friendship between India and China, as also the emerging border problem, Jagat S. Mehta, a former Foreign Secretary of India wrote.

> The period 1954-58 were years of mutual affirmation of indestructible friendship between the two countries. Notwithstanding the ideological divergence and the known differences on the notions of the common border, relations were positive and harmonious ... with emphasis on common approaches to international politics .... However, even during this period, on the border and in the implementation of Tibet Agreement, there were difficulties, but consistent with the cherished overall logic of good relations, they were minimised or suppressed.[4]

Revolt in Tibet: India China relations became sour on account of the manner in which China handled the revolt that Tibetans had organised. Very early after independence, Tibet became a major issue in Sino-Indian relations. Within five years of the signing of *Panchsheel* Agreement, a revolt was organised by the Tibetans against Chinese domination and interference in their religious matters. The cause of revolt, according to China and leftist scholars elsewhere, was Tibetan non-cooperation in the land reforms initiated by China against existing feudal system in Tibet. However, this argument was rejected by Tibetans, who insisted that the entry of Chinese troops to destroy Tibetan autonomy was the main cause of uprising. It was claimed on behalf of China that roads were constructed, new hospitals established and airports were built, slavery was done away with and Marxist ideology was preached. Tibetans did not approve of Chinese control in any form or manner.

The Khampa revolt in China began in 1956. Chinese authorities claimed that this revolt was engineered by the privileged class of the old social order. These elements were encouraged by foreign vested interest and imperialists. Indian public opinion had not been aroused at the reports of Khampa revolt, but "it became stridently sympathetic after the Dalai Lama's escape and the reports of the plight of the Tibetans streaming into India."[5]

In the middle of March 1959, there was a sudden uprising in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. It led to outbreak of hostilities between the Tibetans and the Chinese forces. China attributed the Tibetan unrest to the "subversive and disruptive activities against China's Tibetan Region carried out by the US and Chiang Kai-shek clique in collusion with fugitive reactionaries from Tibet." It also blamed that local special agents were using India's Kalimpong as a base. The revolt was put down by China with a heavy hand and the Chinese army entrenched itself well across the borders of India. Tibet had lost its autonomy. The Dalai Lama fled from his country and is living in India since 1959. He was followed by thousands of Tibetans. Political asylum was granted by India to the Dalai Lama, but he was advised not to organise any anti-China resistance on Indian soil. India made it clear that while it sympathised with Tibetans in their aspirations for autonomy, yet it did not wish to interfere in the developments in Tibet, as this country had already acknowledged that Tibet was a region of China. Within India, there were strong protests at the treatment meted out to His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Nehru was bitterly criticised for his 'inactivity' in the face of Tibetan events.

China did not appreciate India's sympathies to Tibetans, even though India fully supported Chinese legal position in Tibet. The Sino-Indian rift was formalised simply because India had granted asylum to the Dalai Lama on humanitarian considerations. Prime Minister Nehru told the Indian Parliament that, "it is important for us to have friendly relations with the great country China; our sympathies go out very much to the Tibetans .... We want to have friendly relations with the people of Tibet and we want them to progress in freedom."

China refused to appreciate these sentiments. The grant of asylum by India to the Dalai Lama was described as an enemy-like act and China charged that India was being expansionist. There was no truth in these allegations. China even imposed restrictions on Indian tourists and traders. The fact was that the Tibetan disaffection was due to the failure of China's own policy. Chinese media unfortunately, tried to link the revolt to "Nehru's philosophy." But, Nehru had risked Western displeasure in urging the people of India to have faith in friendship with China. Therefore, China's attempts to blame Nehru have been correctly described as a 'thoughtless mistake'. Looking at the criticism of Nehru within India that he was too soft towards China, Professor Dutt commented that, "China's military march into Tibet and the adverse reactions in India darkened the India-China scene, but there was very little that Nehru could do. India did not have the military strength to intervene and help Tibet retain its independences."[6]

THE BORDER DISPUTE

The developments in Tibet had undermined India's faith in China's sincerity. It was felt in India that, as if to retaliate against what had happened in Tibet, China began intrusions in India's territory. To justify their action, they accused that Indian armed personnel had 'unlawfully intruded' into 'Chinese territory' despite 'solemn warning by the Chinese frontier guards.' This meant that China was claiming several thousand miles of Indian territory as its own and was declaring the presence of Indian troops in their own territory as intrusion in 'Chinese territory'.

There is over 2200 mile long border between India and China. The boundary line was regulated by agreements and administrative arrangements. Besides, the natural dividing line is also so clear that there could hardly be any doubt regarding exact border between the two countries. The entire Sino-Indian border can be generally divided into three areas: the border to the east of Bhutan, the central border across Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Himachal Pradesh, and the border separating Jammu & Kashmir from Chinese territories of Sinkiang and Tibet.

The border dispute relates mainly to McMahon Line in North-East, and Ladakh in North-West.

The McMahon Line: This is the boundary line between the two countries, east of Bhutan. India has always treated the McMahon Line as the lawfully demarcated border between India and China. But, China condemned it as 'imperialist line'. The McMahon Line was determined in 1914 at a conference of the representatives of British India, Tibet and China, held at Shimla. The conference was held to sort out border differences between Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Tibet. The Secretary of State for India (in British Cabinet) Arthur Henry McMahon represented India in the Shimla Conference. An agreement was concluded which divided Tibet into Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet (see above). The boundary between Outer Tibet and India was demarcated at the high mountain peaks. The line was drawn on the suggestion of McMahon who himself drew a line by a red pen on the map. The line so drawn came to be known as the McMahon Line. It is in a way natural boundary also as it passes through Tibet Plateau in the north and Indian hills in the South. The map was signed by representatives of British India, Tibet and China. But, the Chinese Government did not ratify it. Nevertheless, no government of China ever disputed this boundary line; India always accepted it.

Ladakh: Ladakh is, and has always been, a part of the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The State was under British paramountcy till independence and later acceded to India, as an integral part of this country. Although Ladakh-China border was not demarcated by any treaty, yet India and China have accepted the existing boundary for centuries. This boundary was always shown by India in its maps. The tourists who came to India from time to time also mentioned this border in their writings. It was made clear in a note sent by India to China in 1899 that Aksai Chin was a part of Indian territory. The revenue records of the State of Jammu & Kashmir also confirm that Aksai Chin was always a part of Ladakh region of Jammu & Kashmir.

Origin of the border dispute: A road was built by the Chinese across the Aksai Chin area during 1956-57. The road was meant to open Western Tibet to Chinese immigrants and to divert its trade from its traditional southward direction into Western China and the Soviet Union.

Earlier, in July 1954 (soon after the Trade Agreement incorporating *Panchsheel* was signed), China had sent a protest note to India alleging that Indian troops had illegally occupied Bu-Je (Barahooti), an area claimed to be within Chinese territory. India rejected this protest saying that Barahooti was situated within Indian State of Uttar Pradesh and an Indian post had been there for a long time. India also mentioned that Tibet-based Chinese officials had often been intruding into this Indian territory. During Nehru's visit to China in October 1954, Chou En-lai dismissed it as a minor incident.

For sometime after the communist revolution, China had not raised any boundary question. Therefore, when India noticed that about 48,000 sq. miles of territory was shown as part of China it protested. The Chinese leadership dismissed the maps as old KMT mistake. Not only in 1954, but even when Chou visited India in 1956, his attention was drawn to continuation of maps showing parts of Indian territory as part of China. He assured Nehru that McMahon Line was acceptable to him, and that corrections would be made in the maps. But, India was shocked when Chou En-lai wrote a letter on January 23, 1959 claiming thousands of square miles of Indian territory. He argued that Sino-Indian boundary had "never been formally delimited" and that the so-called "McMahon Line was a product of British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China." China considered the McMahon Line as illegal. Chou wrote that the border question had not been raised earlier as the time was not opportune for that. India was not only surprised at the Chinese territorial claim, but it wondered as to how the time had become opportune in early 1959. Obviously, by that time Tibet had been fully integrated in China; Chinese troops had been posted all along the Sino-Indian border, and 110-mile long road had been constructed in Aksai Chin area.

In July 1959 Chinese troops came to Khumak Fort in Ladakh and arrested an Indian patrol party in Aksai Chin. A Chinese patrol crossed the Indian border at Khimzemane in NEFA (now called Arunachal Pradesh) in early August. Nehru told the Lok Sabha on 28 August 1959 that, "while I do not wish to take an alarmist view of the situation, we shall naturally be prepared for any eventuality and, without fuss or shouting, keep vigilant." In October 1959, nine Indian *jawans* were killed and ten were imprisoned by the Chinese. This was done at a place 50 miles inside Indian territory near the Kongka Pass.

In order to avoid clashes on the border, India proposed that Indian troops would move south of that line in Ladakh which China claimed as its boundary, provided Chinese troops moved north of the line that was shown in Indian maps as our boundary. This would have avoided Indian and Chinese troops facing each other so that peace could be maintained. China rejected this proposal.

The Chinese Premier formally laid claim to about 50,000 sq. miles of Indian territory on September 8, 1959. The Kongka Pass incident (October 1959) brought Sino-Indian relations almost to a breaking point. Public opinion in India was so strong that a demand was made to break diplomatic relations with China and to throw the aggressor out of India by force. India's China policy was bitterly criticised by the media and in the Parliament.

As the relations continued to deteriorate Prime Ministers of India and China met in April 1960, but differences could not be resolved, nor narrowed down. Indian public opinion did not favour continuation of talks, as no fruitful results were expected. However, the officials of the two countries held three meetings in Peking, New Delhi and Rangoon in 1960 itself but these meetings failed to find any solution.

Pressed by strong public sentiments, Nehru decided to pursue the 'forward policy' which meant that India was to exercise its effective control up to its borders. By the end of 1961, about 50 posts were established by Indian forces all along the border. This step perhaps provoked China to take military action.

China concluded an agreement with Pakistan in May 1962. This made the two Powers, hostile to India, come very close to each other. This alliance was quite extraordinary as America's ally Pakistan and Communist China became friends against India. As China prepared for armed action against India, unfortunately Indian defence forces were not allowed to fully prepare to face the aggression. Political leadership of Nehru and Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon refused to agree with army's assessment of likely Chinese aggression. Thus, Indian troops despite their high morale and bravery found it extremely difficult to contain the Chinese action when it began in 1962.

On July 12, 1962 an Indian police post in Galban Valley in Ladakh was seized by the Chinese and our *jawans* were taken in captivity. This increased the tension further. India's strong protest was ignored. China was fully prepared for military action. Tibet had been integrated in China and Dalai Lama had been forced to flee to India, Pakistan had been befriended, there was no activity on the Taiwan issue, and China had already occupied about 25,000 square miles of Indian territory. With this background China began action against India in September 1962.

INDIA-CHINA WAR, 1962

To begin with Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line in NEFA in the eastern sector on September 8, 1962, and occupied a good part of Indian territory. Pressed by political compulsions, Nehru told the media on October 13, 1962 that his government had asked the army to throw the Chinese out of our territory. This provoked the Chinese. Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul later wrote in *The Untold Story* that:

> No General who knew the serious military situation confronting us in NEFA and Ladakh at the time could have advised him to do so .... It is my surprise that Nehru took up a posture of 'courage' when he knew that we were militarily weak, in the hope that with this bold statement the Chinese might be deterred from attacking India. He might also have been advised by one of his political confidants to make such a statement for public consumption for psychological reasons. The Chinese would have struck us anyhow; if not then, perhaps later. But, I wonder if Nehru's statement did not precipitate their attack.[7]

Whether due to Nehru's statement or otherwise, the Chinese launched a massive attack on October 20, 1962 in North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) as well as in the Ladakh Sector. Two important Indian posts in NEFA were captured within 24 hours. According to Krishna Menon, the attack was so massive that it appeared that locust had unleashed its fury on the Indian frontiers. By October 25, Chinese were inside India about 16 miles south of McMahon Line. After about two weeks of less vigorous fighting the Chinese began attack on a very large scale on November 15 in both NEFA and Ladakh sectors. By November 16, the Chinese had crossed Bomdila and reached the plains of Assam. The entire area in Ladakh that China was claiming was captured by its army. The victorious Chinese, in the eastern sector, reached a spot in Assam overlooking river Brahmaputra, plains of Assam and the Bay of Bengal.

Indian army suffered heavy casualties, though Chinese losses were even heavier. But despite such serious level of warfare, formal declaration of war was not made, and diplomatic missions in both the countries were not closed down. The Ambassadors left their missions, but the two Embassies in Peking and New Delhi functioned with skeleton staff for many years.

Meanwhile, on the urgent request of India, both Britain and the United States rushed necessary war material needed by the Indian army particularly for mountain warfare. Suddenly on November 21, 1962 the Chinese announced unilateral cease-fire. Earlier China had made a three-point proposal for cease-fire on October 26, 1962. China had suggested that both countries accept cease-fire and agree to honour the line of actual control (LOC) and that both the armies withdraw 20 km from the LOC on their sides. Secondly, even if India refused to withdraw, China would unilaterally withdraw 20 km from the north of LOC, provided both countries respected the line of control. Thirdly, the two Prime Ministers should confer to find a solution to the problem. India rejected the proposals, and suggested that China restore the *status quo ante* as on September 8, 1962. This was not accepted by China.

After the unilateral announcement of cease-fire on November 21, 1962, China repeated its proposals, which were again turned down by India. Once again India suggested *status quo ante* as on 8th September. Stalemate followed. India had suffered humiliation as the war allowed China to occupy plenty of Indian territory. Timely help by Britain and the US perhaps compelled China to cease-fire and withdraw to the point chosen by them. "Nehru's Policy towards China lay in shambles, even though the postulates on which it was founded were not wrong ... Nehru had not realized the full extent of the change in Chinese foreign policy and its implications, and public opinion in India had been left totally uneducated by the mass media in this regard..."[8] The border war left a trail of bitterness. Mutual hostility dominated the Sino-Indian relations for nearly two decades.

China initiated a powerful anti-India campaign by propagating that India was no longer non-aligned and that it was firmly in the American imperialist camp. India, however, had not changed its policy. Even after this humiliation, India continued to support China in regard to Taiwan and Tibet and fully backed China's efforts for representation in the United Nations. It was China who had moved closer to Pakistan, shifted its position on Kashmir and gradually had become a major source of supply of military and economic aid to Pakistan. To quote Professor V.P. Dutt again, "India's pride had been grievously hurt. She felt betrayed and her nationalism had been sharply awakened."[9] India believed that China wanted to dominate the entire Asia. A Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri said in the Parliament in 1965 during Indo-Pak War, "To justify its aggressive attitude, China is pretending to be a guardian of Asian countries, who, according to China, are being bullied by India. The basic objective of China is to claim for itself a position of dominance in Asia, which no self-respecting nation in Asia is prepared to recognise."

The Colombo Proposals: Soon after the unilateral cease fire by China, a conference of six non-aligned countries was convened by Sri Lankan Prime Minister in Colombo on December 10, 1962. It was attended by Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Ghana and Cambodia. The recommendations of the conference, called Colombo Proposals, were discussed by Sri Lanka's Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike with the Prime Ministers of India and China. The conference felt that the cease fire period is proper time for seeking peaceful solution to the Sino-Indian dispute; that as suggested by Chou En-lai to Nehru, China should withdraw its posts in the western sector by 10 kilometers; that India should maintain its existing military position in both the sectors; that the area vacated by China should remain demilitarised and it should be managed by neutral posts to be chosen by the two countries; that in NEFA the line of actual control(LAC) accepted by both the countries should be treated as cease fire line; that in the middle sector, position as on September 8, 1962 be maintained; and that final solution should be found by peaceful means.

The Colombo Proposals were acceptable to India. But, China laid down certain conditions which were not acceptable to India. China wanted (a) that only China should maintain its civil posts in the western demilitarised zone and India would not have any right in the area; (b) Indian presence be completely forbidden in the demilitarised zone; and (c) Indian troops must not move up to the McMahon Line in the eastern sector. The Colombo Proposals could not be implemented. China did not change its expansionist attitude. President Nasser of Egypt called for a second conference of Colombo Powers, but nothing came out of it. Nehru died, heartbroken, in May 1964. In his condolence message Chou En-lai hoped for a peaceful solution. But no worthwhile improvement in Sino-Indian relations was noticed till about 1980. The Sino-Indian border dispute has been described by G.P. Deshpande as both a major and minor problem. "It is minor in the sense that although a solution of it may not yet be in sight, it is not inherently impossible to find. It is a major problem in the sense that Sino-Indian relations can never be regarded as fully normal unless there is a border settlement between two countries." Deshpande concludes that, "a border settlement cannot be a sufficient condition for normal Sino-Indian relations, but it is a necessary condition."

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1965-1980

China developed dose relations with Islamic Pakistan. It was a strange combination which was meant mainly to isolate India. During India-Pakistan war of 1965, China dearly demonstrated its hostility towards India and gave moral and diplomatic support to Pakistan. China had already become aid giver to Pakistan. During the 1965 war, Indian troops captured from Pakistanis not only American weapons but also armaments with Chinese markings. During the war, China gave an ultimatum to India on September 16, 1965 asking India to vacate 56 military establishments on India-Sikkim-China border, which, according to China, were illegally constructed by India. China gave three days time to withdraw from the allegedly illegal establishments, failing which India would have to face serious consequences. This ultimatum was meant to show China's solidarity with Pakistan. But, big Powers got disturbed and they gave a stern warning to China not to precipitate the matter. Prime Minister Shastri clearly told China that there was no truth in the alleged violation of Sikkim-China boundary by India, and India rejected all Chinese claims on Indian territory.

Several unsuccessful initiatives were taken during Indira Gandhi's Prime Ministership. Two Chinese Embassy officials in Delhi were arrested for espionage in June 1967, and in September China attacked Indian position at Nathu la. China attacked another Indian post at Cho la in October, and again in April 1968 manipulations were done at Nathu la. Following criticism by many countries, China stopped aggressive actions against Indian posts in 1970. Welcoming the new developments, External Affairs Minister Sardar Swaran Singh called for improvements in Sino-Indian relations.

China demonstrated its continued hostility towards India, and support to Pakistan, during Bangladesh crisis in 1971. Mishandling of political situation by Pakistan President Yahya Khan led to declaration of independence by erstwhile East Pakistan and later India-Pakistan war resulting in defeat of Pakistan. China was not very vocal in early stages, but when the crisis became explosive, China came up with full and militant support to Pakistan. It, however, stopped short of actual intervention in the war. Z.A. Bhutto was not holding any office at that time, but was hoping to lead government if Mujib could be denied this privilege. Yahya Khan later admitted that Bhutto had misled him to believe that China was going to actively intervene in the war on the side of

Pakistan. Even US was expecting Chinese intervention. But, the signing of Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971 deterred both China and America from intervention. But, short of intervention, China gave full support to Pakistan. China's permanent representative to UN described India's case as "gangster logic", and asserted that the question of East Pakistan was purely an internal matter of Pakistan.[10]

Independence of Bangladesh could not be prevented, but China blocked Bangladesh's admission to the United Nations by exercising its veto in the Security Council. China's main concern was to stand by Pakistan and it forgot that its own representation in UN had remained blocked for over two decades because of US veto. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was optimistic. She hoped in January 1972 that despite China-Pak axis, relations between India and China could improve. Another border violation was committed in October 1975 in the eastern sector in which four of Indian *jawans* were killed.

India's Nuclear Test: India conducted a nuclear test in Rajasthan desert in May 1974. India made it clear that its nuclear programme was only for peaceful purposes and it was not going to manufacture nuclear weapons. But, China viewed India's nuclear blast as a means to blackmail smaller neighbours. In fact, these types of allegations were levelled against China itself when it had first exploded its nuclear device. But, there was a clear difference as China's test was aimed at nuclear weapons production, while India's was not. China assured Pakistan against "nuclear blackmail" by India, and reiterated support to Pakistan, in Kashmir.

Sikkim: The Chinese reaction was very strong when people of Sikkim rose in revolt (1974-75) against their ruler the Chogyal, and later when Sikkim's request for merger with India was accepted and it became a state within Indian Union. China blamed India for the problems in Sikkim, and accused her of "expansionism". This was not a new accusation. China said that India was bullying its neighbours, gobbling up Sikkim, had already divided Pakistan, was encouraging anti-national elements in Nepal and giving protection and succor to Tibetan rebels. China stated that it "absolutely does not recognise" Sikkim's status as part of India and that India was trying to create "a great Indian Empire with the backing of Moscow." These were baseless allegations in which even the Soviet Union was involved. India rejected Chinese contention. Mrs. Gandhi was of the view that China had no right to speak about Sikkim, in the light of its own track record in Tibet, and also because it did not utter a word when Pakistan had moved into Hunzra. In 2006, China finally accepted that Sikkim was an Indian state.

Leading a table-tennis team that visited India in 1975, a Chinese Vice-Minister for sports repeated the theme of traditional friendship between China and India, and in Delhi met senior officials of the Ministry of External Affairs.

However, by 2003, China had begun to change its position on Sikkim and in 2006 formally described as Indian State (see below Post-Pokhran Relations).

Normalisation of Diplomatic Relations: Although Embassies were functioning, there were no full ambassadorial-level relations between the two countries during 1962-74. It was after quick negotiations that in April 1975, the then Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan announced in the Lok Sabha that, in a bid to improve relations, India had decided to send an Ambassador to China. Since India had withdrawn its envoy first, China was waiting for an announcement by New Delhi before reciprocating the gesture. India designated Mr. K.R. Narayanan, a former senior diplomat as its ambassador to China. With the arrival of a Chinese ambassador in New Delhi diplomatic relations were normalised in 1975. But, exchange of ambassadors by itself was not detente. India, being aggrieved party, waited for an initiative from China.

The reappointment of ambassadors was not opposed by any party in India. According to Jagat S. Mehta, "China perceived that India had emerged politically self-confident and economically resilient after the Bangladesh crisis even in the face of the US-China tilt towards Pakistan.... The political dispensation within China after the fall of the Gang of Four (1976) was also in a constructive mood."

The relations between India and China remained strained even after the two ambassadors took charge. Border was only one of the many problems. Even border problem was made complex as the Line of Control in Aksai Chin area (western sector) was not the same as it was in 1959 or 1962. China had extended the line. Even today some problems remain unsolved. There is the problem of Karakoram Highway which India believes has been built illegally through Indian territory. China has not forgotten the asylum granted to the Dalai Lama and the presence of large number of Tibetans in India. Peking has often accused India of stirring up trouble in Tibet.

The border problem has been a major irritant between India and China. Chinese leadership indicated in 1970s and 1980s that the two countries could put the border dispute on ice, and move on to resolve other issues. But, Prime Minister Desai had asserted in 1978 that unless border dispute was resolved no progress could be made in other areas. However, the two countries did not allow, border problem to hinder the pace of normalisation of relations.

In 2003, a new initiative was taken during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China. On the question of Sino-Indian border dispute, the two countries appointed special representatives with mandate to "explore from political perspective" of the overall bilateral relationship, the frame work of a boundary settlement. Accordingly, India nominated the Prime Minister's Principal Secretary, Brajesh Mishra and the Chinese side named Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo. Their task was difficult, but it was expected that this process would be more useful than the earlier efforts. Expectation was that by the time of Premier Wen Jiabao's visit in 2004 sufficient progress would have been made. But, solution appeared elusive even after 8 rounds of talks by June 2006.

After the change of government in India in May 2004, Mishra was replaced by new National Security Advisor J.N. Dixit, and when he passed away Prime Minister Manmohan Singh named new Advisor M.K. Narayanan in 2005 as India's representative. The eighth round of talks in June 2006, took place in the background of improving bilateral relations. By that time the two countries had entered into broad cooperation in areas such energy, security, and defence. Bilateral trade was said to be galloping. By 2006-end China was expected to overtake the United States as India's largest trading partner.

Despite discussions at various levels for nearly 25 years, and subsequently several rounds of talk at the level of special representatives, the two sides have not been able to agree even on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), or the verification of alignments of respective areas on mountain tops and lakes. The main stumbling block appeared to be the rigid traditional Chinese position that there should be "swap" of territories. China would give up Aksai Chin in the east, but only if India transferred Arunachal Pradesh to China. But, India considers this suggestion totally unacceptable. The talks have been held in total secrecy, and little is given out to media at the conclusion of talks. For example it was announced after a round of talks in March 2006 that, "The two Special Representatives continued their discussions for an agreed framework for the resolution of boundary question in a constructive and friendly atmosphere." One could only hope that some solution of lasting nature would be found sooner or later.

Hoping for an early solution, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Parliament after Premier Wen Jiabao's visit in 2005 that the two sides had agreed to "strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas."

POST-MAO CHINA AND INDIA

Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong) died in 1976 and in India Mrs. Gandhi's Government was defeated in 1977. The new dispensation in China and Prime Minister Morarji Desai's Government in India decided to carry forward the process of normalisation. The President of Chinese Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and a senior diplomat, Wang Pingnan (Want Bingnan) visited India and met Prime Minister Desai and Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. He invited Vajpayee to visit China. Wang had a meeting with former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at a reception. Morarji Desai made it clear that the border issue was of primary concern for his government. He emphasised that full normalisation could be achieved only after border issue was settled.

Vajpayee's China Visit: External Affairs Minister Vajpayee visited China in February 1979. Unfortunately it had to be cut short. During Vajpayee's visit to a provincial city China was ill advised to attack Vietnam, a non-aligned country. Vajpayee's discussions in Peking, three years after normalisation of diplomatic relations, were generally fruitful, except on the border issue. China did not unilaterally focus on Kashmir, nor objected to Sikkim's integration with India. The Foreign Minister told the Lok Sabha, after the China visit, that a beginning towards normalisation had been made. The border issue had been thawed and was now on the agenda. He had questioned the Chinese about their support to insurgency in North-East, and the Chinese replied that it was a thing of the past. He explained India's position on Sikkim. The Chinese made no comment. After the visit, supply of arms to Nagas and Mizos appeared to have been discontinued. "In general, the hostile propaganda against India was quietly muted. In fact, in the Vajpayee discussions, there was an understanding that the unresolved boundary question would not stand in the way of improved functional cooperation between the two countries"[11] Jagat Mehta felt that the efforts by the pro-Soviet elements to decry the visit by highlighting Chinese attack on Vietnam during Vajpayee's visit as deliberate insult to India were needless and exaggerated. He felt that "the results were positive."

The Vietnam developments did cast a dark shadow on the prospects of India-China relationship. Yet, there have been improvements though slow since 1980. Goodwill missions were exchanged during 1981-83. Earlier, in 1978, after a high level trade delegation visited India, trade worth 12,000,000 dollars was initiated. Vice-President B.D. Jatti also visited China in 1978 on the occasion of China's National Day.

Post-1980 Scenario: The initiative taken by Desai's Janata Government was utilised by Mrs. Gandhi when she returned to power in 1980. She met the then Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng (Hua Guofeng) in May 1980 at Belgrade, during President Tito's funeral. This was the first meeting at this level since Chou-Nehru meeting in 1961. Hua and Indira agreed to pursue the goal of improving relations. By 1981, it had become clear that China wanted to upgrade relations with India without conceding too many concessions, and without injury to relations with India's neighbours including Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh. China adopted the policy that the complicated border problem should best be left alone, while the two countries proceed to build up economic, trade, cultural, social and political relationship. India generally agreed with temporary freezing of border question. But, indefinite *status quo* was not in the interest of India. The elder statesman of China, Deng Xiaoping made a suggestion which would legalise the present line of control as international border. It meant agreeing to *keep what you have* and *we retain what we possess.* He told an Indian delegation led by G. Parthasarthy, in October 1982, that it was "best to put the border issue on ice and concentrate on improvement of relations, but if the Indians wanted continued negotiations on the border issue, the two sides could keep discussing and one day they would find a solution."[12]

Several rounds of talks were held at various levels, but no significant change became visible in the Sino-Indian relations. Mrs. Gandhi met Premier Zhao Ziyang when the two went to Cancun (Mexico) to attend the North-South Conference. By 1983, officials of two sides had agreed on expansion of relations by way of greater exchanges in the field of science, technology, education, arts and sports.

Seven rounds of official level discussions had taken place by July 1986. But, no fruitful results were visible in (regard to border dispute. China had begun to suggest that it could recognise McMahon Line in the east only if it was allowed to hold on to the areas in Ladakh that it had occupied. Rajiv Gandhi was the first Prime Minister, after Nehru, to pay an official visit to China. Among others, Rajiv met Deng Xioping, the elder leader, who shook Rajiv's hand for three minutes and sought improvement in bilateral relations. According to Jagat Mehta, Rajiv "succeeded in creating a striking improvement in the climate for better functional relations." But, he was then looking for 1989 Lok Sabha elections, and was unable to take any bold decision. He failed to take advantage of 3/4 majority that he had in the Lok Sabha.

The Narasimha Rao Government was short of a clear majority. It was more interested in managing majority support for its survival. Nevertheless, it continued to explore possibilities of normalisation of relations.

The Chinese Premier Li Peng paid a visit to India in December 1991, when Rao and Li Peng agreed to increase mutual cooperation. The joint communique at the end of the talks expressed concern over the dangers of "international oligarchy" (meaning US and its allies), trying to pose a protector of human rights, world-wide. However, there could be no parallel in Chinese approach to human rights and that of India. The Tiannanmen Square massacre in Peking was a violation of human rights without a parallel.

The basic obstacle in the improvement of Sino-Indian relations remained the border dispute and the problem of Tibet-Several rounds of official level talks, Indian Foreign Minister's visit to China, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit and meetings of various Indian and Chinese leaders in international fora like Indira-Zhao meting at Cancun, Li Peng-Narasimha Rao meeting at Security Council Summit (1992) have borne no fruit. Commenting on similarity of views, Li Peng said: "We seemed to have consulted with each other before drafting our speeches at the Security Council, since there was a great deal of parallelism on major issues."

On the Tibet issue the Dalai Lama offered to negotiate with the Chinese at Geneva, and suggested that if Tibet was allowed genuine autonomy, China could exercise full control over its foreign policy, defence and transport. But, China did not agree to greater autonomy to Tibet. India made it clear that it did not wish to interfere in China's internal affairs, that it recognised Tibet as a region of China, but that it wanted a mutually acceptable solution of the border dispute.

Analysing the ingredients of future India-China relations, senior diplomat and a former Foreign Secretary Jagat S. Mehta says: "India and China were perceived as two pacesetters of the decolonised post-war world. Both belonged to the Third World, and faced similar problems of development. They still have common interests and attitudes such as on North-South problems and global warming, but they are different in history, values and national personalities and will remain commercial and political rivals." By mid-1990s China had liberalised its economy in an even bigger way than India. India's political system remains committed to pluralism and Parliamentary democracy whereas China is still a one-party state. Adds Mehta, "In the politics of twentieth century, the final advantage will rest with a country which can combine domestic economic dynamism with institutionalised democracy, affording scope for diversity in religion, culture and ethnicity."

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao paid a return visit to China in 1993. During this visit the two countries agreed to keep the border dispute apart, but develop friendly relations in other fields. Until the border dispute is resolved, Rao and Li Peng agreed to maintain peace on Line of Actual Control (LAC). Both countries also agreed to undertake specific confidence building measures like informing each other on their military exercises. A joint working group was formed. However, differences between India and China on the issue of reduction of troops on the border persisted. While India wanted reduction on the basis of "equal balanced security", China insisted on "whichever side advanced first, should withdraw first." India cannot afford to withdraw troops from territory which China claims to be its own and "Indian troops had moved in first."

China is keen to develop friendly relations with India. This is reflected in highest level visit in November 1996 of China's President Jiang Zemin, who was also General Secretary of the Communist Party. China was seeking an alternate market for its massive number of goods produced under the programme of economic liberalisation started more than a decade before India began to liberalise its semi-controlled economy.

Forty Years after Panchsheel: China appeared to be keen to revive the spirit of *Panchsheel*. In June 1994, forty years of signing of *Panchsheel* was celebrated in New Delhi and Peking (Beijing). Conferences of policy makers and scholars, drawn from both the countries, were held. Narasimha Rao emphasised the continued relevance of *Panchsheel*. He said: "in a world driven by ethnic, religious and communal conflicts with the overhanging menace of encroaching populations, degrading environments and social ills and a disintegrating faith in common human endeavour, *Panchsheel* is the only relevant answer". China is motivated by its national interest the way it had attacked Vietnam when Vajpayee was on Chinese soil in 1979, it exploded a nuclear device in 1992 during President Venkatraman's visit to that country; and yet the then Chinese President Yang Shangkun was giving a call to go back to the days of *Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai.* India wanted to normalise its relations with China but certainly not to play the role of a second rate Power in the region. China continued to consolidate its nuclear power and engage in territorial expansion, as is obvious from its claim on Spartly Islands in South China Sea. Its goal of emerging as a Super Power posed a serious threat to India's role in South Asia.

Despite the end of Cold War, China maintained close military and political relations with Pakistan. In early 196Os, the motive behind friendship with Pakistan was "an enemy's enemy is a friend." But, even after improvement in Sino-Indian relations in the field of science, technology, culture, trade and other economic activities, its continued alliance with Pakistan was not quite understandable. China continued to associate itself with Pakistan's nuclear programme. It also agreed to supply fuel for India's Tarapur nuclear plant.

There was a disturbing trend in India's foreign policy toward China. India only responded to initiatives taken by China. India's approach seems to be that of being an object of Chinese policies and it decides its attitude towards China on how the Chinese perceive us. India seems to want to know "how it figures in China's scheme of things; how it impinges on China's external political consciousness." Former Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit, summing up discussions at a meeting on Sino-Indian relations said "... it is time for Indians to examine how China should figure in our scheme of things in the context of its concerns on its external orientations."[13] Indian perception has to be based on certain basic facts: China is, in terms of population, the largest nation-state on the Asian mainland; it has the potential of becoming the most important economic power in this region; it has vast conventional and nuclear weapon capabilities; and despite its claim to the contrary, China has always considered itself the most important politico-cultural entity. As Dixit wrote: "China is firm on nurturing its great power status in economic and military terms. China perceives for itself a central role in Asian developments in the 21st century." Though the relations between China and India were gradually improving since the last decade of twentieth century, the ongoing defence cooperation between China and Pakistan made China a potential adversary of India.

Suggesting how India should respond to China, J.N. Dixit wrote:

> Our objective should be to structure a realistic and practical relationship with China, a relationship which will address the boundary issue devoid of emotionalism ... our relations should be mature and balanced enough for both sides to be able to candidly articulate concerns about each other's policies and attitudes on specific issues like Tibet, Sino-Pak defence cooperation and to see how they can be overcome.[14]

Jagat S. Mehta, writing about the challenge to sophisticated diplomacy, opined that, "Both India and China have to comprehend and adjust to," what he calls, "the political and economic disorder of the post-Cold War World." The two countries require mature diplomacy. "It does not warrant either euphoria or pessimism: neither guilt at the past nor paranoic fears about the future." It is imperative for two countries to adopt mature and balanced approach for future of a respectable relationship. As Mehta concluded, "Both India and China are necessary as independent pillars for a stable international system."

China is well on the way to being a global power. Diplomatic and political management of China will have to be a major concern of India's foreign policy. G.P. Deshpande was of the view that China is not an adversary of India. "It has long ceased to be one. It has not, however; ceased to be a competitor. China and India are competitive rather than complementary, not only in trade but in world politics as well."[16] Whether an adversary, competitor or complementary, China is a very powerful, nuclear weapon equipped neighbour. India will have to formulate a policy that will encourage cooperation between the two countries in the spirit of five principles of good neighbourly relations.

Agreement for Confidence-Building Measures, 1996: During a FAO meet on world food problem in Rome in November 1996, Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda met Chinese Premier Li Peng and assured him that Dalai Lama would not be allowed to engage in political activity on the Indian soil. Premier Li Peng was reported by Xinhua to have said that China treasured its traditional friendship with India and wanted to develop the long-term and stable neighbourhood and mutually beneficial cooperative relations with India as a set policy of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Premier's statement was a welcome move in the promotion of better and cordial relations. But, Indian Prime Minister's uncalled for assurance regarding Dalai Lama attracted criticism as, an attempt to appease China.

Jiang Zemin, President of China and head of the Chinese Communist Party paid an official visit to India in November 1996. This was the first ever visit of a Chinese head of state to India. President Jiang Zemin, who was also Chairman of the Military Commission, held wide ranging talks aimed at normalisation of Sino-Indian relations. He held talks with the President, Prime Minister and leaders of the opposition. During his visit, important agreements were concluded on various issues. The most significant was the "Agreement on Confidence

Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas." This was in continuation with normalisation efforts initiated in 1993 during Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to China. In 1993 it had been agreed "to skirt border dispute" and develop friendly relations in other fields. It was agreed to maintain peace and tranquility on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). It was also decided that acceptance of LAC would not affect the claims of either side for final settlement.

Taking the next step, India and China signed the agreement for confidence building in 1996. It provided that the two countries would reduce their military strength along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and that no military activities would be undertaken by either country that affected the other country. The long preamble to the agreement stressed the relevance of *Panchsheel*, the five principles of peaceful coexistence first initiated by Nehru and Chou En-lai (1954). The agreement stated that it was aimed at "a fair, reasonable, and mutually acceptable settlement" of the complicated border issue. According to the agreement the major categories of armaments to be reduced or limited were combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including Hoitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface to air missiles, and any other system mutually agreed upon. It was also agreed that no military aircraft of either side would fly across the LAC without prior intimation to the other side.

While signing this agreement, the two countries underplayed other contentious issues such as the status of Sikkim (as a state of Indian Union) and China's nuclear and missile collaboration with Pakistan.

India's Foreign Secretary Salman Haider said that for the first time both the sides had formally agreed to reduce their armaments and military presence. Earlier, only unilateral withdrawals had taken place.

Three other agreements were also concluded by India and China. These were: (i) the agreement for the continuation of Indian Consulate in Hong Kong after this British colony was restored to China in July 1997; (ii) an agreement for cooperation between two countries to fight against smuggling of arms and narcotics and other economic offences; and (iii) an agreement to regulate maritime transport including avoidance of double taxation in this regard.

The main agreement for confidence building which provided for prohibition of "military activity that affects the other country" was hailed as a "virtual no war pact", and the revival of *Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai* spirit was described by the *Times of India* as amounting to "Asia's giants retie rakhi."[17] However, the leader of opposition, Atal Behari Vajpayee, who as Foreign Minister had visited China in 1979, called for cautious approach towards China. He wondered why President Jiang Zemin was "maintaining a mysterious silence" on the border issue. Vajpayee had doubts about the Chinese intention on withdrawal of troops from the Line of Actual Control. He said: "... our side of the border is mountainous, while the Chinese side is plain." In the event of hostilities, the Chinese could summon reinforcements immediately, but India would take time. However, general feeling was that the confidence building agreement would enable the two large Asian neighbours to work towards the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control. "Given the chequered history of the Sino-Indian relationship in the aftermath of the 1962 war, and the many unresolved yet contentious bilateral issues, this gradual improvement in the overall ambience augur well for greater regional stability." This is how C. Uday Bhasker Deputy Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses commented on the outcome of Jiang Zemin's visit. He added, "Engaging China is the top priority for all major nations and nowhere is this more immediate and urgent than in India."[18]

The Confidence Building Measures included reduction of troops as well as armaments by the two countries in the disputed border areas. The Line of Actual Control was not to be discussed nor disturbed. China hoped after ratifying the accord that a final solution would soon be found to the long-pending border dispute, which has been for the time being put aside. China said: "This agreement will undoubtedly help both China and India in their effort to enhance trust and transparency in the military field along the Line of Actual Control and to continue maintaining peace and tranquility on the China-India border." Good neighbourly and friendly relations between India and China were not only desired by the leadership of the two countries, but peoples of both the countries were equally keen on peaceful and cordial relations between India and China.

India was one of the first countries to have recognised People's Republic of China in 1949, and one of the first to have established diplomatic relations with the new regime. After excellent relations between the two countries for nearly a decade two Asian giants had started drifting apart, and after the 1962 war Pakistan became China's closest ally. After a long period of adversarial relations, ambassadors were exchanged in 1975 and gradually Sino-Indian relations began to improve, leading ultimately to the signing of a confidence-building measures agreement in 1996. But, China reacted sharply against India when this country declared itself a nuclear weapon state in 1998. The fresh Chinese hostility was reflected in its demand that India should de-weaponise itself. China fully supported, the Security Council Resolution No. 1172 denouncing India's nuclear tests and calling upon her and Pakistan to de-weaponise themselves.

In view of China's long-standing friendship with Pakistan, and even its reported assistance in Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme, it was expected by Pakistan that China would stand by it on the Kargil issue. But, that did not happen. Like the rest of the international community, China asked Pakistan to withdraw its regulars as well as other intruders from Kargil. During the conflict, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Mr. Sartaj Aziz rushed to China, before coming to New Delhi for a day's talks with External Affairs Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh. China refused to support Pakistan's contention that it had no role in Kargil and that the intruders were actually Kashmiri freedom fighters. China made it clear to Pakistan to withdraw the intruders from Kargil. Thus, China for the first time after several years took a position that supported India's stand.

India's Minister of External Affairs Mr. Jaswant Singh paid an official visit to China, during the Kargil crisis, on the formal invitation of his Chinese counterpart. This was in contrast to Mr. Aziz's visit on his own initiative to seek Chinese help and support. India's External Affairs Minister discussed several issues of international and bilateral interest. The two countries agreed to strengthen the confidence building measures, and to initiate dialogue on matters of mutual interest. China assured India that it supported India's position that intruders must vacate the entire Kargil area and that the Line of Control must be respected by both the neighbours. This vindicated India's position.

India and China were keen to restore friendly relations between two of them. The ground for bilateral talks and 'new engagement' between the two was prepared during Mr. Jaswant Singh's visit to China in June 1999. China made it clear on the eve of half century celebrations of the establishment of Communist regime that it still stood by the Security Council resolution of June 6, 1998 calling upon India (and Pakistan) to destroy its nuclear weapons and thus, prepare the ground for signing the CTBT.

In regard to Pakistan's relations with India, the Chinese Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Wang Yi had opined that. "In our neighbourhood in South Asia, India and Pakistan are two important countries and we hope for improvement of their relations." However, for this the two countries must have direct talks. By the fall of 1999, China had again begun to talk of warm ties between India and China, the tradition of friendly relations between them, their joint role in outlining the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which had since become 'model of international dealings'. China agreed that India had some concerns over security issues, and added that all questions could be discussed across the table. "China is ready to discuss anything about the security matters with which Indians are concerned.

On the occasion of China's golden jubilee, President K.R. Narayanan said that India and China had the responsibility of cooperating with each other in order to ensure in the new millennium, the well-being and prosperity of the people of both countries and also to contribute to peace, stability and justice. Ms Zhang Qiyue of the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that, "Over the past 50 years, there have been some twists and turns in the relationship between the two countries, but the general trend has been very good and friendly," China

stressed that both the countries had a role in the establishment of a new just and fair economic and political world order", and that the two countries shared many common ideals. Lately, China was talking of developing good friendly and neighbourly relations with India. On its part, India was willing to go an extra mile not only in normalising and improving relations with China but also with Pakistan.

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: POST-POKHRAN II

China was a bitter critic of India's nuclear tests of 1998. We have seen above that it stood solidly by Security Council Resolution Number 1172, and imposed sanctions against India. But, the situation began to change rather fast in mid-1999, and clear improvement in Sino-Indian relations was soon visible. China put pressure on its friend Pakistan in June-July 1999 to pull back its forces and irregulars from the Line of Control in Kargil. This was in keeping with the wishes of entire international community, and served the cause of a new multi-dimensional relationship between India and China.

President K.R. Narayanan's highly successful visit to China in May 2000 marked a new watershed. Narayanan is an old China expert. He created ground for more rewarding relationship. This new environment of trust was strengthened by the return visit of Chinese President and Party Chief Jiang Zemin later the same year. China invited Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to visit China. His visit could materialise only in June 2003. It had been delayed, besides other pressing engagements, due to the deteriorating international environment caused by Anglo-American resolve to wage a war against Iraq "to establish democracy in that country" and to bring about "regime change".

Meanwhile some progress was slowly being made in regard to the border question. The Joint India-China Working Group (JWG) met 14 times since Rajiv Gandhi's 1988 visit till 2002. With a view to resolve the decades old boundary dispute the 14th meeting of the JWG saw the exchange of maps by the two countries in regard to the western sector stating their respective positions. Earlier, the maps in regard to the Central Sector had been exchanged. According to Mr. Yashwant Sinha, the Minister of External Affairs the progress was being made in the right direction. During a visit of Lok Sabha Speaker Manohar Joshi to China in January 2003, the then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji had expressed the hope that the two countries would soon develop a new constructive partnership of mutual cooperation. China was willing to subordinate the old differences and make a new beginning.

A new chapter of cooperation was introduced as a result of Prime Minister Vajpayee's China visit in June 2003. Both the countries had earlier expressed themselves strongly against any (UK-US) action against Iraq without authorisation by the United Nations. Both India and China were advocating a multiplier world rather than domination by the only Super Power, even if both the Asian countries were developing close friendly ties with the United States. Before going to China, the Indian Prime Minister had gone in May 2003 to Russia to participate in the 300th founding day of St. Petersburg. He was one of the 40 prominent world leaders invited for the occasion. During his Russian visit, Vajpayee had a brief interaction with the new President of China Hu Jintao. Prime Mjnister Vajpayee then gave expression to a vision of India and China making this an Asian century of peace and progress. Later, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao underscored the need for more democracy. Vajpayee's visits to Russia (May 2003) and China (June 2003) took place at a time when the international relations were in an unprecedented flux. The world had been rudely shaken by the 'American doctrine of "pre-emption", and war on Iraq.

Sikkim: There was another vexed problem. China had refused to accept Sikkim as a part of India right from the time the tiny Himalayan state had formally merged in 1975 and became one of the states of Indian Union. Beijing (Peking) had then castigated it. However, lately the Chinese had played down the question of Sikkim. Throughout mid-1 990s, China sent, in the words of C. Raja Mohan, "tantalising signals that it was prepared to recognise the state as part of India" (see below). The state had been a part of India now for nearly three decades. It was expected that China wanted India to categorically declare that Taiwan and Tibet were integral parts of China, before the latter could prepare a roadmap for recognition of Sikkim as part of India. In fact India has never questioned China's claim over Taiwan. In regard to Tibet, India does recognise it as an autonomous region of China since the signing of Panchsheel Agreement in 1954. During Vajpayee visit, the Prime Minister put a new spin by stressing "Tibet autonomy" within China. A way out for Sikkim was found. The two countries agreed to a new trade route between them through Sikkim and Tibet, implying that China "accepted" Sikkim as an Indian state, without clearly saying so, and Tibet has always been accepted by India as a Chinese territory while emphasising its autonomy. Thus, both on the question of the border and Sikkim, the Prime Minister said that India and China were moving in right direction. He said: "The road ahead is a long one, but a good beginning has been made."

Even before the Vajpayee visit, C. Raja Mohan had written that "The easiest place to start (the normalising process) would be Sikkim. An unambiguous Chinese recognition that Sikkim is part of India would allow India to reopen the state to trade with China through Tibet". This is what happened, initially without a formal declaration by China of Sikkim being a part of India. Restoration of trade links reopened the historic silk route that runs through Sikkim and Tibet. This would also complement the developmental needs of both Tibet and Sikkim, and remove one more irritant between India and China.

In their third meeting in six months, Prime Minister Vajpayee and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao moved decisively towards normalisation of relations. They met on the sidelines of ASEAN Summit at Bali in October 2003. For the first time, China removed Sikkim from its website of independent Asian countries. Till mid-2003 Sikkim used to appear after Singapore. Wen told Vajpayee that Sikkim was no more on Chinese website implying clear recognition of Sikkim as a part of India by China, thus giving *de facto* recognition to Sikkim as an Indian state while Chinese position in regard to Tibet remains firm and unchanged.

During Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003 some more progress was made in Chinese attitude to wards Sikkim. At that point of time China was the only country in the world that did not recognise Sikkim as an Indian State. The border trade agreement signed during Vajpayee visit stated that India and China would conduct their "border trade" at a market in Sikkim on Indian side and at another in Tibet on the Chinese side.

It was only in 2004 that China finally **ceased** treating Sikkim as an "independent nation annexed by India". Later when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited India, he categorically told Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that China regarded Sikkim as an 'inalienable part of India' and that Sikkim was no more an issue between China and India. The joint statement signed in April 2005 by the two Prime Ministers explicitly referred to Sikkim, as a 'State of the Republic of India'. The Chinese handed over to Indian officials their official maps showing Sikkim as an Indian State.

Thus, Sikkim's status which was disputed by China since 1975 was no more an issue between India and China.

The Nathu La (or the 'Pass of Listening Ear' in Tibetan Language), which was for a long time used as route of trade between China and India, via Tibet and Sikkim, was closed in 1962 during the border war. After a gap of 44 years the Nathu la was reopened as the route of 'silk trade' between Tibetan Autonomous Region of China, and Sikkim the State of India on July 6, 2006. This incidentally happened to be the birthday of exiled Tibetan Leader the Dalai Lama. To begin with the Silk Route would be, used for trading 29 items from Sikkim and 15 items from Tibet. The route opened at the height of 14,500 feet was initially to function Mondays to Thursdays between 7.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m. But, Saurabh Kumar, Director (China) in our Foreign Office hoped that "The scope and volume of trade would definitely increase." This was also the opinion of Prof. Mahendra P. Lama of J.N.U., the head of Nathu La Trade Study Group. However, China continues to claim that Arunachal Pardesh is a Chinese territory. It refuses to accept Arunachal as an Indian state even in first decade of 21st century.

At the Bali meeting, India and China decided to speed up efforts to set up an India-China Free Trade Area on the lines both countries have signed FTA with ASEAN. Vajpayee and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao agreed in October

2003 to set up the joint study group on economic cooperation that will identify areas of trade in goods and services, investment and joint productions venture. With these developments the unauthorised dumping of Chinese goods in Indian markets would go down.

India and China had set a target to *double* the trade between them to 10 billion US dollars by 2004. It was believed that the target was not too ambitious. Indian exports to China in 2003 were already growing by more than 100 per cent.

There were other emerging areas of cooperation as both India and China sought multipolarity in international relations; and both committed themselves to the objective of nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons by all the countries. Manmohan Singh Government in May 2004 committed itself to process of normalisation between India and China.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS HAPPIER TIMES

India was among the first few countries to have recognised People's Republic of China soon after the revolution in 1949. Gradually the relations between the two largest Asian countries developed into very friendly ties. After successful exchanges of visits between India and China including the exchange of visits between Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Chou-en Lai, the famous Panchsheel Agreement was signed in 1954. This heralded the "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai" era, and at the Bandung Conference of 1955 Nehru and Chou were reported to be working in total cooperation. But, within a few years, developments in Tibet and occupation of Indian territories in West and East, a border war took place in 1962. India suffered heavy losses, and Chinese occupied whatever territories they chose to. Relations were spoilt, Nathu la closed, trade badly affected, and hostile atmosphere prevailed for many years as ambassadors were withdrawn. The first process towards normalisation was begun when Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi said in January 1969 that India would be prepared to hold talks with China without pre-conditions. The Bangladesh war (1971) became a major hurdle as China supported Pakistan. China took exception to Sikkim's merger with India and criticised India's 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion.

However, in 1976 India and China agreed to restore ambassador-level relations after a gap of 15 years. Mr. K.R. Narayanan was sent by India as its ambassador to China. After many years of tension, India's Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited China in 1979, but during his visit, China's military action against. Vietnam forced Vajpayee to cut short his visit. The ice was really broken when Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988—first visit by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. Thereafter relations gradually improved and finally in 1996 India and China signed the agreement for Confidence Building Measures. But, India's nuclear explosion in 1998 annoyed China along with the USA demanded that India destroy its nuclear weapons. However, within less than two years things were brightening up again.

One of the most encouraging developments has been rapid increase in bilateral trade, which has "registered double digit percentage increases each year over several years. It rose from an insignificant level of (one) million dollars in to 5 billion dollars" by 2002. The then Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji had set a target of 10 billion dollars to be achieved by 2005.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the Lok Sabha in April 2005, after Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India, "... India-China relations have entered a new phase of comprehensive development". He added that the two countries had agreed to establish a 'strategic and cooperative Partnership' for peace and prosperity. Dr. Singh summed up that the border discussions at the level of Special Representatives were moving in right direction. He appreciated the Chinese recognition of Sikkim as an 'inalienable part of India' (see above). In respect of trade, Dr. Singh noted that by 2004 the bilateral trade had crossed the 13 billion dollar mark, and hoped that by 2008 it would touch the 20 billion dollar target. Thus, India-China relations were smoothly moving toward happier days. However, occasionally strains do appear. For example, in 2007, China (who claims Arunachal Pradesh as its territory) denied visa to an IAS officer of Arunachal Pradesh. This led to cancellation of the visit of an entire group of IAS officers to China. But, the leaders of two countries were keeping in touch. Meetings between President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2006 and 2007 helped in greater understanding. Trade between India and China was growing. It grew by 56.8 per cent in first four months of 2007, and was likely to cross 40 billion US dollars a year by 2010.

NOTES

1. Werner Levi, *Free India in Asia*, Minneapolis, 1952, p. 85.
2. V.P. Dutt, *India's Foreign Policy*, Vikas, New Delhi, p. 277.
3. The 1959 revolt in Tibet is dealt with in a later section.
4. Jagat S. Mehta, 'India-China Relations', in V.A. Pai Pannandikar (ed), *India's Policy Problem*, Vol. I, p. 221.
5. Ibid.
6. V.P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 278.
7. B. Kaul, *The Untold Story*, New Delhi, p. 387.
8. V.P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 279.
9. V.P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 280.
10. People's Republic of China was given representation in the United Nations in 1971 itself.
11. Jagat S. Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 225.
12. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 195. Dr. Dutt was himself a member of the delegation.
13. J.N. Dixit, 'No Place for Emotionalism', *Indian Express*, 12 November.
14. Ibid.

15. Jagat S. Mehta, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
16. G.P. Deshpande, 'Looking into Next Millennium: India and China', in *International Studies*, New Delhi, 1993.
17. *The Times of India*, 29 November 1996.
18. *The Times of India*, 3 December 1996.
19. C. Raja Mohan, *Recent Trends in India-China Relations*, 2003.
20. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, *Statement of Lok Sabha*, April, 2005.

Chapter 7

India and Its Neighbours: Nepal, Bangladesh & Sri Lanka

India's foreign policy-makers have always given high priority to building friendly relations with our immediate neighbours. Despite his global perception of India's foreign policy, Prime Minister Nehru always underlined the importance of friendly relations with neighbours. Highest priority to neighbouring countries was also accorded by Prime Minister Shastri, though he had to lead the country in conflict with Pakistan. After 1971, Mrs. Indira Gandhi boldly pursued the goal of friendly bilateral relations with the South Asian neighbours in the spirit of Shimla Agreement. But, she could not achieve much success. Soon after assuming office as Foreign Minister in 1977, Atal Behari Vajpayee said that it was his (and Janata Government's) primary concern to cooperate with and seek confidence of immediate neighbours of India. He said that while government was fully aware of its responsibility to defend India's borders, it also wanted to honour and respect all its neighbours and their sovereignty and integrity. Vajpayee said that he desired tension-free relations in South Asia. Prime Minister Desai also emphasised the need for friendly relations with the neighbours whom he described as 'younger brothers'. Desai said that as 'elder brother' India would have to be liberal and caring. Janata Government insisted on 'genuine' and 'real' non-alignment. The Gujral Doctrine (1996) was in continuations with the policy of 'elder brothers.'

Foreign Minister Vajpayee's visits to Pakistan and China prepared ground for improved relations. Pakistan President Zia-ul-Haq said that he was deeply impressed by sincerity of efforts of Desai and Vajpayee to improve bilateral relations. These efforts were vigorously pursued by Mrs. Gandhi as well as Rajiv Gandhi. Rajiv became the first Prime Minister after Nehru to have visited China. He also made efforts to strengthen friendly bilateral relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. He sent IPKF to Sri Lanka, and rushed forces to defeat coup attempts in Maldives. During the Prime Ministership of

P.V. Narasimha Rao relations with neighbours, showed clear signs of improvement Sri Lankans set aside suspicion and better understanding developed in both the countries regarding threat from international terrorism. Narasimha Rao Government achieved fair amount of success in maintaining cordial relations with Pakistan. Nepalese Prime Minister Koirala who visited India in 1991 assured Rao that Nepal no longer depended on China to fulfill its security requirements. Nepal's communist Prime Minister Manmohan Adhikary visited India twice within a span of six months in 1995. Rao Government permitted port facilities for Nepalese goods in Bombay and Kandla in addition to existing facility in Calcutta. Efforts were made to ensure that Nepal did not become hostile to India as it was during 1989-90. India has made several attempts to solve Indo-Bangladesh problems and to have friendly relations with Bangladesh. In this chapter brief discussion follows on India's relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH NEPAL

Till 2006 Nepal was the only Hindu state in the world. It is a landlocked country, situated on the southern slopes of Himalayas. It has Tibet in the north and India in the south. It has common frontiers both with India and China. Ever since China established its full sovereignty over Tibet, Nepal's position has become all the more important for India. It may be regarded as a buffer state between India and China. Professor V.P. Dutt is of the opinion that, "There are few countries other than India and Nepal to whom the analogy about the lips and teeth applies so demonstrably and aptly." India and Nepal are bound together by history, geography, kinship, religion, faith, cultural legacy and linguistic affinity. The two countries "have shared their mythology of the Himalayas and their reverence for those tall and forbidding mountains."[1]

Nepal was not organised as a sovereign state till 1769 when Maharaj Prithvi Narain Shah brought about political unification of Nepal and established a monarchy. Another significant development took place in 1846 when Rana Jang Bahadur seized power and forced the king to become a nominal head of state. The Ranas became, and remained virtual rulers of Nepal till early 1951.

A conflict took place between Nepal and East India Company. In the process of British imperialist expansion, Nepal was defeated and forced to sign a treaty in 1816. The treaty provided for transfer of part of Nepalese territory to East India Company. A British Resident was posted in Nepalese capital Kathmandu and the country came under British influence. The British rulers of India had treated Tibet as a buffer between China and India, but the situation changed after India's independence. Prime Minister Nehru said in the Lok Sabha on December 6, 1950: "Apart from our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we are also interested in the security of our own country." He added, "Much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot risk our own security by anything going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier to be crossed or otherwise weakens our frontier."

India's interest in Nepal was natural for historical, religious and strategic reasons. Recruitment of Gorkha soldiers in Nepal for British army continued even in 1947. Communist victory in China in 1949 made it apparent that it would establish its control over Tibet, and that would bring China in close contact with the borders of Nepal. In view of communist power emerging in China it was natural for the United States to take interest in Nepal. India's security was perceived to be closely related to Nepal in the north. Meanwhile, there was a move in Nepal to draft a Constitution for the Himalayan Kingdom. On Nepal's request, India sent Mr. Sri Prakasa to assist the Kingdom in drafting a Constitution. Since the constitution then drafted went against the power of Ranas it was not enforced. The Nepali Congress was carrying on a movement for democratisation of the country's polity. Indian National Congress was always sympathetic to the movement for democracy in Nepal. A treaty of friendship negotiated in 1949 could not be signed as Nepalese Rana leaders resented India's proposal for a democratic structure of government of Nepal.

Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950: India was keen to redefine Indo-Nepalese relations on the basis of sovereign equality and good neighbourly relations between the two. After about nine months of diplomatic activity and negotiations, a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was finally concluded between India and Nepal on July 31, 1950. It was clearly provided in the Treaty that, "neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor," and the two countries promised to "consult each other and device effective counter-measures" in case of any threat from a third country. Nepal would ordinarily purchase war equipment from India. The Treaty provided that Nepal would consult India before buying war material from any other country. After such consultation Nepal would "import from or through the territory of India, arms, ammunitions, or warlike material and equipment necessary for the security of Nepal." Indo-Nepalese relations have been based on this treaty.

After the signing of the treaty, India established seventeen check-posts to watch the passes between Tibet and Nepal and Bhutan. These posts were jointly manned by Indian and Nepalese personnel. An Indian military mission was also established in Kathmandu for the organisation and training of Nepalese army.

The special relationship between India and Nepal was further underlined by the conclusion of a Treaty of Trade and Commerce, signed on the same day; i.e., July 31, 1950. India agreed to make available to Nepal, to the maximum extent possible, commodities essential to its economy, also secure their routes and methods of transportation which were the most convenient and economical. The arrangements were reciprocal, but India was keen to help develop the economy of Nepal. As Nepal is a landlocked country, the Treaty of Trade and Commerce acknowledged Nepal's "full and unrestricted right of commercial transit of all goods and manufactures through the territory and parts of India." There were two other important provisions. The treaty provided for fixing the same level of import duties on items imported from third countries. Nepal also agreed to levy on ground produce in that country, for export to India, export duties at rates that would enable Nepalese goods to be sold in India at prices not lower than the prices on which goods produced in India were sold. Thus began an era of extensive economic cooperation and of economic assistance by India to Nepal.

Nehru was keen that Nepal must enjoy all the attributes of independence and sovereignty. Even during democratic movement against the autocratic regime of Ranas, India adopted the attitude of restraint and patience.

Political Changes in Nepal: India played a significant role in the change of Nepalese political structure. The people of Nepal, inspired by freedom struggles in neighbouring countries, launched a movement for removal of Rana regime. People wanted to free the King from the control of Ranas and set up a constitutional government. The King, Maharaja Tribhuvan Narain Shah was fully sympathetic with the aspirations of people. Palace intrigues had become order of the day as Rana Shamsher Jang Bahadur imposed restrictions on the monarch. The Ranas were contemplating assistance from Western Powers. India's anxiety was natural.

Forced by circumstances, King Tribhuvan left the palace along with 14 members of the royal family and took shelter in the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu on November 6, 1950. The next day, Rana Shamsher made an unsuccessful attempt to get the King back. Prime Minister Rana Shamsher, in a vindictive mood, "deposed" the King and declared a child Jainendra as the new King of Nepal. Maharaja Tribhuvan then flew to India with members of his family. India, thus, was forced into the process of political change in Nepal, although Nehru firmly remained committed to independence of that country and principle of non-involvement in the internal affairs of other states. India tried to be discrete mediator between various groups. As a result of negotiations held in Delhi in February 1951, King Tribhuvan returned to Nepal as its monarch. It was decided in the tripartite negotiations (King, Rana and Nepal Congress) that a democratic system would soon be introduced.

The cooperation between Ranas and Nepal Congress could not last long. A revolt was organised under the leadership of Dr. K.I. Singh. India cooperated with Nepal in taking police action against K.I. Singh, who was detained. He fled from jail in 1952. By early 1952, most political parties in Nepal had adopted anti-India stance. King Tribhuvan died in March 1955. His son Mahendra became the new King who assumed all powers to himself. Mahendra was already deputising for his ailing father for sometime. Meanwhile in 1954 Nepal was admitted to the United Nations. India had fully supported Nepal's membership of the UN.

Professor V.P. Dutt has written that, "It is generally believed in India that soon after the overthrow of the Rana autocracy, King Tribhuvan suggested the merger of Nepal with India". But, Nehru turned down the suggestion, and relationship of mutual cooperation based on sovereign equality of two countries was sought to be evolved. Nepal remained an absolute monarchy till the long-drawn struggle for multi-party parliamentary democracy was successfully completed in 1990 (see below).

Anti-India Stance of King Mahendra: King Mahendra did not have the same feelings for India as his father had, and "Palace politics soon came to be dominated by elements and forces not too-friendly to New Delhi". The King began moving away from India. The rise of Chinese power in Tibet largely changed the situation for India-Nepal relations. Most of the opponents of King Mahendra were put in jail and the monarch instituted the Rashtriya Panchayat System.

India was disturbed at the setback to democracy in neighbouring Nepal. Regrets were expressed in Indian media on Nepalese developments. Leaders and supporters of Nepali Congress, who stood for parliamentary democracy, fled to India to work for a democratic government in that country. These developments disturbed the King. Thus began difficult phase of Indo-Nepalese relations. While India supported democracy, it was not prepared to support insurgency from its territory. King Mahendra rapidly moved closer to China. This resulted in Nepal securing economic assistance from China, expansion of Sino-Nepalese economic cooperation, balance of relationship, and reduction in the dependence on India. "Peking was more than ready to play the game and not only encouraged and stoked the anti-Indian sentiments but seemingly gave concessions on a border treaty while obtaining the right to build the Kathmandu-Kodari road ...."[2] The young King was trying to convey the impression that he was a champion of Nepalese nationalism. He approved his supporters' anti-India campaign. At times India felt that he was playing China against India. Mahendra had come to believe that India was supporting the rebels. This was not correct.

The then Prime Minister of Nepal T.P. Acharya was clearly pro-Chinese. During his visit to India in 1956, he said that Nepal was willing to act as a bridge between China and India. The Chinese Prime Minister Cbou En-lai returned Acharya's China visit of 1956, in January 1957. He told the Nepalese that both the Chinese and Nepalese belonged to the same blood. He perhaps was intending to align China with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. As Acharya began to speak Chou's language in international relations Indo-Nepalese relations were strained. He also said that India, in its own interest, should support the cause of Nepalese nationalism. A Sino-Nepalese treaty relating to Tibet signed in 1956 caused anxiety in India. China also promised six crore rupees assistance to Nepal. India never had any evil designs on Nepal. President Rajendra Prasad, during his 1956 visit to Nepal, assured the people of that country that India had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal nor did India claim any of the Nepalese territory. In 1957, Dr. K.I. Singh became Prime Minister of Nepal. His policy was clearly pro-India but media did not permit him to change the anti-India stance of his predecessor. B.P. Koirala, who became Prime Minister in 1959, tried to consolidate Nepal-China relations and even signed an agreement with China in regard to Mount Everest, which was bitterly criticised in Indian press. Even after the fall of Koirala Government (1960), Indo-Nepalese relations reminded strained till 1961.

After Koirala was sacked by King Mahendra and many leaders of Nepali Congress were arrested, several of Congress leaders fled to India. The King blamed India for promoting anti-Nepal agitation, which further strained the relations. Despite India's warning, King Mahendra entered into an agreement with China for the construction of Kathmandu-Lhasa Road. He praised the Communist Government during a visit to China. The Chinese aid to Nepal was highly appreciated in the press. The Chinese aid was described as liberal and selfless.

The 'Detente'. Nepal assumed greater importance in India's security perception after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. India's bid for improvement in relations was reciprocated. The soft-spoken Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was then Union Home Minister, visited Nepal and successfully removed doubts that the Nepalese had about India and its policy. Shastri laid the foundation of better bilateral relations. Nepal King's 13-day visit to India, and President Radhakrishnan's return visit, further cemented the improved relations. Appreciating the *detente* in Indo-Nepal relations the President of Rashtriya Panchayat, Surya Bahadur Thapa assured India that none would be allowed to attack India through its territory so long as even one Nepalese was alive.

Relations were further improved when Foreign Minister Swaran Singh visited Nepal in 1964 and signed an agreement of large economic assistance to Nepal (see next section). The King of Nepal again visited India in 1965 and conferred with Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. Nepal gave full support to India's position on Kashmir. It was stated by the two leaders that the principle of self-determination (as demanded by Pakistan) could apply only to a dependent country. It did not apply to sovereign countries or to parts thereof. The King appreciated the economic assistance being provided by India to his country. However, the bilateral relations received another setback when a border dispute relating to Susta region arose. This region was claimed by Nepal in 1966. This one square-mile territory on Bihar-Nepal border remained a subject of dispute. Finally, a boundary commission was appointed to resolve the issue.

India's Economic Assistance to Nepal: Economic relations between India and Nepal were regulated by the treaty of trade and commerce of 1950. Nepal's main trading partner was India. By 1960, about 95 percent of Nepal's trade was only with India. A programme of economic development of Nepal was undertaken by India. To begin with, India started construction of roads and a transport system that would facilitate the movement of goods between the two countries, and within Nepal itself. As economic cooperation increased, many Indians acquired considerable economic stakes in Nepal. The Government of Nepal desired a greater access to foreign markets for the diversification of its international trade, which had to be routed through India. For India, large scale smuggling at the borders was causing anxiety. Negotiations for a new agreement resulted in the signing of an Agreement on Trade and Transit in 1961. It visualised setting up of a "common market" between the two countries. Goods originating in one country for sale in another country were generally exempted from any duties. Duty-free transit facilities were given by India to goods being exported to third countries. Steps against smuggling were to be taken by both the governments. Jute goods, match boxes and straw boards produced in Nepal were exempted from taxes by India. During 1962 Sino-Indian war, Nepal King tried to follow the policy of equidistance.

Even after increase in Sino-Nepal trade, chunk of trade remained with India. In 1966-67, for example, the value of Nepal's exports to India was about.420,759,000 Nepalese rupees and of import from India about 465,113,000 rupees; during the same period exports to China were only to the tune of Nepalese Rupees 5,562,000 and imports were worth 5,231,000 rupees. Nepal exported to the rest of the world goods worth about 60,941,000 rupees and its imports were of the value of Nepalese Rupees 10,924,000. Even in 1970-71, despite lapse of 1961 treaty and certain difficulties in economic relations, Nepal exported to India goods worth Nepalese Rs. 485,160,000 and imported items of the value of Rs. 783,050,000, while exports to China came down to 4,087,000 rupees and imports to Rs. 2,732,000 only.

In the field of economic assistance, by 1967 India had extended over Nepalese Rs. 50 crores for Nepal's economic development and had pledged another Rs. 40 crores, while China had advanced only Rs. 10 crores and pledged another about Rs. 35 crores. By 1967, India was the single largest aid giver to Nepal. Road building and power development were two major areas in which India assisted Nepal. India pledged to construct over 700 miles of roads in Nepal. Indian commitment included 78-mile Tribhuvan Rajpath (completed in 1956) which virtually became Nepal's life-line, the 128-mile long Sonali-Pokhara

Highway and 40-mile East-West Highway. India also constructed a 46-mile road linking Kathmandu with Trisuli and a road in the Kosi Project area.

India pledged to complete the Kosi Project. In 1965, Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri inaugurated work on western canal of the Kosi Project. The project was aimed at protection of Nepalese areas from floods and to assure supply of electricity and water for irrigation. Despite setback in 1966 on the border issue, India promised continued assistance for Nepal's development during Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai's visit in 1967. By 1968, Nepal was receiving about 40,000 kilowatt of power generated by India, including supply from Kosi and Gandak power stations.

India helped Nepal in the construction of the Kingdom's first airport at Kathmandu. Besides, India also built three all-weather airports at Bhairava, Janakur and Biratnagar, and a fine weather airport at Simra. But, by this time China became an important factor in Nepal's economic as well as political relations. King Mahendra reaffirmed Nepal's decision to stay neutral between India and China. He added that Nepal's economic problems were normal problems of a land-locked country, and he expected to receive all facilities allowed by international law. In late 1960s, Nepal wanted to erode special relations with India, and secure free and uninterrupted transit facilities for trade with third countries including Pakistan. For India, China factor in Nepal's foreign policy had opened a dangerous situation. Goods were smuggled from India and then exported to foreign countries using the facility of duty-free trade. Foreign goods imported by Nepal under duty-free arrangement, through India, also found their way into India and were sold at higher prices. India was not willing to allow duty-free trade with Pakistan.

The Kathmandu-Kodari road built by China, as also anti-India activities by the Chinese in Nepal caused anxiety in India. The road posed a serious threat to the security of India. Even if China never used the road to attack India, it continued to pose a security risk at a time when Sino-Indian relations were hostile and Nepal was quite friendly with its northern neighbour.

Demand for Withdrawal of Indian Personnel: Meanwhile, anti-India demonstrations were repeatedly held in Nepal. High level efforts were reported to have been made to spread anti-India sentiments and "turn the edge of Nepalese nationalism against India." Shortly after Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh's goodwill visit to Nepal in June 1969, Nepal made public demands for the withdrawal of Indian personnel from the northern check posts and its military liaison group in Kathmandu. Indians were based in these two positions in accordance with treaty agreements between the two countries. The demand for withdrawal was, thus, contrary to the treaty arrangement. Nepal was by this demand, questioning the very basis of Indo-Nepalese relationship. The demand was formally conveyed by Nepalese Ambassador in New Delhi. Nepal's Foreign Minister Rajbhandari said in the Rashtriya Panchayat, that the Liaison Group had completed its work and that the Nepalese personnel were now available to man the check posts.

King Mahendra said, in the presence of President V.V. Giri of India[3] that, "Nepal seeks nothing more than usual trade and transit facilities in accordance with the customary international practices in a spirit of good neighbourliness. We like to be frank and friendly with our friends and neighbours; we will appreciate if they are likewise frank and friendly with us." India resented the implied insinuation. It was believed in New Delhi that the Palace was trying to play China against India, and now even Pakistan against it. India refused to allow transit facilities through Radhikapur for trade with Pakistan, but the validity of trade agreement of 1961 due to expire in October 1970 was extended by India for two months. All round anti-India campaign was maintained against "Indian imperialism." The government tried for international support. As a result of anti-India campaign about 1300 Indians fled to Bihar.

However, by early 1971 Nepal realised the futility of anti-India campaign. Eventually, that would have hurt Nepal's own economy. Negotiations were opened and a new Treaty of Transit was signed in Kathmandu in August 1971. Sardar Swaran Singh, India's Foreign Minister and an ace negotiator, held talks in Kathmandu and secured Nepal's expression of deep concern over the developments in the then East Pakistan, the refugee problem and the need for political settlement of the Bangladesh crisis. This was a clear shift towards India. Nepal did not stop Gurkha soldiers of Indian army from fighting against Pakistan, supported Indian stand in the United Nations, and finally recognised independent Bangladesh. Thus, by the end of 1971 Indo-Nepal relations started looking brighter.

Towards Normalisation: King Birendra succeeded his father Mahendra when the latter died in early 1972. Under his reign, Nepal began to work for better and normal relations with India. Nepalese Prime Minister Kirtinidhi Bista, during a visit to New Delhi, said in 1972 that being a neighbour, Nepal "has always to be more oriented towards India." He said that there was no need for a treaty between the two countries on the lines of Indo-Soviet Treaty (1971), but in view of intimate relations between the two countries there was need for bilateral consultations on matters of security. Mrs. Indira Gandhi's warm welcome in Kathmandu in 1973, and King Birendra's successful visit to India in 1974 further improved the bilateral relations. King Birendra emphasised on "mature and sober" bilateral relations and acknowledged that the Indo-Nepalese relations had improved considerably.

A number of agreements were concluded in 1974 to implement assurances given by Planning Minister D.P. Dhar. India offered to set up a cement plant, a sugar mill and an ancillary engineering factory in Nepal, and to collaborate in industrial field. China had earlier made certain commitments, but later backed out. India and Nepal now agreed on speedy implementation of Karnali project, and India agreed to assist in the implementation of Devighat project to meet Nepal's urgent power needs. India also undertook to provide teachers to Nepal's technical institutes, assist in the expansion of technological facilities in Nepal, and provide opportunities for training of more Nepalese personnel in Indian technical institutes.

Even after improvements in political and economic relations become visible, there were still some irritants in bilateral relations. The Nepali Congress and its leader B.P. Koirala who were fighting for a democratic system were functioning in, and from India. This was a ground for suspicion of encouragement and sympathy by India, though no such encouragement was given by the Government of India. Secondly, there were certain irritants in regard to the working of Treaty of Trade and Transit of 1971. Nepal was demanding faster flow of goods, fulfilment of stipulated targets, and an agreed diversion of even those goods which were in short supply in India. Thirdly, a new irritant entered during 1975-76 when people of neighbouring Sikkim revolted against their ruler, the Chogyal. People were demanding Sikkim's participation in the Indian Union. Following a referendum, Sikkim decided to become an associate State of India, and later joined India as a full fledged state. Initially (before formal merger of Sikkim), Nepal denounced the Indian move as "outside interference in the internal affairs" of Sikkim, a neighbour. The democratic aspirations of Sikkim were regarded as a threat to Nepal's system of monarchy. It was expected to encourage demand of Nepali Congress for democracy in Nepal also. Protest demonstrations by students were organised and a fresh anti-India campaign was initiated in Nepal. The fear of Indian support to Koirala was baseless, particularly when Nepal itself had given asylum to Khampas from Tibet.

India made it abundantly clear to Nepal that Indo-Sikkimese relations were exclusive concern of the two, and no third country had any business to express any concern. Nepal Prime Minister N.P. Rijal's visit to India and discussions with our leaders led to immediate reduction in tension, and anti-India campaign faded out. Various steps were taken by India to normalise relations with Nepal. For example, in early 1976, India lifted all restrictions on the export of 44 items, imposed earlier, which could now be bought freely in the Indian market by Nepalese traders. Nepal was also assured by Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan that Indian economic assistance would continue and that India would remain Nepal's major development partner.

Ever since King Birendra became the monarch, Indo-Nepal relations remained generally cordial, though occasional irritants did appear. India participated in Nepal's development of power and irrigation, the major projects being the Kosi, the Gandak, the Karnali, the Trisuli and the Devighat and Pokhra Hydel projects. India and Nepal planned the harnessing of Himalayan rivers. There were Indian aid and cooperation activities in areas such as road building, airport construction, telecommunication, horticulture, agriculture, forestry, education and health.

Nepal as 'Zone of Peace': King Birendra's coronation took place in February 1975. On that occasion, he advocated the idea of Nepal being accepted by other Powers as a "Zone of Peace". If this concept was accepted by major Powers and neighbours it would have ensured Nepal's neutrality and security. The King of Nepal reiterated his plea for zone of peace in an official function in New Delhi in 1980. The proposal was vigorously pursued by Nepalese diplomats, and it was officially announced in 1985 that as many as 58 countries had endorsed the idea of Nepal as a zone of peace. But the then Super Power former USSR, as also two of Nepal's neighbours India and Bhutan did not accept the proposal. India did not act favourably as it believed that the thrust in the plea was certainly against the interest of India. If Nepal is to be declared zone of peace, India would feel greatly threatened by an unfriendly China. India would rather prefer entire Sub-Continent to be made a zone of peace. No worthwhile progress was made in the direction of Nepal being declared a zone of peace.

Bilateral Relations Since 1977: Indian National Congress which had been in power at the Centre since 1947 was not only defeated and voted out of power, but even Prime Minister Indira Gandhi lost her seat in the Lok Sabha elections held in early 1977. The Janata Party Government that took over under the Prime Ministership of Morarji Desai pledged to give highest priority to friendly relations with India's neighbours. Foreign Minister Vajpayee reiterated India's resolve to improve relations with neighbours and forget the misunderstanding and tensions of the past. Without sacrificing India's national interests, Janata Government sought to undertake confidence-building measures with the neighbours.

The Desai Government tried to strengthen the cultural ties between India and Nepal. Prime Minister Desai's visit to Nepal opened the path for finding solution of the pending problems. Two trade agreements were concluded at the end of the visit. Nepalese Prime Minister Bista acknowledged in April 1978 that Indo-Nepalese relations had never been as cordial as they were at that time. India made no comments and took no action when movement for democracy began in Nepal. This was done to underline India's resolve not to interfere in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries.

The friendly relations with Nepal were further consolidated after Mrs. Gandhi returned to power in 1980. King Birendra visited India in 1981 and the visit was returned by President Sanjiva Reddy the same year. The King once again pressed for the acceptance of Nepal as the zone of peace but India stood for the entire sub-continent, or entire South Asia, as zone of peace. Being a big Power, and a neighbour of Nepal, China had been taking keen interest in Nepal. China had been trying to widen the rift between India and Nepal whenever tension developed in the bilateral relations. However, India continued to be Nepal's main trading partner. During 1984-85 Nepal's 52 percent of total export-import trade was with India. Most of the goods produced in India and needed by Nepal are usually made available without much difficulty.

India and Nepal became founder-members of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), set up in 1985. This further strengthened the bilateral trade and commerce. The decision to establish SAPTA to enable preferential trading within 7-nation SAARC was welcomed in both the countries. By 1996 all members of SAARC had submitted lists of goods to be traded on preferential terms within South Asia and it was decided in 1997 that SAPTA would be replaced by SAFTA by 2001 AD to ensure for trading in the region (See Chapter 10).

When the Treaty of Trade and Transit expired in 1989 the Indo-Nepalese relations were once again strained. At that time Nepali Congress was engaged in struggle for multi-party democracy in Nepal. The King suspected that the Nepali Congress had the support of a good section of Indian people. The situation changed after the success of movement for democracy in April 1990.

Multi-Party Democracy and India-Nepal Relations: The age-old system of absolute monarchy in Nepal was replaced by constitutional monarchy on April 8, 1990. King Birendra agreed to the demands of the people for putting an end to partyless Panchayat system. The King agreed to a new constitutional arrangement in which he would continue to be head of state, but the governance would be the responsibility of a Cabinet answerable to Parliament. Elections would be held on the basis of multi-party system. Ever since B.P. Koirala-led Nepali Congress Government was dismissed in 1960, the agitation for restoration of democracy was going on. Eventually, partyless democracy was replaced by party-based parliamentary democracy. The King appointed the acting Chief of Nepali Congress K.P. Bhattarai as the Prime Minister and ordered general elections. Soon after assuming office as Prime Minister of India in December 1989, V.P. Singh expressed a desire to work sincerely for better Indo-Nepal relations. The process of normalised friendly relations was accelerated when Prime Minister of Nepal came to India in June 1990. Two new agreements were concluded and signed by the two Prime Ministers on June 10, 1990.

In December 1991, the then Prime Minister of Nepal G.P. Koirala visited New Delhi and held talks with Prime Minister Rao. India was concerned about frequent attempts by Nepal to balance relations between India and China, by often leaning towards the latter. Prime Minister Koirala assured India that

Nepal no longer depended on China to meet its security concerns. The first ever communist Prime Minister of Nepal Manmohan Adhikary visited India twice within a period of six months in 1995. Narasimha Rao Government told Adhikary in April 1995 that India was going to allow port facilities for Nepalese goods in Bombay and Kandla also, in addition to existing facility in Calcutta. However, one of contention remained in regard to certain changes demanded by Nepal in Friendship Treaty of 1950. For example, Nepal wanted to drop the requirement of reciprocity in matters of citizens of two countries. Nepal's contention was that India being a large country can afford to absorb Nepalese settling in India, while it finds it difficult to absorb Indians living in Nepal. The temporary tension of 1989-90 had ceased by 1991, even though the issue of reciprocity remained unsolved.

Economic relations between the two countries improved on account of liberalisation of their economies since 1991. The Treaties of Trade and Transit of 1991, and their amendments in 1993 have also had positive results. During 1992-94 period, India's commitment to Nepal's economic development continued to be expressed through various programmes. This included up-gradation of the Jayanagar railway through the supply of new locomotives and carriages as also the supply of city sanitation equipment to Kathmandu Municipality. Boundary pillars in demarcated stretch of Indo-Nepalese border were repaired, and steps were taken to extend cooperation in the field of ecological, soil conservation and other cross-border problems.

India and Nepal signed a treaty on the development of Mahakali Project during Prime Minister Deuba's visit to India in February 1996. This project represents a major breakthrough in the harnessing of river waters for mutual benefit. The two countries are working through Joint Technical Level India-Nepal Boundary Committee on a time bound programme for identification of boundary.

India-Nepal relations generally remained cordial since introduction of multiparty democracy in 1990. In 2001 murder of King Birendra, with his family, by the Crown Prince who also later died, brbught Gyanendra (younger brother of Birendra) to the throne. He, like his late father King Mahendra, had ambition of becoming real ruler. His tilt was towards China. Several governments changed as Maoist violence kept increasing. But, when he dissolved the elected Parliament in 2005 and assumed all powers to himself, internal situation worsened. Maoist violence went on increasing, and seven-party-alliance of non-Maoist parties spearheaded movement for restoration of democracy. The King tried to crush both Maoist and popular agitation for restoration of democracy. The Palace was in danger and security forces were unable to control surging mobs. Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran played an important role and persuaded the King to restore democracy. Finally, in April 2006, King Mahendra bowed to the public and international pressure, and revived the dissolved Parliament and appointed seven-party alliance leader Girija Prasad Koirala as Prime Minister. The revived Parliament accepted Maoist demand, in principle, to convene a new Constituent Assembly. It deprived the King of almost all his powers. He was no more supreme commander. He became a mere figure head. The Parliament amended the succession law and ladies became eligible for the ceremonial throne. The Parliament converted the Hindu Kingdom into a secular state. India welcomed these changes. CPI(M) leader Sitaram Yachuri brought Maoists in the mainstream.

In this situation, India had to readjust its foreign and security policies. There was a fear that China might occupy centre stage in Nepalese politics. Besides, the most disturbing factor was the *jehadis* and other anti-India terrorists spreading their wings into Nepal and Bangladesh. This would force India to rethink its entire Nepal policy.

Even if growing Sino-Indian relations would mean no threat to India's interest in Nepal, the presence of terrorists in that country are a good enough reason for India to adopt a policy that would strengthen our traditional friendship with Nepal and yet crush and eliminate anti-India militants using Nepal as a safe route.

India's hand of friendship remains extended to Nepal.

INDIA AND BANGLADESH

Bangladesh is the eighth most populous country in the world. It has a total area of 1,39,523 sq. kilometres. The birth of Bangladesh in December 1971 was a direct outcome of the Indo-Pakistan war in which Pakistani troops surrendered unconditionally in erstwhile East Pakistan. Lt. Gen. Niazi of Pakistan surrendered to Lt. Gen. J.S. Aurora of Indian army. It was culmination of revolt of Bangladeshis against tyrannical Pakistani regime. The revolt had begun in March 1971, when the most popular leader of Awami League Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was arrested and taken to a West Pakistani Jail. India had full sympathy with the people of East Pakistan in their struggle for independence. An interim government of Bangladesh had been constituted in as early as March 1971 but India had refrained from giving recognition to it for fear of provoking Pakistan into a war. But, when eventually the war did begin on December 3, 1971 India decided to go ahead and recognition was granted to Bangladesh on December 6, 1971. Pakistani surrender took place on December 16, 1971. During that 13-day war in the winter of 1971 nearly 20,000 Indian soldiers laid down their lives. The emergence of Bangladesh was described as an event of major importance in the Sub-continent, "For the people of Bangladesh it was the end of a nightmare of terror and torture, a reassertion of their individuality and personality. For India it was a major victory of democratic socialism."[4] But, the former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, who in 1971 was not in the government, expressed his opposition to Bangladesh. Writing in 2006, he said that Bangladesh war was unique because not only the US sent its fleet to Indian waters, but the war initiated two strategic partnerships. These were strategic relationships between the United States and China, and second between India and the Soviet Union.

Earlier India had to face an unprecedented crisis caused by massive influx of 10 million tortured refugees from East Pakistan. None of the refugees was willing to go back to East Pakistan. All efforts by India, and its Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, to persuade Pakistan for a negotiated settlement with Awami leaders had failed. Pakistani President Yahya Khan was determined to seek a military solution to the crisis. He failed in this and had to hand over-power to Z.A. Bhutto after East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh.

Soon after recognition of Bangladesh, while the war was still going on, the first Indo-Bangladesh Treaty was concluded on December 10, 1971. The treaty, signed by Mrs. Gandhi and acting Bangla President Nazrul Islam, set up a joint India-Mukti Bahini command under an Indian general to liberate Bangladesh from Pakistani military regime. The Indian army would leave Bangladesh as soon as normalcy was established in that country. India pledged to protect the territorial integrity of Bangladesh, and promised economic assistance for the reconstruction of the new state. Details about return of Bangladeshi refugees to their country were also worked out.

India pleaded with major Powers to exercise their influence over Pakistan to secure the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who was under detention. The Sheikh was released on January 8, and he arrived to a tumultuous welcome in New Delhi on January 10, 1972. He profusely thanked India for the sacrifices made by this country for his country. After he assumed the office of Prime Minister of Bangladesh in Dhaka, India invited him for an official visit. He visited Calcutta from 16-18 February 1972 where he held formal talks with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The two leaders resolved that Indo-Bangla relations would be guided by the principles of "democracy, socialism, secularism, non-alignment and opposition to racialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations."

India assured Bangladesh that it would never interfere in its internal affairs. India also announced that, as agreed, its troops would be withdrawn by March 25, 1972. The two Prime Ministers promised to ensure, as far as possible, that trade between two countries be regulated through official channels so that anti-social elements could not take advantage by smuggling.

Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Peace: Sheikh Mujib's visit to Calcutta was returned by Mrs. Indira Gandhi's official tour of Bangladesh in March 1972. At the end of Indo-Bangla summit talks the Treaty of Friendship and Peace was signed on March 19, 1972. It was stated in the joint declaration that the treaty was concluded "to give concrete expression to the similarity of views, ideals and interests." It was inspired by the ideals of peace, secularism, democracy, socialism and nationalism. Mrs. Gandhi assured Bangladesh of India's full support and cooperation in securing its admission to the United Nations. The two Prime Ministers declared that the Indian Ocean should be kept free of great power rivalries and competition, and that they would work for making Indian Ocean a nuclear-free zone. Indira Gandhi and Mujibur Rehman also decided to establish a Joint Rivers Commission on permanent basis to carry out a comprehensive survey of the rivers shared by the two countries and to formulate projects concerning both the countries in the field of flood control. They also promised consultations at official level for exchange in science and technology so as to promote speedy social and economic development.

The Treaty of Friendship and Peace was signed for a period of 25 years. India withdrew its troops from Bangladesh even before signatures were put on the Treaty, though they could have stayed on till 25th of March. India did not want to be criticised that the Treaty was signed due to pressure of the presence of Indian army in Bangladesh. It was provided in the treaty that the two countries would not interfere in the internal affairs of the other, and that they would respect the territorial integrity of each other. The Preamble spoke of friendship between the two countries based on sacrifice by their peoples leading to emergence of Bangladesh. The two countries promised to promote international peace and security and to fight against imperialism and racialism. The two countries would seek solution of international disputes through cooperation rather than conflict. It was also provided in the Treaty that in case of aggression, or threat of aggression, against either, India or Bangladesh, the two countries would consult each other and try to find a solution to ensure security of both the High Contracting Parties. The two countries would not attack each other, nor help any third country against the other signatory. None of the parties to this treaty would enter into an agreement with a third country that might be against the interest of the other party. They would not enter into any military alliance aimed against the other. Both the parties expressed their faith in the principle of peaceful co-existence. The two countries agreed to cooperate with each other in economic, scientific and technological field. They would work together in areas such as irrigation and education, culture and sports. Thus, the Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Peace covered wide range of bilateral relations as also their commitment to international peace and security.

Pakistan was disturbed at the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Peace and described it as a virtual military alliance. But, study of provisions of the Treaty makes it clear that it was signed to strengthen bilateral relations and promote regional peace and international cooperation. It was certainly not a military pact against any country or bloc of countries.

The Trade Agreement: The signing of friendship treaty was followed by the conclusion of a comprehensive trade agreement on March 25, 1972. The short-term agreement provided for creation of a duty-free zone up to 16 km on both sides of Indo-Bangla border. People could cross the border once a day and carry not more than Rs. 100 with them to purchase their essential requirements of daily use. The second part of the agreement provided for rupee trade up to 50 crores in a year. This enabled Bangladesh to secure market for its products including fish, raw jute, hides and skins and newsprint. India, on the other hand, could supply to meet Bangladeshi requirements of tobacco, cement, minerals, machinery etc. The third part of the treaty dealt with trading in foreign currencies (foreign exchange). The two countries could purchase from each other any goods to be sold against foreign exchange.

The Treaty of Friendship and the Trade Agreement were concluded in the spirit of equality and mutual benefit, friendship and good neighbourliness. Thus, during the first year after the emergence of independent Bangladesh there were signs of only friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

India's Prime Minister had detailed consultations with Bangla Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rehman before she went to attend the Shimla Conference where an agreement was concluded with Z.A. Bhutto of Pakistan on various issues arising out of 1971 war. India made it clear to Pakistan that it was not ready for any solution regarding prisoners of war detained in India which was not acceptable to Bangladesh, and until Pakistan granted recognition to Bangladesh. Bangladesh was keen to try all those POWs who had committed atrocities.

Bhutto was equally keen to get 90,000 prisoners of war (detained in India) repatriated to Pakistan. Eventually, except 195 POW s others were repatriated in accordance with an agreement concluded in 1973. Pakistan refused to recognise Bangladesh till all POWs were repatriated. China, who stood by Pakistan during and after the crisis, not only refused to recognise Bangladesh, but even exercised its veto in the Security Council on Bangla application for membership of the UN in 1972.

Pakistan recognised Bangladesh on February 22, 1974. She had earlier extended invitation to Bangladesh to attend the Islamic summit at Lahore (1974). When Pakistan did recognise Bangladesh, it was said that it was to facilitate Pakistan-Bangladesh friendship and help pro-Islamic and Pro-Pakistan elements in Bangladesh. Mujib attended the Islamic meet, which gave Pakistan an opportunity to intensify anti-India and Pro-Islamic campaign in Bangladesh. Early in 1975 India and Bangladesh had signed an agreement on sharing of Ganga waters. This upset Pakistan, and its government took steps to weaken Indian influence in Bangladesh. It talked of "India's new-imperialist attitude" and Bangladesh's subservient position. Pakistan Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto visited Bangladesh in June 1975. Not only the two countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations, but Bhutto also offered economic aid to Dhaka. The discord between India and Bangladesh was systematically created.

Assassination of Mujibur Rehman and India-Bangladesh Relations: A number of forces hostile to India were active in Bangladesh. It was generally believed that the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was "faltering economically and wobbling administratively." Prices were continuously rising. Mujibur Rehman declared emergency on December 24, 1974 and assumed all the powers himself. He failed to check corruption, hoarding etc. V.P. Dutt says that. "His style of functioning continued to be loose and disjointed, paternalistic and easy going." He brushed aside the intelligence reports and refused to believe that his "children" could do him any harm. But, on August 15, 1975 a *coup* was staged by some army majors. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the creator of Bangladesh, the *Bangabandhu,* was killed along with members of his family. By this time anti-Indianism was clearly visible in Bangladesh. Fundamentalism had emerged and secularism became a victim in the new military regime. After a brief struggle, power was assumed by Lt. Gen. Zia-ur-Rehman. The period after Mujib's assassination was quite disturbing for India. But, once Zia consolidated his regime, efforts were made for some normalcy in Indo-Bangladesh relations. The *coup* leaders made it clear that Bangladesh was no more secular, though Mujib's Bangladesh was secular, democratic republic and there was no place for army in politics. Since 1975 Bangladesh came to be ruled by pro-Pakistani and anti-Indian forces. Bangladesh later became an Islamic Republic, when its Parliament (*Jatio Sangsad*) passed a constitutional amendment bill in 1988 declaring Islam to be the state religion of Bangladesh. Thus, Islamisation of Bangladesh begun by Zia-ur-Rehman was completed during President Ershad's rule.

Bangladesh was ruled by Gen. Zia-ur-Rehman till May 1981 when he was killed. His successor, civilian President, Sattar was overthrown in a bloodless *coup* on March 24, 1982 and Lt. Gen. Ershad assumed power. Lt. Gen. Ershad took his country closer to Islamic oil producing countries. The attitude of new regime towards India was marked by confusion. The problems relating to Farakka barrage and sharing of Ganga waters were major issues of conflict between India and Bangladesh. The Bangla President had said in 1982 that, "we would not accept a policy of submission even if the entire North Bengal turns into a desert as a result of the Farakka problem ... Bangladeshis are good Muslims, who offer their prayers five times a day and whom Allah would certainly help ... Bangladeshis would continue to live for all times to come, Farakka or no Farakka ... was not Islam born in the desert." With such emphasis on Islam, relations with secular India could not be expected to be as smooth as were anticipated by Sheikh Mujib and Indira Gandhi.

Sharing of Ganga Waters: The most difficult and nagging problem between India and Bangladesh relates to sharing of Ganga waters. River Ganga originating at Gangotri flows in south-eastern direction through India and reaches Bangladesh. Ganga mainstream bifurcates 38 km south of Farakka in Murshidabad district of West Bengal. One of the two streams called Bhagirathi-Hoogly flows in the lower reaches of West Bengal, and the other called Padma flows along the India-Bangladesh boundary and then joins Brahmaputra. It meets River Meghna before it reaches the Bay of Bengal.

The Ganga waters dispute between India and Bangladesh is mainly concerned with sharing of waters during lean season, January to May, particularly mid-March to mid-May, when the flow of Ganga reduces to minimum level of 55,000 cusecs. "The fortunes of Calcutta port dependent on flow of river Hoogly have dwindled because of its decreased flow ... 40,000 cusecs is the barest minimum required to flush Hoogly to save Calcutta port. The crux of the problem is that if India withdraws 40,000 cusecs, Bangladesh receives only 15,000 cusecs which is highly insufficient to meet its needs. The extraction of this larger amount of water by India gives rise to multifarious problems in Bangladesh.[5] Thus, the dispute between India and Bangladesh relates to equitable sharing of Ganga waters by the two countries.

The Farakka Barrage was built by India, during 1962-71 when Bangladesh was still East Pakistan. The barrage is situated across Ganga on the Bengal-Bihar border near Farakka about 400 km north of Calcutta. The primary reason for the construction of this barrage was the preservation and maintenance of the Calcutta port and navigability of Bhagirathi-Hoogly. All the studies since mid-nineteenth century had concluded that safety of Calcutta port depended on increase in the headwater supply through diversion of water, which could not be done except through a barrage. Thus, India's national interest and safety of Calcutta port demanded the proper utilisation of water through Farakka barrage. The Calcutta port is not only vital for India's international trade, but also it was the only port (till recently) that Nepal and Bhutan used for their overseas trade. Once the barrage was constructed, Calcutta port was saved, but diversion of water for the port became an issue of international discord and misunderstanding.

In 1972 a Joint Rivers Commission was set up in accordance with Mujib-Indira agreement. It conducted detailed survey and identified weak point which could be strengthened and gaps that could be closed by further embankments. After Mujib's 1974 visit to India, an agreement was concluded on temporary basis for allocation of Ganga waters. It was signed in 1975 and was called a 'breakthrough'. India agreed to allow about 80% of water to Bangladesh in six weeks of lean period. This was a gesture of goodwill on the part of India. But, with the assassination of Mujibur Rehman in August 1975, India's attitude became hard, more so because anti-Indian forces had become active and vocal in Bangladesh. When the temporary agreement expired in May 1975, and till a new agreement was signed in 1977, India kept on drawing its normal requirement of 40,000 cusecs. Meanwhile, Maulana Bhashani of Bangladesh began mobilising public opinion on alleged "devastation and desertification" 'caused by reduced flow of Ganga water. In May 1976, Bhashani led a "Farakka Peace March" but no damage was done to the barrage because of vigilance by authorities. Bangladesh kept on raising the issue at international fora.

The 1977 Agreement: The Government of Morarji Desai in India accorded a high priority to the improvement of relations with India's neighbours. After negotiations between the two countries, an agreement for five years was concluded on sharing of Ganga waters in November 1977. It was a bilateral agreement signed at a time when Zia-ur-Rehman was working for stability of Bangladesh and regional cooperation in South Asia. The 1977 agreement offered partial solution as it dealt with only the sharing of water during the lean period. Attempt was made to regulate flow of Ganga at Farakka during five month period, January to May each year. Sharing of water was to be regulated for every 10-day period. Thus, for example, from January 1 to 10, out of a total flow of 98,000 cusecs, India would draw 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh would share 58,000 cusecs. At the peak of lean period April 21 to 30, India's share would be 20,500 cusecs and Bangladesh would get 34,500 cusecs. This was the best that India could offer to Bangladesh. Prime Minister Desai described this agreement as an achievement of Indian diplomacy. He emphasised that the agreement underlined the fact that developing countries are competent to resolve their bilateral disputes through negotiations. Mrs. Gandhi, however, felt that the national interest of India was being compromised. Critics pointed out that Farakka was constructed for safety of Calcutta port, and provision of less than 40,000 cusecs for India at any time was against the interest of India. West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu pointed out to the Prime Minister that steps should be taken to ensure 40,000 supply to West Bengal. He emphasised the need for augmentation of water at Farakka.

The agreement of 1977 expired on May 30, 1982. Fresh agreement had to be concluded. A meeting between Gen. H.M. Ershad, the then President of Bangladesh and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi opened new horizons in the bilateral relations. A fresh Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 1982. The 1977 agreement was extended for 18 months. Meanwhile, MoU called for augmentation of water supply so as to reach a long term solution. But, the minimum availability clause of 1977 agreement was deleted. It was agreed in 1982 that if the actual availability of water during a 10-day period was higher or lower, then it would be shared in proportion applicable to that period. The agreement was renewed in 1983 and again in J986. It finally lapsed in 1988 and India began releasing water on *ad hoc* basis.

It was realized by both the countries that augmentation of water was essential for a permanent solution of the problem. India suggested diversion of Brahmaputra river waters to the Ganga above Farakka for limited discharge to Bangladesh during dry season. The proposal was to link Ganga with Brahmaputra through a link canal. India's argument was that the waters of Ganga basin are insufficient to meet the requirements of the two countries, whereas Brahmaputra and Meghna have surplus water which could be properly utilised. Bangladesh rejected Indian proposal describing it as "legally unjustifiable, technically impractical, economically and ecologically disastrous." Bangladesh put up its own scheme of building reservoirs in the upper reaches of the Ganga in India and Nepal, as there are no storage sites in Bangladesh. This would bring Nepal in the picture. The issue of Ganga waters could be easily resolved only if countries concerned rose above narrow political considerations.

India time and again reiterated its commitment to holding a constructive bilateral dialogue for arriving at a long-term comprehensive arrangement on sharing of Ganga waters. But, Bangladesh continued to raise the issue at international fora. Thus, in October 1974, the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh made a reference of the subject in a statement in the UN General Assembly. Again in October 1995, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh raised the issue in General Assembly. However, India remained committed to finding a negotiated settlement to this bilateral problem. Earlier during SAARC summit at New Delhi in May 1995 Prime Ministers Rao and Khaleda Zia discussed various issues including sharing of rivers waters. It was decided by the foreign secretaries of the two countries to reconvene the Joint Rivers Commission at ministerial level as a confidence building measure. From 1988 to 1996 India was releasing water on *ad hoc* basis. A fresh negotiated agreement was formally concluded in December 1996 (see below).

The New Moore Island Dispute: There have been tensions between India and Bangladesh over certain territorial claims also. These include the dispute over New Moore Island, the problem related to Teen Bigha corridor, and the clash in Muhuni Char in the Belonia Sector. Of the three, the dispute over New Moore Island persisted as a major problem.

Towards the end of 1979, India and Bangladesh got engaged in firing at the border town of Belonia in Southern Tripura. Tripura is a state of Indian Republic. The dispute arose over about 45 acres of land which emerged largely as a result of shifting of the course by river Muhari which forms the border between Bangladesh and Tripura (India). Here, security forces of the two countries clashed but the tension soon cooled down.

New Moore Island covering an area of 2 to 12 sq. km, depending on rising and receding tide, is located in the Bay of Bengal. It is about 5200 meters from the nearest Indian coastal point and about 7000 meters from Bangladesh coastal point. It emerged in the sea some years ago and was built by millions of tons of silt swept down the Ganga. The Island was first noticed by India in 1971. It was notified to the British Admiralty for recording. The Admiralty chart included it as 'New Moore Island'. In 1974 during Indo-Bangladesh maritime talks India brought the existence of the Island to the notice of Bangladesh. Till 1979 Bangladesh did not question the Indian ownership of Island. The West Bengal Government named the Island as *Purbasha* (Hope of the East) and Bangladesh called it as South Talpatty. Indian flag was hoisted on the Island on March 12, 1980. It is at that stage that Bangladesh claimed its ownership and said that New Moore was a disputed territory. Bangladesh threatened to take the issue to the United Nations. In March 1980 there was a massive demonstration in front of Indian High Commission in Dhaka questioning India's hoisting of its flag in New Moore. The situation became explosive in May 1981 when Bangladesh raised serious objections to the arrival of Indian ship I.N.S. Sandhyak in the Island waters. The dispute has remained unresolved though it has been discussed at different levels.

The reason behind the dispute is that the entire maritime boundary between India and Bangladesh has not been demarcated. The Island is not clearly located in the territorial waters of either country. It is in the Bay situated at the mouth of rivers Haribhanga. The bay begins where the mainland masses of the two countries are joined by a line. It is situated 2 km away from the Redcliffe Line that marked the India-Pakistan border in 1947. Indian claim is based on the 'Median Line Principle'. This means an equidistant line drawn on plotted points on the sea from the nearest shores of the contending counties. It is on this basis that India's maritime boundary with Sri Lanka, Thailand and Indonesia has been demarcated. New Moore Island has become as Chandrika Gulati says, "a source of fear for Bangladesh, of India's domination over her."[6] This is not a serious dispute. If both the sides are willing, a negotiated settlement can be easily found. As S.C. Gangal wrote in 1982, "When we are seeking to build a structure of peace, security and harmony in the region, we should not be playing tough when moderation or accommodation would seem the preferable alternative."

Indo-Bangla relations were adversely affected on account of dispute regarding Tin Bigha corridor also. Dahagram and Angorpota, the two enclaves of Bangladesh are separated from district Rangpur of Bangladesh by a small patch of an acre of Indian territory called Tin Bigha. This is the nearest point between Bangladesh mainland and her two enclaves. The prolonged dispute regarding transit of Bangladeshis via Tin Bigha was sought to be settled when Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Bangladesh President H.M. Ershad signed an agreement in 1982. It confirmed permanent lease of Indian territory of Tin Bigha to Bangladesh. The rent for leased territory was fixed at Bangla Taka one per

annum. But, India agreed not to charge the lease money. Bangladesh was given full possession of the area given to her on lease. People and security personnel of Bangladesh would have the right to free and unfettered movement and they would not be required to carry travel documents of any kind. Movement of Indians across the leased area would also be free. The people of Dahagram and Angorpota welcomed the signing of the agreement. But, people of West Bengal had strong reservations. The agreement could not be implemented as leasing out an Indian territory required a constitutional amendment. The leasing out of Tin Bigha became an emotional issue for many Indians. A petition was filed in the Calcutta High Court challenging the leasing of Tin Bigha corridor. It was argued that leasing of Tin Bigha would not only make India's border insecure, but about 5000 Indian residents of 28 adjoining villages would be reduced to the level of refugees in their own country.

Other Bilateral Issues: Among other problems in India-Bangladesh relations is the problem of Chakma refugees who have mostly taken shelter in Indian state of Tripura. Negotiations during 1994 led to the repatriation of Chakma refugees from Tripura to Chittagong Hill tracts in Bangladesh. By August 1994 nearly 5100 such refugees were repatriated. Discussions for repatriation of nearly 50,000 more Chakma refugees were going on till 1996. Most of them were awaiting repatriation in Tripura camps. All repatriation has been on voluntary basis.

India is facing another problem concerning Bangladeshi nationals. A very large number of Bangladeshis, mostly belonging to economically weaker section, have been illegally entering India. It is difficult to distinguish between Indians belonging to West Bengal and Bangladeshi migrants. They have come in search of employment and have settled down mostly in slums. Some non-Muslims have been illegally coming as refugees because of occasional communal tensions. There are about 4 lakh such illegal migrants in Delhi alone. Their arrival without valid travel documents is made easy by the lack of any natural border between two countries. India's proposal to do fencing of the border with barbed wires was opposed by Bangladesh. India had made it clear to Bangladesh that it wanted barbed wires as a preventive measure against illegal migration. It was not contrary to 1975 treaty of friendship. Still, Bangladesh Rifles fired at the workers engaged in fencing in April 1984. This caused tension. India does not seem to be in a position to identify illegal entrants and to repatriate them.

Indo-Bangladesh Joint Business Council has been exploring possibilities for expansion of economic and commercial cooperation and for setting up of industrial projects and joint ventures. Bilateral trade has been gradually increasing. India's exports to Bangladesh in 1993-94 were valued at nearly Rs. 350 crores, and imports from Bangladesh were of the value of Rs. 56 crores.

India has reduced tariffs on selected items of export in the interest of Bangladesh.

The Annual Report of India's Ministry of External Affairs for 1995-96 claimed that, "Relations with Bangladesh continue to be close and stable with regular interaction between the two Governments". Bangladesh, however, continued to internationalise the river water issue and occasionally raised it even in UN General Assembly, though India firmly believed that it could be solved through bilateral efforts. During 1994-95 India's exports to Bangladesh had increased to over Rs. 2000 crores. A Rs. 30 crore credit agreement and an agreement on avoidance of double taxation have been concluded. India continues to provide training facilities to Bangladesh personnel under the Technical Assistance Programme. SAARC has become an important forum for economic cooperation in South Asia. The decision to have preferential trading through SAPTA (See chapter 10) was likely to further increase economic cooperation between India and Bangladesh. The election of Sheikh Hasina Wajed (daughter of *Bangabandhu* Mujibur Rehman) as Prime Minister of Bangladesh in 1996 was likely to help in the improvement of India-Bangladesh relations. Soon after taking over as Prime Minister she had said that she would not allow anti-Indian activities on Bangladesh soil. She had taken strong exception to Pakistan intelligence agency, ISI's activities in Bangladesh. The Awami League Government led by Sheikh Hasina could give India a chance to turn the tide of anti-India rhetoric that had been spewing out of Dhaka in the past.

Sheikh Hasina Wajed visited New Delhi in December 1996, and signed an accord with India on the sharing of Ganga waters for next 30 years. India's difficulty is that it needs enough water for flushing the Hoogly to save the future of Calcutta. The India-Bangladesh accord of 1996 was signed after the 1977 accord lapsed in 1982. Since then, India had been releasing water on *ad hoc* basis. The new accord can be utilized by both the countries in finding solution of other bilateral issues such as integrated economic development of the region, augmentation of water supply, transit facilities and efforts to end insurgency. Besides, the two countries will have to apply their mind to the problem of illegal migrants.

Thirty-Year Water Sharing Agreement, 1996: The India-Bangladesh treaty on sharing of Ganga waters signed in 1977 for five years expired in 1982, but was extended and remained operational with mutual consent till 1988. Since then India was releasing water on *ad hoc* basis. During 1988-96 period, several tensions developed as pro-Pakistan elements in Bangladesh kept on encouraging anti-India sentiments. Sheikh Hasina Wajed, daughter of *Bangabandhu* Mujibur Rehman, took over as Prime Minister in 1996. Although general environment in Bangladesh did not change, Hasina Government negotiated with India a treaty for sharing of Ganga waters for 30 years. The Treaty was signed in New Delhi on December 12, 1996 by the two Prime Ministers, H.D. Deve Gowda and Sheikh Hasina Wajed. The treaty has a provision for mandatory review every five years. The review may take place even after two years with scope for adjustments, if required. The treaty may be renewed with mutual consent. Deve Gowda described the signing of the treaty as a "landmark event in Indo-Bangladesh relations". He told the Lok Sabha that it was "a fitting tribute to the special quality of our relations". However, general anti-India climate in Bangladesh was likely to take time to change. That would also be possible only if Sheikh Hasina could convince her people that there was no ill-will in India against that country.

The Treaty of 1996, like the one signed in 1977, recognised the period from January 1 to May 31, every year as the lean period, though the period from April 21 to 30 is the leanest period. Under the 1977 treaty, during ten-day period from January 1 to 10, out of a total flow of 98,000 cusecs, India was to draw 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh was to be allowed 58,000 cusecs. But, during the leanest period (April 21 to 30), India's share was only 20,500 cusecs per day and Bangladesh received 34,500 cusecs. Bangladesh was given a much larger share of waters than India, although the minimum requirement to flush Hoogly and save Calcutta Port is 40,000 cusecs. When the treaty was renewed for 18 months is 1982, the clause guaranteeing fixed share to Bangladesh was allowed to lapse. Under the 1996 Treaty, during the leanest period Bangladesh would get 35,000 cusecs and India would have to contend with 25,992 cusecs.

The main features of 30-year treaty signed in 1996 are that sharing of Ganga water at Farakka would be determined by 15 blocs of 10-day period from January 1 to May 31 every year. The agreed formula gives India a constant 40,000 cusecs for first two months (January-February), whereas the share of Bangladesh would gradually come down from 67,516 cusecs to 39,106 cusecs during the same period. During March 1 to May 10 (excluding the leanest period of April 21-30) there will be six blocs of 10 days each. Three of these blocs will provide assured 35,000 to India, and three of these would give guaranteed 35,000 cusecs to Bangladesh. The two countries will have assured share in alternate blocs of 10 days. The country that gets less water in one bloc will be compensated in the next bloc. However, during leanest period Bangladesh would get 35,000 cusecs while India's share would be only 25,992 cusecs.

It is provided in the agreement that if during last two blocs in May the availability of water at Farakka is 70,000 cusecs or less both countries would get 50 percent of the available water. If the flow is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs, Bangladesh would get 35,000 cusecs and the balance flow would be retained by India. If Farakka has more than 75,000 cusecs of water, India would retain 40,000 cusecs and the balance would be released to Bangladesh.

The 30-year treaty was described by Sheikh Hasina and Deve Gowda as "fair and just" to both the countries. Commenting on the sharing of Ganga waters under the new agreement, an official of the Ministry of External Affairs made it clear that, "while in the eventuality of surplus water during January and February, Bangladesh can take all the water leaving 40,000 cusecs for Calcutta port, it has to share with us the water if the availability of water is less than 70,000 cusecs." Bangladesh Prime Minister was described as "a tough bargainer", who did not give any concession to India. In effect she managed 500 cusecs more than what it was in the 1977 treaty during the lean period. The critics pointed out that there is no provision for augmentation of water which was clearly provided for in the 1977 agreement. The absence of such a provision in 1996 document is a concession by India, and was, therefore, said to be against the interests of India.

West Bengal Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu had visited Dhaka little before Hasina Wajed came to India. He was not happy with the treaty when he saw it in the proposal stage, but once the agreement assured enough water to keep Calcutta port in good condition, he expressed satisfaction. He said that Calcutta would now utilise 40,000 cusecs in 7 out of 15 cycles of 10 days during the lean period. According to Basu, the agreement would benefit India as well as Bangladesh. It would also pave the way for other bilateral agreements on trade and cultural exchanges. Basu hoped that water sharing agreement would open up the possibility of an arrangement for utilising Chittagong port by industry in both the countries.

The traditional friendship between India and Bangladesh was sought to be further consolidated by the Bangla Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. But, tension developed on international border in the Assam and Meghalaya sector. In April 2001, it was found that one of our villages was occupied, and 18 officers and *jawans* of India's Border Security Force were missing. 16 of them were allegedly killed by Bangladesh Rifles and 2 were injured. The mutilated bodies of Indian security men, when returned after three days, created outrage in India, as many of them were apparently killed at point blank range after being arrested. Many bodies were charged beyond recognition. India lodged a very strong protest. The Bangla authorities gave impression of their innocence. The brutal act was condemned widely. The Bangla Prime Minister, facing elections after a few months, called the Indian Prime Minister and assured Vajpayee that thorough probe would be done and that the guilty would be punished. This incident caused severe strains in the bilateral relations.

INDIA-SRI LANKA RELATIONS

Sri Lanka, earlier known as Ceylon, is an island republic situated in the Indian Ocean, south of India. Its total area is 25,332 sq miles. About 15 percent of its people speak Tamil, the rest speak Sinhalese. Out of a total of over 150,00,000 population of Sri Lanka, about 64% believe in Buddhism, 14 percent are Hindus, 9 percent Christians, 6 percent believe in Islam and the rest believe in other religions. It is said that in 543 BC some people from Ganga Basin in India had migrated and settled down in Sri Lanka. The Portuguese arrived in Sri Lanka in early sixteenth century and established their colonies. The Dutch defeated the Portuguese and established their rule in 1658. The British seized power in 1796, and in 1802 Sri Lanka became a crown colony. Sri Lanka got independence from the British on February 4, 1948. India had become independent only a few months earlier. Sri Lanka, like India, is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. She discarded her dominion status and, like India, became a republic. Again, like India, Sri Lanka has been a practitioner of the foreign policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. Sri Lanka is an active member of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) right from 1961 when it was founded. Sri Lanka along with seven other countries is a member of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and, like India, has full faith in the United Nations and the ideal of world peace. Thus, this southern neighbour of India has so much in common with this country that one cannot believe that there can be any areas of conflict between the two. But, conflict is a part of bilateral relations of any two countries. Efforts should always be made to avoid disputes.

India-Sri Lanka relations have generally been cordial, though there have been tensions caused mainly because of ethnic conflict between people of Indian origin—mainly Tamils—living in Sri Lanka and the Sinhalese. Usually a small country is suspicious of a big neighbour. But, India has never tried to play the role of a dominant big neighbour. India's foreign policy has always been based on friendship with all its neighbours. Despite ethnic problems of Sri Lanka, India has never sought to impose its will on Sri Lanka.

Like India and most other Third World countries, Sri Lanka has followed the policy of non-alignment. The first Prime Minister of independent Ceylon (Sri Lanka), D.S. Senanaike had made it clear that his country would not align with any power bloc, that it believed in peace, and that it would follow a middle course as far as power politics was concerned. Sri Lanka has been aware of its strategic position as a large island in the Indian Ocean. Senanaike believed that communism could be a serious threat to the newly emerging countries. Since Sri Lanka was not in a position to ensure her defence, she concluded a security treaty with Britain in 1948 itself and allowed British military bases in Colombo and Triconmalee. The policy of non-alignment was emphasised by Senanaike's successor Sir John Kotelawala also. But, he was more anti-communist and advocated pro-West policy. Sir John was willing to cooperate with all anti-communist forces. He opposed imperialism and considered Soviet influence in Eastern Europe as dangerous as any other form of imperialism.

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike who came to power in 1956 was closer to Nehruvian approach of non-alignment. He was neither pro-West nor pro-East. He secured removal of British bases. Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959, and after a brief interregnum his wife Sirimavo Bandaranaike became Prime Minister in 1960. For over 35 years Bandaranaikes influenced Sri Lankan politics either in power or in opposition. Mrs. Bandaranaike tried to mediate between India and China after 1962 war. She invited several non-aligned countries to Colombo, but their proposals were not acceptable to China. Sri Lanka remained generally neutral in Sino-Indian as well as Indonesia-Malaysia disputes. The 1976 NAM summit was held in Colombo under Sirimavo's chairmanship. She called for a new world order based on sovereign equality of all nations.

After Junius Richard Jayawardene's victory in 1977, there was a long spell of his rule as Prime Minister and then as President, and later Premadasa held the Presidency. But, the Bandaranaikes once again returned to power in 1994 when Mrs. Bandarnaike's daughter Chandrika became President. Later she appointed her mother as Prime Minster. During Jayawardene's leadership, Sri Lanka was generally tilted towards the United States.

The Tamilians' Problem: Jaffna Province in northern Sri Lanka has a large concentration of Tamilian people. The problem became serious when Tamilians began demanding a national homeland or "Republic of Eelam" in an area of about 18000 sq km in northern Sri Lanka. The Tamil speaking people are of Dravidian origin and generally believe in Hinduism. They constitute about 15% of total population. The remaining Sinhalese are of Aryan origin and majority of them are Buddhists. During the colonial period the British had taken a large number of plantation workers to Ceylon, mainly from erstwhile Madras Presidency. Many more went on their own looking out for employment. Thus, as V.P. Dutt says, "To the normal anxieties of a small country on the borders of a big neighbour has been added the peculiar problem of a significant minority originally hailing from the big neighbour."

There are essentially two categories of Tamilians in Sri Lanka. There are about one million people, whose forefathers migrated from India in ancient times. They are known as Ceylon Tamils. The other category includes another about one million people, many of them without citizenship, who went to Sri Lanka during the nineteenth century. The problem of their status dominated early India-Sri Lanka relations. The conflict with Ceylon Tamils came later. The Sinhalese fear Tamil domination, and that is the principal reason behind the conflict. The difference in the two categories of people was highlighted by the British rulers. Tamils who were taken as plantation workers were encouraged as a check on Sinhalese nationalism. Tamils managed to enter the administrative structure and took control of even trade and professions. Sinhalese nationalism began to grow by 1931. Tamils demanded 50 percent reservation for all minorities. The demand was turned down. The Soulbury Constitution of 1946 sought to give some representation to Tamils in the Parliament of the Island.

After independence, justice was assured to the Tamils by Prime Minister Dudley S. Senanayeke. He told Tamils that they should not fear the Sinhalese. Discrimination against the Tamils allegedly began after Senanayeke's death. The two-language system adopted during Senanayeke's time was discarded, and official Language Act, 1956 declared Sinhalese to be the sole official language of Sri Lanka. This was opposed by the Tamils, and it led to ethnic riots. An agreement was concluded in 1957 between Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Tamil leader Chelvanayakam which recognised Tamil as the language of national minority. Legislation was enacted in 1958 which provided for appropriate use of Tamil language in education, government services' entrance examination, and administration of northern and eastern provinces. But, neither the agreement of 1957 nor the Act of 1958 could be effectively implemented. The representation of Tamilians in public service in 1948 was 30 percent. By 1975 it had fallen to mere five percent. Their representation in the army and police was brought down heavily, and Tamils were discriminated against in matters of education. Sinhalese were encouraged to settle down in large numbers in the Tamil-dominated areas. In 1948 about 31 percent university students were Tamils; by 1970 it came down to' 16 percent. The citizenship laws of 1948 and 1949 deprived about 10 lakh Tamils (who had gone to Ceylon in nineteenth century) of political rights.

The foremost leader of Tamil nationalists S.J.V. Chalvanayakam led several non-violent peaceful agitations for their rights, during the 1950s under the banner of the Federal Party. After the death of Chalvanayakam liberal Tamils were reduced to a minority, and the Federal Party changed its name to Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). It was led by Amrithalingam who did not have much faith in non-violent means. The Tamil youth who had lost faith in non-violence organised themselves into the Liberation Tigers. The aim of the 'Tigers' is a sovereign Tamil state or Eelam. By 1953 many Sinhalese as well as Tamils had become subjects of "inflated fear".

Nehru-Kotelawala Agreement, 1953: The earliest efforts made for finding a solution to the ethnic problem was an agreement signed in 1953 by the two Prime Ministers Nehru and Kotelawala. The main features of the agreement were:

1. The Sri Lankan Government would register the names of all those people of Indian origin who desired to stay permanently in Sri Lanka.
2. Those who did not wish to become citizens of Sri Lanka would be sent back to India.
3. Illegal migration from India to Sri Lanka was to be effectively checked.
4. Sri Lanka was to quickly dispose off the applications for citizenship pending for two years or more.

5. A separate electoral register was to be maintained for people of Indian origin to enable them to elect their representatives proportionately.
6. Those persons of Indian origin who desired, but could not be granted, Lankan citizenship would be allowed to stay on as aliens.

Tamils alleged that Nehru-Kotelawala Agreement was not implemented sincerely. Consequently, large number of persons of Indian origin could not get citizenship of Sri Lanka and they became "stateless persons". This caused serious tension in India-Sri Lanka relations which was aggravated by the 1956 language disturbances. Sri Lankans blamed India for these disturbances. India-Sri Lanka relations were normalised during the Prime Ministership of S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike (1956-59). He, like Nehru, believed in non-alignment and worked for closer friendship between the two countries. During Mrs. Bandaranaike's leadership steps were taken to maintain friendly relations.

Shastri-Sirimavo Agreement: Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike visited India in October 1964. After prolonged negotiations (at diplomatic level) an agreement was signed on 24 October 1964 by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Mrs. Bandaranaike. It sought to solve the problem of about 9 lakh 75 thousand stateless persons in Sri Lanka. About 3 lakh of these people were to be granted Sri Lankan citizenship, and about 5 lakh 25 thousand persons were to be given citizenship of India. These people were allowed 15 years time during which period they were to shift to India in installments. The fate of the remaining 1 lakh 50 thousand stateless persons was to be decided in future. During her second tenure as Prime Minister, Sirimavo Bandaranaike visited India in January 1974 and her talks with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi resulted in a fresh agreement, whereby half of these persons were to be given citizenship of Sri Lanka and the rest would become Indian nationals. Thus, this issue of stateless persons was sought to be peacefully settled.

The Kacchativu Dispute: A territorial dispute arose in regard to the ownership of a one square mile uninhabited island, called Kacchativu, off the Jaffna coast in the Palk Straits. Pilgrims from both India and Sri Lanka used to go to Kacchativu Island every year in the month of March during the four-day St. Anthony's festival for worship at the local Roman Catholic Church. India protested over the presence of Sri Lankan police during the festival in 1968. This caused conflict. Both India and Sri Lanka were keen to avoid a serious situation. The Prime Ministers of India and Sri Lanka met twice and pending a final decision on the issue of island's title, resolved to maintain *status quo* in and around the island. Neither India nor Sri Lanka would send its policemen in uniform or custom officials, or resort to aerial reconnaissance or naval patrolling of adjacent waters during the St Anthony's festival.

It took another five years to conclude a final agreement in regard to Kacchativu Island. A whole range of issues involving territorial, navigational and fishing rights in the Palk Bay were discussed between the two countries. Finally, in June 1974 Mrs. Bandaranaike and Mrs. Gandhi concluded a comprehensive agreement on the demarcation of maritime boundary. Accordingly, India accepted Sri Lanka's ownership of the Kacchativu Island. The joint communique issued after the India-Sri Lanka summit made it clear that there were no longer any serious road blocks in the bilateral relations. The major concern of the two countries now was enlarging the area of economic cooperation and coordinating the efforts of the two countries for a better deal for their marketable raw materials particularly tea.

Leftist Revolt and the Bangladesh Crisis: Two developments of 1971 deserve brief mention at this stage. A serious insurgency, led by leftist youth, took place in Sri Lanka in March-April 1971. The Government of Sri Lanka was unable to handle the crisis all by itself. In response to request for help, India was the first to offer assistance to curb the insurgency. Although it was claimed that no Indian personnel would be involved in the operations, yet it was reported that some helicopters were supplied to Sri Lanka, and a small flotilla of Indian naval ships patrolled Lankan waters on the request of Sirimavo Bandaranaike. This was done to prevent the flow of illicit arms to insurgents from abroad. It was later reported that Indian military assistance was worth 55 million US dollars. This was the first time that India got involved in a neighbour's troubles. Government of India was criticised as it had no stakes in the Sri Lankan civil strife. However, it was done because Indira Gandhi Government felt that violent takeover of Sri Lankan government by radical leftist youth would be highly injurious to the national interest, stability and security of India. Interestingly even Chinese Government pledged support to the government of Sri Lanka, condemning the violent uprising.

During the Bangladesh crisis later in 1971, Sri Lanka observed total neutrality between India and Pakistan. Sri Lanka "did considerable, tight rope-walking, but its real sympathy lay with Pakistan". Sri Lanka itself was faced with ethnic conflict. Any indiscreet step on the part of Sri Lankan Government could have sent wrong signal to its ethnic minorities. Therefore, it turned blind eye to the suppression of the majority of population of East Pakistan by the military regime of Yahya Khan. The signing of Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in August 1971 was criticised by some elements in Sri Lanka on the ground that it compromised with India's non-aligned position.

Sri Lankan approach was cautious. It was not until march 1972 that Sri Lanka recognised Bangladesh, although other neighbours including Burma and Nepal, besides Bhutan and India had already granted recognition.

India-Sri Lanka Economic Cooperation: Economic cooperation between the two countries began rather late. Both countries are major exporters of tea. Therefore, their relationship for sometime was competitive. China had established itself as an important factor in Sri Lanka's economy by offering stable prices for its rubber in return for rice shipments. India's economic relationship with Sri Lanka began expanding since 1966 when India extended a Rs. 2 crore loan to enable Sri Lanka to import food products from this country. Dried fish, textiles and dried chillies were *to* be imported from India. India extended in 1967 another credit of Rs. 5 crores to finance the purchase of some electrical and telecommunication equipment, commercial vehicles, machines and machine tools, railway coaches and wagons, etc. Trade with India was improving.

A major problem in the field of commerce was a highly unfavourable balance of trade for Sri Lanka. In 1971, Sri Lanka imported from India goods worth Rs. 20 crores, as against her exports to India worth only Rs. 1 crore. This was to be corrected. Sri Lanka was keen to promote exports to India. The economic cooperation got a boost after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's visit to Sri Lanka, in April 1973. The five areas that were identified for Indian assistance to Sri Lanka were sheet glass, rubber-based goods, graphite, refractory and mica. India decided in 1973 to go all out to help correct Sri Lanka's balance of trade. Besides, India offered annual aid of Rs. 1 crore for the next five years for Sri Lanka's development projects. India agreed to meet the cost amounting to about Rs. 50 lakhs of establishing a cattle and sheep breeding unit in Sri Lanka and donate high-breed animals and machinery for the project. India gifted a common facility for Island's mica industry at the cost of to Rs. 25 lakhs. India wanted to promote a new economic relationship and diversification of Sri Lanka's economy.

India has been taking keen interest in building up a lasting economic relationship with Sri Lanka. India gave a credit of Rs. 5 crores in 1973 to enable Sri Lanka to purchase such goods as commercial vehicles, wagons, machinery used in agriculture and industry, fisheries, electrical equipments and parts of sewing machines. It was agreed in 1974 that two countries would implement the project to set up several small rural industrial centres in Sri Lanka as well as a micro-wave link between the two countries. A science and technical cooperation agreement was signed in 1975. Systematic efforts were made by both the sides to strengthen economic ties.

The Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Commission has been engaged in initiating several measures to consolidate, diversify and strengthen bilateral relations in a large variety of areas. Some of the decisions taken by the Joint Commission in 1994 include restoration of preferential tariff margins on Sri Lankan cloves; reduction in tariff on exports to India on items such as ceramic tiles, glycerin, graphite and rubber; extensions of a new line of dollar denominated credit; permission to Bank of Ceylon to open a branch in Madras (Chennai), and increased seating capacity in civil aviation flights. During 1993, the total value of trade between India and Sri Lanka was Rs. 1131 crores with exports to Sri Lanka of Rs. 1069

crores and imports of the value of Rs. 62 crores. Thus, as compared to 1971 there was remarkable rise in bilateral trade, though the balance remained unfavourable to Sri Lanka. This is unavoidable on account of size of India's neighbour. The trade grew to Rs. 1252 crores during 1995-96. The Sri Lankan government sought tariff concessions and greater investment from India as part of efforts to reduce trade imbalance. India also announced reduction in custom duties on 18 items of export Interest to Sri Lanka. The Indo-Sri Lanka Joint Business Council examines possibilities of attracting greater Indian investments into Sri Lanka as well as expanding bilateral trade.[7]

The Ethnic Conflict: The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka between Tamils and Sinhalese assumed serious proportions in 1983. It was described as "ethnic explosion" and the "Sri Lanka Carnage". It has already been explained that Tamils in Sri Lanka belong to two categories: the Ceylon Tamils whose forefathers had gone to Sri Lanka centuries ago. They are estimated to be about one million. The second category is of Indian Tamils whose forefathers were taken by the British as plantation workers in the nineteenth century. They are another one million. The Ceylon Tamils are mostly concentrated in Jaffna and on the northern and eastern coast, while the Indian Tamils live mostly in the districts of Colombo, Kandy and Triconmalee in the traditional tea garden areas. The relations between Sinhalese majority and the minority have been gradually deteriorating. Serious violence occurred between the two communities in 1956, 1958 and again in 1977. As gulf developed, militancy and separatist organisations became active. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) demanded in 1988 a separate homeland for Tamils, the 'Tamil Eelam'. The Tamil Tigers resorted to violence. The Sinhalese reaction was equally powerful. In February 1983, a reign of terror was unleashed against the agitating Tamils. India arrested a leading Tamil "Tiger" Uma Maheswaran, and the Tamil Nadu police nabbed a rival "Tiger" leader Prabhakaran in Madras. These steps were appreciated by the Sri Lankan authorities.

In the last week of July 1983 all hell broke loose after the reported killing of 13 soldiers by Tamil "Tigers". The army retaliated by indiscriminate killing and torture of the Tamils. "Colombo itself was subjected to a ravaging of Tamilian life and property unparalleled in Ceylonese history."[8] India's position was very delicate as most of victims were Tamilians of Indian origin. Public opinion in India was greatly exercised. As Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao arrived in Colombo on July 25, renewed violence took place and some 15 persons were killed in one day in the Sri Lankan capital. Even as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was officially described by the Lankan Government sources as "friendly", yet President Junius Jayawardene said that India was sheltering, and helping the terrorists. He claimed that he had told Mrs. Gandhi that, "this is not a friendly act at all. I am not harbouring people who want to separate Punjab and Assam from India". India not only denied the allegations of its involvement, but the

Government also advocated caution within the country. India conveyed to Sri Lanka that it condemned all violence against the innocent defenceless people. India, at the same time, condemned terrorism in all forms. Mrs. Gandhi made it clear that India was totally against interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The violence during 1983-86 turned about 2 lakhs Tamils into refugees as they lost their homes. Thousands were killed and wounded. About 25000 refugees came to India; many others went to South East Asian or Western countries. Indians were naturally sympathetic to the plight of Tamilians in Sri Lanka. Several steps were initiated by both the Governments to restore normalcy in the Island. Mrs. Indira Gandhi held prolonged negotiations with President Jayawardene. The Tamil leaders led by Mr. Amrithalingam visited India and held talks with the Prime Minister. India made all possible efforts to persuade the Tamil leaders to join the political talks in Colombo. The All-Party talks finally got off in January 1984, but peace eluded the island Republic.

The Sri Lankan correspondent of the *London Times* reported in January 1985 that the Tamils were living under a reign of terror in Sri Lanka. He wrote: "The predominantly Sinhalese army seems to have a freehand as it cracks down on the civilian population in the overwhelmingly Tamil Northern Province." And the *Christian Science Monitor* reported that "the battle between Tamil separatists and the Sri Lankan army is sliding into a civil war."

Rajiv-Jayawardene Agreement, 1987: An attempt was made by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to help Sri Lanka find a solution to the ethnic violence. The Tamils were very hostile to the Sri Lankan security forces who were allegedly trying to eliminate them. It appeared that as a confidence building measure Indian troops would succeed in handling the situation. On the invitation of Sri Lankan Government, Rajiv Gandhi paid a two day visit to Colombo. He and President Jayawardene signed an agreement to provide for Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to be posted in Sri Lanka to restore normalcy in the strife-torn areas. The agreement provided that

1. An autonomous unit comprising northern and eastern provinces would be constituted. The proposal was to be submitted to a referendum by December 31, 1988. The referendum was to be supervised by a committee headed by the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka.
2. Elections to the provincial councils were to be completed by December 31, 1987 in the presence of Indian observers.
3. Emergency was to be lifted in the northern and eastern provinces by August 15, 1987.
4. General amnesty would be granted throughout Sri Lanka and all political prisoners were to be released.

5. Militants were expected to surrender and Sri Lankan troops were to return to their barracks.
6. India would guarantee the implementation of this agreement and Indian territory would not be allowed to be used for anti-Sri Lanka activities.
7. Indian navy would check all anti-Sri Lanka terrorist activities.
8. Both the countries would take effective steps for the security of Tamils as well as Sinhalese.
9. Tamil, Sinhalese and English would be official languages in Sri Lanka.

In accordance with Rajiv-Jayawardene agreement hundreds of thousands Indian troops were sent to Sri Lanka for maintenance of peace. However, the agreement was vehemently opposed by the Sri Lankans. So much so that Sri Lankan Prime Minister Premadasa did not attend official functions, held in honour of Indian Prime Minister and an attack was attempted on Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when he was inspecting a guard of honour at the Colombo Airport before leaving for New Delhi. This agreement could not be effectively implemented as both Tamil and Sinhalese extremists were opposed to it.

The posting of IPKF proved to be very costly for India. Crores of rupees were spent on Indian troops trying to restore order. Hundreds of Indian soldiers were killed in clashes with the Tamil extremists. President Jayawardene later said that the Sri Lankan troops were no more fighting the battle which was waged by Indians. Had IPKF not gone to Sri Lanka, the economy of the Island would have been adversely affected. India gained nothing. India lost its several hundred soldiers in Sri Lanka. Even then ethnic conflict could not be brought under control. Having realised the futility of IPKF, India decided to pull its troops out. By March 1990 all the Indian troops were recalled. Very effective political measures and will to implement them was required on the part of Sri Lankan authorities so that the strife could be ended and normalcy restored.

The separatist movement in Sri Lanka had an adverse effect on India-Sri Lanka relations, although India had taken all positive steps to ensure that Indian territory was not used for anti-Sri Lanka activities. In 1993, S.D. Muni had opined that, "The separatist movements or insurgencies have a tendency to reinforce India's own sectarian polarities ... Sri Lanka's ethnic war is raging today with as much intensity as ever before, and this presents a strange dilemma to India's policy; for India cannot be comfortable with the outright victory of either the LTTE or the armed forces of Sri Lanka. Whichever side wins, it will only reinforce Tamil alienation in India's state of Tamil Nadu."[9]

In 1991 during the run-up to the Lok Sabha election, former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in an alleged human bomb explosion. The murder of Rajiv was allegedly the result of a conspiracy by certain elements involved in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. Later, U.N.P. candidate for presidency of Sri Lanka, Gamini Dissanayake fell victim to a terrorist attack.

Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga, daughter of S.W.R.D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, became Prime Minister and then the President of Sri Lanka in 1994. She visited India in March 1995. A better understanding was reached between the two countries on the handling of ethnic violence and terrorism. Sri Lanka continued to face secessionist movement led by Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Government of India assured President Chandrika that India would continue to support all efforts for a peaceful settlement of the ethnic issue. Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Kadirgamar stressed his country's keenness for sound and cordial relations with India. Government of India fully reciprocated these sentiments. It was agreed in 1995 to strengthen and diversify bilateral economic cooperation. It was also decided that matters such as the security of Indian fisherman and the release of boats of Sri Lanka's refugees should be soon resolved.

India continues to favour a peaceful solution to ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka within the framework of sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country, through negotiation and without outside interference. India welcomed the proposal of Sri Lanka for devolution of power to secure some element of autonomy to the areas largely inhabited by Tamil minority. Problems pertaining to fishermen of the two countries straying into each other's territorial waters continued to draw the attention of the two governments.

CONCLUSION

"One of the cornerstones of India's foreign policy has been to build a strategically secure, politically stable and harmonious and economically cooperative neighbourhood."[10] India has always given a high priority to friendly relations with our immediate neighbours. India's relations with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka discussed in this chapter, and its relations with Pakistan and China analysed in two preceding chapters give a clear indication of India's desire to avoid conflicts, to seek peaceful settlement of international disputes, and build friendship with all the neighbours. Many of India's neighbours are non-aligned and have generally responded to India's approach of peace. Nevertheless, India has had moments of conflicts and even regular wars. Despite India's efforts to cultivate most friendly relations with China and even make concessions as in case of Tibet, India had to suffer humiliating border war in 1962. China is still in occupation of Indian territory both in north-east and north- west. It was only after three decades that serious efforts were initiated to normalise Sino-Indian relations. In the end of 1996, it was expected that as a result of President Jiang Zemin's visit to New Delhi and signing of Confidence Building Agreement, relations between two countries would begin to normalise.

Pakistan continues to be the most difficult neighbour. Pakistan continues efforts to internationalise the Kashmir issue. The unilateral closure of their Consulate-General in Bombay and later closure of our Consulate-General in Karachi in 1994 were designed to heighten tension, and reflected the rejection by Pakistan of numerous initiatives taken by India to resume a meaningful dialogue with that country. Both Houses of Indian Parliament had to pass resolutions, in February 1994, condemning Pakistan's interference in India's internal affairs. India has, on numerous occasions, reiterated legal and constitutional position of the State of Jammu & Kashmir as an integral part of the Republic, but Pakistan appeared to be colour-blind and kept on talking of Kashmir as a disputed territory which it wanted to acquire at any cost.

India has good relations with all other neighbours. The new Governments installed in Nepal and Sri Lanka (1994) had expressed their desire to consolidate and strengthen relations with India. Purposive efforts continue to be made by India to improve regional economic as well as political cooperation. During 1995-96 India continued to play an active role in Nepal's development efforts. "A landmark treaty on joint development of the Mahakali River was signed, opening up important new possibilities for co-operation in water resource exploitation."[11] India has vigorously pursued the goal of friendly relations with Bhutan and Myanmar (Burma) also. A successful visit by the King of Bhutan in 1995 was marked by the signing of important agreements on the bilateral development of a major hydro-electric project at Tala and a large cement plant at Dungsum.

India is concerned with the continued denial of power to democratically elected leaders in Myanmar. India does not, however, wish to interfere in the internal affairs of either the military-ruled Myanmar or the strife torn Afghanistan. Nevertheless, India is keen to see the victory of peace and democracy all around it and to develop best of relations with all its neighbours including Pakistan and China. On its part, China has definite interests in India's neighbourhood, and it will not sacrifice them to build greater understanding with India. China has, nevertheless, distanced itself from the Nepalese Communist Party (which was in power from a short time), and has told Pakistan to stop raising Kashmir in international fora. However, there appeared a number of positive signs in India-Pakistan relations by early 1997. Pakistan Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif and India's Prime Minister I.K. Gujral took initiatives for building confidence between two neighbours.

The initiative was taken further during Prime Minister Vajpayee's Lahore Visit in early 1999, but Pakistani action in Kargil and subsequent military *coup* in that country caused serious tension. Vajpayee took another step towards peace when he invited Pakistan President Gen. Musharraf for talks in mid-2001.

While India desired early restoration of democracy in Myanmar, steps were initiated by both the countries to strengthens heir ,ties. Senior members of military regime in Myanmar visited India in 2000, and concrete steps were taken for ensuring peaceful border and better trade and political relations. India and Afghanistan are in a peculiar situation. In the period following withdrawal of Soviet forces and end of Cold War (1889), Afghanistan had faced unprecedented internal conflict and virtual civil war. By mid-1990s, Pakistan trained youth called Taliban had become a major force and by 2000, only a small part of Afghanistan remained under the control of President Rabbani's government, which still found recognition in India. About 90% of Afghanistan was under Taliban's control that believed in the power of the gun and imposed fundamentalist rules. Only three countries including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia recognised Taliban. The violent terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir, as also in Iran was attributed to Pak-sponsored Taliban initiative. It was also alleged that initially US had encouraged elements in Afghanistan which later became strongly Anti-America and fundamentalist. The hijacking of Indian Airlines plane in early 2000 to Taliban-controlled Kandahar was strongly resented by international community.

Troubles in Neighbourhood: India's neighbourhood was in turmoil in 2007 for various reasons. This was naturally a cause for worry for India. Pakistan was thrown into unprecedented unrest when President Musharraf attempted to dismiss the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary. Musharraf had enjoyed nearly eight years of unchallenged power. When the Chief Justice refused to step down, he was suspended on March, 9, 2007. This led to unexpected agitations by lawyers supported by media. It suddenly turned into public outrage against independence of judiciary. When he drove from Islamabad to Lahore to addresses the High Court judges and lawyers, people wholeheartedly gave him support on the roads. Chaudhary's cavalcade swelled and it took 26 hours to complete a journey that should normally take four hours. Later, when he was not allowed to travel by road from Karachi airport to the city to lecture, several clashes took place which claimed 42 lives. The President was pushed to the wall when he was forced to withdraw an ordinance imposing restriction on the media. The civil society in Pakistan appeared to have taken over the fight against the General from the legal fraternity. As militants become more active, and as Talibanisation picks up, Musharraf might rely even more on fundamentalists. This would mean a serious threat to India.

Bangladesh was once again appeared in mid-2007 to be heading for yet another spill of military regime. Once the government of Begum Khalida Zia handed over power to an interim government to hold elections under a neutral dispensation, as required by the Constitution, the trouble began. The caretaker government led by Fakhruddin Ahmed was increasingly coming under the military control. The caretaker government tried to compel Begum Zia to go to Saudi Arabia to deny her the chance to lead her party in the (postponed) elections. The Awami League Leader and former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina who was returning from USA was denied in May 2007 to board a Dhaka-bound flight from London. It took her several days to be able to reach home. Thus, attempts to keep the two former Prime Ministers out of the possible elections backfired. But India was naturally concerned at the developments in Bangladesh where democracy appeared to be under threat, and where pro-Pakistani and Jehadi fundamentalists were raising their heads. Anti-India terrorism from Bangla soil was causing a grave concern in this country.

Neighbouring Myanmar was not only continuing to be ruled for decades by a military *junta*, but denial of freedom to Aung San Suu Kyi, Nobel prize winner (for peace) was a matter of worldwide concern. Extension of her detention for yet another year in mid-2007 caused grave anxiety. Myanmar is a member of ASEAN, but ASEAN was feeling helpless in getting Suu Kyi freed. The fighter for democracy is languishing under detention. ASEAN noticed that the West had failed to get Suu Kyi freed. ASEAN was hoping that China and India might be able to persuade the *junta* to end her detention because China has strategic relations with Myanmar regime and India has close economic cooperation with that country.

Nepal still remained to be in turmoil. The promised elections to the Constituent Assembly were put off till November 2007, and the eight-party alliance, including Maoists, was unable to maintain internal security. Killings are reported almost daily from the areas known as terai bordering Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The area is inhabited by the Madhesi community of Indian origin. It was being alleged that Maoist Youth Organizations were involved in extortion and abduction of Indians. It was feared that if elections were not held by November 2007, the democratic framework might collapse. All this was of grave concern to India which is keen on a friendly, peaceful democratic and prosperous Nepal.

The decades-old ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was another cause of worry. Fierce fighting was going on since early 2006 till going to the press in mid-2007, between Tamils (LTTE) and the armed forces. LTTE resorted to even air strikes on Colombo airport and elsewhere. In this serious situation, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa was seeking India's involvement in curbing LTTE, but India wanted Sri Lanka to come out with a credible devolution package for Tamils. India would not like to repeat the IPKF-type of mistake.

NOTES

1. V.P. Dutt, *India's Foreign Policy*, Vikas, New Delhi, p. 252.
2. Ibid., p. 256.
3. On the occasion of Prince Birendra's marriage reception.
4. V.P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 233.
5. Chandrika Gulati, *Liberation to Fundamentalism*, New Delhi, p. 102.

6. Ibid., p. 174.
7. Ministry of External Affairs Report, 1995-96.
8. V.P. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 323.
9. S.D. Muni, 'India and its Neighbours', in *International Studies*, J.N.V., 1993, p. 199.
10. Ibid., p. 189.
11. Ministry of External Affairs Report, *op. cit.*, 1995-96.

Chapter 8

Disarmament, India's Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

INTRODUCTION

India has consistently supported all efforts for disarmament and arms control. The proposal for reduction of armaments was first formally made by the US President Woodrow Wilson in his famous 14-points announced in 1918. Unprecedented destruction during the First World War had convinced statesmen and scholars alike that if lasting peace was to be ensured reduction of armaments was a necessity. President Wilson, like many others, believed that possession of deadly weapons of war encouraged states to go to war and play havoc with human lives. Wilson was an idealist who was keen to make the world safe for future generations through international organisations and disarmament. In the fourth of his 14 points Wilson called for: "Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." The underlying philosophy was that armaments caused wars, and disarmament would minimise the possibilities of future armed confrontations. The delegates assembled at Paris Peace Conference (1919) accepted disarmament in principle, disarmed the defeated countries, and provided for reduction of armaments by all other powers. Drastic reduction of defeated Germany's armed might was "to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of armaments of all nations."

The commitment of nations to reduce armaments was incorporated in Article 8 of the Covenant of League of Nations. It provided: "The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations ..." Members also pledged not to increase their armaments, once reduced, without the permission of the League Council. Paragraph 2 of Article 8 required the Council to "formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments". Article 9 had provided for a permanent commission to advise the Council on the execution of disarmament provisions of the Covenant. Thus, the League Council was to initiate steps for reduction of armaments for acceptance of several Governments. The Commission appointed under Article 9 reported that in the prevailing circumstances no efforts could be made for the reduction of armaments. The Commission consisted of experts of defence forces. Therefore, no other report could be expected from them.

The Assembly of the League appointed a Temporary Mixed Commission in November 1920 to study the problem of disarmament. It included both civilian and defence personnel. As France raised the issue of security, the Commission could not achieve anything substantial, though it made certain general recommendations. After security issue was sorted out with the signing of Locarno Treaties, the Council appointed a Preparatory Commission in December 1925, which again made no significant progress. Without any concrete recommendations by the Preparatory Commission, the Disarmament Conference was convened in February 1932. Although the Conference went on for two years, no agreement could be reached. It appeared that major Powers were not sincere regarding reduction of armaments. Germany withdrew from Disarmament Conference in October 1933. This was a signal of the failure of disarmament efforts. Nothing was heard thereafter because the arms race had begun which led to Second World War.

India was a Member of the League of Nations. As such it was a party to the League disarmament efforts, which in any case completely failed. Besides, India was then a British dependency. Therefore, India's voice was actually decided by the British Government.

During the inter-war period efforts for naval disarmament were made outside the League of Nations also. The Washington Conference (1921-22) convened by the US resulted in the signing of a 5-Power Treaty providing for limitation on warships of British Empire, the United States, Japan, France and Italy in the proportion of 10: 10: 6: 3.5: 3.5. Two more conferences were convened to carry forward the work of Washington Conference but not with much success. These meetings took place at Geneva (1927) and London (1930). Once the period of crises began in 1931, disarmament was forgotten.

Fresh efforts for disarmament and arms control were initiated after the Second World War. By that time the problem had acquired new dimensions as two atom bombs had been used by the United States. Even other big powers began developing their own nuclear weapons, giving rise to arms race of serious magnitude.

Having achieved independence in 1947, India began taking active interest in disarmament and arms control. India was the first country to plead for total ban on nuclear testing as far back as 1954. Speaking in Lok Sabha, on April 2, 1954, Prime Minister Nehru had called for an "immediate standstill" agreement by the two Super Powers until the United Nations elaborated a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

Disarmament and Arms Control: The terms disarmament and arms control both are related to reduction of armaments, present and future. But the two are not synonyms. A layman's interpretation of disarmament would be to do away with all armaments or not to retain any armed forces. Actually, when the League Covenant first incorporated the concept of disarmament, without using the term, the call was to provide for reduction of armaments to the point consistent with national safety. Total disarmament has not been regarded as feasible. When the term 'qualitative disarmament' is used, it means prohibition of certain types of weapons only. For example, a ban on chemical weapons is qualitative limitation. But, when the term 'quantitative disarmament' is used, it implies control of weapons of all categories.

The two terms which are often used are disarmament and arms control. Disarmament refers to reduction or abolition of existing weapons. It does not cover the weapons of the future. The control of the weapons of future is described by the term arms control. Thus, 'disarmament' means control or reduction of existing weapons, whereas 'arms control' means control of weapons of future. Professor Mahendra Kumar sums up the distinction thus: "Disarmament seeks to control armaments and arms control tries to check arms race."[1] There can be disarmament which is not controlled and there can also be control which does not involve reduction of armaments. But, as a necessary condition for world peace disarmament and arms control are complementary to each other. Only reduction of existing weapons will not serve the purpose of world peace and security, if countries are allowed to, acquire new and improved types of weapons in future. On the other hand, says Mahendra Kumar, "mere arms control would be a negation of the disarmament theory that armaments are a cause of war:" Arms control is not an alterative to disarmament. Both are important. It is a different matter that for some strategic reasons simultaneous efforts may not be made for both. Since the end of Second World War there has been so much and continuous talk of disarmament. It is not related only to what is technically called reduction of existing weapons. In a general way, the modern image of disarmament and arms control is reduction of armaments that will ensure world peace in future—a world free from war. Thus, disarmament is an approach to peace.

India, as a matter of policy, is committed to disarmament and arms control. India has been actively associated with efforts for disarmament and arms control in different fora at different times. India stands for peace and considers reduction of weapons as essential for avoidance of war and ensuring security. India fully believes in total abolition of nuclear weapons, and does not support

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that permits existing nuclear powers to retain their weapons and prohibits others from testing and acquiring such weapons in future.

Nuclear Proliferation: Soon after the United States dropped two atom bombs in August 1945 to secure Japanese surrender, race for nuclear weapons got initiated. As the end of the twentieth century began approaching the "nuclear revolution" created "a global nuclear system". M. Zuberi concludes that, "Nuclear weapons are the products of nationalism and science, the two most powerful forces of the twentieth century. They are not the result of any ghastly accident." He adds, "They represent the culmination of three centuries of modern science."[2] Five big Powers have entered the race for nuclear armaments. They have established a coalition between high politics and grand science. The Soviet Union had tested its nuclear device (in 1949) within four years of the end of Second World War. Britain and France were constituents of the US-led alliance system. Chinese initiated their nuclear search when they were still in the Soviet Camp. It is the Chinese nuclear programme that posed a direct threat to India. By the time China became a nuclear power she had already humiliated India in the border war of 1962. Deng Xiaoping had said in a message to the scientists engaged in producing the bomb that. "Just go ahead with your work. You can claim all the credit for yourself if you achieve success, and you call ascribe your errors to the party Central Secretariat if you commit mistakes." Once China joined the nuclear club, it decided to help Pakistan develop nuclear weapons, as both had hostile relations with India.

The nuclear arms race had reached its peak by mid-1980s. By that time the Soviet Union possessed roughly 30,000 weapons and the United States had 24,000 nuclear weapons. While Partial Test Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty signed earlier (see below) were meant only to control nuclear testing and their proliferation outside the "Club", the first decision to begin substantive reduction of weapons of mass destruction was taken in 1987 with the signing of INF Treaty. This treaty on the elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range missiles was signed by the United States President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet President Gorbachev. The dramatic cuts in the nuclear weapons began as a result of initiatives of President Bush and Gorbachev and later Russian President Yeltsin. According to Zuberi, by the year 2003 America and Russia will be left with 3000 to 3500 warheads each. "The pace of disarmament is now being determined to some extent by the speed with which discarded warheads can be dismantled." Even when nuclear Powers are committed to radical reduction in nuclear weapons, they continue to rely on nuclear deterrent for immediate future. It is in this context that India must have sufficient deterrent capacity.

A new problem was created after the disintegration of the former USSR. The strategic nuclear forces of erstwhile USSR were located in the Republics of

Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. About 3000 strategic weapons were deployed outside Russia. As Russia was recognised as legal heir of the Soviet Union's stockpile, the three other Republics returned to Russia all tactical weapons by May 1992. The United States has considerable experience of dismantling nuclear weapons. It proposed to dismantle 2000 weapons every year till the end of the century. The US also offered help to Russia for transport, safe storage and dismantling of that country's nuclear weapons.

China welcomed the reduction in the Russian and American stockpiles. China, however, declared that it would join the disarmament process only when Russia and the United States have reduced their arsenal to the level of China. The status of China's nuclear forces was boosted with the Russian and US weapon reduction programme. China conducted a megaton test in 1992. Both France and China conducted several tests in 1995-96. China conducted its last test as late as on the eve of Conference on Disarmament (CD) to adopt CTBT. India blocked its passage in the C.D.

India's security is directly threatened by China's missile deployment in Tibet and its assistance in Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. According to US intelligence sources, China gave to Pakistan the complete design of the weapon that it had tested in 1966. It was also reported to have provided weapons-grade uranium to Pakistan. China denied these reports, but India's anxiety remained. With the signing of Confidence Building Agreement by India and China (see Chapter 6) in 1996 it could be reasonably expected that China would take measures to generate confidence in India about its reported assistance to Pakistan in the area of nuclear weapons.

According to eminent scientist Dr. Raja Ramanna, India had intentions, as early as in 1947, of developing an atomic energy programme for all purposes. Prime Minister Nehru was reported to have directed Dr. Homi Bhabha to make no commitments limiting the scope of our atomic energy programme. Nehru made statements hinting at times at keeping nuclear option open, and at other times talking of atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. India's nuclear option actually emerged from the expansion of its civilian programme, atom for peace. This has been described as a unique feature. India conducted its first test in 1974 at Pokhran in Rajasthan. It was a "comparatively cheap spin off" from the civilian programme. India had kept its nuclear weapons programme shelved because of our anti-nuclear weapons commitment. However, at the end of 1991, India had weapons-grade plutonium stockpile enough for about sixty nuclear weapons. By the end of the twentieth century India was likely to have the capacity to build a good number of nuclear weapons, though there were no indications till early 1998 that India would exercise its nuclear option. So long as nuclear weapons remained in the possession of China and so long as Pakistan did not completely give up its nuclear programme, India had to keep its nuclear option open as a deterrent in the interest of India's security.

India finally exercised its option in May 1998 and declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon-state.

Pakistan, determined to produce nuclear weapons particularly since our 1974 test at Pokhran, used extra-ordinary methods to obtain blueprints material from different parts of the world. This seriously challenged India's conventional military superiority. The United States not only failed to restrain Pakistan in the nuclear field, but it ended up giving crucial support in the evolution of its nuclear weapon programme. Pakistan moved towards its nuclear option rather easily. US Senator Pressler's amendment provided for statutory certificate by the President that Pakistan did not possess bomb for it to receive US aid. President Bush (1989-92) failed to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear explosive capability. This amounted to "something akin to independent confirmation that Islamabad has acquired a nuclear device." By the end of 1991, Pakistan possessed enough weapon-grade enriched uranium capable of making ten nuclear weapons.

Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who later became an influential member of the Clinton Administration, had said in 1978 that according to official statement of Israel, that country was not a nuclear power and "will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area." By 1992, Israel had acquired the nuclear capability. During the Conference on Disarmament (CD) held at Geneva (1996) India, Pakistan and Israel Were described as "threshold countries" who were in a position to enter the "nuclear club" whenever they wished. Professor Nye had said in 1992 that nuclear proliferation had occurred in the Middle East (West Asia) and South Asia, and that adjustment to this new situation was difficult for policy- makers who continued to devise strategies for non-proliferation.

Nuclear proliferation had indeed taken place, and the US Administration was keen to manage the situation in South Asia by "encouragement, suggestion, wooing, cajoling and plain blunt warning with emphasis on regional non-proliferation and the use of confidence. building measures."[3]

India's nuclear policy has been shaped by the factor of nuclearisation of its security environment since the early 1960s. India's disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives were taken during that period. "China is deeply engaged in qualitative and quantitative build up of its nuclear arsenal"[4] Jasjit Singh recalls that China carried out a nuclear test within hours of giving a commitment (during NPT extension conference in 1995) that it would exercise utmost restraint in nuclear explosions. Later in Conference on Disarmament, China insisted that Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) must be subject to India's ratification. This, according to Jasjit Singh, was done with the aim of keeping India permanently at a disadvantageous position. Even Russia and America were keen on India's ratification of CTBT. Thus, both Moscow and Washington were hoping that a disadvantaged India would be forced to rely on them.

INDIA'S SECURITY ISSUES

Security is the primary concern of every state. The first task of foreign policy-makers of every country is to ensure its security which primarily means territorial integrity and sovereignty. There indeed are other aspects of security such as economic well-being. India, like any other country, has been deeply concerned about its security. Explaining the concept of security, V.P. Dutt wrote that the concept "to be fully serviceable, includes a peaceful environment, friendly relations with neighbours and as many countries as possible, the availability of countervailing factors and forces where hostility was inevitable, internal cohesion and stability, economic development and progress, indeed in the final analysis the well-being, happiness and prosperity of the people." India's security has been under constant threat from its immediate neighbourhood. Security is largely influenced by international situation and regional equations. Even certain domestic factors influence the state's security.

The security of a country may be threatened in many ways. The most serious is an aggression or a threat thereof. But, direct invasion is not the only factor that undermines security, though it is the most visible happening. Security may also face a threat by an attempt to break the unity and integrity of the country through subversion and externally sponsored terrorism. There are various covert activities of other countries aimed at destabilisation. Faced with a threat to a nation's security, it may enter into bilateral alliances (Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902) or multilateral pacts (NATO, SEATO, Warsaw Pact) or depend on its own power, or rely on the effectiveness of an international organisation. Nations may resort to collective defence or rely on collective security. In the former arrangement a number of countries, having identified a common likely-enemy, unite to defend each other. In case of collective security, however, the United Nations is the medium that may provide security to any victim of aggression against any aggressor (who is not pre determined). In collective defence the principle is "all against one"; in collective security it is "one for all, all for one". The concept of collective security is to provide all power, or preponderance of power, to the victim of aggression. Thus, a future aggressor must know that it will face combined resistance from international community.

India adopted non-alignment as a. matter of policy to ensure its security. India did not wish to join any military alliance formed in the context of cold war or enter into any collective defence arrangement. Besides the membership of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in pursuance of the policy of non-alignment, India relies on collective security arrangement designed by the founding fathers of the United Nations. India, as an original member of the United Nations, is determined to utilize the world organisation not only for its own security but general international security also. The policy of non-alignment has been described as "the best security for India." It enabled India to preserve its identity in international system and fortify its independence. "Non-alignment endured only because it proved to be better alternative than any other course of action or policy."[6] According to V.P. Dutt, despite three wars imposed by Pakistan and the Chinese aggression, India has developed as an independent nation, "because of the sophisticated combination of the framework of non-alignment with a hard headed exercise of national interest."[7]

India's security was threatened by the interventionist policies of big powers. The US support to Pakistan against India in 1965, and more apparently in 1971, posed a threat to India's security. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan caused tension in the regions which could not be ignored by India. The development of Diago Garcia as a major naval base by the United States and the expansion of its navy into a 600-ship strong force, and introduction of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean also amounted to challenge to Indian security. Obviously, the most serious threat to India's security was caused by Pakistan and China, individually as well as in collaboration.

The most serious aspects of Sino-Pakistan cooperation against India have been the nuclear weapons in possession of China, Pakistan's capability to develop a nuclear bomb and China's help to Pakistan in the latter's nuclear weapon programme. Pakistan has been denying the possession of bomb, but a statement of a prominent Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is alarming for India. Dr. Khan had said: "By the grace of God, Pakistan is now among those few countries which have acquired mastery over uranium enrichment". He asserted that Pakistan had left India behind by many years.

It is essential to identify India's vital interests so that a correct assessment of threat to India's security can be made. Generally speaking, India's vital interests are: (a) the protection of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of India; (b) the maintenance of inalienable and sovereign right to pursue the domestic and foreign policies, which are in India's national interest, without any external interference; (c) the development of socio-economic growth; and (d) the protection of environment of peace and security. In other words, India's vital interests are protection of its plural society and secular structure of its polity, protection of India's heritage and its natural resources, and protection of its entire economic system and structure of agriculture and industry. India's only ideological commitment is to democracy, pluralism and secularism. India does not consider any social system inferior or superior to its way of life. India is not hostile to any ideology. Therefore, India's vital interests include the protection of its freedom to opt for a social system of its choice.

These vital interests of India are sought to be threatened by nuclear presence in our neighbourhood as well as in the Indian Ocean. Even huge stockpiles of conventional weapons in possession of a regional power hostile to India causes a serious threat to its territorial integrity. There has been no real ideological threat to India's security. The policy of creating ill-will among different sections of Indian society by false and mischievous propaganda by an unfriendly neighbour is bound to threaten the secular fabric of Indian society. Therefore, India's security needs are to be met not only by the policy of non-alignment, but also by acquisition of sufficient power by India. By power, we mean not only conventional weapons and nuclear deterrent, but also power to enable India to ensure that it can change the behaviour of other states if such a change becomes necessary to serve the national interests of India. Unfortunately, despite a large territory and population and vast natural resources that India possesses and a highly professional, dedicated and patriotic armed forces that India has it remains economically inferior to several nations and politically it is far from being a major power. Thus, India's security requires, besides a foreign policy that promotes national interest and protects our vital interests, a politically and militarily powerful India that also has a sound economic base. By early twenty-first century India had become economically and politically strong that the world was talking of India as a future Super Power.

Regional Environment: Vandana Puri refers to China's role in South Asia and hints at hostile attitude of some of our neighbours prompted for several years by China's anti-India policy. She says "Beijing's relations with South Asian states are based on military aid and assistance which amounts to pitching an armed dragnet around India". In fact, "China's role in South-Asian goo-politics has been of using India's neighbours to limit India's power". In case of Myanmar (Burma) India has always supported democracy, without interfering with its domestic politics, because India wants stability in its immediate neighbourhood. But, insurgency in North-Eastern regions of India has received help from certain sections in Myanmar. In turn, the military rulers of Myanmar, who suppressed democracy movement in that country, would not have survived without encouragement and support from China. Prior to the Confidence-Building Agreement signed by China and India (see Chapter 6) in 1996, China had tried to develop close relations with some of India's neighbours by exploiting differences between India and these countries. Encouraged by China, Nepal and Bhutan who are culturally closer to India and have normally maintained friendly relations with India cultivated ties with China also. Nepal bought weapons in violation of India-Nepal agreement under which India was expected to meet Himalayan Kingdom's requirement of armaments. At one time China was reported to have even proposed a confederation of Himalayan states. Even Bangladesh which was greatly helped by India in its struggle for independence was lured by China after Mujib's assassination in 1975. Military regimes in Bangladesh used Chinese connections to minimise their dependence on India. With the Awami League Government installed in 1996 under the Prime

Ministership of Sheikh Hasina (daughter of Mujibur Rehman), the situation was expected to change in favour of India. However, anti-India elements in Bangladesh, encouraged by Pakistan, maintained pressure on Sheikh Hasina to continue with anti-India stance.

The Agni Project: International environment, even in the post-cold War period has not helped reduce threats to India's security. India has acquired the nuclear weapons. India had voluntarily decided not to make the nuclear bomb till 1998, but to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. However, the hostile attitude of a neighbour, who reportedly has nuclear bomb, made it imperative for India to possess nuclear deterrence. This required Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)-based delivery system. The Standing Committee on Defence of the Tenth Lok Sabha, under the Chairmanship of Indrajit Gupta, had, in its report, highlighted its recommendation that, "India has no option but to continue to develop and upgrade its missile capabilities for deterrence..." While announcing the first successful test of Agni, the Intermediate Range Balliatic Missile (IRBM), in 1989, the Prime Minister had stated that this type of missile was needed or India's security in accordance with the prevalent strategic doctrine in the world. Later the Government of Narasimha Rao was severely criticised for allegedly slowing down the missile programme, thus neglecting national security.

The Agni Project tests were successfully completed in February 1994. At that time the Defence Ministry had said that the consequent situation was being examined, which meant that the Government was to decide on serial production of IRBM for induction into the armed forces as a deterrent to threats to India's security. Accordingly, Ministry of Defence had confirmed in 1994 that, "when developed, these missiles will have desired deterrent effect on the adversary". Again it was said in July 1996 that, "India will continue its indigenous missile development programme", in the context of national security threats and stockpiling of missiles in our neighbourhood.

In a submission to the Standing Committee on Defence, the Government said in October 1996, that the 'Agni' project had been successfully completed, but "the decision to develop and deploy a missile system based on AGNI technologies (that is, an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile), however, can be taken at an appropriate time consistent with the then prevailing threat perception and global/regional security environment". This statement of the Ministry of Defence implies a clear shift from the earlier stand. It means that Deve Gowda's UF Government had shelved the issue of production of IRBM, and their induction into the armed forces. While threats remain unaltered, decision not to immediately take deterrent measures amounted to compromising with the nation's security by the UF Government. Surprisingly, even the Standing Committee on Defence has accepted the proposal that no further action was required. Jasjit Singh, Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses describes this strange decision as "Panipat Syndrome", and writes, "Ballistic missile development and their induction into operational service is critical to India's security".[8] Jasjit Singh adds that China has already deployed such missiles by hundreds, and is vigorously pursuing the programme of deploying newly developed accurate and mobile missiles of varying ranges with improved nuclear warheads. China has also supplied ballistic missiles to Pakistan. This had been first reported in 1991 and confirmed by Pakistan Government in their Parliament in 1993. Three years later China was reported to be helping Pakistan in building missile factory.

It is well-known that there is no reliable defence against ballistic missiles. "The only viable defence against ballistic missile attacks is a counter-attack capability with ballistic missiles."[9] That is why ballistic missiles have come to play such a crucial role in national security and hence India needs, according to defence experts, deployed missiles at an early date. India will need to undertake "extensive tests of the Agni successor to be prepared for deterrent capability at a future date." Conventional weapons situation becomes more acute in a nuclear environment. That is why nuclear deterrence requires an IRBM-based delivery capability.

Writing in the context of CTBT-related developments, Jasjit Singh, opines that the truth is "we could manage without a nuclear test explosion. But there can be no credibility or reliability in our strategic deterrent posture without adequately testing and developing a long range ballistic missile."[10] If that is how defence analysts feel, it is absolutely essential not to shelve the intermediate range missile project. The Deve Gowda Government or any successor Government cannot, afford to compromise with nation's security. Agni project must be taken to its logical conclusion of deploying the IRBMs. Otherwise India will place itself in an extremely vulnerable position not only in a situation of war or attack, but also to coercive diplomacy in peace time.

Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who is regarded as "the father of India's missile programme", pointed out in late 1996, a grim regional security scenario. He pointed out how India was surrounded by two nuclear weapon neighbours (China and Pakistan) armed with adequate delivery platforms, as also a missile possessing neighbourhood that extended beyond Pakistan and China to Iran, Saudi Arabia and Central Asian Republics.[11] Dr. Kalam opined that a nation's ability to conduct an independent foreign and security policy was dependent on the degree of its self-reliance in defence system. "Strength respects strength. And technology determines strength. Technology is prime for economic and military strength. And the need is to arm India with technological excellence." Dr. Kalam insisted that India needed "a national will" to become strong and self-reliant. So far the technology control regimes are discriminatory. The NPT, for example, signified that only a few nations were allowed to possess nuclear weapons. It discriminates against the have-dots. That is why India has been refusing to sign it. Similarly, the nuclear weapon states pushed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) after they had "done enough" tests and were now pushing the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) because they "have enough". The real game plan of nuclear powers, according to Dr. Kalam, was to ensure technology gap as also perpetual dependence of the have-nots on the haves. India has to awaken to build a powerful national will and to acquire not only IRBM as deterrent, but also continue with more advanced Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) so that it can, on its own, effectively meet threats to its security.

India has taken a principled stand on the issue of ban on nuclear testing. India has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 on the ground that it is discriminatory, as it bars proliferation of nuclear weapons outside the Nuclear Club of Britain, France, Russian, United States and China, but it did not seek to force the members of the Club not to manufacture or test new weapons. We will briefly examine the history of test ban efforts since early 1950s.

NUCLEAR TEST BAN AND INDIA

The first atomic device was tested by the United States of America on July 16, 1945. For the first time, energy equal to that released by 20,000 tons of the conventional explosive was released by fissioning the nuclei of plutonium in an instantaneous chain reaction. Three weeks later US dropped an atom bomb at Hiroshima, and three days afterwards another similar bomb was dropped at Nagasaki. The unprecedented destruction caused by the two bombs forced Japan's unconditional surrender. The former Soviet Union took the US action as a challenge. As the Cold War commenced, the USSR got busy in developing its own atom bomb. The US monopoly was ended when USSR exploded an atomic device in 1949. Britain (1952), France (1960) and China (1964) also joined the two Super Powers to constitute the exclusive Nuclear Club. Till 1995, a total of 2068 tests had been conducted which included one by India. Like most other developing countries, India has been against the manufacture, testing and indeed possession of nucleus weapons.

The mankind was horror-stricken when the first two bombs were dropped on two Japanese cities. The dangers of radioactive fall-out were highlighted when an American nuclear test of 15 megaton hydrogen bomb was conducted on March 1, 1954 at the Namu Island. The test was a part of nuclear tests called "Operation Castle" Official statements confirmed the radioactive contamination of 28 Americans and 236 residents of nearby Marshall Islands. The crew of a Japanese fishing boat was exposed to high radiation. This panicked the people when the highly contaminated boat returned to the harbour. This led the world to think of asking for a ban on such tests in future.

India was the first country to officially ask for stoppage of nuclear tests. Prime Minster Nehru told the Parliament in April 1954: "Nuclear tests are a crime against humanity and a crime against survival of the human race. No country pleading the interests of its security has the right to perpetuate this nuclear holocaust". Nehru proposed an immediate "standstill agreement" on nuclear testing. The nuclear explosions are "the most visible manifestation of the arm race", and can lead to impending nuclear disaster. India made a formal proposal for total cessation of nuclear testing in the UN General Assembly in December, 1954, but did not put it to vote. However, India's proposal to establish a scientific committee to enquire into the effects of radiation was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly.

The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) had their arguments for justification of nuclear testing. Firstly, the tests were needed to determine the effectiveness and reliability of weapons that were developed and stockpiled. Secondly, we tests helped nuclear weapon states to continuously modernise their weapons to keep an edge on their adversaries. Thirdly, some of the tests were also conducted to evaluate the effects of nuclear explosions. Lastly, it was argued that nuclear testing was essential to ensure the safety of the weapons already developed.

There are various reasons why the international community wanted a ban on nuclear tests. As stated above, the contamination caused by US test of March 1954 and death of a Japanese crew member caught public attention, and concern of the people became widespread. Asian countries were the main victims of nuclear testing. This led Nehru to demand immediate cessation of tests. The main reasons for the demand of Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) were: (a) to curb nuclear arms race by stopping both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons; (b) to check environmental hazards; and (c) to promote socio-economic well-being of the mankind. As Sri Lanka asserted in 1991 in Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference that: "It is against all civilised standards and moral convictions that billions of people are deprived of basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, care etc. and other things that are fundamental to a dignified life, while the international community is spending billions of dollars for destructive purposes.

The formal proposal made by India in the UN General Assembly in December 1954 was not pressed to vote. The formal negotiations for test ban were initiated when Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin proposed the cessation of nuclear testing in October 1956, but rejected the idea of international verification of compliance. The United States, on the other hand, considered international verification as an essential condition, several other proposals followed. For example, in January 1957 the United States presented a five-point plan calling for cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, to be followed by nuclear testing as well. After the first thermonuclear device was tested by Britain in

May 1957, it opposed the test ban on the ground that it had very small stockpile of hydrogen bombs and it wanted to further develop the weapon. France was still busy developing its bomb.

The test ban negotiations were held off and on, but they ran into one difficulty or the other. These negotiations were adversely affected after American spy plane U-2 was shot down by the Soviet Union when it was flying without permission in its air space on May 1, 1960. France had earlier exploded its first nuclear device (February 1960). The Bay of Pigs incident in which an unsuccessful attempt was made to do away with Castro regime in Cuba took place in April 1961, and the Berlin Wall dividing the city into pro and anti-Soviet parts was erected in August 1961 by East Germany. The USSR resumed an extensive test series on August 31, 1961. Finally, the East-West relations suffered a big jolt when the Cuban crisis of October 1962 brought the United States and the USSR on the brink of a nuclear war. When USA blockaded Cuba and warned USSR not to dare send its nuclear missiles into Cuba, the USSR ordered return of its ships. The situation was saved. But, it was realised how close the world had moved to a nuclear holocaust.

Meanwhile, the test ban issue had been put on the agenda of Eighteen-Nations Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) in Geneva. This Committee included both Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states. India was one of the non-nuclear weapon powers who participated in this arms control exercise.

Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963: The direct negotiations for test ban were speeded up after the Cuban crisis. A US-USSR hotline was established and a meeting on test ban was held in Moscow. The meeting negotiated a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which was signed by the Foreign Ministers of UK, USA and USSR on August 5, 1963. It came into force on October 10, 1963. The treaty prohibited all nuclear weapon test explosions on the surface, in the atmosphere and underwater including territorial waters and high seas. It prohibited all tests, including tests for peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), at a place under the jurisdiction of a party to this treaty in the following environments: "The atmosphere, beyond its limits including outer space, or under water including territorial waters and high seas." The treaty stated that the underground tests were not prohibited. High seas were specifically mentioned to ensure that no country used them for nuclear testing on the pretext that these seas are not within the jurisdiction of any state. Although underground tests were allowed, yet those tests that could cause "radioactive debris" to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions were conducted were prohibited.

All states were invited to join the treaty, which is of unlimited duration. In extraordinary events a state, which having signed the treaty became a party to it, was given the right to withdraw. The treaty could be amended by the affirmative vote of a majority of parties, including affirmative vote of three original parties; i.e. UK, USA and USSR. Thus, it represented the "First global agreement to protect the environment." The PTBT sought to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. It paved the way for negotiations for more effective arms control measures. The treaty was ratified by three original signatories (parties to PTBT), 98 other members of the United Nations, including India, and seven non-member States of the UN.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968: The Partial Test Ban Treaty sought to solve the most urgent environmental problem. But the problem of qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms race and the danger of nuclear proliferation remained. The growing world-wide interest in nuclear power caused the danger of nuclear proliferation. Many countries including India were interested only in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But, the problem was that the line between energy for peaceful purposes and nuclear arms manufacture was very thin. Therefore, public pressure was built for a ban on nuclear proliferation. According to a report published in 1967, besides five nuclear weapons states (NWS), there were seven other states which were engaged in research for nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but they could easily develop nuclear armaments also. Hence, it was necessary to curb further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the United States and Soviet Union negotiated a treaty for cessation of nuclear proliferation. Two separate, though identical treaties were proposed by the US and USSR in the UN General Assembly. The General Assembly endorsed the US-USSR proposal by a big majority on June 12, 1968. It was opened for signature on July 1, 1968. The treaty known as Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was immediately signed by UK, USA, USSR and over 50 others countries. India refused to sign the treaty on the ground that it was discriminatory in nature. While it seeks to deny the freedom to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons, it does not ask nuclear weapon states to destroy their armaments. Even France and China delayed their signatures for many years. China signed it as late as in 1992. Earlier, after ratification formalities, the NPT had come into force on March 5, 1970.

The NPT was initially to last for 25 years. After that a conference of parties to the non-proliferation treaty was to be convened to extend it for a limited or unlimited period. The conference for extension of NPT was held in 1995, and after prolonged negotiations the treaty was extended for indefinite period. India, not being a party to the NPT, did not attend the conference.

The NPT provides that none of the nuclear weapon states (NWS), either individually or collectively would transfer their nuclear weapons to any of the non-nuclear weapon states. The countries who signed this treaty are bound to discourage nuclear arms race and will make effective efforts for nuclear disarmament. If the national interests of any party are adversely affected, then it has the freedom to withdraw from the NPT.

Commenting on the utility of the NPT, the then UN Secretary-General U. Thant said that besides non-proliferation this treaty would enable the developing countries to direct their financial resources and attention to their socio-economic development. He also said the nuclear weapon states would have the responsibility of accelerating the process of complete nuclear disarmament. But, besides India, even France, Italy and West Germany also had reservations about the treaty. India felt that the NPT did not in any way minimise threat to its security from China, while it denies non-nuclear weapon states the right to acquire nuclear weapons. Besides, the Super Powers and other NWS were to continue to possess and increase their stockpiles of weapons. The only limitation was that they would not be able to transfer their weapons to other countries.

The non-nuclear weapon states failed to get a commitment from Super Powers to continue negotiations on nuclear disarmament in general. However, Article VI of the Treaty provided for less committal obligation to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date". Super Powers also agreed to continue negotiations on a CTBT as mentioned in the NPT Preamble also.

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), 1974: The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was agreed upon by the two Super Powers just after five weeks of negotiations. This US-USSR bilateral treaty was signed on July 3, 1974. But, it could not come into force till December 1990. Its enforcement was delayed because the United States wanted a clearly spelt out verification arrangement. The treaty required the two signatories "to prevent and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon tests having yield exceeding 150 kilotons". It was also agreed to limit the underground nuclear tests to bare minimum, and to continue negotiations for cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The provisions of the treaty did not apply to underground explosions for peaceful purposes. The treaty did have a verification provision, but the US insisted that it would ratify the treaty only if there was clear provision to ensure that the 150 kiloton threshold was actually observed.

The Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET), 1976: The provisions of the TTBT did not extend to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This left a possibility that in the name of explosion for peaceful purpose the states could circumvent the threshold limit for military purposes and test nuclear weapons of higher than 150 kilotons. Therefore, to plug this loophole the two Super Powers signed a supplementary agreement called the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) on May 28, 1976. The PNET extended the 150 kiloton threshold to the explosions for peaceful purposes also. In this case also the US desired a clear verification protocol. Therefore, PNET could not come into force till December 1990 when the new protocol was agreed upon by the US and USSR.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996): The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and subsequent agreements did not ban nuclear testing under the ground. The concern of mankind for its security and environmental safety prompted negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The negotiations on CTBT were initiated in 1977 by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union. These negotiations were suspended at the end of 1980. During 1980s all the nuclear weapon states (NWS) carried on vigorous nuclear testing.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) whose origin can be traced back to the 1960s became active at Geneva in 1980s. The Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) which was convened in 1962 and which had India as one of the members was re-organised as Conference of the Committee on) Disarmament. In 1978, the first Special session of UN General Assembly on Disarmament recommended the setting up of a Committee on Disarmament, which was later renamed as Conference on Disarmament (CD). India has been an active member of CD and consistently advocated non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament and arms Control. The CTBT negotiations came on the centre-stage during Reagan Gorbachev Summit at Reykjavik (Iceland) in 1986.

After many years of debate, it was decided in 1990 to convene a conference of states which were parties to the PTBT to consider amendments to the Treaty. The proposal was to convert the Treaty into a comprehensive test ban agreement. The conference of states that are parties to PTBT met at UN headquarters from January 7 to 18, 1991. However, it failed to reach any decision.

India's position had been repeatedly made clear at various fora. India believes in total nuclear disarmament, but it opposes any agreement that is discriminatory in nature. India's stand on CTBT is discussed in the next section in this chapter.

The negotiations for CTBT were taken up seriously in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva during 1993-96. It is an irony that India who sought a nuclear test ban as early as 1954, could not agree to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as it finally emerged in 1996. India stands for total nuclear disarmament, whereas America worked for a ban on nuclear testing even at the underground level which was permitted by the PTBT. But, the United States which was earlier not enthusiastic about CTBT decided to work seriously for a CTBT to be concluded by 1996. India and the United States became co-sponsors of a resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1993. It called for a comprehensive test ban treaty which would "effectively contribute" to the twin goal of nuclear non-proliferation in all aspects as well as the process of nuclear disarmament. The negotiating mandate adopted by the. Geneva Conference on Disarmament also used the same language of twin objectives. President Clinton of the US and India's Prime Minister P.Y. Narasimha Rao had together called for a CTBT with the twin objectives in 1994. But, by the time negotiations reached a decisive stage early in 1996, the Nuclear Weapon States changed their stand and began advocating non-proliferation rather than total nuclear disarmament. By that time the United States had developed sufficient laboratory facilities to continue to develop its nuclear weapons by laboratory testing, while ensuring that non-nuclear weapon states would not acquire the nuclear weapons.

During the negotiations in CD India had repeatedly made it clear that it would not sign any treaty that did not meet the twin objectives of the negotiating mandate. The CD leadership tried to coerce India by laying down that CTBT would enter into force when signed by all the 44 nuclear weapon capability states. These include five nuclear weapons states, three threshold countries (India, Pakistan and Israel) and the remaining countries having capabilities of developing nuclear energy. India regarded this condition as arms twisting which was finally resented and India refused to sign the CTBT not only in the CD but also after the UN General Assembly adopted it on an Australian resolution by an overwhelming majority.

According to Jasjit Singh, "The treaty will allow sub-critical tests and computer simulation to design, fabricate and test new types of warheads." He adds, "The treaty, will, in reality, legitimise a new qualitative arms race." There is no ban on transfer of proven nuclear weapon design and technology by a nuclear weapon state to another state. The treaty clearly discriminates against non-nuclear weapon states like India. As Jasjit Singh concludes, this treaty, "like the NPT, will be a license to proliferate vertically without effectively banning horizontal proliferation."[12] Thus, while the NWS can continue to develop new weapons and even transfer these to other states, nothing is done by the treaty to initiate the process of disarmament.

India's Objections and Rejection of CTBT: Despite India's strong objections the CTBT was pushed through, though India refused to sign it. The position taken by the Indian Government had wide public support. The CTBT directly affects five nuclear weapons states and three threshold states. The remaining non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) are committed under the NPT to indefinitely abstain from nuclear tests. In 1984, India and five other nations, i.e., Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania had appealed for a halt to nuclear testing. The leaders of this "six nation initiative" met in New Delhi in 1985. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told the Summit that, "Existing compacts deny to non-nuclear weapon states the right to conduct experiments even for peaceful purposes, while placing no restraint on the nuclear weapon powers in the matter of multiplying their arsenals." India has always been against this discrimination.

Addressing the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February 1986, the Indian representative Eric Gonsalves had said that, "we do not see how carrying out more tests is essential, especially when the existing nuclear weapons with the super powers are, on each side's admission, adequate to deter the adversary." Not only tests were conducted off and on, but even a few months before the CTBT was opened for signature in 1996 France and China were busy carrying on their nuclear explosions. Later, speaking in the CD Ambassador Satish Chandra had said:

"In our view ... a treaty on nuclear test ban, which would be comprehensive in character, should have three essential characteristics; namely, (i) it should cover all states including the five nuclear weapon states; (ii) it should extend the prohibition on the testing of nuclear weapons to the underground environment as well; and that (iii) it should do so for all time. The verification system to be developed must be non-discriminatory..." He added that a compelling reason why CTBT had become a matter of high priority was to prevent the development of 'third generation' nuclear weapons. Ambassador Satish Chandra was expressing the views of India in totality — views of all parties and people.

Speaking in the CD in September 1994, Indian Ambassador had objected to the reference to NPT in the preamble of the proposed CTBT He said: "since we are not a signatory to the NPT, any reference to the same would not be acceptable to us." A year later in 1995, Ambassador Ms. Arundhati Ghose insisted that, "... the preamble of the treaty will have to clearly define the linkage of the CTBT to the overall framework of nuclear disarmament." Accordingly, India suggested several amendments in the draft CTBT in order to link it with nuclear disarmament. Ms. Ghose reiterated India's position on January 25, 1996. She said, "We are of the view that the treaty should be securely anchored in the global disarmament context and be linked through treaty language to the elimination of all nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework..." Since the United States and other NWS were in, no mood to lay down a time-bound disarmament programme India decided to vote against the treaty, and so it did. India could not accept a mere assurance for disarmament. As Ambassador Arundhati Ghose said, "The open-ended commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons is an unsigned promissory note, useless against threat of nuclear weapons." India regretted that no consensus was reached on its formal proposal for establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament India formally declared that it would reject the draft CTBT as it stood on June 20, 1996.

The CD Chairman Ambassador Jaap Ramaker submitted the draft which India rejected. The 'Entry into Force' clause in the treaty laid down the condition that it would enter into force only if ratified by 44 countries, including India, who have research and power reactors. India having this facility and being a threshold country was required to ratify. India found no merit in being virtually coerced to ratify. Rejecting the text as well as the 'entry into force' clause India said, "The present CTBT is shaped more by technological preferences of nuclear weapon states rather than by imperative of nuclear disarmament."

India suggested an amendment in 'entry into force' clause. India suggested that it should enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification by 65 states and no less than two years after its opening for signature. India's amendments were not accepted either in the text (to link CTBT with phased programme of nuclear disarmament) or in the 'entry into force' clause. India refused to accept that it should be ratified by 44 countries including India.

India exercised double veto in the Conference on Disarmament. India voted against the text as well as 'entry into force' clause. On August 21, 1996 India's adverse vote on transmission of the treaty to the plenary blocked the CTBT as negotiated by CD despite India's protest.

Australia moved a resolution in the General Assembly for adoption of the CTBT as negotiated by CD. Australian resolution, co-sponsored by 126 countries, provided for opening the CTBT for signature. The Australian resolution was adopted by 158 votes in favour, 3 against and 5 abstentions in the UN General Assembly in September 1996. India's veto had thus been nullified by the General Assembly vote. The three countries who voted against were India, Bhutan and Libya. Five abstentions were: Tanzania, Lebanon, Cuba, Syria and Mauritius.

The treaty was to enter into force 180 days after it was ratified by 44 countries, listed by CD, including India. If necessary ratifications were not received, a conference would be convened three years after General Assembly resolution to accelerate the process.

The first country to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was the United States of America. President Bill Clinton signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996 using the same pen with which President John F. Kennedy had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. This was a sentimental demonstration of the US "concern" for nuclear testing and its desire to ban. About 70 other countries also signed CTBT after Clinton's signature. As announced earlier, India did not sign although President Clinton had expressed the hope that India would 'come round'. Pakistan, also a threshold country, voted in favour of the CTBT in the General Assembly, but said that it would not sign so long as India did not put down its signature. The third threshold country Israel, of course, decided to go along with the United States. Thus, a "discriminatory CTBT", as India looks at it, was opened for signature with India insisting on not associating itself with it. India had to pay the price immediately. India's attempt to get into the Security Council for a term of two years as a non-permanent member failed, as only 42 member-nations voted for India in the 185 member General Assembly. India's hope for a permanent seat in the Security Council was indeed dashed. As Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral said in the Lok Sabha in December 1996: "We have paid the price for defiance, and we are proud of it." He denied that India had been isolated.

In an unexpected development, the United States Senate refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the fall of 1999. This rejection of the treaty by the Senate put a big question mark on its implementation. The CTBT has been virtually forgotten. Nobody talks about it any longer.

India's policy on disarmament is clear and unambiguous. India is not satisfied merely with ban on nuclear testing — partial or comprehensive. India seeks total nuclear disarmament. This policy has support of the entire country. It is not only the position of the government of the day, but is based on national consensus. It has the full support of the political parties, civil servants and technocrats. India will continue to strive for conventional disarmament and total phasing out of nuclear weapons. This alone will meet India's security requirements. India will be willing to dismantle its entire nuclear war heads, but only if all other nuclear weapons state do that.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): The only significant decision in the direction of disarmament during the inter-war period was the adoption of the Geneva Convention of 1925 banning the use of chemical weapons. India had strongly supported the convention which became the basis of Chemical Weapons Convention which opened for signature in 1993. This convention prohibits the manufacture and use of all types of chemical weapons. India signed it soon after it opened for signature and ratified it in 1996. Meanwhile, most other countries including China, Russia, the United States and other chemical weapon states had also signed. But, major powers were reluctant to ratify it. It had been decided to bring the CWC into force with effect from April 29, 1997. Since the United States had not ratified the Convention till March 1997, fear was expressed that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) proposed to be set up after 29 April 1997 might not materialise. China and Russia had indicated their unwillingness to ratify CWC till the United States ratified it. India was in a dilemma, whether to withdraw or suspend its ratification, or not in case major weapon states did not ratify it in time. However, President Clinton succeeded in persuading the Republican-dominated Senate, and the United States did finally ratify the CWC some days before the April 29, 1997 deadline. This paved the way for ratification by others like Russia and China. India, having already ratified it, remains bound by total prohibition of chemical weapons and hoped that CWC would be universally endorsed and made operative.

India took a significant initiative in June 1997. India threw open its chemical weapons stockpiles and their production and storage facilities to international inspection. However, India made it clear that its compliance with Chemical Weapons Convention "will not in any way compromise with our security." India submitted list of its chemical weapons and related facilities to the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) based at The Hague. This decision of India confirms its commitment to the cause of comprehensive disarmament.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR OPTION

Ever since India developed nuclear capability, and conducted a test at Pokhran in May 1974, it was repeatedly insisted that although India did not wish to make a bomb, and that it supported complete nuclear disarmament, yet it was also stated that we would keep our nuclear option open. It meant that if ever India felt that her security was being threatened, it would not hesitate in exercising its nuclear option. China is a nuclear power and its relations with India did not become normal even after signing the Confidence Building Measures late in 1996. Pakistan also possessed nuclear capability. That is why both India and Pakistan (along with Israel) were described as threshold countries. Despite numerous efforts made by India, Pakistan's anti-India approach had no signs of change. China had been fully, though clandestinely, supporting Pakistan in its nuclear programme. Thus, both China and Pakistan posed threat to India's security. That is why India decided not to give up its right of exercising the nuclear option. Prior to 1998, many political leaders demanded from time to time that India should not delay in acquiring nuclear weapons, yet officially India neither closed its option nor exercised it. The analysis of India's attitude towards CTBT (see above) clearly shows that India's position on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was not accepted by the Nuclear Weapon States, no programme for nuclear disarmament was even seriously discussed, and India continues to have clear and definite threat to its security. It is in this background that an opinion was emerging in India that the country should give up its vague policy and exercise the nuclear option.

The feelings of most Indian people were very appropriately expressed in August 1997 by Brahma Chellany of the Centre for Policy Research. In a critical comment, he wrote that there could not be a better example of India's "tendency not to take decisions" than its policy in regard to nuclear option. He wrote that India had remained committed to its nuclear option for decades, but it had hated to exercise this option as a direct, "security asset". India had been making noises of discriminatory nature of nuclear regime of big Powers, but

had not gathered courage to get out of their domination. India had paid heavy price of its decision, for it had neither had the courage to give up the option, nor determined will to exercise it.

Within a year of India's independence, Nehru had established the Atomic Energy Commission. The well-known scientist Dr. Homi Bhabha was its Chairman and Nobel Prize winner C.V. Raman was made its advisor. Nehru had told the Commission that as a matter of policy India would have to develop all basic material for nuclear power. India would have to take maximum care of its security by developing all the modern scientific tools needed for this power. In accordance with this direction, brilliant Indian scientists made it possible to secure for India the status of a threshold country, by the time the Conference on Disarmament debated the CTBT during 1995-96.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub had suggested in mid-1997 that India and Pakistan should sign an agreement for "non-use of nuclear weapons". Earlier, in 1994, India had suggested that the two countries should commit themselves to "no-first use" of nuclear bomb. This proposal was straightaway rejected by Pakistan. There is a basic difference in the two proposals, though both imply that India and Pakistan, either possessed or had the capability to manufacture and possess the nuclear weapons — the difference is that India's proposal of 'no-first use' means that we will not use the bomb for aggression, but if attacked We can use it for self-defence. We had to adopt this policy in view of China being a recognised nuclear weapon state (NWS) and not having very cordial relations with India. Pakistan's proposal, if accepted, would mean possession of nuclear weapons, but not making use of it. If that is Pakistan's view, then there is no use for that country to possess nuclear weapon because India was willing to commit itself to 'no-first use'. Since Pakistan says that it had threat only from India, and that latter is not going to be first to use the bomb, Pakistan had no justification for its nuclear programme, but India had to keep its option open in view of a nuclear Power being in its neighbourhood.

India considered Gauhar Ayub's proposal as clever and confusing. If India accepted, it would get into the American trap which advocated the policy of "cap, reduce and eliminate" the nuclear weapons, while "big five" (P-5) would continue to possess the weapons.

Unfortunately, India had kept its nuclear option open without exercising it. A former officer of Indian Air Force, Ajay Singh commented that Pakistan's military-bureaucratic complex would never be willing to sign an agreement that would commit it against nuclear weapons. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of independence, Prime Minister I.K. Gujral had suggested that both India and Pakistan should reduce their military expenditure so that confidence could be built and peace promoted in the region. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif ignored this proposal and began talking of Kashmir as the main issue. On the eve of Vajpayee Government assuming office in March

1998, the "Agenda for Governance" released by the BJP and its Allies insisted that, not only nuclear option would be kept open, but if necessary it would even be exercised.

A prominent political leader, and a former army officer, Jaswant Singh had opined (early in March 1998) that, given the nuclear weapon capacities of the NWS and their strategic postures, and given the emerging security environment around India, New Delhi would certainly focus attention on improving its nuclear technological and weapon capacities. He hinted at a Seminar on Security and Non-Proliferation Issues that India might soon exercise its nuclear option. Commenting about this seminar, former Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit confirmed that there was lot of continuing pressure, formal and informal, on India to abandon its nuclear security and strategic option. Dixit raised two questions: First, why was India a special focus of attention for these pressures? And, second, what bad had India done regarding nuclear proliferation to invite such pressures? His answers to these questions were:

1. According to him there were, not three, but six threshold countries viz. India, Pakistan and Israel (officially acknowledged), and Japan, Germany and South Africa. The last three are said to have confirmed their technological capacities, though they have signed the NPT. Of these Israel, Germany, Japan and South Africa come under US security umbrella. But, India and Pakistan are different. Their relations are adverse and they had nuclear capability, but not signed the NPT and CTBT. The impression of the West was that other threshold countries could be managed; therefore, India must be persuaded, pressured and coerced not to exercise nuclear option.
2. India gave full cooperation in the CTBT negotiations till it became clear that its discriminatory provisions would not be given up by NWS. India has also supported chemical and biological weapons convention, and was willing to join the Fissile Material Cut Off Agreement. Despite assurances that the non-proliferation regime would be made non-discriminatory, nothing was done.

But, Clinton Administration began suffering from "Jimmy Carter Syndrome" of being "assertively and insensitively ... demanding on non-proliferation issue."

The Agenda for Governance: An interesting debate followed the announcement in the Agenda for Governance released in March 1998 by BJP and its allies, that if necessary India would exercise its nuclear option. There were people who strongly advocated in favour of nuclear weaponisation. These included Gen. (Rtd.) V.N. Sharma, Uday Bhaskar, Deputy Director, Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, and Brahma Chellany of Centre for Policy Research. Those who opposed the move include Praful Bidai, Senior Follow at Nehru Memorial Library and Bhabani Sen Gupta.

General Sharma opined that, "A country should have a strong military machine—including nuclear to carry out its political and economic agenda without external interference." According to Uday Bhaskar we must exercise our option to act as a deterrent He wrote, "A nuclear weapon should be a means to an end — it should help achieve the politico-diplomatic and socio-economic objectives of the country." He added, "You don't need a nuclear weapon state to threaten; its presence is enough to shrink your sovereignty. We have to build a quiet confidence to face China." Professor Chellany was more forthright. He said that unless a country felt secure it cannot concentrate on economic modernisation. He added, "With defence expenditure continuing to fall and extra regional dangers becoming sharper, the attraction of a minimum nuclear deterrent is irresistible in the military and economic interests."

An anti-nuclear bomb view was expressed by Praful Bidai when he said that India had learnt to live with the Chinese bomb. "When China carried out its first nuclear explosion in 1964 neither did India protest then, nor did it say in 1974 that its explosion was an answer to China." He argued that Chinese missiles were not directed against India, and "Why China, we stand equally threatened by the US" According to Sen Gupta, "India will have to pay the price and that would be disastrous for its economy." Saying that "Indians nurture a very romantic idea about nuclear power arid the majesty of nuclear bomb..." he said that even if a bomb is acquired by us, India will have to go on spending on conventional weapons. However, a view in favour of ambiguity was expressed by Professor Amitabh Mattoo, "Clarity is good but you should have a second strike capability against China and be able to clearly demonstrate it. Unless that is done, it is not advisable to deviate from the present stand."

India Exercises Its Nuclear Option: In accordance with the Agenda for Governance, India did finally exercise its nuclear option in May 1998. Three nuclear tests were held on May 11 and two on May 13, 1998. One of the explosions on May 11 was that of a thermo-nuclear device. The tests were conducted in such secrecy that even the American agency CIA with all its sophisticated system of intelligence collection failed to notice that India was going to test. The orders for testing on May 11 were issued one month in advance. Earlier when Defence Minister George Fernandes had said that China posed a threat to India, he was bitterly criticised by many opponents. But, when Indian explosions on May II, 1998 at 3.45 rocked the scorched desert sands of Pokhran in Rajasthan, not only the Prime Minister was over-joyed, but the entire nation took pride in the new status acquired by the country to ensure its security.

The tests were made possible by a number of scientists and engineers working under the overall control of Chairman of Atomic Energy Department, R. Chidambaran and Scientific Adviser to Defence Minister, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam. While the Prime Minister thanked the two top scientists for their achievements, the country was thrilled. As a well known journalist, wrote: "Every nation's history is determined by turning points; times when a nation, for better or worse, changes course. Such a moment is upon us." Aroon Puri added, "It matters little what else Prime Minister Vajpayee may do. By announcing India's membership of the nuclear club he has ensured he will not be forgotten." Most Indians shared this view. Right from Mrs. Indira Gandhi down to I.K. Gujral every Prime Minister had the opportunity to make India a nuclear state, but each one of them hesitated. Mrs. Gandhi had planned some tests, after May 1974, but scrapped them fearing American reprisals. Prime Minister Gujral in 1997 had all the ingredients for test but did not do so because, for him, not signing the CTBT was enough guarantee of the country's security. He, however, welcomed the tests when they were conducted but asked the Vajpayee Government to sign the CTBT.

The nuclear tests conducted by India, according to Vajpayee, have enabled India to make a big bomb. He said, "India is now a nuclear weapon state." The US President was among the first to react against India. He condemned Indian tests and imposed sanctions against India. Japan followed suit. Clinton tried to persuade other highly industrialised Group of 8 also to impose sanctions, but he did not succeed, although India was generally condemned by most of them. However, UK, France and Russia made it clear that they will not impose sanctions against India which may prove to be counter productive. Some elements in Russia were happy about Indian tests, though China became one of the worst critics of India. Interestingly, China has herself conducted 45 tests including some as late as 1996. She had justified them on the ground of her security. When India conducted tests in view of prevailing security threat to it, India is being condemned, and the West refused to admit India into the exclusive nuclear club of five. President Clinton came in for sharp criticism by the speaker of American House of Representatives Mr. Newt Gingrich. He criticised President Clinton for having followed double standards, and for having allowed the "transfer of American missile technology to China" whose missile system was "more deadly through multiple warheads on each missile." Speaker Gingrich criticised Clinton administration for its "failed policy" to contain China who was not only a threat to India but was helping Pakistan in its nuclear programme. The US Speaker wrote to members of the Congress that while Clinton administration continued with the policy of "accommodation towards Communist China, the administration roared with outrage when a democratic Indian Government chose to test its nuclear capability." The Speaker charged Clinton Administration that it would "rather confront an Indian democracy than anger a Chinese dictatorship."

What worried India was the fact that for the first time even the UN Security Council passed a resolution against Indian tests, whereas it had passed not even one resolution when hundreds of tests were conducted during 50 years period till CTBT was adopted by the General Assembly.

Justifying the decision to conduct the nuclear tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee said, "We live in a world where India is surrounded by nuclear weaponry. No responsible government can formulate a security policy for the country on abstract principles." He said that India could not depend for its security on discriminatory nuclear regime. Replying to sanctions imposed by the US, the Prime Minister said that no price was too high where nation's security is concerned. However, he said, "Our intentions were, are and will always be peaceful. But we do not want to cover our action with a veil of needless ambiguity. India is now a nuclear weapon state. But, India's bomb will never be a weapon of aggression." India, soon after the tests, announced unilateral moratorium on further tests. India also declared that it would never be first to use the bomb against any country, implying that India reserved the bomb only for its defence. President K.R. Narayanan told his German hosts that when those who had signed the NPT were themselves proliferating nuclear weapons in India's neighbourhood, India could not afford not to acquire the nuclear deterrent. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 1998, Prime Minister Vajpayee made it clear that India stood for total nuclear disarmament but had acquired its own weapon because the big five were not willing to destroy their weapons.

At the political level, Vajpayee Government had been defeated by one vote in the Lok Sabha in April 1999. But, no alternative government could be put in place; Lok Sabha was dissolved and fresh elections ordered for September-October 1999. Meanwhile, Vajpayee Government remained in office in, what is called, caretaker capacity. The Vajpayee Government returned to power with a clear mandate in October 1999. Earlier, Mr. Vajpayee had declared basic tenets of India's nuclear doctrine of no-first-use and minimum nuclear deterrence.

National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of the National Security Council released, in August 1999, draft of the country's nuclear doctrine which included the command and control system. Accordingly, India would never be the first to use nuclear weapons against any country. But, if attacked by a nuclear weapon country, India would retaliate. The command of nuclear button should be in the hands of the Prime Minister or his nominee(s).

REACTIONS OF OTHER MAJOR POWERS

The relations between India and other major actors in international community saw ups and downs after Pokhran II. It was natural for Japan to feel upset because that was the only country that had been victim of attack of American atom bombs. But, two countries who themselves were nuclear weapon states reacted very sharply in May 1998. These were (i) China, India's neighbour, a nuclear power since 1964 and a permanent Member of the UN Security Council, who had a long history of unpleasant relations with India and who had not only fought a war in 1962 with India but had been a friend of Pakistan and even helped that country in its nuclear programme; and (ii) the United States, the only surviving Super Power, the first and most powerful nuclear weapon state, and a country that had often adopted anti-India policies and had generally supported Pakistan. The United States was the first country to react with imposition of economic sanctions. It refused to accept India as a nuclear weapon state, and demanded that this country must sign the NPT and the CTBT as a non-nuclear weapon country. China fully supported the United States. An attempt was made to force collective economic sanctions through a meeting of the Group of 8 (G-8) highly industrialised countries. But, Russia, Britain and France firmly turned down the proposal. Therefore, sanctions were individually imposed by some of the countries of G-8, and by China. But it was soon realised by the Western countries that sanctions were counterproductive, and that Indian economy was vibrant and had withstood the pressure of sanctions.

Meanwhile, on the initiative of the US and its friends, the UN Security Council had unanimously condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India. This was an unpredicted step, taken on June 6, 1998.

The United States had taken the initiative to impose sanctions in accordance with various American laws and amendments incorporated in Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, 1994. But, people in India felt that it was an act of revenge against a sovereign country (India) which had earlier refused to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty and Opposed and refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, because India considered them as discriminatory. Now, India had exercised its sovereign right by conducting the tests and declaring itself a nuclear weapon state. America and its allies saw in it a challenge to their hegemonic position. India's Minister of External Affairs Mr. Jaswant Singh categorically declared that India, like Pakistan, was a nuclear weapon state. He said, "That reality can neither be denied nor wished away. This category of 'nuclear weapon state' is not ... a conferment. Nor is it a status for others to grant. It is rather an objective reality." Realising that India was not going to bow before the P-5, the United States Government soon initiated a dialogue with India to persuade this country to sign the CTBT. India had already declared unilateral moratorium on further tests. So, India in any case was not going to conduct any more tests. The question that was to be decided was that India should sign the CTBT as a nuclear weapon state (NWS), not as a non-weapon state which the US and its friends wanted. By the time the Vajpayee Government lost the vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha in April 1999 eight rounds of talks had taken place between Mr. Jaswant Singh and the United States Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Strobe Talbott. The negotiations were disrupted after dissolution of the Lok Sabha and the commencement of Kargil conflict soon thereafter.

The talks were resumed after Vajpayee Government's return to power, and by January 2000 Mr. Jaswant Singh and Mr. Strobe Talbott had in all met 10 times.

By that time significant changes were noticed in the policies of major powers. China took important steps in the direction of improving bilateral ties with India. The US Administration also began to reorient its policy. Several (not all) of the sanctions imposed by US on India were lifted. For the rest, US Secretary of Treasury Mr. Summers hinted in New Delhi in January 2000 that they could also be relaxed, though he was not directly concerned with the sanctions. But Japan was adamant on India signing the CTBT as a precondition the resumption of its official Development Assistance (ODA) to this country. Although significant improvement was noticed in the India-Japanese relations, yet there was no change in Japanese attitude on the nuclear weapon issue. The process of improving bilateral relations was accelerated by External Affairs minister Jaswant Singh's visit to Japan in November 1999 and that of Defence Minister George Fernandes in January 2000. The two countries had agreed to initiate a security dialogue, yet Japanese Defence Minister indicated that there would be no change in that country's nuclear policy.

India has repeatedly said that it is firmly committed to the nuclear weapons tree world. But so long as other countries do not destroy their nuclear weapons, India would have to maintain a minimum nuclear deterrence. India's nuclear doctrine emphasises no-first use of its nuclear weapons against another nuclear-weapon state, and no use at all against non-nuclear-weapon countries. India has also reiterated that it would not sign the CTBT so long as it remained discriminatory. In January 2000 even the United States indicated that India had the sovereign right to decide on the nature of weapons needed for its security. That is a positive step in the direction of better Indo-US relations.

The Republican Administration of George W. Bush, which succeeded Clinton regime in January 2001, reduced pressure on India in respect of CTBT, because Republican-dominated Senate had earlier rejected it. A nuclear deal was concluded between Indian and the USA in 2005 (see Chapter 11).

INDIA: A SPACE POWER

India became a nuclear power in May 1998. In April 2001, India enthusiastically entered the select group, called the Big Boy's Club, which included the United States, Russia, the European Space Agency led by France, Japan and China. This happened when India successfully launched an experimental satellite atop GSLV, or the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle. Earlier, for 30 years Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) had been designing increasingly advanced weather and communication satellites, and built rockets to carry them to their precise stations in the space. At the same time, it has boosted the country's strike capability with a series of missiles. But, despite sophisticated rocketry, India had been dependent on other countries for launch vehicles. Indian scientists have now overcome even this shortcoming. April 18, 2001 was a day of pride for the entire country, and especially the scientists led by ISRO Chainnan K. Kasturirangan. GSLV was the biggest rocket that India had ever built. Costing Rs. 125 crore, it could lift a satellite weighing 1.53 tonnes and put it into orbit 36,000 km in space. The satellite matches the speed of the earth's rotation so that it appears still in relation to the earth's movement.

India did not possess a launcher to put the Indian National Satellite System (INSAT) satellites in the orbit. These satellites are used, besides other purposes, for transmission of Doordarshan signals. India had to pay an average of Rs. 300 crores for each launch. Now with GSLV, India would not only save crores of rupees on each launch, but will also compete for a share in the 10 billion US dollar (Rs. 47,000 crore) global communication space business. India thus became self-sufficient in respect of satellite, rocketry and launch vehicle. It means that India was now capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles. Commercially, it means, India was now a more important player in the business of launching satellites worth 10 billion US dollars a year.

NOTES

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7. Ibid.
8. Jasjit Singh, "Extinguishing the Agni", *Indian Express*, 12 December 1996.
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Chapter 9

India and the United Nations

INTRODUCTION

India's foreign policy recognises the United Nations as the humanity's hope for a peaceful and secure world order. The Constitution of India, in Article 51, gives directive to the Government to promote international peace and seek peaceful settlement of international disputes. India endeavours to act on the basis of this basic principle. The United Nations is an organisation of sovereign nations dedicated to the cause of world peace and working for peaceful settlement of disputes and avoidance of war. Faith in the United Nations and cooperation with the world body is an important principle of India's foreign policy. India was a British dependency when it was allowed to become a Member of the League of Nations after the First World War. But India did not have an independent voice. When it was decided by the major Allies during the Second World War to establish a new international organisation, called the United Nations, and not to revive the League, India was still not independent. But, it was invited to send a delegation to the San Francisco Conference (April-June 1945) held to finalise and adopt the Charter of the United Nations. As discussed below two of the Union Republics (without being sovereign) of the erstwhile USSR were also invited to join the United Nations.

A delegation led by Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar represented India in the San Francisco Conference. The delegation took active interest in the deliberations. Sir Ramaswami signed the Charter on behalf of India. When India became independent in August 1947, it voluntarily decided to continue as an active Member of the United Nations. India's commitment to the ideals of the United Nations was expressed time and again, without any reservations. During the first sixty years of the existence of the United Nations, India always fulfilled its obligations, cooperated with all organs of the UN and its specialised agencies, and faithfully discharged such responsibilities as were assigned to it from time to time. These included India's role in peace-keeping in West Asia and the Congo. India has actively cooperated with the UN in all its efforts for disarmament and arms control. However, India refuses to compromise with its basic values, principles and national interest. Before we discuss India's contribution in various spheres, by way of cooperation with the United Nations, a brief explanation of the formation of the United Nations, its objectives and membership will not be out of place. A very brief account of major organs of the UN is also given.

ORIGIN OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is described as the symbol of hope of the mankind. This hope, as a former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold said, is the hope that peace is possible. The United Nations is an organisation of 192 sovereign states. It was set up in 1945 to replace the ill-fated League of Nations. The Allies, who were fighting the Axis Powers in the Second World War to destroy dictatorship and secure democracy for the world, resolved to establish a new world organisation rather than revive the League of Nations. It was in the London Declaration of June 12, 1941 that all nations then lighting against Hitler's Germany announced their intention of working together, with other free peoples, to establish "a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic and social security."

Earlier, President Roosevelt of the United States, in a message to the Congress in January 1941, had spelt out four freedoms as being of universal importance. These were: (a) Freedom of speech and expression; (b) Freedom to worship; (c) Freedom from want; and (d) Freedom from fear. At that time the United States was not at war. It was observing neutrality. The four freedoms and the London Declaration were expressions of the desire of mankind to be free from 'war' and free from 'want'. On 14 August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill issued the famous Atlantic Charter which spoke of the establishment of "a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries," of freedom from fear and want, and the creation of "a wider and permanent system of general security." The principles spelt out in the Atlantic Charter, and the London declaration, were endorsed by the 26 countries who were than Allies, on January 1, 1942 in what came to be known as the United Nations Declaration. This declaration signed in Washington was mainly concerned with war, not peace. It was to emphasise cooperation in an all-out struggle against Axis and to give an assurance to each other not to make peace individually.

The formal decision to establish a new international organisation was taken on October 30, 1943 in the 'Moscow Declaration of Four Nations on General Security'. These four Allies were Britain, China, the United States and the USSR. They announced "that they recognise the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership to all such states, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security". Why was the new organisation created and why was it named the United Nations? The then American Secretary of State Cordell Hull merely stated that it was decided to set up a new organisation. But, the obvious considerations were that the League had miserably failed to maintain peace and had been disgraced and defamed; Soviet Union had been expelled by the League, and the United States had never joined it. As H.G. Nicholas says. "... by 1942, fairly or unfairly, the League reeked with the odour of failure; Russian pride had been mortally offended by the League's condemnation and its subsequent expulsion at the time of the Russo-Finnish war; and in the United States it was generally thought that it would be much better to try to enlist public support for a new organisation than to risk reviving the stale and bitter controversy over American entry into the League."

The title "United Nations" was chosen to emphasise unity among the Allies against the common enemy. The term was coined by President Roosevelt and used in the Declaration of January 1, 1942. Having decided to replace the League by the United Nations, the Allies convened a conference which was held at Dumbarton Oaks (Washington D.C.) in August-September 1944. The Conference was initially attended by Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union and later by Britain, the United States and China. This was done to underline USSR's neutrality in the Far East. The Charter of the United Nations was drafted at Dumbarton Oaks, but no agreement could be reached on certain issues, such as voting procedure in the Security Council and Soviet demand for membership of all its 16 Union Republics, besides itself. These issues were resolved at the Yalta Summit of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in February 1945. The Soviet leader was persuaded to give up his demand for separate membership of 16 Union Republics. It was, however, agreed that, besides USSR, Ukraine and Bylo-Russia would also be members of the UN. The draft Charter was finally adopted at a conference at San Francisco (USA). China and France, along with Big Three, became the sponsors of the Charter. The Charter was signed after two months of deliberations by 50 countries who had attended the San Francisco Conference and Poland who was invited to become an original member. Thus, the United Nation had 51 original Members in 1945. Truman, the new US President, had opened the Conference on April 25, 1945 and he bade the delegate farewell on June 26, 1945. Unlike the League Covenant, the Charter was easily ratified by the US Congress by 89 votes to 2. It was stipulated in Article 110 that the UN would be established after the Charter Was ratified by the five Big Powers (UK, USA, USSR, France and China) and a majority of other signatory states. This having been achieved, the United Nations was formally established on October 24, 1945.

Meanwhile, efforts were initiated to put the organisation "on flesh and blood". This task was assigned to the Preparatory Commission which met in London later in 1945. Between August and November 1945, an executive committee drawn from fourteen countries made certain recommendations which were considered by the Preparatory Commission when it met in London on November 25, 1945. The Commission had to make preparations for convening the first session of the General Assembly. A set of draft rules of procedures was drawn, which was later adopted by the General Assembly almost without any change. The draft rules for the Security Council were adopted by the Council with some modifications. After hectic activity in search of a suitable site, the present site in New York was chosen. The first General Assembly was convened in the Central Hall, Westminster, London on January 10, 1946. The Cold War reflected itself immediately in the choice of the President of the General Assembly. M. Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium was elected by a narrow margin of 28 votes to 23. He defeated Trygve Lie, Foreign Minister of Norway, whose name was proposed by Soviet delegate Gromyko. Subsequently Mr. Trygve Lie was chosen to be the first Secretary-General to head the UN Secretariat. He was supported by a vast majority. He won by 46 votes to 3, defeating M. Simic, Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia. The UN began functioning in London, and later moved to its permanent site.

OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations is "sharing in the name of solidarity". Dag Hammerskjold used this phrase and said that it is a necessity of the mankind; it is not a matter of choice. The mankind's hope and involvement is reflected in the Preamble itself. It says: "We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind do hereby establish an international organisation to be known as the United Nations." Thus, unlike the League of Nations, peoples of the world are source of power of the United Nations. Purposes of the United Nations are stated in Article 1 of the Charter. Briefly, these purposes are: (a) to maintain international peace and security; and with that aim in view to take effective collective security measures, for prevention and removal of threats to peace; (b) to develop friendly relations among nations; (c) to achieve international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems; and (d) to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends. Thus, the United Nations is a necessity for maintenance of international peace, for protection of human rights, and for socio-economic development of the member-states.

Article 2 of the Charter lays down seven principles for the guidance of the UN and its Members in pursuit of the above mentioned purposes. These are: (i) sovereign equality of all the Members of UN; (ii) all Members shall fulfill in

good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter; (iii) peaceful settlement of international disputes so that international peace and security, and justice, are not threatened; (iv) all Members will refrain from threat, or use of force against the territorial integrity of other states; (v) all Members will give all possible assistance to the United Nations, and will not give any help to a country against whom the UN is taking action; (vi) the UN will try to ensure that even non-members act in accordance with the principles of the Charter; and (vii) the United Nations shall not intervene in matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction of the states. These principles sum up the objectives for which the UN was established. Thus, sovereignty of nations is to be honoured, their integrity protected, disputes are to be peacefully resolved, use of force is to be avoided, and no action is to be taken by the UN in matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. All the provisions of the Charter revolve around the above-mentioned purposes and principles. Non-intervention in domestic jurisdiction of states is indicative of emphasis on Member's sovereignty, and consequently a (self-imposed) restriction on the United Nations.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Membership of the United Nations is open to all sovereign, peace-loving states of the world. According to Article 3 of the Charter, the countries who attended the San Francisco Conference, and those who had signed the United Nations Declaration on January 1, 1942 became original Members of the United Nations. The number of such original members was 51. Later, according to Article 4, "all peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter", could be admitted as Members of the UN. Admission of new members is effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. Accordingly, many countries who could not become members in 1945 were later admitted to the membership of the UN. Besides, a large number of countries who were colonies were admitted from time to time as they attained independence. When Soviet Union disintegrated all its erstwhile Union Republics, who became sovereign states, were admitted. Earlier when India was partitioned in 1947, Pakistan was made a Member (India was already a Member of the UN), or when in 1992 Czechoslovakia was partitioned into two, both Czech Republic and Slovakia were allowed to become Members of the World Body. With the completion of the process of de-colonisation and disintegration of the former USSR, the number of members went up to 192. Russia was allowed, in 1992, to replace the former Soviet Union and occupy its permanent seat in the Security Council. Earlier, membership of certain countries like West and East Germany and Japan was delayed for many years on account of cold war politics. Switzerland had voluntarily kept itself out of the UN. It joined as 190th member of the world body.

The question of representation of People's Republic of China had become a subject of serious conflict in the context of the cold war. When the Charter was adopted, and when the UN was initially established, Republic of China had become a founder-member, and as a Big Power, occupied permanent seat in the Security Council. After the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek regime in Chinese mainland, the new government of People's Republic of China sought to replace the Chiang regime's representation in the UN. As the United States refused to recognise Communist China, and as USSR supported the demand of representation of People's Republic (Communist) of China, the issue became involved in the cold war. For sometime, the USSR boycotted the UN bodies. It was during this boycott that North Korea was declared aggressor by the Security Council. After more than 20 years of the establishment of People's Republic, the United States finally agreed not to veto the change in representation of China. In 1971, Republic of China (Taiwan) was removed, and People's Republic of China was allowed to be represented in the UN, with permanent membership of the Security Council.

India consistently supported People's Republic of China in its endeavour to get representation in the United Nations. Besides, India stood for universality of the United Nations and generally voted for admission of new members.

PRINCIPAL ORGANS AND SPECIALISED AGENCIES

A brief mention of principal organs of the UN and its specialised agencies will not be out of place, though it could have even been avoided in this chapter on India's role in the United Nations. Six principal organs created by the UN Charter are: The General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. The General Assembly being a plenary organ consists of all the (192) Members of the United Nations. The General Assembly meets at least once a year, and can discuss any matter within the scope of UN Charter, and may make recommendations to the Members, or to the Security Council or direct the Secretary-General. It elects non-permanent members of the Security Council and has other electoral functions and functions related to international peace and cooperation. The Security Council consists of 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent members. The Security Council has the primary responsibility of maintenance of international peace and security. It performs important functions in the areas of pacific settlement of international disputes, initiates collective security measures and organises UN peace-keeping activities. The Economic and Social Council consists of 54 members elected by the General Assembly. It is responsible for socio-economic cooperation in the world. The ECOSOC coordinates the activities of several specialised agencies. The Trusteeship Council was responsible for supervision of management of trust territories. These territories were either former mandates or new trust territories detached

from Japan and Italy after their defeat in the Second World War. With the process of de-colonisation having been completed the Trusteeship Council has ceased to meet. International Court of Justice is the judicial organ of the UN. It is made up of 15 judges elected from as many different countries. These eminent jurists, as judges of ICJ, seek to find just and fair solutions to legal disputes brought to the Court. It interprets international law. It also has advisory jurisdiction and gives advice on matters of law to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council. The Secretariat is the permanent office of the UN. It comprises a Secretary-General and such staff as the organisation may decide to have. The Secretary General is elected normally from a small Power and is head of the international civil service. He acts as the Secretary-General in General Assembly as well as in the Security Council. He often brings disputes to the notice of the Security Council, and performs numerous political functions assigned to him by the two principal organs. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was denied a second 5-year term in the end of 1996, though earlier incumbents were given this privilege. Ghana's diplomat, and already a senior officer of the Secretariat, Mr. Kofi Annan was elected Secretary General in 1997 and several for ten years. He was succeeded in 2007 by Mr. Ban Ki–moon of South Korea.

The UN has several specialised agencies. These include: (i) Specialised Agencies concerned with technical matters, viz. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), World Metrological Organisation (WMO), Universal Postal Union, and International Telecommunication Union; (ii) Agencies engaged in social and humanitarian activities include International Labour Organisation (ILO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), World Health Organisation (WHO),' and Food and Agriculture Organisations (FAO); and (iii) Agencies that tackle international financial problems. These include International Monetary Fund, International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and International Development Authority (IDA). India cooperates with most of these agencies and receives help and assistance from many of them. Three such prominent bodies are UNICEF (Children's Fund), the United Nations Population Fund and the UN Development Programme.

INDIA'S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

India has actively cooperated with various principal organs and specialised agencies of the United Nations. India has served a number of 2-year terms as a non-permanent Member of the Security Council. India's Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit was elected as President of the eighth session of the UN General Assembly. The grace and dignity with which she conducted the proceedings of the General Assembly received all-round acclaim. India's association with the Economic and Social Council is almost permanent and it has offered such assistance in numerous social-economic activities as it is capable of. Eminent

Indian jurists, such as B.N. Rau and Nagendra Singh, have served with distinction as judges of the International Court of Justice. Dr. Nagendra Singh was also President of the Court. Various specialised agencies have helped India overcome shortages and solve problems such as of health, malnutrition, food, child care etc.

Commenting on India's commitment to the UN ideals, Charles H. Heinsath and Suljit Mansingh wrote: "... after independence, the Charter became Nehru's most consistent criterion for judging international conduct and a compendium of ideals to which his Government could subscribe. He felt that if there was hope in the world for a new dispensation that might lessen conflict and promote international justice, it might lie in the reconstructive efforts that the UN could undertake". Nehru's faith in the United Nations and its reconstructive efforts remained the underlying principle of India's policy towards the United Nations, and seeking solution to various international problems through this organisation. A brief discussion on India's contribution to the UN efforts is given below.

The issue of membership of several newly independent countries was one of the earliest issues that attracted India's concern. India fully supported the cause of admission of those sovereign states which were being denied admission. Their membership was being blocked, in the context of Cold War, by one Super Power or the other. These included Japan and a number of socialist countries. India led a group of developing countries whose support proved valuable in getting 16 countries admitted in 1956. India forcefully pleaded for representation of Communist China in the United Nations. The question of Chinese representation remained unresolved from the end of 1949 till October 1971 when finally the US allowed the expulsion of KMT China and its replacement by the People's Republic of China. India supported Chinese admission even after India was attacked by China in 1962. India argued that China as a large sovereign country could not be logically kept out of the world body.

India pleaded strongly for speeding up the process of de-colonisation in Asia and Africa. In such cases as Indonesia where imperial Powers tried to block their independence, India helped build public opinion in favour of independence and quick de-colonisation of Afro-Asia.

India came out strongly against the maintenance of colonial system. Prime Minister Nehru had argued that colonialism had to disappear so that the world could achieve peace, and "a friendly relationship" could develop between Asia and Europe. He believed that colonialism was obsolete in the contemporary world. Under Nehru's leadership "India decided to create a historic process which, by the very fact of India's independence, was known to be well under way." The first major campaign that India initiated in the United Nations was aimed at forcing the Government of the Netherlands to give up its control over Indonesia. The attention of the Security Council was called by India and Australia, ' under Articles 34 and 39 of the Charter, to the fighting which had broken out in July 1947 between the Netherlands and Indonesian nationalist forces. Although the Government of the Netherlands sought to invoke provisions of domestic jurisdiction clause saying that Indonesia was its internal matter, yet the Security Council took up the matter, called for an end to hostilities, and asked the parties involved to settle their dispute by peaceful means. Thus, the Security Council rejected the Dutch Contention that UN did not have competence to deal with the case. The Conference on Indonesia convened by Prime Minister Nehru in New Delhi in January 1949 made significant contribution to the cause of Indonesia's Independence which became a reality by the end of 1949.

India, along with other like minded countries, played a significant role in the release of French colonies of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. India supported the cause of freedom of Cyprus. The Indian efforts in support of national self-determination in the General Assembly resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of a resolution calling upon member countries to recognise the sovereign right of the peoples of non-self governing territories. The resolution against colonialism declared that "all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty, and the integrity of their national territory." By 1960s most of the colonies had achieved independence, and in the remaining areas the process of de-colonisation was nearing completion. As more and more erstwhile colonies emerged as independent states, India played a leading role in bringing them together in the non-aligned movement, which was based on India's policy of non-alignment and was initiated as a movement by Nehru along with Egyptian' President Nasser and Yugoslavia's Tito. Professor Satish Kumar points out that, "The Non-aligned Movement, while articulating the political and economic aspirations of its member states at its various conferences, assumed the role of an organised pressure group in the United Nations". One of its major achievements was the setting up of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Later, it was on the initiative of NAM that the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution (1974) calling for the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

An interesting case that came up in the UN in its infancy pertained to controversy between the United States and other Powers such as Britain, Australia and Canada interested in the Pacific. A number of islands in the Pacific which were made mandated territory after First World War and placed under Japan were now the subject of dispute as the mandatory had been defeated and US was controlling it. While America wanted to acquire these islands as the US Navy was insisting on their outright annexation, Britain proposed and Australia supported that all victorious Powers of Pacific War should be consulted on any trusteeship decision regarding these islands. Australia was keen to acquire islands south of Equator. India was not a member of the Security Council, but UK and Australia demanded that India and New Zealand should also be invited. The US reluctantly agreed. Thus in a matter pertaining to mandates trusteeship India came in the picture. US desire was against "democracy and justice" in the eyes of Canada and New Zealand. They said that US plea was not in conformity with international law. However, India disagreed with other Commonwealth members. Sir Ramaswamy Mudalior taunted: "Law can be very pedantic and that this very pedantry can sometimes bring law into contempt". US was very adamant and it ultimately had its way.

India had cut-off diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1949. The Government of South Africa was not only in the hands of white minority and it denied the majority coloured people their legitimate right to govern, but it also continued to maintain its hold on Namibia (the former German Colony of South West Africa) which was made a mandated territory in 1919. India fully supported the cause of independence of Namibia and co-sponsored resolutions in the United Nations calling upon South Africa to grant independence to Namibia. The freedom fighters of Namibia recognised India's contribution in the cause of their struggle when they finally won their statehood in 1990.

India is a strong supporter of the UN efforts for protection of human rights. Ever since the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948, India has cooperated in implementation of human rights related decisions and resolutions. The two human rights covenants have received India's whole-hearted support. The Constitution of India, enacted in 1949, incorporated most of the human rights either as fundamental rights or as directive principles of state policy. Wherever there is violation of human rights, India has raised its voice against such violation. The human rights violation in South Africa is one such case in which India played a leading role in demanding end of all such violations. India either sponsored or, at least, supported resolutions passed by the General Assembly condemning apartheid in South Africa. Apartheid was declared to be a crime against humanity. South African Government was excluded from the General Assembly since 1974. Mandatory arms embargo was imposed against South Africa in 1976 by a unanimous resolution of the Security Council. Led by the UN, several countries had applied comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa and many did not maintain diplomatic relations with the racist regime. India's role was highly appreciated by Dr. Nelson Mandela who became the fist non-white President of South Africa in May 1994, after an all-party election returned him to power. Thus, India led the movement against apartheid both in the United Nations and outside it. India has constituted its own National Human Rights Commission, chaired by a former Chief Justice of India. This Commission is expected to ensure that there are no human rights violations in India. It also suggests measures to check violations and protect human rights in India.

India has played a consistently positive and energetic role in UN efforts for disarmament and arms control. India stands committed to total nuclear disarmament. India pleaded the cause of disarmament and arms Control in Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee, special sessions of the UN General Assembly and finally in Conference on Disarmament (CD). India had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, but firmly resisted all pressures to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and blocked the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.

India has always actively supported peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. Peace-keeping as a concept, though not spelt out in the Charter, has evolved over the years as an internationally acceptable way of controlling conflicts. UN directed forces have not been used to wage wars, but to control and resolve conflicts between states or communities within states. During the first 50 years of UN existence about 35 peace-keeping operations were organised. These included, in some cases, peace-keeping forces, and in others military observer missions. One of the first assignments given by the UN and accepted by India was Chairmanship of Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) for Korea. It was charged with the custody of the prisoners of war entrusted to its armed forces in 1953. Earlier, in its first action under collective security, the UN Security Council had asked member-nations of UN to resist North Korean aggression against South Korea, and India had responded with a token assistance by sending its army medical units. As Chairman of NNRC, India performed the difficult task of repatriation of the prisoners of Korean War.

India also acted as Chairman of the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Indo-China under the Geneva Agreement of July 1954.

Another important assignment was peace-keeping operations in the Congo by the Indian Independent Brigade during 1960-63. As in case of Korea, the Congolese assignment involved the use of Indian troops. The Republic of Congo (later the Republic of Zaire) became independent from Belgian rule in June 30, 1960. Soon afterwards disorder broke out and Belgian troops were sent 'to protect and evacuate Europeans'. On the Congolese request, the Security Council authorised the Secretary General to provide military assistance to the Congo. In less than 48 hours, UN forces made up of several Asian-African countries began arriving in the Congo. As situation became complex after the assassination of former Prime Minister Lumumba in Katanga province and attempted secession by Katanga, the UN forces at one time reached 20,000 troops. After Katanga was reintegrated in February 1963, phased withdrawal of UN troops began. The role of Indian peace-keepers was greatly appreciated.

Peace-keeping in West Asia after Anglo-French-Israeli aggression on Egypt, over the Suez Canal nationalisation issue, was another case of India's contribution to the UN. Immediately after the cease fire on US Soviet initiative, a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was raised to supervise the observance of cease fire. The UNEF was constituted by a resolution of the General Assembly. Soviet Union, Israel as well as Egypt abstained, as the USSR argued that only the Security Council could set up such a force. The UNEF included contingents from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Brazil, Cambodia, India, Indonesia and Yugoslavia. All of them, like India, were considered neutral in the Suez-related crisis. The UNEF ensured observance of cease fire, evacuation of Sinai area and Gaza Strip from Israel and patrolled the 273-km long Egypt-Israel border.

The strife-torn former Yugoslavia presented a serious challenge to the UN and its ideal of international peace. The break-up of erstwhile Yugoslavia soon after the end of Cold War, and disintegration of USSR in 1991, resulted in unprecedented ethnic conflicts mainly between Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. The Serbs talked of ethnic cleansing and killed large numbers of Bosnians or made them homeless and orphans in over three years of conflict. The United Nations Protection Force for Yugoslavia was constituted in February 1992. It had a difficult task of maintaining peace in erstwhile Yugoslavia. The Force was headed by an Indian Army General. India, as usual, tried to make significant contribution to the cause of peace in the Balkans.

SIXTY YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INDIA

India, as mentioned earlier, was one of the founder-Members of the United Nations. During the sixty year period, since its independence, India has maintained close links with the world body. India has contributed to UN peace-keeping efforts, and has also been a host to several UN agencies. There are country offices of as many as 18 agencies in New Delhi, and they have been working in close cooperation with Government of India as well as some of the non-governmental organisations (NGOs). India's concern for peace has been reflected in her repeated calls for disarmament and complete and comprehensive ban on nuclear and thermonuclear tests, though ironically it has not signed the nuclear non proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1968, on the ground of the treaty being discriminatory in' nature. On the same ground, India refused to endorse the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996.

India itself is a developing country; and has consistently been a strong supporter of the UN activities of development in other developing countries. India is now the second largest donor to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which is the central development funding agency of the

UN System. The maximum funds are donated to UNDP by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

We will briefly deal with some of the major areas of Cooperation between India and the UN System. Gender inequality has been, and still is, a major global problem. As the Beijing Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 1995, noted, "Women comprise about half the world's population, perform about two-third of its work, receive only one-tenth of its income, and own less than one-hundredth of world assets". This is pathetic. The Conference declared, "We reaffirm our commitment to ensure full implementation of the human rights of women and of the girl child as inalienable, integral and indivisible part of all human rights and fundamental freedoms". Over the years, several UN agencies have been supporting programmes to improve the quality of life for women in India, and more than 100 other countries. The most significant contributions for gender equality and mainstreaming women into development have been made by the UN agency UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women). It has been working in association with UNDP and several non-governmental organisations in India. For example SEW A (Self-Employed Women's Association) in India has been dealing with the problem of home workers (domestic help). It has also set up social security schemes for the un-organised women workers. ILO has been supporting both these activities.

An important issue being addressed to in India is to empower women by the Panchayati Raj System. The Government of India, assisted by UNDP and UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund) has initiated massive country-wide training programme to equip about 8,00,000 women members of the Panchayats to manage local government effectively and transform them into effective agents of social change. Once considered "invisible" in the economy, women today are an important percentage of the country's workforce. Women's economic contribution was more accurately reflected in the 1991 census. The agencies such as UNFPA, WHO and UNICEF are working in India in the fields of maternal health, female contraception and populations initiatives.

In India, UNDP implements its largest country programme spending about 40 million US dollars per year in assistance. Its assistance supports activities related to areas such as technology transfer for increased industrial productivity, agricultural development, energy and environment, transport, communication and social infrastructure.

Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has been supporting projects in agricultural sector including support of agricultural education, advance research including modern biotechnologies, hybrid rice production, plant quarantine facilities, integrated pest management, long-term support to desert locust control, and technical assistance to National Dairy Development and for increasing milk production. In the forestry sector, FAO supports forestry research and education. It also assists State Forest Departments on human resource development, and to meet the objectives of forest conservation and management. FAO was supporting in 1995 the implementation of 48 projects, including 27 UNDP funded projects. It organises recruitment of Indian specialists for F AO assignments in other countries, and placement of fellows from other countries for training in Indian institutions. FAO has made very valuable contribution in helping India in boosting of agricultural production in the country. As against production of only 50 million tonnes of food grains in 1950, the country had achieved a record production of 189 million tonnes by 1994-95. India now ranks second in the world in wheat and rice production and first in the production of ground nuts. There has also been remarkable progress, thanks to FAO, in the production of sugar cane, cotton, poultry, milk, fish, vegetables and fruits. This has been made possible through introduction of new technologies in the field of agriculture.

But, in spite of impressive growth, India's food grains output cannot feed its population reaching nearly 1 billion people. According to an estimate nearly 300 million people in India are unable to buy sufficient food to satisfy minimum calorie requirements. Therefore, agriculture development in India has to deal with three basic issues namely, meeting national food requirements, reversing resource degradation and poverty alleviation of its rural population. The World Food Programme of the UN has given assistance for "food for work" programme which helps the lowest-paid workers on large intensive government projects. The World Food Programme (WFP) has enabled economically poor people in rural India to improve their own living conditions while participating in the overall development of the country.

Another agency that has an important mandate is the World Health Organisation (WHO). It directs and coordinates international health work within the family of the United Nations. The WHO has divided itself into six regional offices. Its South-East Asia Regional Office situated in New Delhi promotes health care in 10 countries including India, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. In this region small pox has been eradicated as part of global programme. There are no longer sweeping epidemics like cholera, plague and malaria. With the active support of WHO, India has aimed at health for all by 2000 A.D. It has taken up massive programme to control and fight HIV/AIDS problems. India remains a very active, strong and special partner of WHO. A number of Indian specialists are serving as member of WHO Advisory Panels, Boards and Global Committees. A large number of foreign fellows continue to receive training in Indian medical institutes.

The World Food Programme (WFP) has been described as the food aid arm of the United Nations. In India, WFP has been supporting the government in handling the problems of poverty, hunger, malnutrition and illiteracy by

directly helping the poor, the tribals, women and children. Almost all the beneficiaries of WFP projects live in remote rural areas. India had received by 1995 the commitment for assistance worth about one billion US dollars. WFP assistance to India concentrates on three major sectors. They are: (a) tribal development through forestry: (b) integrated child development; and (c) rural development through irrigation, settlement and inland fisheries. The WFP had begun its mission to eradicate hunger in 1963. Food aid is of particular significance to women who are mainly concerned with bringing up the children.

The United Nations Fund for Population Activities (WFPA) established in 1969 works under the guidance of the ECOSOC. It is the largest international funded source of population assistance world-wide. It helps various governments in designing and implementation of their population programmes. UNFPA has supported India in population activities since 1974. During the 1991-95 period its programme in India, providing assistance of nearly 90 million US dollars was (i) upgrading the capacity as well as the quality of health and family welfare services in states with high birth, death and infant mortality rate; (ii) increasing self-reliance in production of contraceptives, (ii) to help strengthen and intensify information and awareness in support of population programmes; (iv) consolidating achievements in population education; and (v) enhancing women's status by improving their literacy, promoting employment and income generating opportunities in selected areas. The major thrust of UNFPA in India is reproductive health including family planning and sexual health. Its programme includes emphasis on gender equality and empowerment of women.

An area directly related with population activities is the child care. The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF — originally called UN International Children's Emergency Fund) has a unique mandate to work on behalf of children on the basis of need and without discrimination. It was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 1965. The work of UNICEF is based on the premise that all children have rights, and that it is the legal obligation of state and society to ensure that these rights are actually enjoyed. The Convention on the Right of the Child adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989 provides for legal and moral framework for UNICEF's work for children. The Convention has been ratified by most of the Members of the United Nations. India ratified the convention in 1992, and a former cricket captain Ravi Shastri was later appointed UNICEF's National Ambassador for Children. The Articles of the Convention on the Rights of the child have now become basis of UNICEF's work in India. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) now supports and funds in India programmes for children in primary health care, water supply and sanitation, primary education, nutrition and child development. UNICEF is seeking ban on child labour, particularly in the case of carpet industry which is highly injurious to the health of child workers.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is an important specialised agency of the UN system. It is mainly concerned with education. In the field of science and technology, UNESCO seeks to respond to the needs expressed by Member-states. It recognises importance of communication for development. It also ensures translation of certain master pieces of world literature and recording of traditional music from all regions of the world. The New Delhi office of UNESCO covers 11 countries of South and Central Asia including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Maldives, Nepal and Myanmar. In the field of education, *Learning without Barriers* is a major step taken to help lower the barriers to education and to create an open flexible learning environment. UNESCO office in New Delhi has given special attention to education of girls and women, distance education and open schooling. It provides funds and assistance for the preservation of tangible and intangible heritage to protect the Indian culture.

The Constitution of UNESCO declares that, "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." It is with this aim in view that the UNESCO concentrates on proper education for all round development of personality of the children as well as adults. To achieve Education for All (EFA) in India, more than 20 million children in 6-14 age groups (of whom 60 per cent are girls) must be reached by the end of twentieth century. To achieve this aim, UN agencies including UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, UNICEF and the World Bank are assisting India in her efforts to reach her literacy and education targets.

Humayun's Tomb and the Qutab Minar in Delhi are among the sites which have been included in UNESCO's World Heritage List. Another unique project which addresses the interface between development and culture aims to assist the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts in demonstrating "how fragments of the cultural past can be recreated," to promote interrelationships between culture, environment and development.

The UNESCO is committed to help India and other developing countries to ensure that education reaches all, and particularly the girl child. As an Algerian reformer A Ibn Badis had said, "Teach a boy and you will train one individual. Teach a girl and you will train the whole nation." It is with this ideal that the UN system in India has been working for education for all, and gender equality especially in the field of education and employment.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) established in 1944 as part of Bretton Woods regime now has about 180 members. It seeks to ensure exchange stability and orderly exchange arrangements among member countries. In addition, lately it has widened its scope and tries to establish a dynamic world economy. The IMF provides financial assistance to countries experiencing balance of payment difficulties. India has been a member and beneficiary of

IMF since 1945. IMF supported the stabilisation and structural reform programme that India embarked upon in 1991 with the aim of liberalisation of economy. India, thus, tried to become an active participant in worldwide economic changes, opening up, accepting foreign investment and promoting market economic forces to operate freely. In 1994, India accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the Fund's Article of Agreement, which imposes restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions, or to engage in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices without the approval of International Monetary Fund. This obligation was severally criticised by certain elements within the country.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is another agency of the UN. Its aims are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and development of international air transport. India is a member of ICAO, which establishes regional air-navigation plans; creates standards and helps with aviation security; streamlines customs, immigration and public health formalities; and drafts air-law conventions.

Thus, these and other agencies of the United Nations are working in cooperation with the Government of India. It is a two-way cooperation. India has full faith, as a matter of policy, in the United Nations and its objectives, aims and goals of international peace and security, peaceful settlement of disputes, all-round social and economic development and prevention of such vital projects as population activity, education and health for all, food and agricultural growth on scientific lines and welfare of women and children. India has always cooperated with numerous activities of the UN and its agencies. In return, India has greatly benefited from numerous agencies and funds provided by such bodies as UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, IMF and the World Bank.

INDIA AND PROPOSED RECONSTITUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council may be described as a small executive body of the United Nations. Its original membership of 11 (5 permanent and 6 elected for two-year term) was raised to 15 in 1963 without changing the permanent membership.[2] Since 1963, membership of the United Nations has substantially gone up. In view of end of the Cold War, disintegration of the USSR, and enlargement of membership (192 in 2007), it has become necessary to restructure the Security Council, even if the entire Charter is not thoroughly revised. It is also necessary to revise the provisions pertaining to voting procedure in the Security Council. The power of veto enjoyed by five big Powers, who are permanent Members, should be modified to make the Council more democratic. Various suggestions have been made for restructuring the Security Council and reviewing its procedures.

It was suggested by the UN Secretary-General Dr. Boutros-Ghali in August 1992 that five more countries be made permanent members. The countries suggested by him were: India, Brazil, Germany, Japan and Nigeria. He made this suggestion after Japan informed the US and other countries that it should be given a permanent seat in the Security Council within next three years. Immediately after that, German Foreign Minister declared his country's intention to stake its claim to a permanent seat. Meanwhile, India made a call to make the UN more effective and democratic. Syria's Vice-President supported India's call in August 1992, and even suggested scrapping off the veto power. He argued that the Council was not properly representative as Asia having half of world's population had only one country, China, as permanent member.

The then Prime Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao reiterated the need to expand the Security Council, because he said, "... any interpretation of the UN Charter or action by the Security Council must be heard in collective will and not the predilection of a few." India formally made its claim for a permanent seat in September 1992. Since then the issue has remained open. India felt that besides economic potential and military power, the size and population of a country as well as its standing in the region must be given due weightage while deciding on increase in the permanent membership of the Council.

India did not agree with the contention that expansion of the Security Council would affect the efficiency and effectiveness of the Security Council. A resolution moved by India seeking equitable representation on, and increase in, the membership of the Security Council was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1992. Although it is generally recognised that the Security Council's composition and its procedures require revision, most of the beneficiaries of the present arrangement are not enthusiastic about the proposal. Neither UK, nor France nor China showed much enthusiasm for expansion of the Security Council. By late 1993, the United States had reluctantly agreed to permanent seats being given to Germany and Japan, the two emerging economic giants. But, there is not much support for India's move for a permanent seat.

There are grounds on which permanent seats are suggested for India, Brazil and Nigeria in addition to Germany and Japan. India having 16 per cent of world's population is a strong case for permanent seat. Besides, it has an important standing in South Asia and it has now become a nuclear weapon state. Both Brazil and Nigeria have big size and are important regional powers of Latin America and Africa respectively. Brazil has 2.8 per cent of world's population, and 2 per cent of world's people live in Nigeria. "Apart from population and regional standing," according to Professor Satish Kumar, "the qualification that should entitle India to a permanent seat in the Security Council is its consistent role in promoting the purposes and principles of the UN Charter."[3] However, the main obstacle in India getting a permanent seat is America's unwillingness to recognise it as a nation to get such a position.

India has been able to acquire enough power to be able to influence international politics. Despite having so many factors of power India is still far from being a powerful nation.

The Government of India argued in late 1996 that because of our principled stand on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, India is being punished. During foreign policy debate, Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral said in the Lok Sabha in December 1996, that India was being denied membership of the Security Council for "defiance" on CTBT. But no country has been elevated to the status of permanent member. The expansion of Security Council and revision of its procedures for making it more democratic is pending consideration. The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, during a visit to Japan in May 1997, fully supported the Japanese claim for a permanent seat in the Security Council. But, no such support was extended to India. In fact, an important section of enlightened public opinion feels that rather than asking for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, India should prove itself so important that the international community seeks India as a permanent Member of the Security Council.

New developments took place during 2005-06 in regard to reforms in the United Nations, particularly in respect of enlargement of the Security Council. A group of four aspirants was informally put together. The four countries, known as G-4, included Brazil, Japan, Germany and India. An African aspirant Nigeria was not included in this group. They moved a resolution in 2005 in the UN General Assembly for enlargement of the Council and to include these four countries as permanent Members in addition to the existing five. The resolution was not pushed for voting as the US did not express itself in its favour, and China was surely against it.

Earlier in 2004, Secretary-General Kofi Annan had appointed an international panel to suggest reforms. The Panel gave two options in its report. It suggested as first option that the number of permanent members, without veto, may be raised by six and three seats may be added in the category of non-permanent members. Thus, there would be addition of 7 countries to the existing 15-member Council. The alternate proposal or the second option was the creation of the new category of 8 members elected for four-year renewable term. This would not give them the status of permanent members, though they may always be re-elected. In addition one non-permanent member may be added. This would mean 9 total seats to be added to the existing 15-member Council. In the second option there would be 5 (existing) permanent members, 8 semi-permanent members and 11 non-permanent members. None of the two options provided for veto power for the new permanent or semi-permanent members. The Panel, thus, did not support (even in first option) veto power for the new permanent member. This was not acceptable to the countries when then constituted the G-4.

Reacting to the above proposal, India's ambassador to the UN, Nirupam Sen said that this would not satisfy the vast majority of countries or it would not bring about structural changes in the system. The G-4 went about creating world opinion in favour of addition of 4 countries with veto power, and non-discriminatory 9 permanent members. The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice indicated that the US did not share India's enthusiasm about Security Council reforms.

The efforts of India, Brazil, Germany and Japan were supported by a large number of UN members. But, another group emerged which opposed India's aspirations. The "Coffee Club" as it was called was led by Pakistan and Italy. It comprised of 40 out of 192 members. A meeting convened by Coffee Club in July 2005 was attended by 119 members, while a similar meeting convened by G-4 was attended by 150 countries. The Pakistan-led Coffee Club tried to convince the members that it did not want inclusion of any new permanent members. It favoured only addition of non-permanent members.

During a visit to India in 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao agreed that India deserved to play a bigger role in the UN. Yet, its opposition to Japan being made a permanent member created a situation to block the efforts of G-4. But if Japan and other members of G-4 can muster the support of 2/3 of UN members, China may not be able to exercise its veto.

Surprisingly, the Russian President Putin, while supporting India's candidature for permanent membership, threw cold waters on new members getting veto power. A joint statement issued by Manmohan Singh and Putin (2005) had declared that, "The Russian Federation reaffirmed its support to India as a deserving and strong candidate for the permanent membership in the expanded UN Security Council." However, in a press conference in New Delhi President Putin asserted if tools like Veto power were diluted, the UN would lose its weight and would become into some kind of a discussion club. He was not categorical about India as a veto-enjoying power, Meanwhile, in 2005, just before George Bush and Manmohan Singh signed the famous statement of July 18, for civilian nuclear cooperation, the US representative Shirin Tahir-Kheli told the General Assembly (that was debating resolution of G-4) that the US did not think that any proposal to expand Security Council should be voted at that stage. In view of this stand of the US, the G-4 did not insist on voting on its resolution. Thus, in mid 2007 the reforms remained in the cold storage.

NOTES

1. Satish Kumar, 'Towards a Stronger and More Democratic United Nations: India's Role, in *International Studies*, JNU, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 185
2. Amendment effective since 1965.
3. Satish Kumar, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

Chapter 10

India and the SAARC

INTRODUCTION

The setting up of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) marked the beginning of regional cooperation in South Asia. It has been described as one of the most important developments of 1980s in this region. Its establishment is backed by the concept of regional integration, which has been defined by Earnest Hass as the "process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new larger centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing nation-states." This is a process that links several nations of a region in collective decision-making system. Joseph Nye has said that the process of integration implies recognition of mutual obligations and common interests. Both at the societal and political levels human relationships have generally been in conflict.

International relations are dominated by conflict which is a regular phenomenon. Conflicts tend to perpetuate. Even cooperation, the opposite of conflict, is often aimed at securing advantage in a situation of conflict. "This phenomenon of conflict", says B.A. Prasad, "had been vitiating all the endeavours for universal peace and harmony — manifesting itself either in the form of national animosities leading to war and destruction or intra-state violence... fed on parochial tendencies." The conflicts are largely responsible for halting the developmental processes, which in turn leads to impoverishment of the people. Therefore, the remedy for conflict lies in substituting it with cooperation. Regional organisations enable nation-states in a particular region to minimise their conflicts and promote cooperation. The process of regional integration is translated into institutional framework through the regional organisations.

Cooperation among states is promoted by common factors which may be geographic, ethnic, linguistic, religious, civilisational, politico-historical or socio-economic. The greater the interaction, the better are the chances of success of cooperative endeavours. The South-Asian region certainly has commonality of above-mentioned factors, with minor variations. Explaining the commonality of factors of regional cooperation in South Asia, B.A. Prasad wrote:

> Geography had obviously intended the epical *Bharata Khanda* or the *Jambu Dweepa* to be one physical entity. Even in the ethno-linguistic and religio-civilisational terms the region has innumerable common strands causing the mosaic of a supra-nation, owing to inseparable admixtures. Their distinct origins or puritanical patents are neither distinguishable nor material. The entwining communication technology .... would suffice in times to come to psychologically further integrate the peoples of this region.

These factors have existed for a long time, but the concept of regional socio-economic and political cooperation is of recent origin. In South Asia it was only in 1977 that the idea of a regional organisation was first floated by the then Bangladesh President Zia-Ur-Rehman. Several regional organisations in different parts of the world had already come into existence and were working fairly satisfactorily. These included the Organisation of American States (OAS) set up in 1948, the Arab League established in 1945, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) set up in 1967, and the European Union (EU). The European Union in its present form was established in 1993. It evolved from the six-nation European Coal and Steel Community created in 1952. This 25-member union is the most perfect and effective of all regional organisations.

Article 52 of the Charter of United Nations provides for regional organisations. It permits "the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action..." provided they are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Some of the regional organisations established after Second World War were of the nature of military alliance. These included North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) (1949), South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) (1954), the Inter-American Defence System (1948), the Australia-New Zealand-United States Pact (1952), CENTO (1959) and Warsaw Pact. All, but last, were controlled by the United States of America and, in the context of Cold War, were meant to protect member countries from communism. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, was to provide security to socialist states led by the USSR against "imperialist and capitalist" West. In addition to defensive organisations, number of functional organisations are also now in existence. These include European Union, ASEAN, APEC and SAARC.

Origin of SAARC: The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in December 1985 at a summit of seven heads of states or governments, of South Asian countries, held at Dhaka. Initiative for SAARC was taken in 1977 by the then President of Bangladesh Zia-Ur-Rehman.

"It was with the yearning to bring some measure of stability and peace, and to improve the subhuman conditions of eternal poverty and misery" of new born Bangladesh that President Zia-Ur-Rehman mooted the idea of regional cooperation in the immediate surroundings. It has been argued that compulsions of domestic conditions of economic chaos made Zia-Ur-Rehman suggest a regional organisation for economic cooperation. According to Lt. Col. K.S. Ramanathan (Retd.), "It was perhaps his logic that combination with other tiny nations and Pakistan forming ring on the top, and Sir Lanka at the bottom, will ensure a better bargaining strength and moral justification."[2] India and Pakistan, the two major actors of the region, were initially reluctant to join. Zia's proposal found ready acceptance by Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. But, Pakistan felt that an association where India would play a major role was not in its interest. The feeling in Pakistani circles was that India would dominate by sheer weight and size of everything — land, economy, military, industry, power, infrastructure, science and technology. Pakistan's attitude has always been "Never say yes to India". India is a giant among lilliputs. However, India wanted to avoid playing a 'local big brother'. India also had a lurking doubt that the principle of bilateralism, which it had so zealously guarded, may lose its significance and the forum may be used to raise bilateral issues which would be against the principle of regional cooperation. However, reluctance of both India and Pakistan was soon overcome by the desire for social, economic and cultural cooperation within the region.

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Maldives were the seven original members of the SAARC. Gunnar Myrdal had said about South Asia in 1968, "There is a similarity in the basic economic conditions of the South Asian countries. All are very poor, in general, the largest are the poorest ... All have endured a long period of stagnation ... and the levels of living of the masses are either lower or not substantially higher today than they were before the Second World War."[3] This unfortunate situation has largely remained unchanged, though with economic liberalisation since 1991 future appears to be brighter. In 1994, according to the Human Development Index, covering 173 countries, India ranked 135 and Pakistan 132 in terms of human development. This is pathetic. There has been growing realisation that cooperation at regional level can go a long way in areas such as poverty alleviation. Lack of cooperation can perpetuate economic misery in spite of liberalisation.

Inspired by the then President Zia-Ur-Rehman, who had mooted the idea of SAARC while touring India, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka in 1977, the Government of Bangladesh circulated a working paper, titled "Regional Cooperation in South Asia," advocating regional cooperation in economic, technical, scientific, social, cultural and educational fields. It was circulated in 1980 and it suggested that meetings at Foreign Secretary-level should examine prospects of regional cooperation. From 1977 to 1981 consultative and preparatory work had been done. The proposal was formally submitted to concerned governments in May 1980 by President Rehman. The first meeting of Foreign Secretaries was held at Colombo in April 1981. It was followed by six more such meetings in other capitals. Foreign Ministers of seven countries also held a number of meetings, before the Dhaka Summit.

An Integrated Programme of Action (IPA) was adopted in 1983 at Foreign Ministers meeting in New Delhi. The Programme was announced through the New Delhi Declaration. During negotiations, leading to Dhaka Summit (1985), it was agreed that SAARC would actively try for greater regional cooperation on the basis of sovereign equality of states, protection on the basis of territorial integrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. The cooperation was likely to grow in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Initially eleven areas of regional cooperation were identified. They were: telecommunication, meteorology, transport, shipping, tourism, agricultural research, joint ventures, market promotion, scientific and technological cooperation, educational cooperation and cultural cooperation these areas were quite vast to promote cooperation and seek regional unity.

The spade work for launching the SAARC was completed (after New Delhi meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1983) in the Foreign Ministers meetings held at Male in July 1984, and Thimpu in May 1985. It was decided to hold a summit of seven South Asian countries at Dhaka on December 7-8, 1985. The summit was presided over by Bangladesh President General H.M. Ershad. India was represented by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The other heads of states who attended Dhaka summit Included President (Gen.) Zia-Ul-Haq of Pakistan, President J.R. Jayawardene of Sri Lanka, Kings of Nepal and Bhutan and President M. Abdul Gayoom of Maldives. The Dhaka Summit was held in a very cordial atmosphere. Sri Lanka's President Jayawardene praised .the role of Late Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the establishment of SAARC and promotion of regional cooperation, despite tensions and bilateral disputes. Jayawardene went to the extent of suggesting that Rajiv Gandhi should be requested to lead the Association. A 10-point Charter of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was adopted, and SAARC was formally launched.

It was decided, and incorporated in the Charter, that bilateral issues or disputes shall not be raised or discussed in the SAARC fora. Secondly, it was agreed to establish a permanent Secretariat of the organisation. Its details were to be worked out by the Foreign Ministers. The Secretariat was temporarily located in Dhaka and Mr. Abdul Hasan was chosen as the SAARC Secretary-General. The Foreign Ministers later decided to establish the permanent Secretariat at Kathmandu (Nepal), where it now functions.

Objectives and Principles of SAARC: The Charter of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has spelt out the following main objectives of the organisation:

(a) to promote the welfare of peoples in South Asian countries, and to improve their quality of life; (b) to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development; (c) to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance; (d) to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's problems; (e) to promote mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; (f) to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; (g) to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international fora; and (h) to cooperate with other regional and international organisations.

The principles of SAARC, as defined in its Charter are: (i) Regional cooperation through SAARC shall be based on mutual respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs of other states and mutual benefit; (ii) Such cooperation shall not be a substitute for bilateral and multilateral cooperation, but shall complement them; and (iii) Such cooperation shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multi-lateral obligations. Thus, the emphasis is on regional cooperation without interference, either in bilateral or multi-lateral obligations, and without disregarding sovereign equality or challenging territorial integrity and independence of all its members.

Institutional Framework: The institutional framework of SAARC is based on direct involvement of heads of states or governments, foreign ministers and foreign secretaries of all the Member-Nations. At the lowest level there are a number of technical committees which are constituted for implementation of programmes and determining areas of cooperation along with all their financial and administrative implications. The technical committees are made up of officials and experts from various Member-countries. They submit their reports to the Standing Committees. Next, there is a Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries. It meets at least once a year; but may meet more frequently. The Standing Committee monitors coordination, mobilises resources and identifies new areas of cooperation of the Foreign Ministers and the Summit. It reviews the work of all the technical committees, receives their reports and considers them. It issues guidelines for effective working of the technical committees. Next the Foreign Ministers constitute a Council of Ministers, or Foreign Minister's Conference. It generally meets twice a year, though at least one meeting a year is mandatory. It reviews the progress of regional cooperation and grants political approval to the recommendations of the Standing Committee. The Foreign Ministers prepare agenda for the summit and finalise measures to be discussed and declarations to be adopted by heads of states or governments in their annual summit. Lastly, at the highest level are the annual summits of Heads of States or Governments. The summits are held in different countries, and they consider reports of the Foreign Ministers. The summits have political significance as they are the highest forum of South Asian regional cooperation. The financial resources are provided by member-countries.

After the end of Cold War, the single most critical problem faced by the world is that of development and underdevelopment. Thus, East-West divide has been replaced by the divide between rich and developed North and the poor and developing South. South Asia is an important region of the developing South. As Prasad rightly concludes, "In the wake of the Cold War conflictual dynamics the concept of regional cooperation is now flourishing." Dealing will the value of regional cooperation in South Asia, Nancy Jetley says: "The South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), marked the first regional effort to rise above residual prejudices and mistrust in order to evolve a positive framework of cooperative economic development to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia."[4] No other region in the world is more underdeveloped than South Asia, and none has more poverty and exploding population. At the same time no other region has comparable commonality in terms of geography, civilisation and ethno-linguistic affiliations. Yet, South Asia was the last of regional entities to have opted for regional economic cooperation. But, even this late effort seems to be floundering as it is difficult to ensure that Pakistan abides by the Charter of SAARC which prohibits discussion of bilateral issues in the SAARC, or as Professor Shanti Swarup says, to reconcile the often "irreconcilable nationalistic egos" of India and Pakistan. Yet, there are lots of expectations and there is a hope that South Asian countries will overcome their prejudices and work together for prosperity of the region.

Expanding the SAARC: At the time of exploring the possibilities of a regional organisation for South Asia in 1977, a suggestion was made to include, besides the seven who constitute SAARC, Iran, Afghanistan and Myanmar (Burma) as well. However, during eight years that were spent in planning and setting up the SAARC, the opinion centred around India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. After the formal establishment of SAARC in 1985, Afghanistan and Myanmar were sounded to join the Association. India was in favour of Afghanistan joining the SAARC, as it saw in this a support for the then (Pro-Soviet) Najibullah Government, and as a counter-balance to Pakistan's anti-India approach. Pakistan was obviously unhappy about Najib's Afghanistan joining the SAARC. It said that criteria for admission of new members had not yet been worked out. The response from both the countries was not positive. Afghanistan at that time was under Soviet control and Myanmar had a government not favourably inclined to the democratic system of government.

In 1996, Mr. I.K. Gujral, India's External Affairs Minister in Deve Gowda Government, called for the expansion of SAARC by inviting Myanmar in the east and Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics in the West to join the organisation. Gujral himself became the Prime Minister in 1997. It is not easy to expand the organisation on such a large scale. Afghanistan in 1996 was too deeply involved in civil war, and to expect that country to respond to the call of SAARC would be unrealistic. Pakistan has been trying to sell the idea of Islamic Unity to the erstwhile Soviet Republics in Central Asia. and even to Iran. Thus, it may suit Pakistan's strategy to bring these countries in SAARC. But, whether it would be in India's national interest, and whether regional cooperation would actually be promoted is doubtful. Professor S.D. Muni wrote:

Strategicaly, it will free SAARC from its narrow sub-continental focus where South Asia's bilateral tensions, between India and Pakistan, are constraining regional cooperation. The larger size of tile regional community resulting from the inclusion of Central Asian countries may help Pakistan's often self-imposed ideological fixation against a South Asian regional identity. It is true that as a consequence of Central Asia's membership, a number of other volatile issues will be brought to South Asia's attention. This is because Central Asia is exposed to conflicting and powerful forces 'on account of its fragile state structure, rich oil and mineral reserves, burgeoning Islamic identity and strategic proximity to China and Russia.[5]

As for Myanmar it was expecting an early membership of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It did eventually join ASEAN. Once a democratic government was set up in Afghanistan it became possible to invite it to join SAARC. Afghanistan did join SAARC in 2006, thus making it on 8- nation regional association.

INDIA, PAKISTAN AND SAARC

Pakistan's policy of "hate India" is reflected in all its actions. Pakistan refuses to recognise India's secular character, and cannot forget that Jinnah's two-nation theory was responsible for the creation of Pakistan. Communal divide is the basis of Pakistan's policy. It keeps its anti-India propaganda going on the ground that Muslim-Kashmir must not remain a part of India. Pakistan has tried to raise the Kashmir issue at SAARC conferences, jut as it has been trying to bring up this issue in other fora such as Non-aligned Movement and Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings. It even tried to have India censured in the 1994 Conference on Human Rights at Vienna. Indian delegation led by Former Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee convinced the Conference that Pakistan had no case.

The political problems, between India and Pakistan are rooted in differing perception of common past of the sub-continent. This had been vitiating not only Indo-Pak bilateral relationship but also the SAARC framework.

The most important problem between India and Bangladesh was related to the sharing of Ganga waters. Yet, the two countries see the imperative of expanding trade relations between them. SAARC, whose foundation was laid by Bangladesh President, provides a forum to Bangladesh to project itself as a state determined to further the cause of regional cooperation in South Asia.

Nepal's system of government has changed (1990) from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy with a multi-party parliamentary democracy. Nepal's development depends upon how effectively it can profit from the preferential treatment it has received for 200 years from India. Nepal's cooperative relations with India are a great help to the effectiveness of SAARC. While relations between India and Bhutan and India and Maldives have been very cordial, there has been the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka-India relations. India has played a leading role in the development of Bhutan and has received fullest cooperation from the tiny country inhabited by 6 lakh people. When in late 1980s a *coup* was attempted in Maldives, India's timely help rushed to the Island foiled the *coup* attempt. The two countries have maintained meaningful cooperation between them. Sri Lanka has been suffering from violent insurgency. As the ethnic problem is concerned with Tamil-Sinhalese conflict India is naturally concerned with the ending of insurgency so that friendly relations may be revived. This will help consolidate the benefits of regional cooperation.

Encouraged by the bilateral talks between Prime Minister I.K. Gujral and his Pakistani counterpart Mian Nawaz Sharif during Male Summit (1997), the SAARC leadership agreed in principle on a declaration of political cooperation and stability which might be issued at a later date. The idea was that SAARC summits might be used for greater bilateral understanding, without amending the Charter which prohibits taking up of bilateral issues in a formal manner. Releasing the formal resolution of ninth summit, Maldivian President Abdul Gayoom hoped that, "... the aims of promoting peace, stability and amity and accelerated socio-economic cooperation might be best achieved by fostering good neighbourly relations, relieving tension and building confidence" through "informal political consultation." Sri Lankan President Mrs. Chandrika Kumaratunga also lauded the idea of informal bilateral talks on the pattern of Gujral-Sharif dialogue.

FROM SAPTA TO SAFTA

The concept of preferential trading within a group of countries is behind the creation of South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in 1995. It is a stepping stone towards eventual free trade arrangement within South Asia. As early as in 1959 a European Free Trade Area (FFTA) was created by a treaty signed by the United Kingdom, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Portugal, Iceland and Switzerland. The conceptual basis of EFTA was a bloc of countries who would trade among themselves free of custom restrictions. A zero-custom arrangement promotes greater trading, without restriction, within the specific area. A free trade area benefits all the member countries who constitute such an area. In early 1990s, NAFTA or North American Free Trade Area was established to remove trade barriers between the United States of America, Canada and Mexico. It has been realised all over the world that free trading at regional level is in the interest of economies of the countries concerned. SAPTA was established in the hope that by the first decade of 21st century a South Asian Free Trade Area would become a reality where, as P.V. Narasimha Rao, the then Prime Minister of India (1995) said, there would be zero-custom trading in South Asia.

International trading system is facing new challenges. With the emergence of new regional trading blocs across the world, the South Asian countries are faced with a tight position on the export front. According to Professor Vijaya Kathi of Indian institute of Foreign Trade, about 50 percent of world trade was confined in 1996 to the trading blocs and intra-regional trade activity. But, "there has been consistent decline in South Asia's share in the world trade". The 3 billion dollar trade within SAARC region is only 3 percent of its total imports and 4 percent of its total exports, which means that SAARC countries have 97% imports from outside South Asia, and they export 96% to outside this region. This is depressing. In the trading field, South Asia has been described as lagging "behind every other area in the world in constructing explicit, cooperative arrangements." There is a possibility of developed countries imposing new trade restrictions on South Asia. Besides, with the setting up of World Trade Organisation (1995), South Asian countries were likely to face difficulty in having access to the developed world, which had been major trading partners of these countries.

Trading within the SAARC region has become necessary as aid flow slows down. If South Asia does not receive aid as it has been receiving in the past, its economies are likely to be adversely affected. Therefore, "economics of the neighbourhood" can act as foundation stone of building up satisfactory international economic relations. Lack of capital within SAARC region has also posed a serious problem for any meaningful regional cooperation. The bilateral political issues between member-countries, such as Kashmir and sharing of river waters, are hindrances in the path of smooth evolution of trade relations.

A document to set up South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) was signed by the ministers of member-countries on April 11, 1993 during a summit at Dhaka. The initiative for the establishment of SAPTA was taken at the SAARC summit at Colombo in December 1991. This agreement has been described as "an umbrella framework of rules providing for step-by-step liberalisation of trade within the region. It provides for periodic round of trade negotiations for exchange of trade concessions on tariff and related matters." SAPTA contains provisions for favourable treatment to be given to the least developed countries in SAARC region.

A regional seminar held in Kathmandu during 1994 determined certain salient points for SAPTA. These were: (i) SAPTA must be made effective by agreeing to exchange concessions on products with high trade Potential; (ii) sectoral or across the board concessions may be agreed to; (iii) SAPTA will become meaningful if it is agreed to exchange concessions which are deeper than the concessions already available to countries under other multilateral arrangements; (iv) for SAPTA to make a meaningful impact on trade within the region, the non-tariff barriers including transit barriers must be removed, and shipping services introduced where non-existent; and (v) services may be included in the framework of SAPTA for cooperation on a preferential basis.

The SAARC Council of Ministers (Foreign Ministers' Conference) as well as Foreign Secretaries of the seven countries met in New Delhi in December 1995 to complete formalities of the functioning of SAPTA The ratification documents were submitted. It was expected that discussions would soon begin to replace SAPTA by a South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by the beginning of twenty first century. This will mean that trading among the South Asian countries (as in EFTA and NAFTA) will become free from custom restrictions and duties. There will be free flow of goods within SAFTA, if achieved.

Meanwhile, it was essential to effectively implement the already established SAPTA for preferential intra-regional trading. In December 1995, at the New Delhi meeting all SAPTA countries exchanged lists of commodities for preferential trading. India offered a list of 106 items which should enjoy duty concession for preferential trading within SAARC. This list of 106 items is more than three times as large as the list from Pakistan which comprised only 35 items. Nepal offered 14 items, Maldives 17 items, Bhutan 7 and Bangladesh 12 items for trade on preferential rates of duty with other SAARC countries. SAPTA countries are facing two major problems. First, there is vast difference in the number of items notified by different member-countries to be covered for preferential trading. Second, most of the items in most of the lists, exchanged for preferential trading, either do not have a demand in the potential importing countries of the region, or the items are such that they do not have exportable surplus which could be traded within SAPTA, after domestic needs are met and after exports to the developed countries generating hard currencies have been made.

There is yet another problem, but that is essentially of political nature. It relates to the demand by Pakistan and Bangladesh that political disputes between India and these two countries must be resolved before any meaningful economic cooperation can take place. Pakistani Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ali and his Bangla counterpart Mustafizur Rehman both argued in December 1995 meeting that despite their obligations under World Trade Organisation (WTO) they would not be able to respond to India till Kashmir and Farraka disputes were resolved. As already mentioned, SAARC Charter clearly prohibits discussion on bilateral issues, yet surprisingly in 1995 even Nepal and Maldives supported Pakistan's demand that Heads of Government of SAARC states should examine possibility of setting up a consultative machinery at the official level to regularly discuss pending bilateral issues and to evolve possible solutions. This linking up of bilateral disputes like Kashmir with economic cooperation would weaken, rather than strengthen, regional cooperation in South Asia. If SAARC has to succeed it is imperative that all the member countries concentrate on economic development in the entire region, discourage tensions and promote mutual understanding.

India had become a "sectoral dialogue partner" of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1991. This initiated, as former Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit said, "the process of cooperative linkages with this important regional grouping." Sectoral dialogue partnership meant that India was allowed limited cooperation in areas that ASEAN permitted. These areas were culture, tourism and certain categories of trade. In 1994, science and technology were also added. However, in 1995 the fifth ASEAN summit confirmed with India the status of "full dialogue partnership." This would enable India to have multi-dimensional and comprehensive cooperation with ASEAN. However, there was a speculation whether full dialogue partnership would be withdrawn from India if a nuclear test is conducted by us. That did not happen when India became a nuclear weapon state in 1998.

The "full dialogue partner" status should be fully utilised by India. As J.N. Dixit said, "opportunities are of dealing with an economically vibrant market of 360 to 400 million people..." However, ASEAN does not yet have a common agricultural policy, monetary union or common socio-development programme. SAARC itself is going through preliminary stage of evolution as an effective economic unit.

Once SAPTA starts working effectively, the establishment of SAFTA will be facilitated. India's Commerce Secretary Tejindra Khanna said in late 1996 that the free trading in EFTA could be a model for proposed SAFTA whose scheduled framework was between 2000-05 A.D. SAARC had in principle agreed to create a free trade area (SAFTA) but a number of problems will have to be overcome. These problems include issue of trade imbalances and lifting of non-tariff barriers (such as transit restrictions). Pakistan's refusal to grant "most favoured nation" status to India, and demand by smaller economies for level playing field are other issues to be tackled for effective change from SAPTA to SAFTA. Meanwhile, business community led by trade union bodies and chambers of commerce and industry of SAARC countries are keen on an early introduction of free trading in the region. Therefore, as Commerce Secretary Khanna opined it is "the duty of the governments in these countries to facilitate the creation of free trade area in the region."

Government of India's decision to extend several trade concessions to Nepal in 1996 was likely to hasten the process of establishment of SAFTA. These concessions were given with all good intentions and were likely to boost bilateral trade and joint investment in Nepal, which in turn was likely to facilitate SAFTA.

The decision to convert preferential trading (SAPTA) into free trading by establishing a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) between 2000-05 A.D. was given a concrete shape when Male Summit in 1997 formally decided to establish SAFTA in the year 2001. This gave just four years to prepare. President Gayoom denied that it was too ambitious to hope for SAFTA by 2001, by saying that SAPTA had made considerable progress since its inception in December 1995. He admitted that nearly 4000 non-tariff items remained to be accessible, but hoped that it would be possible to cover these items by 2001 so that SAFTA could become a reality. Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral told the Lok Sabha, after the Summit, that the decision on SAFTA was an important step reflecting the growing sentiment among the member countries to consolidate economic interaction at a fast pace. Proper implementation SAFTA had not been achieved even by 2007.

THE SOUTH ASIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND (SADF)

The King of Bhutan had mooted the idea of a South Asian Development Fund at Colombo SAARC Summit in 1991. The idea behind such a fund was to encourage the possibility of giving preference for regional investments in projects in SAARC countries. There was also a need to hold an investment survey to identify production capabilities and export promotion investment projects. The proposal of the King of Bhutan was finally endorsed in New Delhi Summit in 1995.

The South Asian Development Fund (SADF) was formally launched in June 1996. Its aim is to promote projects which will benefit two or more member countries of the SAARC region. The announcement of its establishment was made by Mr. Khairul Huda, Managing Director of Investment Corporation of Bangladesh. Mr. Huda was appointed Chairman of SADF Board. The SADF Secretariat is based in Dhaka. The member countries had donated by June 1996 a total of 5 million US dollars as the initial core capital of the Fund. The highest amount of US $1,605,000 was contributed by India. Pakistan contributed $ 1,192,500, and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka gave $ 567,500 each. Japan promised to provide 500,000 dollars to the fund. The two existing funds — SAARC Fund for Regional Projects and the SAARC Regional Fund — were merged with the SADF. It now has three windows. There is Window for Identification and Development Projects, Window for Institutional and Human Resource Development, and the Window for Social and Infrastructure Development Projects. The Fund for Regional Projects has already identified and recommended 13 projects, mostly large-scale manufacturing projects for different South Asian countries.

Prospects for SAARC: The utility of regional cooperation is now universally accepted. Such cooperation in South Asia is also imperative, particularly because 50% of international trade is now being done at intra-regional level. Besides, a wide' commonality of factors also exists in South Asia. But, the attitude of Pakistan towards India and hostility in Indo-Pak relations is a major stumbling block. It is essential for any meaningful regional economic cooperation that it should be done both at inter-governmental level as well as at people-to-people level. "The former is a prerequisite not only to overcome the state of inertia but also to eschew the 'conflictual dynamics' which alone will dismantle our very own regional version of the 'Berlin Wall' and physically allow people-to-people contacts at the outset and integration in the long run, which alone shall sustain and make this regional endeavour durable."[6]

There are a number of bilateral problems in South Asia. They must not be allowed to come in the way of regional cooperation. Development without detriment to their integrity and sovereignty is in the national interest of all the South Asian countries. It has been said that unlike the G-8 (Group of eight highly industrialised nations), we are P-8 (Group of poor eight of South Asia). We will have to remove the label of P-8. Though poverty is not a sin, yet to perpetuate it and accept it as a curse of destiny is harmful, and we must work for the change. This can be done through systematic development.

The birth of SAARC was not related to bloc politics. "It was considered a basic, inescapable, prerequisite for ensuring better living standards for millions of people ... It was a bold political experiment involving seven nations with different political systems .... It was an honest attempt at self improvement accepting the reality as start point."[7]

Regional cooperation, which is being promoted everywhere, will be immensely useful in South Asia also. South Asian nations can enhance their bargaining power, through SAARC, with the developed North, and reduce their dependence on it. It will also create a new set of equitable relations within themselves in the region. "Being more inward looking, the South Asian nations can exploit the regional resources more effectively in an environment of mutual trust and cooperation."[8] But, bilateral issues are largely responsible for slow progress in SAARC. Besides, there is some sort of hidden fear about India's position in the region. India alone has 72 percent of South Asian territory and about 77 per cent of total population. This enables it to a position of hegemony, though India has no desire to impose its will on smaller neighbours.

Among the conflicts that are creating difficulties in the region are ethnic tensions between Assamese and Bangladeshis, Tamils and Sinhalese and Mohajirs and Sindhis in Pakistan. Besides, these have been serious troubles within Nepal and Bangladesh. These internal conflicts are between democratic and anti-democratic elements in the two countries.

Attempts will have to be made for ethnic and religious harmony. The issue of distribution of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh has been amicably and permanently settled in order to accelerate Indo-Bangla cooperation. India-Pakistan conflict relating to Kashmir and occasional alleged encouragement of terrorism from across the border has been dominating politics in South Asia. A report by the American Republic Party Task Force on terrorism confirmed Pakistani efforts, with some Arab support, to destabilise India. Similar conclusion was reached in the American State Department's annual report for 1994 titled Patterns of Global Terrorism.[9] True spirit of regional cooperation demands fruitful bilateral dialogues to resolve differences and promote development through cooperation. Distrust must be replaced by mutual understanding. There is ample scope of regional cooperation which can go a long way in promoting peace and progress in the entire world. In strengthening SAARC and making it more effective, the most important role has to be played by India. While all bilateral relationships are important, the most important and relevant in the future evolution and success of SAARC would be a rapprochement between India and Pakistan. Then alone SAPTA experiment will succeed, and then alone path for SAFTA will be cleared.

The Ninth summit of SAARC held at Male, the capital of Maldives in May 1997 made a lofty declaration that poverty should be eradicated by the year 2000 A.D. in South Asia, which accounts for nearly one-fifth of total population of the globe and has the largest number of poor in any region of the world. Nobody, however, explained how this gigantic task would be achieved in four years. The Declaration only said that "trade and tariff barriers militating against greater cross country flows" would be gradually reduced. The Summit declared the year 1997 as the "SAARC year of Participatory Governance." The seven heads of state or government at Male also emphasised the need for bringing women into the mainstream of socio-economic development in the region. Besides, concerned about the promotion of child welfare in South Asia, it was decided to launch the SAARC decade of the rights of the child, from the year 2001 to 2010 A.D. The Summit also resolved to combat the nefarious activities such as terrorism and drug trafficking which posed serious threat to security and stability of Member States.

The tenth SAARC Summit was held in 1998 at Colombo. This Summit was held in the background of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998. Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif tried to identify the regional problems that needed to be resolved. The Summit expressed concern at the lack of progress in the direction of custom-free South Asia. However, emphasis has laid on the need to work for greater regional trading. Although the Summit did not have much to its credit, yet the cordial relations that evolved between Vajpayee and Sharif led to the Indian Prime Minister's bus journey and the Lahore Declaration. But, the situation was suddenly altered when Kargil conflict took place, which, it seemed, was being planned when the Indian Prime Minister was still in Pakistan. Later, in October 1999 Army Chief Parvez Musharraf removed Prime Minister Sharif in a military *coup* with the establishment of military rule (for the fourth time in Pakistan), the regional cooperation received a major setback. India took the position that the next SAARC Summit could not take place till democracy was restored in Pakistan.

Eventually India agreed to participate in the eleventh Summit held (after a gap of nearly three years) in early 2002 in Kathmandu. In view of acute tension prevailing between India and Pakistan (the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001) no real progress was made at the Summit. Indian Prime Minister refused to meet the Pakistani leader. Nevertheless, for the sake of formality it was resolved at the Summit that efforts would be initiated to increase trade, strengthen the preferential trading, and hope was expressed for the establishment of free trade area (SAFTA) by 2004. This indeed was impracticable idealistic hope. The next Summit scheduled for early 2003 at Islamabad could not take place as Vajpayee was in no mood to travel to Pakistan. After several efforts to revive the Summit process, it was finally decided at the official level talk (in Kathmandu in the summer of 2003) that the next Summit would finally take place in January 2004 in Islamabad. The twelfth Summit did take place in January 2004. Vajpayee and Musharraf met on the sidelines of SAARC, and a declaration by the two on January 6, 2004 accelerated the place process between India and Pakistan. This was a good development for the future of SAARC also.

Regional cooperation in South Asia will eventually strengthen non-alignment. As Major S.P. Yadav concludes, "It will provide an effective forum to deal with the rest of the world. It will consolidate the common desire to live and let live, strengthen the friendship, reconcile or minimise differences, and safeguard their independence and sovereignty. It will be the beginning of a new economic and political order in South Asia."[10] There is no truth in the fear that India will dominate or establish its hegemony. In fact regional cooperation is as much in India's national interest as in others'. It will hasten development and promote political understanding.

It is unfortunate that while the entire world is engaged in globalisation, and setting up and strengthening regional economic groupings, the SAARC set up in 1985 has made such little progress that doubts were being expressed in early 21st century whether the Association would survive in view of Indo-Pakistan stand off. Lack of real democracy in Pakistan and constant promotion of cross-border terrorism are not conducive to any meaningful cooperation in South Asia. India's External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha had said in January

2003 that India was ready for free trading "right from tomorrow", but that required end of terrorism, increase in investment and creation of mutual trust. Constant anti-India trade and economic cooperation cannot coexist. While the smaller nations of the region were keen for economic cooperation, the two biggest likely beneficiaries, India and Pakistan, were engaged in constant mud-slinging. India has begun to realise that it would have to look elsewhere for economic cooperation and free trading.

C. Raja Mohan so rightly stated that, "Pakistan has been the slowest camel that has set the pace for the caravan. It has been more interested in bringing its bilateral dispute with India over Kashmir into SAARC's ambit than in trade liberalisation." With the failure of SAARC looming large, India was already strengthening its contacts with the European Union and ASEAN. The EU-India summits and India's status as full dialogue partner of ASEAN and slowly building up of its relations with APEC would certainly benefit. India-ASEAN Summit (2002) paved the way for the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement in Second India-ASEAN Summit at Bali (Indonesia) in October 2003. In addition, India and ASEAN signed an anti-terror convention also (see below).

In addition to the above, the BIMST-EC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation) that began to take shape since June 1997 was poised for an effective take off with the first BIMST-EC Summit proposed for February 2004. India agreed immediately to Myanmar proposal for the Summit, which could put in life in the "sub-regional" grouping as the BIMST-EC is called. In 2003, Nepal enjoyed the Observer status. In 2004 both Nepal and Bhutan were admitted to BIMST-EC. It was hoped that BIMST-EC could fill the gap caused in SAARC by Pakistani attitude. BIMST-EC had chosen members both from SAARC and ASEAN. There was no possibility of Pakistan being association for that would lead this grouping the way the SAARC has been going.

The BIMST-EC, a sub-regional grouping, had been "languishing for want of decision-makers at the summit level. It had started in 1997 at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers, and occasionally there were meetings of the Foreign Ministers. A meeting of Foreign Ministers of members of BIMST-EC held in 2006 proposed 2007 for summit. The BIMST–EC has been described as essentially a Bay of Bengal community. India has developed close links with the European Union, and is rapidly moving towards greater integration with the ASEAN. Although India's desire to join what is known as ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and South Korea) could not materialise, yet its annual summits with ASEAN gave it the unique status of ASEAN + 1.

India has been denied admission to the huge Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Indian Ocean Rim initiative has failed to make any headway, yet India's role in the BIMST-EC evolution and very close association with ASEAN do make up for the lack of effectiveness of SAARC which "has become a prisoner of India-Pakistan feud." In a lead article *The Hindu* (October 7, 2003), made out a case for closer integration with South Eastern countries and go ahead with the Look East Policy, which was once, described by Prime Minister Vajpayee as the "Relook East" policy as India has had traditional friendship with South East Asian countries. According to *The Hindu*, "Being one of the world's better performing economies at this stage gives India an advantage that must be capitalised on in a slow growth world."

India's frustration with SAARC is more than made up by growing India-ASEAN cooperation, as was evident by the three documents signed at Bali and the friendly atmosphere seen at the 2003 Summit (see below).

INDIA-ASEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 2003

India and ASEAN signed three historic agreements during their Second Summit held at Bali (Indonesia) in October 2003. The three agreements were: (i) a framework agreement for a free trade area (India and ASEAN) by 2011, (ii) a joint declaration against terrorism; and (iii) India's accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The Framework FTA has a built in "early harvest programme." It means that, while it will be fully effective by 2011, the exchange of tariff concessions and elimination of tariffs on an agreed list of 105 items will take place within three years between India and six more developed countries of ASEAN namely, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and Philippines. The remaining four countries i.e., Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam will respond within six years, though India would remove tariffs even for these Countries within three years. Total elimination of tariffs will begin by 2011. At the Summit Mr. Vajpayee floated the idea of a broad Asian Economic community, comprising 10 Asian countries, China, Japan, South Korea and India. 'Such a grouping can be a new engine of growth.'

The second document signed at Bali, the joint declaration for combating international terrorism, modelled on an existing accord between the United States and ASEAN, identified the main areas of cooperation as: information exchange, cooperation in legal matters, free cooperation in enforcement matters as well as document and identity fraud. Without going into the "root causes" of terror, it was decided to unitedly fight the evil. As Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal said, "It is reflective of our desire for fostering closer cooperation with ASEAN as well as our determination to cooperate in the maintenance of peace and stability in South-East Asia.

The third document, India's accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was a political step to foster close and comprehensive cooperation between India and ASEAN. It was said to be compatible with the UN Charter as well as the five principles of Panchsheel.

As the Foreign Secretary said, the three documents gave greater content to our "Look East" policy.

AFGHANISTAN JOINS SAARC

The thirteenth summit of SAARC was held in Dhaka in the winter of 2005. The summit reiterated the Association's commitment to enhanced cooperation in the fields like fight against terrorism and promotion of free trade in South Asia. A significant decision taken at Dhaka was to invite Afghanistan to join SAARC. Thus, 20 years after the setting up of SAARC, a decision on its expansion was finally taken. Announcing the decision Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, "We are delighted to welcome Afghanistan to our group. This is an appropriate recognition of the long-standing ties of culture and history that Afghanistan shares with us." For the first time Afghan Foreign Minister attended SAARC Ministerial meet in July 2006.

FOURTEENTH SUMMIT OF SAARC— CALL TO BE ACTION-ORIENTED

The fourteenth SAARC Summit was held in April 2007 at New Delhi. It was attended for the first time by President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan. The 8-nation Summit was also attended for the first time by China, Japan, the United States, South Korea and the Europeans Union as observers. The Summit also decided to give the observer status to Iran.

The Summit Chairman Manmohan Singh announced unilateral liberalization of Visas by India for students, teachers, professors, journalists and patients from SAARC counties. As the largest member of the grouping, India said that it would allow zero-duty access for goods from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives.

The Summit favourably responded to the call of Sri Lankan President Mahindu Rajpakse to make SAARC "action-oriented" rather than remain dependent on rhetoric, and Hamid Karzai's call to tackle terrorism effectively. Sri Lanka also said that it was high time that SAARC adopted a common currency.

The Declaration issued by SAARC leaders emphasised the need to develop a road map for a South Asian Customs Union. It was decided that SAARC Development Fund should be made operational and resources mobilised both from within and outside the grouping. In a strong statement against terrorism, the Summit called for urgent conclusion of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. It was also agreed to work on modalities for effective implementation of existing conventions to fight terrorism.

Two agreements were concluded during the Summit. One provided for setting up a South Asian University in India (it would be set up in Delhi), and

the other for forming a regional food bank. These would go a long way in making the Association active and vibrant. It could be expected that SAARC would come out of its shell and work for a customs union, a single currency, a South Asian University, and that terrorism would be effectively fought and food bank would be of immense help to the people of the region.

NOTES

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6. B.A. Prasad, *op. cit.*
7. Lt. Col. K.S. Ramanathan, *op. cit.*
8. Major S.P. Yadav, 'India's Role in the Future of SAARC', *U.S.I. Journal*, 1994.
9. Quoted in Prasad, *op. cit.*, p. 1371.
10. Yadav, *op. cit.*

Chapter 11

India and the United States of America

Immediately after the termination of Second World War, two erstwhile allies turned foes and gave rise to an unprecedented peace-time tension, called the Cold War. These two former allies were the United States of America and the Soviet Union. While other big powers like Britain and France were fully exhausted and weakened at the end of the war, USA and USSR, emerged so powerful that they came to acquire the status of Super Powers. Both of them developed a bloc of nations each and the world, thus, became bipolar. By 1949 both of them had acquired nuclear weapons. Almost at the same time when the Cold War was gaining momentum, India became free of British imperialism and emerged as a new democratic nation on the political map of the world. India took an instant decision to follow independent foreign policy without aligning itself with any of the two power blocs, in the context of the Cold War. India's policy of non-alignment is based on this basic decision. Thus, India decided to pursue the policy of friendship with all, but permanent alliances with none.

In pursuance of this policy, it was natural that India not only maintained friendly relations with Britain, but also tried to develop cordial relations with both the Super Powers. India and the United States being the two largest democracies were expected to develop very close, friendly and cooperative relations. Generally, the two countries have maintained good relations between them, but there have also been periods of bitterness and virtual hostility. Such ups and downs are natural in the bilateral relations of any two large and self-respecting nations. In this chapter we will briefly examine India's relations with the United States both during and after the Cold War.

For almost five decades, the United States generally did not place Indo-US relations at the level of high priority. The US policy was altered in India's favour during the period of Chinese aggression on India in 1962. For some time, Kennedy Administration adopted pro-India posture. But, the United States always gave primary attention to its own national interests and did not treat

India as an equal nation. This country was generally given low priority by the US foreign policy-makers. The United States found it difficult to appreciate India's approach to international politics, and often dubbed its non-alignment as pro-Soviet policy. Commenting on fluctuating Indo-American relations, Stanley Hofmann had said that of all countries India's relations with the United States have been causing anxiety. He had written that ever since India became independent there have been several tensions in their relations and they often allowed opportunities to go out of their hands. India-America relations have been described as relations of "unfriendly friends".

Similarities and Irritants: India and the United States of America are the two largest democracies in the world. Despite differences in the size of their territories (US being more than double in size) and population (India having more than three times the US population), the two countries have much in common. Their similarities can be easily traced into their colonial past. Both were ruled by Britain, though at different times. The 13 original states of the US were British colonies when they declared their independence on July 4, 1776. They later won their struggle against British efforts to keep the colonies, and set up the United States in accordance with the Constitution that they drafted in 1987 and ratified in 1789.

India had a long history and ancient civilisation when the British first arrived in 17th century as traders and later established their empire. India waged a struggle for its independence against British colonialism and became a sovereign state in 1947. India's Constitution, enacted in 1949 and enforced in 1950, has many similarities with the US Constitution. Both countries are republics, governed by democratically elected representatives of people. Both India and the United States allow freedom to their peoples to elect their rulers in a free system of universal adult franchise. India, like the United States, has an administration responsive to the aspirations of people. It is not merely the similarity of polity and electoral systems, but there are basic common features in the two societies. India and the United States, both are plural societies where dissent is not crushed. People express their views freely and have full freedom of belief and worship. These freedoms are assured by the US Constitution (Amendment number one) and Part III of the Constitution of India. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are essential common features of two democracies. Not only governments are often changed in the two countries by their peoples, if they do not fulfill peoples' wishes, through democratic process, but also redressal of grievances is given primary attention. In India people did not hesitate to defeat Indira Gandhi in 1977, just as the Americans turned out Bush Sr. in 1992, even though he had inflicted a crushing defeat on Iraq.

America is a country of migrants India is not. Nevertheless, in both the democracies people belonging to different races and having faith in different religions, live side by side and help the nation-building process. Secularism is an important faith in both the countries. Similarly, free market economy has now become a common feature, though before liberalisation in 1991 there was greater state control over economy in India than the US but, both countries have always rejected the concept of "command economies", which was so common in Communist, and even Fascist countries. A large presence of Indian migrants in the US has also helped in communality of interest of the two countries.

India and the United States have had trade relations for over two hundred years. Indo-American trade had started in the eighteenth century when the Yankee Clipper ships brought ice from Boston and reached Calcutta, and returned to America carrying spices and textiles from India. Limited diplomatic relations were established in 1790 when US President George Washington appointed a consul at Calcutta. India's freedom fighters received friendly help and encouragement from the US people, from time to time. Inter-governmental exchanges, tourism and religious experiences promoted friendly relations between the two countries.

Two basic facts of international relations remain at the core of Indo-US relations. First, relations among nations are always in conflict. Here we must distinguish between conflict and dispute. While conflict is a situation of disagreement which is unavoidable not only between nations but even between any two individuals, there can be no politics in a situation of total agreement nor in complete disagreement. Thus, conflict consists of disagreement which will not lead to rupture. Dispute is specific expression of sharp differences on a given issue. It may be resolved peacefully or result in rupture, even war. The second constant feature of international relations is change. Relations between nations do undergo changes, for change is the essence of life. Both these phenomena have influenced Indo-American relations during last 50 years. There have been disputes, as in regard to approach of two countries on the question of crisis in Bangladesh (1971) and the issue of signing of NPT (since 1968) and CTBT, for few years, culminating in India's refusal to sign CTBT in 1996. The situation of conflict is natural whether on the question of non-alignment versus power blocs, or the question of nuclear weapons, or the question of military alliances like SEATO or the question of Israel versus Palestine, or even the question of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-80).

There have been clear changes in perspective of two countries. For example, in early Nehru era, the US was not very appreciative of non-aligned policy of India nor did the USSR like it. Both blamed India to be in the other camp. But, when India responded favourably to UN Security Council resolution of June 17, 1950 on assisting South Korea, the Indian position was appreciated in Washington, but resented by the USSR. Later when India criticised American General, MacArthur's action threatening China (late 1950), the USSR suddenly became friendly and US became cool.

In 1962, when China attacked India, the US offered help and support, but when Indo-Pak War of 1965 took place; the US took pro-Pak stand. In 1971 (during and before) Indo-Pak War, US President Nixon openly came out in support of Pakistan and warned India of US intervention. US even sent its nuclear weapon-equipped 7th fleet into Bay of Bengal to terrorise India. Nixon went to the extent of asking China in 1971 to take steps in Himalayas to cause irritation to India. This pro-Pak position was at its height in 1971.

Thus, main areas of irritation in Indo-US relation are: the question of Kashmir, arms aid to Pakistan, generally pro-Pak position of the US, India's non-alignment and since 1971 till 1991 India's very friendly relations with the USSR. The whole question of NPT and CTBT is still a major irritant. The consistent US support to Israel and India's recognition of PLO has been another irritant.

After the end of Cold War, India and the United States have been actively looking for occasions and policies that can create more cordial and friendly relations between the two largest democracies. The termination of Cold War has freed Indo-US relations from the limitations of a bipolar world. However, their bilateral relations have been adversely affected on account of differences on the question of nuclear proliferation, missiles proliferation, regional stability, human rights and economic policies. According to American experts, the primary objective of the US policy in South Asia is to stop nuclear proliferation and the related regional tensions. The Clinton Administration of the US (1992-2000) took the initiative by advocating confidence building measures between India and Pakistan. President Clinton made it clear in 1997 that the US had no intention of mediating on the question of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. He told Pakistan Prime Minister that India and Pakistan must resolve their differences through direct bilateral negotiations. India received US support during the Kargil war, 1999.

An important improvement in the Indo-US relations took place in the area of economic policies. The United States welcomed liberalisation of Indian economy and India's policy of inviting more and more foreign investment in industry, and development projects. An American delegation, under the leadership of the then Commerce Secretary Ronald Brown, that visited India in January 1995, concluded several economic agreements in the areas of energy, industrial production, transport, petro-chemicals, financial services, telecommunication, and health care schemes. These agreements provided for massive US investment to the tune of 7 billion US dollars. American investment in Indian industry and commerce has grown rapidly. By 1997, even greater Indo-US economic cooperation was being projected, and during 2005-2006

India and US agreed on a nuclear deal for Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation. The deal was to be finalised in the form 123 agreement (see below).

The US Agency for International Development was impressing upon the need to promote these development projects that were likely to bring about structural changes and help in the privatisation of Indian economy. These projects included greater participation of private sector in the production and development of energy; joint Indo-American commercial and technological ventures; greater supply of water, better sanitation and provision for energy and better roads in urban areas; family planning and health care; food assistance; and more efforts for women education. Both India and the United States signed in 1995, a common Agenda for the Environment, so that the two countries could jointly try to solve such common problems, affecting entire mankind, as from global warming, ozone depletion, and desertification. The other issues which were emphasised in the Common Agenda were population explosion and investment in the field of human resources development.

India and the United States both consider illegal traffic in drugs as a serious international problem. The two countries pledged to cooperate to tackle this problem at all levels. This joint programme can succeed by the exchange of anti-drugs intelligence information, and by effective control and check on production, trade and use of the harmful and injurious drugs.

India and the United States pledged to fight and abolish the curse of terrorism, and for this purpose decided to sign a comprehensive extradition treaty during the last decade of the twentieth century. This was an attempt at Indo-American cooperation in the maintenance of law and order in the world.

India and the United States were engaged in cooperative action in several other areas in the end of the twentieth century. Prominent among these areas were educational and cultural exchanges. Both the countries promised to make their cultural heritage available for the benefit of each other.

INDO-US RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR PERIOD

To put relations between India and the United States in perspective it is no longer necessary to go over the five decade-long estrangement between the world's most populous and most powerful democracies. This divergence, often sharp, but never so sharp as to drive the relationship to the breaking point, is a thing of the past. Its principal cause, the Cold War is over. Consequently, Indo-US relationship, good, bad or indifferent, has become the most important in the entire gamut of our relations with the outside world. It may not be a multi-polar world just yet but is surely a perycentric one. Even so, America remains unquestionably the mightiest military power and has the world's largest economy at a time when globalisation has become almost the universal economic creed.

The emergence of free India coincided with the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union as two Super Powers. Both these powers with faith in their respective ideologies and way of life looked with suspicion towards each other and set up military blocs like NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS, and the Warsaw Pact to meet the possible threat from the other. When India gained independence, there was the option of joining either of the two power blocs. However, India decided to keep away from both these blocs and follow an independent foreign policy.

Nehru opted for the policy of friendship with all, but enmity with none; the policy of seeking help, without strings for India's economic development; and the policy employing freedom to decide all issues on merit. This policy (Chapter 4) came to be known as the policy of non-alignment.

The adoption of policy of non-alignment did not imply that India declined to play a positive role in international sphere. It expressed positive opinion on the issues facing the world on the basis of merit. Though India has always wanted to have balanced relationship with both the Super Powers, it has not always succeeded in this mission.

India's relations with the USA have followed a zig-zag course during the First 50 years (1947-97). India's relations with three of the important neighbours — Pakistan, China and the Soviet Union in particular and the policy towards Asia and Africa, in general, have been the most significant determining factors in the Indo-US relations. Soon after independence, India developed very friendly relations with the USA. The Indian leaders acknowledged with gratitude the positive role played by America in exerting pressure on the British Government to expedite the grant of independence to India. The democratic ideals of America fascinated the Indian leaders. However, they decided to follow non-alignment, not favoured by America and hence considered as an unfriendly posture. Also, the refusal of India to join the military alliances sponsored by USA, and different stands taken by it on various international issues like the grant of independence to Indonesia and recognising the communist regime of China were quite annoying to the American leaders.

India did not approve of the American policy of containment of communism against Soviet Union and China through a system of military alliances, and sought to promote a climate of peaceful co-existence and cooperation. Nehru's mild stand on the Chinese invasion of Tibet, disassociation with America not to brand China as an aggressor in Korea and opposition to the US sponsored Uniting for Peace Resolution of November 1950, irritated the United States. India's attitude towards the Peace Pact between the US and Japan also caused bitterness. She did not even attend the conference convened by the US for the conclusion of US-Japan peace treaty.

The relations between the two countries in the economic, cultural and educational spheres continued to grow and the US provided valuable assistance to India under the Technical Cooperation Agreement of 1951. The US also made available to India huge quantities of food grains to tide over the problem of food shortage. India received enormous assistance from various private foundations, like the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Carnage. Earlier, when Nehru visited the United States in 1949 he was given warm welcome. Indo-US relations were friendly and cordial during the period 1951-54. When Britain, France and Israel launched an aggression on Egypt in 1956, because Suez Canal had been nationalised, the three aggressor countries were bitterly criticised by most countries. India did the same. India fully supported the US efforts to end the Suez conflict. But, India did not support the call to Soviet Union to end its military action in Hungary, also in 1956.

Pakistan-America Relations and India: In pursuance of the policy of containment of communism, the United States had sponsored several military alliances. It is in this process that the United States ensured Pakistan's entry into the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Earlier, India had turned down the invitation to join this organisation. Prime Minister Nehru was of the opinion that formation of regional military organisations was not in conformity with the objectives of the United Nations. Meanwhile, in May 1954, a bilateral agreement was concluded by the United States with Pakistan whereby the latter received large scale military supplies from the US. This spoilt India's relations with the United States. The supply of modern sophisticated weapons to Pakistan served America's two objectives. Firstly, she *punished* India for having declined to join the US-sponsored military alliance. Secondly, Pakistan was pleased because in the process India's power was naturally limited. The bilateral defence agreement signed in 1959 by Pakistan and the United States further spoilt Indo-US relation. The main purpose of 1959 US-Pak agreement was to include Pakistan, in place of Iraq, in the Middle East (West Asia) military alliance system. This, incidentally, would strengthen the Eisenhower Doctrine. Earlier, in 1959, Iraq had left the Baghdad Pact, its name was changed to Central Treaty Organisation, CENTO. India protested, and told the United States that she had harmed India's national interests by bringing the CENTO to its door steps. India-Pakistan relations were, in any case, not very friendly. This agreement, as mentioned above, made even Indo-US relations worse. In response to India's protest against supply of US weapons to Pakistan, India was assured that those weapons were meant to strengthen Pakistan to contain communism and that they would not be used against India. But, in practice these US weapons were freely used by Pakistan against India both in 1965 and 1971 wars.

It was generally believed that, by associating Pakistan with its alliance system, the United States had established an 'outpost' in South Asia. A former US ambassador to India Chester Bowles had then said that during the preceding 15 years, the US had given military assistance, outside Europe, to several new

governments so that they would support America's foreign policy on crucial issues. India would never make itself a spokesman of any other country's foreign policy. Criticising President Eisenhower's Pakistan policy, Senator Fullbright had said that he respected the peoples of both India and Pakistan. The tension between the two countries had given rise to several conflicts. "We would intensify this conflict by giving arms assistance to Pakistan". This, he had opined, would lead to dangerous consequences. Fullbright's warning proved correct, and tension between India and the United States further developed. At that time, Senator John F. Kennedy was amongst the prominent opponents of the US aid to Pakistan. Kennedy was later (1960) elected President of the United States.

America and Containment of Communism: India had opposed the Truman Doctrine (1947) in the context of Greece and Turkey, and the Eisenhower Doctrine in regard to the Middle East. Both these initiatives were aimed at opposition and containment of communism. India had described both the Doctrines as provocative in the context of Cold War. India had also criticised the US intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. This had also increased tension in the Indo-US relations. Nehru was the founder of India's foreign policy and his approach was generally supported by Indian people. But, Nehru Government was bitterly criticised by Indian people in regard to its policy on the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956. The Soviet armed forces were sent to Hungary to crush the Hungarian people's uprising against Soviet domination over their country. The Soviet army openly suppressed the aspirations and wishes of Hungarian people. It destroyed Hungarian desire to pursue an independent policy. India was in no way concerned with this crisis. But, when a resolution was moved by the United States in the UN General Assembly condemning Soviet intervention in Hungary, India abstained during voting. This was an indirect way of supporting the Soviet Union in its totally unjustifiable action in Hungary. India took a worst step when it voted along with the USSR, to oppose the 5-nation resolution calling for free and democratic elections in Hungary. It was impossible to understand how India voted against the proposal for democratic elections in Hungary. This pro-Soviet policy of Nehru Government naturally strained already tense Indo-US relations. Within India itself, Nehru Government's pro-Soviet, anti-democratic, action was criticised and opposed by people. The opposition was led by Jayaprakash Narain. A demand was made by Indian people and media for the immediate recall of India's representative in the UN Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon for having voted on the side of the Soviet Union. Thus, during Nehru's Prime Ministership, sharp differences were noticed between India and the United States on several issues.

Liberation of Goa: Goa and four other small territories in Western India, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, were under the Portuguese colonial rule for a long time. In normal course, it was expected that after the British left India, the Portguese would also withdraw from these small packets. But despite numerous diplomatic efforts made by India, Goa could not be liberated from the Portguese rule and, therefore, could not be integrated into the Indian Union. The Government of Portugal was not willing to cooperate with India. The American policy, on the question of Goa, was anti-India. The liberation movement of Goa was repeatedly criticised by the Americans. The United States had always taken pride in being an opponent of imperialism. However, she did not support Goa's freedom from the colonial rule. One reason for this strange American attitude could be that Portugal was a member of US-led NATO, and the US wanted to appease its ally. The US media went to the extent of saying that while people of Goa wanted to stay under the Portuguese rule, it was Government of India that was adopting the path of armed action. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State had even described Goa as a province of Portugal. India was left with no alternative but to take military action, which was done late in 1961; and in a swift action Indian Army liberated Goa (and other Portuguese pockets) from the Portuguese rule. Condemning Indian action, the US representative in the United Nations described it as "aggression". But, when India was attacked by China in 1962, Kennedy Administration quickly changed its policy, and supported India.

India-China Border War, 1962: The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 introduced a new element in the Indo-US relations. A common element of China's hostility towards India and the US now introduced a new mood in the country. Kennedy had taken over as US President in January 1961. Prime Minister Nehru had paid third visit to the US in 1961. Kennedy Administration was generally appreciative of India's foreign policy, except on the question of Goa. President Kennedy, for the first time, recognised the principle of peaceful co-existence and appreciated the fact that a country could remain neutral in the on-going conflict between democracy and communism. Indo-US relations began to improve. Speaking in the US Congress, Kennedy publicly praised Nehru's high ideals. Therefore, when consequent upon China's aggression in October, 1962 India appealed for help, the US gave unconditional support to India and sent necessary war material. Voices were raised in India for an alliance with the US against China, and the drastic modification of non-alignment.

India's China policy indeed had short comings. India did not realise the gravity of situation, and made no proper defence preparations, even after Sino-Indian relations were thoroughly spoilt by 1961. Nothing was done to ensure India's security by increasing defence expenditure, evolving proper defence strategy, and securing active cooperation of tribal people of North-Eastern region. It appeared that India was totally unaware of the threat to its territorial integrity. Possibilities of war or external aggression were completely ruled out. Nehru and his Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon both were convinced that threat to India's security was only from Pakistan, and not from China. It

was their belief that China could just not commit aggression on India. This was also the opinion of India's envoy to China. Thus, when China continued aggression, it was natural that unprepared Indian troops would have to lose battle after battle. China did not expect that the United States would not only provide moral support, but even rush defence weapons and other war material. China had to declare unilateral cease-fire and withdraw its troops for some distance. In view of US support given to India, a demand was strongly made in the country for modification in our policy of non-alignment as well as India's US policy. Some people went to the extent of suggesting that India might enter into an alliance with the United States. However, with the withdrawal of military forces by China from most of Indian territory and generally pro-Indian stand of the Soviet Union, India returned to the earlier non-aligned position. The rejection of the Indian request by the USA for supply of a variety of advanced military hardware also checked more intimate relations between India and the USA. The Soviet factor and valuable Soviet assistance inhibited relations with Washington.

India's foreign policy decisions were considerably influenced by the fact that China had betrayed India and that the Americans stood by this country at that juncture. Thus, Indo-US relations were brightened during the post-1961 Kennedy Administration. Earlier, in May, 1960, PL-480 agreement was concluded between India and the United States, which enabled India to get large quantities of wheat from the United States. The Air Forces of India, Britain, Australia and the United States carried out joint air exercises in different parts of India in 1964. An agreement signed by the two countries in December 1964 provided for the American assistance to the tune of 80 million US dollars to enable India to set up a plant for nuclear energy at Tarapur. But, fresh tensions erupted in the bilateral relations in 1965. After Nehru's death in May 1964, Lal Bahadur Shastri had become the Prime Minister. Despite the fact that Shastri had hardly any experience in the field of foreign policy, he not only vigorously pursued the policy of non-alignment, but led India to victory in the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965.

During the brief 18 months rule of Shastri, relations between India and the United States received clear setback. Sardar Swaran Singh, as Shastri's Foreign Minister, played an important role in world politics. During this period, the US had started heavy bombardment on North Vietnam. India was critical of this action of the US, which resulted in strong anti-India opinion in America. One consequence of India's views on Vietnam was that Prime Minister Shastri's scheduled visit to the United States, in May 1965, was postponed by President Johnson on account of his "busy schedule" at home. This postponement was very humiliating for India. It was essential for India to give a suitable reply to the US President for this insult of a sovereign country.

India-Pakistan War, 1965: India's humiliation by China in the 1962 war had convinced Pakistan that India's defences were so weak that she could also easily defeat India, and capture the State of Jammu & Kashmir. Thus, Pakistan precipitated conflict with India first in the Rann of Kutch, and later in the State of Kashmir. Thus, in the wake of border war with China, came the war with Pakistan in September 1965. The use of American arms by Pakistan during Indo-Pak war of 1965 embittered Indo US relations. India protested to the American Government that its arms were being used against India despite assurances of the US Government that they would not be used against India, and asked America to prevent this. However, American leaders took no action in this regard and continued to maintain a pro-Pakistan stand. During that period six US ships were approaching India with certain supplies. When these ships were only 15 kilometers away from Indian coast, the US Administration asked them to return home. The United States, in accordance with its policy of equating India and Pakistan, suspended the economic assistance and military supplies (already in pipeline) to both the countries. India, at that time had acute shortage of wheat and other food items. Thus, suspension of supplies of these essential goods to India caused serious hardships.

However, US maintained neutrality in this war and refused Pakistan President Ayub Khan's request for active intervention. Washington also privately warned China against intervention in the Indo-Pak war, or otherwise USA would provide military aid to India. This action of the US was much appreciated. These conflicts, followed by serious economic crisis, inflation and sharply dwindling foreign exchange reserves kept India's dependence on the US at a fairly large level. As professor V.P. Dutt put it, the thinning "bread basket" and the lengthening "hunger line" required substantial food imports from that country.

Indira Gandhi and Indo-US Relations: The Tashkent Agreement was signed in January 1966 by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistan President Ayub Khan to normalise Indo-Pak relations. Within few hours of the signing of this agreement Shastri died at Tashkent. He was succeeded by Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

When Mrs. Indira Gandhi became the Prime Minister in January 1966, her first foreign policy move was to visit the US in March 1966. She was received warmly by President Johnson, who put pressure on India in regard to this country's relations with the Soviet Union. This effort to pressurize India at a crucial moment for a major turning away from her policies left an undoubted mark on subsequent developments bringing about a resolve in New Delhi to urgently strive for self sufficiency in food grains. As V.P. Dutt opined, on the one hand India appeared to be going around with a begging bowl on the verge of an economic disaster, in need of American help and investment which was put in the context of shared values of democracy and human freedom, and on the other hand she had to point out and carry conviction about the basic health of the Indian economy and the strength of Indian democracy, a potentially major country plagued by temporary difficulties. Mrs. Gandhi welcomed foreign investments. She drew attention towards China's aggressive policies. Relations with Pakistan were also discussed. India moderated its stand on Vietnam. Mrs. Gandhi emphasised the need for a political solution and the helpful contribution that a cessation of US bombing of North Vietnam would make in the search of political solution. Mrs. Gandhi's visit in 1966 was perhaps the most serious, the most extensive and the most determined bid to establish and promote a close state of Indo-US relations. The new international situation, the US-Soviet detente, the Sino-Soviet split, the conflict with China and common opposition to Chinese policies, US economic and military assistance, it was believed by many in India, would justify the relationships and ensure a long spell of friendly relations with America.

India devalued its currency (rupee) apparently under the US pressure in 1966. The economic assistance to India that was suspended by the US during 1965 Indo-Pak war, was now resumed, though it was much less than the original assistance. Early Indira Gandhi period was marked by a major effort at aligning Indian and US policies as closely together as possible. The first formal bilateral talks were held in 1968. Talks took place in a changing international environment and political situations in the two countries. America was becoming heavily preoccupied with the war in Vietnam and, therefore, had to considerably cut short aid to India which affected India's five year plans also. America's consistent support to Pakistan on Kashmir issue and its decision to provide shelter to the Naga rebel leader Phizo in the US in 1967 caused strain in our bilateral relations but US Ambassador Chester Bowles was keen that talks should take place, hence he felt that America's preoccupation with war in Vietnam had led to a neglect of India during a critical period of political and economic transition. This was for the first time that an important American delegation had come to New Delhi without telling the Indians to settle the Kashmir problem. But differences remained wide. Johnson Administration was replaced by Nixon in 1969. Nixon stood for assistance to India. He visited India in August 1969. It was the first trip of a US President after Eisenhower's visit of 1955. While the visit helped clear some air, and narrow differences, it also underlined the existence of differing approaches and the problems thus created. Indo-American relationship reached a low point during the June, 1967 war in West Asia when Mrs. Gandhi supported the Arabs. This had irked not only President Johnson but also Jewish members of the US Congress. President Nixon did not try to inject US into the seemingly unresolvable Kashmir question.

India and the US could not resolve their differences. Sharp differences remained on US arms supplies to Pakistan, the West Asian conflict and the war in Vietnam. The perception of the two countries of their interests in Asia in particular, and the developing countries and the world in general had for most of the time, been fairly divergent. Whether it was Kashmir, the Indian Ocean, the question of colonialism or international political and economic order, their outlooks have been wide apart.

What should be done in South Asia, in South East Asia, in West Asia (Middle East), in Africa, the two countries have not generally seen eye to eye. But above all, the US policy in the sub-continent, with its ramification for the political and societal interests of India had combined with differing policies towards other important areas and issues to cool their relationship and often kept them at loggerheads.

The US policy towards this sub-continent was determined by the overall strategy of the Western Bloc, of which the US was the leader, and by British experience after India's independence, Americans looked upon and often bowed to the "superb experiment and wisdom" of the British.

Pakistan's entry into western military alliance network and provisions of US military bases in Pakistan confirmed American support to Pakistan. Indian protests of Pakistan using arms and ammunitions against India, and not China and Russia, cut no ice. Therefore, America's strategic interests demanded alignment with Pakistan. This alignment secured two purposes. It gave a valuable foothold in South Asia, base for extending its military alliance system from Europe to North-West to South-West Asia and launching pads for flights over China and Soviet Union to serve their secondary needs. Secondly, it provided a useful lever of pressure against India which flaunted its independence and refused to become a part of any military bloc. In any case, the persistent, US policy of maintaining parity of military power between India and Pakistan and their obvious bias towards the latter remained a basic element of discord between the USA and India. The Congress party projected a left-of-centre image. This slight leftward twist did not please the US and could not but have its repercussion on ties between the two countries.

The Crisis of Bangladesh: Indo-American relations were never as bad as they turned in 1971. The crisis in Bangladesh had started as domestic problem of Pakistan. But, it soon developed into a major uprising and resulted in India-Pakistan war in December 1971. Although President Nixon of the US had indicated that US might intervene on the side of Pakistan, yet in practice it refrained from doing that. Pakistan had always been at the root of Indo-American differences. Initially, Pakistan was not America's first choice. It is only after India declined to join the US sponsored SEATO that Pakistan was invited to join the Western alliance system. Pakistan had been receiving military assistance from the United States since 1954. Despite assurances given to India, Pakistan used the American weapons against this country both in 1965 and 1971. Pakistan

was more openly supported by the United States in 1971 than during the 1965 war. There was a strange cooperation in 1971 between Pakistan, China and the United States of America. Pakistan was receiving massive military supplies from the US even before the Bangladesh Crisis began. America had decided in 1968 to send to Pakistan, *via* Turkey, 100 tanks of M-47 category. India had made it clear at that time itself that the supply of these tanks would make Pakistan stronger and India more vulnerable. But, US Administration was not bothered.

It was formally announced by the United States on October 7, 1970 that it would provide to Pakistan B-57 bomber aircraft and other lethal weapons. The then US Ambassador in India Keating said at a press conference that the purpose of providing this "limited" supply to Pakistan was to restrict Pakistan's dependence on China and the Soviet Union. India's protest was ignored. Unfortunately, at that time China, the United States and even India's friend Soviet Union were competing with each other for providing armaments to Pakistan. This caused anxiety in India, and could not convince this country that US assistance to Pakistan was meant to be used against communist countries. It was in this situation that the then East Pakistan became an area of serious domestic politics of Pakistan.

The Bangladesh crisis of 1971 created a big divide between India and the United States. We have explained the events leading to the 1971 crisis and its consequences in Chapters 5 and 7. President Nixon of the United States had adopted a clearly anti-India Policy. A strange combination of Pakistan, China and the United States had emerged. Pakistan had been liberally receiving armaments from the United States. As the Pakistan President adopted stiff attitude and refused to appoint Sheikh Mujibur Rehman (whose party had won clear majority in Pakistan's National Assembly) as the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Bangla people launched agitation for an independent Bangladesh. President Yahya Khan was then acting on the advice of ambitious Z.A. Bhutto. When Mrs. Indira Gandhi visited Washington, she was told by President Nixon, of the US resolve to support the position of Pakistan. Encouraged by US support, President Yahya Khan launched military action on December 3, 1971. Meanwhile Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation had been signed (see next chapter) which acted as a deterrent. US threatened intervention in the 1971 war, but did not carry out the threat. Meanwhile, for several months before the commencement of war, millions of Bangla refugees were arriving in India. It was a big burden on India to look after 10 million Bangla refugees. The Bangla struggle for freedom was sought to be suppressed by Yahya regime. Bangla youth set up their army called *Muktibahini.* But, Pakistan alleged that in fact it consisted of Indian troops which were fighting in the grab of *Muktibahini.* The Bangla crisis eventually led to India-Pak war in which Pakistani army surrendered unconditionally in the Eastern sector. Thus, despite

American support to Pakistani designs, Bangladesh emerged as an independent sovereign state.

By that time, India's relations with the United States had reached all time low. The then US Secretary of state Henry Kissinger wrote in his book *White House Years* that by 1971 "Our relations with India" had become full of tension yet friendly. Nixon's pro-Pakistan policy was evident by the fact that he had completely closed his eyes to the ongoing repression in East Pakistan. The reports of repression that US Consul in Dhaka Archer Blood was sending to Washington were consistency denied by Joseph Farland, the American Ambassador to Pakistan. Archer Blood was, in fact punished for having sent reports of Pakistani repression in Bangladesh. The US Ambassador in India Keiting had also informed his government of the deteriorating situation in East Pakistan. Keiting was reprimanded by President Nixon for "speaking the language of the Indians." Nixon was determined to support Pakistan at any cost. Nixon Administration even ignored the warning of Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and maintained armaments supply to Pakistan. At the same time, Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger was busy establishing contacts with China with the help of Pakistani President Yahya Khan.

The open American assistance to Pakistan was strongly resented by India. India moved closer to the Soviet Union. A resolution that was brought before the Security Council calling upon India to withdraw its troops from East Pakistan was vetoed by the Soviet Union. America could not prevent partition of Pakistan, even after having opposed India. Secretary of State Kissinger opined in 1972 that South Asia had come under India's domination.

Indo-American Relations after the Bangladesh Crisis: India tested its first nuclear device in 1974 in the deserts of Rajasthan. India had made clear that its nuclear programme was entirely for peaceful purposes. However, the United States was highly critical and felt that the explosion might lead to nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Pakistan had naturally raised serious doubts about India's actual intentions. Despite this, American Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger's visit to New Delhi in October 1974 went a long way in easing the Indo-US tensions.

A 35-nation conference was held in Helsinki where countries of both American and Soviet Blocs signed the Final Act of Helsinki in 1975. This was a remarkable achievement that brought about detente in the East-West conflict. But, in 1979, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan revived the tension and gave rise to the 'New Cold War'.

Meanwhile, both in India and the United States governments had changed. In the US Jimmy Carter assumed Presidency in January 1977. In March, after Mrs. Gandhi's party was defeated in the Lok Sabha election, a new Janata Party Government led by Morarji Desai assumed office in New Delhi. After some

time, Bhutto was overthrown in a coup led by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, and he was detained in jail. President Carter visited India in January 1978, and Desai paid a return visit to America in June. These visits helped in restoration of cooperation and friendship, though in a very limited way. America promised increased economic cooperation. But, India did not agree to Carter's request to sign the non-proliferation treaty, which India has always said is discriminatory. Carter had expressed fear that if India did not sign the NPT, the US might have to stop supply of enriched uranium for the Tarapur nuclear plant. However, despite Desai's refusal to sign the NPT, Carter succeeded in persuading the Senate to maintain the supply of uranium, but, this did not signify lasting friendship. During his four-day visit to the United States, Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee discussed with the US Administration the issues related to the supply of uranium, the problem caused by Pakistan's attempt to develop nuclear bomb and the need to declare Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

As mentioned above, a fresh high point of East-West confrontation was reached in 1979 with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Helsinki Spirit of 1975 was now replaced by the New Cold War. Pakistan was given the status of a 'frontline state' by America. Pakistan thus became America's outpost in the region and it received significant military aid which led to serious tensions in Indo-American relations. Contrary to the general belief that big powers used to sell and transfer only obsolete and out of service armaments, Pakistan continued to receive latest and sophisticated armaments from the United States. India did not condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which became a point of conflict between the United States and India.

At the Cancun meeting of the developed and the developing countries in October 1981, Mrs. Gandhi met President Reagan of the United States. After the summit, the US President acquired a new insight into the Indian thinking and began re-examining the postulates on which India's foreign policy was based. Two of the assumptions of the US policy-makers had to be cleared. The US assumptions were that, firstly, India's close relations with the Soviet Union necessarily meant hostility towards the west, and secondly, that good relations of India with one Super Power could not co-exist with good relationship with the other. India tried to convince the US that these assumptions were not valid. The Indo-US relations now showed signs of improvement. Mrs. Gandhi described her meeting with Reagan as an "adventure in search of understanding and friendship", and Reagan called it as a "dialogue of discovery". One concrete result of Mrs. Gandhi's visit was the conclusion of an agreement between India and the United States on the long drawn out problem of the supply of enriched uranium to the Tarapur Nuclear Plant. However, differences still persisted mainly in regard to three areas. These were: continued American military aid to Pakistan which was strongly resented by India; American action in alerting Pakistan about an impending Indian strike against its nuclear installation; and thirdly, the increasing militancy in Punjab and the US attitude towards the separatists who had strong organisational and financial links in the UK, USA and Canada.

US Military Assistance to Pakistan — Pressler and Brown Amendments: When President Carter was convinced that Pakistan was developing a nuclear bomb, then in April 1979, America suspended economic and military assistance being given to Pakistan. But, consequent upon Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979, the suspended assistance to Pakistan was resumed. It was announced that during the next five years, Pakistan would be given military assistance to the tune of 1 billion and 600 million US dollars. Besides, it was also decided to sell to Pakistan sixteen F-40 fighter aircrafts. India strongly protested against these decisions. Ignoring India's protest America justified its decision in order to defend Pakistan against threat of communism and dangers from the Soviet Union. Pakistan received even greater assistance after Reagan became President in 1981. This was done on the ground of prevention of proliferation of communism in Asia. During the period 1987-93, the assistance to Pakistan reached all time high of over 4 billion dollars. It appeared that the policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons did not apply to Pakistan. It was clearly stated in 1984 by Pakistan's nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Kadir Khan that Pakistan had indeed developed a bomb. It was also hinted by Benazir Bhutto in 1991 and Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shaharyar Khan in 1992 that Pakistan possessed the capability to manufacture the bomb. Ignoring India's repeated pleas Presidents Reagan and Bush kept on supplying arms to Pakistan.

After the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi and coming to power of Rajiv Gandhi a more congenial atmosphere was noticed in the Indo-US relations. After his visit to America in 1985, Rajiv Gandhi said that "we feel we can cooperate to reduce our differences and to work together for the common ideals of freedom and democracy." But, later the euphoria gave way to disenchantment. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Cuba and his air dash to Moscow in October 1985 created a measure of disenchantment in the US.

An amendment was made in the Foreign Assistance Act in 1985. It was moved by Senator Pressler. Therefore, it came to be known as the Pressler Amendment. It amended a provision in the Foreign Assistance Act. Accordingly, it became obligatory for the US President to certify that Pakistan did not possess any nuclear weapon, before any assistance could be provided to Pakistan. Thus, if a President does not certify that Pakistan does not possess nuclear weapons, assistance would not be given to that country. After the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan, and when the communist system in USSR was threatened in 1990, President Bush of the United States refused to certify that Pakistan did not possess a bomb, and the 600 million dollar economic and military assistance for 1991-92 was cancelled. Thus, George Bush for the first time punished Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, though the commercial arms sale to Pakistan was not prevented. During the 1992 — Presidential campaign, Bill Clinton had given enough indications that he could go a long way in improving Indo-US relations. But, the Pakistan lobby in the US Congress succeeded in 1995 when an amendment moved by Senator Hank Brown was adopted in the Foreign Assistance Act. The Brown Amendment modified the Pressler Amendment by providing 'one-time exemption' in regard to release of US assistance to Pakistan. This implied that, ignoring India's feelings and national interests, the United States wanted to keep on arming Pakistan on one pretext, or the other. But, before India's nuclear tests, Clinton Administration appeared willing to improve ties with India without sacrificing its interests in Pakistan.

By the time Cold War ended (1989) .and the Soviet Union actually disintegrated (1991) India had considerably improved its relations with the United States. It was felt that India had turned over-optimistic about the future of Indo-US relationship. As Inder Malhotra opined "thanks to initiatives taken by Rajiv Gandhi and Ronald Reagan, military cooperation on a limited scale between the two countries had begun." Joint exercises by the navies of the two countries took place after a long time. During Gulf War (1991) the American war planes flying from South-East Asia to Gulf destinations were allowed to be refuelled in India, for which US was very appreciative, though Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar was criticised in many quarters for the facility provided to the United States.

INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE THE END OF COLD WAR

The Cold War that had commenced soon after the termination of Second World War ended in 1989. The two Super Powers gave up the path of confrontation, but the Soviet Union soon began to collapse. It finally disintegrated in December, 1991. India, like rest of the world, was not prepared for this development. This left the United States as the only Super Power. It, therefore, became essential for most of the countries to review their foreign policies and diplomatic activities. It was natural that India's relations with the United States must also undergo substantial change.

Writing about the Indo-American relations in the post-Cold War period, Professor B.K. Shrivastava said that, "A new world much more chaotic than ever before and much more prone to violence emerged at the beginning of 1990s. "The world is no longer divided into two power blocs." Professor Shrivastava added: "With the end of the Cold War, the ideological confrontation between East and West has also ended. There are not many countries left in the world today which do not swear by democracy". Centrally controlled economies have moved towards market economies. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and emergence of the US as the sole Super Power, India's relations with the United States have undergone significant changes.

Until 1996, when under the Gujral Doctrine, relations were sought to be improved by India with all its neighbours, India viewed both Pakistan and China as threats to its security. The intensity of this perception has, however, varied from time to time. But India has never regarded the United States as a Power posing direct threat to its security. India has always regarded that the threat from the United States is indirect through its military alliance with Pakistan. For a long time since 1960s India had depended on the Soviet Union for its defence requirements. The United States saw India's special relations with the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War as strengthening the Soviet position in South Asia. This view, as US perception, had taken particular exception to the Indo-Soviet relationship which had led India to support the Soviet policy in Afghanistan and opposed the United States even when India's interests were not directly involved. There was a particular interlocking of relationships as during the "Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." America provided huge military aid to Pakistan. This, according to India, constituted a clear threat to its security.

This inter-locking of relationships was done away with at the end of the Cold War. The Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan late in 1980s. After the disintegration of USSR, the closer cooperation and integration with the West became Russia's top priority. As Russia and America moved closer to each other there was a clear neglect of Russia's traditional relations with long-standing friends like India. The decline of Indo-Russian ties was clearly reflected in the trade relations of the two countries. For example, India's exports to Russia came down from 16.1 per cent of its total exports in 1989-90 to 9.1 per cent during 1991-92. India's long-standing defence relations with Russia also came under strain.

In April 1993, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher had said, of the US assistance to Russia that the programme of assistance, "will support Russia's long term transformation to the market and most importantly ... directly serve US interest by reducing the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and opening new markets for our workers, farmers and businesses. The sudden improvement in relationship between Russia and America in the post-Cold War period had a profound impact on America's relations with India and Pakistan. After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, importance of Pakistan in US strategic thinking had considerably declined. With the end of the Cold War the United States insisted that the goal of its policy in South Asia was promotion of peace and stability in the region. It is in this background that the Americans brought the issue of nuclear proliferation to the top of its list of priorities in Asia.

The Problem of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: India's decision not to suspend, or terminate, its nuclear programme was a major irritant in the Indo-American relations. India's clear policy was that it would stop its nuclear programme only if all the nuclear weapon states (NWS) made a commitment that they would, in course of time, bring about complete nuclear disarmament. This commitment should be time-bound so that the world knows by what time it would be free of nuclear weapons. But, India's views were not taken seriously by the United States. Meanwhile, India had not conducted any nuclear test since its only explosion in 1974. The United States believed that India's security could be ensured only if it gave up its nuclear programme.

The United States had always wanted that both India and Pakistan should sign Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This policy was vigorously pursued by Presidents Carter through Clinton. Pakistan had made it clear to Bush as well as Clinton that it would sign NPT only after India signed it. India consistently refused to sign the NPT because it regarded it as discriminatory (for details please see Chapter 8 above). India has always argued that three countries in its neighbourhood had nuclear weapons and, therefore, it could not give up its nuclear option unilaterally. The United States went on putting pressure on India not only to sign NPT but also not to develop its missile programme. India's decision to test *Prithvi* and *Agni* missiles provoked serious criticism in America and elsewhere. India made no compromise on its stand on the question of signing of NPT and later on the proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India succeeded in blocking the CTBT in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva in 1996 and voted against it even in the UN General Assembly (See Chapter 8). Thus, by 1997 Indo-US differences persisted on the question of NPT, CTBT, the missiles programme as also the whole issue of Kashmir and human rights. However, for the first time in September 1997, President Clinton told Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif that Kashmir question must be bilaterally tackled by India and Pakistan, and that the US had no intention of mediating between the two countries. This was a welcome development. India's Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral also met President Clinton, on the latter's initiative, during UN General Assembly session in September 1997. In accordance with Gujral's wishes, President Clinton did not raise the issue of Kashmir. As mentioned above, US position now is that Kashmir question should be bilaterally dealt with by India and Pakistan. Later, during a visit to India and Pakistan, US Secretary of State Ms. Albright also said that US had no intention of mediating in the Kashmir question.

Although a clear shift in the American position in Kashmir was noticed yet, unlike India, the United States still regarded Kashmir as a disputed territory. But the changed US position on Kashmir did not permit Pakistan to raise the Kashmir question in the Security Council although it continued to support secessionist forces in Kashmir.

The Clinton Administration admitted that it considered the whole of Asia as an important region. It was of the view that it was willing to discuss the common interests of India and Pakistan. It was claimed on behalf of the Clinton Administration that the US wanted to ensure stability in India-Pakistan relations, so that the tensions of the past could be eased. The United States was keen to strengthen friendship with all the countries of South Asia.

America felt that the Gujral Doctrine (see Chapters 2 & 13) would be highly beneficial to the entire Asian region. The agreements that were concluded in 1996 between India and Nepal, and India and Bangladesh were appreciated by the United States and credit was given to the doctrine of developing good neighbourly relations with smaller nations advocated by the then Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral.

The Question of Human Rights: There have been serious differences between India and America on the question of human rights also. The world community, according to Prof. Shrivastava "is not very sensitive to any serious violation of human rights". The organisations like Amnesty International and Asia Watch, focussed attention on violation of human rights by India's security forces. Not only these organisations have demanded repeal of laws like TADA, passed by Indian Parliament, but even the US Congress had expressed its concern over the violation of human rights time and again. India did not permit representative of Amnesty International for nearly 14 years to investigate cases of alleged violations of human rights. This provoked, in June 1990, the introduction of a bill in the American House of Representatives calling for suspension of developmental aid until India allowed Amnesty International — to investigate the cases of alleged violations of human rights. But a member of Bush Administration, Jennet B. Mullins opposing the bill had said, "India is a vigorous democracy and human rights are monitored there in much the same way as they are monitored in the US". Meanwhile, under the pressure of public opinion both inside and outside the country, a National Human Rights Commission was set up in India. This Commission functions under the chairmanship of a retired judge of the Supreme Court, and examines the allegations of violations of human rights. Even then, the United States always appears to be bothered about human rights in India.

Some of the pro-Pakistan members of American Congress have been making efforts to prevent India from getting US economic assistance on the ground of alleged violation of human rights. In this process, a prominent India-baiter Congress member Dan Burton performed his "annual duty" when he moved an amendment in the Foreign Operations Appropriation Bill. The purpose of this amendment moved in the House of Representatives was to punish India by preventing continuation of development assistance given by the United States. Burton suggested the stoppage of aid to India "Until it improves its human rights records." Such efforts are regularly made by a small *coterie* of "Pro-Pakistan" members of House of Representatives. Their aim is to harass India. A similar proposal made by Burton in 1996 was defeated as a result of vigorous efforts made by pro-India members of the US Congress. Once again in 1997, Kashmiri militants and Khalistan supporters started the campaign to stop or

reduce the developmental aid to India. Ten members of the House of Representatives, including Chairman of the Rules Committee Gerald Solomon, wrote a letter to other members of the House in which they asked them to help them in sending a message to India that the United States "will not tolerate such a friend who has its own people killed." This false and baseless allegation was levelled only to defame India. The background of Burton Amendment was that Clinton Administration had proposed (1997) to provide an additional aid for economic development of over four and a half million dollars to India. While proposing their cut Burton and others said that they would not be able to justify this increased aid to India in view of its dismal human rights record. They argued that American people are sending a part of their hard-earned income to a country (India) that does not share their moral values. Despite support by some prominent members, Burton Amendment was rejected by the US Congress. Only 82 members of the House voted for the amendment and 342 voted against it. Thus, Dan Burton's "annual duty" failed once again.

US Assistance to Pakistan after the Cold War: We have mentioned above that the Pressler Amendment of 1985 had made it obligatory to certify that Pakistan did not possess nuclear bomb, so that US grant could be released. Not only Pakistan did not get assistance after President Bush refused to certify, but even aircrafts for which Pakistan had made payment were not delivered. Pakistan had started campaign against the Pressler Amendment since 1991, and it suggested that South Asia might be declared a nuclear free zone. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif proposed in 1991 convening of 5 - nation conference to consider nuclear free zone of South Asia. Pakistan has always tried to raise the question of threat from India to her security. This is done to keep receiving US assistance. Bill Clinton, during presidential campaign of 1992 had hinted at pro-India approach. But, during his first tenure President Clinton took hardly any step to better ties with India. Pakistan was helped in 1995 when Brown Amendment authorised the US Administration to release assistance to Pakistan as well as make supplies for which Pakistan had made payment. India's Ambassador S.S. Ray had said at that time that the Brown Amendment was likely to adversely affect the Indo-US relations and economic cooperation. India's security was once again threatened because, as in the past, Pakistan could easily use the US weapons against India in any future conflict. Large scale US supplies to Pakistan were against India's national interest.

Pakistan was not satisfied with one-time waiver allowed by the Brown Amendment of 1995, which became law in 1996. Therefore, Pakistan lobby in the US prompted senators Tom Harkins, John Warner and others to propose in the Senate to provide for limited economic assistance and military training for Pakistan on regular basis. This would virtually negate the Pressler Amendment. The American multinational companies operating in Pakistan would be able to secure funds from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Also, Pakistan defence forces' officers would become entitled to advanced training in the United States under the International Military Education and Training Programme. The new arrangement, according to Senator Warner, would enable "constructive cooperation with Pakistan". He described Pakistan as a country with which US has had a long history of friendship. Thus, the US Government, (in any case, some of its leaders) had been constantly trying to strengthen Pakistan and weaken India.

There are sharp differences of opinion among foreign policy experts as to actual US policy-intentions regarding India. In fact, the United States itself has given contradictory signals. P.K. Panigrahi had written in 1996 that there were enough indications of Washington trying to gradually move closer to India. He was of the opinion that India being better placed than Pakistan, economically, politically and strategically, US felt that India could play useful role as a leading third world nation. We do not feel that the US has actually opted for India, because (a) wherever possible, the United States has always tried to equate India and Pakistan, and (b) according to US strategic planning Pakistan has been more useful and important. Somewhat similar views were expressed by eminent journalist and a nominated member of Rajya Sabha (1997) Mr. Kuldip Nayar. In his opinion there were indications that the United States was likely to modify its policy, and improve Indo-US relations. The South Asia US experts have been busy evolving strategy for improvement in Indo-US relations without sacrificing their traditional friendship with Pakistan. Although it was realised in several US quarters that Pakistan was a "failed state", yet it must continue to receive US military assistance, so that it does not develop into a pure military dictatorship. Thus, US would continue to provide assistance to Pakistan even after the collapse of communism in the post-Cold War period, yet she would try to "accommodate" India to the extent it is possible.

Economic Liberalisation in India and the United States: The United States has been very appreciative of the economic liberalisation programme. Initiated in 1985, but vigorously pursued since 1991 by the Government of P.V. Narasimha Rao. The American government strongly supported India's case for financial assistance from the institutions like the World Bank and IMF. The Second Clinton Administration asserted that it would continue to work for better economic ties with India. According to the Secretary of State Mrs. Madeline Albright, the Clinton Administration, "will encourage US trade and investment with India as it continues to carry out path-breaking economic reforms." In the growing environment of interdependence of nations, greater capital investment will make for faster economic growth. According to US Secretary of Commerce, Ronald Brown trade agreements to the tune of 4 billion dollars had been concluded by 1995 and negotiations were going on for bilateral trade of about 16 billion dollars. It is generally believed that India urgently required US investments in this country, rather than the US wanting to invest in India. But, trade relations are normally for the benefit of both the countries. The Brown Delegation had accepted that, in .the post-Cold War period, India, rather than China, was America's destination in respect of capital investment. Clinton Administration was of the opinion that India was one of the top ten emerging markets. As Secretary of State Ms. Albright had said in 1997, the US was likely to encourage commerce with India and increased investments in this country. Later, a senior State Department official Thomas Pickering also enthusiastically acknowledged that India had the potential to be an important pattern in the region. But, in view of the large size and potentials of India, the US assistance was still far from adequate.

Kuldip Nayar, an eminent journalist, and then a nominated member of the Rajya Sabha, in an article *"Estranged Democracies"* wrote in 1997:

> One would have expected a Marshall Plan to give economic content to political democracy in India. Washington did it in the case of Europe after World War II so that those democracies could once again be put on their feet. Never has such an idea been mooted for India among the policy makers in Washington. This country is democratic to the core and needs a large assistance to take off.

INDIA — A NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE

India and the United States of America are two of the largest democracies. It is argued that India, the largest democracy, and America, the most powerful democracy should be natural friends, if not allies. But, this is an idealistic assumption. Most Americans had, perhaps, thought in 1947, that India would not survive as a democracy because the system, according to them, did not suit our genius. According to Kuldip Nayar, "Many have changed their view after seeing India going to the polls and accepting a peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box". Despite numerous diversities, the United States and other Western countries have found "That India works". Still, "the cussedness has not gone." To some extent India is responsible for this situation. India was so much concerned with its security and Pakistan's friendship with America that, during the Cold War, the democratic India "had to tilt towards authoritarian communist regimes". Making this comment, Kuldip Nayar said that those postures should have changed with the end of Cold War, and wondered "why can't the two democracies start a new chapter?"

With the adoption of Harkin-Warner Amendment in the Foreign Assistance Act, India would have to examine its strategic shortcomings. America's continued assistance to Pakistan cannot enable the two largest democracies to become close friends. In mid-1997 Pakistan conducted a successful test of Haft III missile. The Chinese missile programme has also been made more sophisticated. Thus, though there has never been a direct threat to India from the United States, India's security can be threatened by continued cooperation between China and Pakistan in the latter's missile programme. According to C. Uday Bhaskar, Deputy Director of the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, India is perhaps the only country in the world whose security can be seriously threatened by two of its immediate neighbours. Whereas China is a one party nuclear power having a highly sophisticated missile system, India has always had fairly tense relations with Pakistan. These two neighbours of India have close cooperation particularly in the area of missile technology. Therefore, experts believe that India should further develop its *Agni* missile.

The United States Government has most of the time equated India and Pakistan, though it has always been more friendly with Islamabad. Reacting to an unconfirmed report in June 1997, that India had moved a small number of *Prithvi* missiles to a prospective launch site near Pakistan border, the United States warned that it would "react very negatively" if either India or Pakistan tried to deploy ballistic missiles along their borders. The US authorities considered preparation to deploy ballistic missiles as a negative development at a time when there were clear signs of a *detente* between India and Pakistan. Clinton Administration felt that move by India was "completely contrary to the only good news that we have seen in a very long time" on Indo-Pakistan relations. This good news obviously was Gujral-Nawaz Sharif meeting at Male (see Chapter 5). Thus, the US considered deployment of ballistic missiles either by India or Pakistan as a destablising factor "that would underline the security of both the countries". India, however, denied having deployed missiles along the border.

It is unfortunate that even after the end of Cold War, the United States has its sympathies with Pakistan. Prakash Nanda opined that the stationing of *Prithvi* missiles (not their deployment) disturbed the US yet it completely ignored the Haft III test by Pakistan. An American official went to the extent of saying that in view of "what India had done", the action of Pakistan was natural and justifiable. It was widely believed till mid-1997 that the United States was still looking at South Asia with the glasses coloured with the Cold War.

The growing understanding of India's position by the United States was recognised by America's Ambassador in New Delhi, Frank Wisner who said in April 1997 that the area of disagreement between India and the US "has vastly shrunk and the relationship between the two nations is now on firmer ground". The Ambassador felt that the points of agreement vastly out numbered the differences between the two countries. The two main differences pertained to the nuclear policy including the signing of NPT and CTBT, and continued American ties with Pakistan. But what was remarkable was the way in which

even these differences were being managed. Wisner concluded that Asia was expected to play a major role in the 21st century and, "thus US needed India as a strong partner for ensuring peace and, stability in the continent."

It is in this background that President Clinton met the Prime Minister Mr. I.K. Gujral in September 1997, and also his Pakistan counterpart. For the first time, US President made a welcome move when he made it clear that the United States had no intention of mediating on the Kashmir issue. Clinton made it clear that if India and Pakistan could resolve their differences bilaterally that would be the most welcome development. At the end of 1997 there were clear signs of improvement in the Indo-US relation, as both India and Pakistan were engaged in taking confidence-building measures. The seriousness with which Prime Ministers Inder Kumar Gujral and Nawaz Sharif Initiated steps to find solutions to all outstanding bilateral issues was appreciated in the United States, and the Clinton Administration was likely to re-examine its entire Asia policy. But the problem is that the US interests appeared to be mainly limited to market operations. America's approach is largely determined by the extent to which its goods are sought in a certain country, but relations cannot be made-cordial simply by increase in bilateral trade. India has its own culture; its own values, Industry, agriculture, laboratories, dams and high-rise buildings are important, but they can't be the end by themselves. These can only be means. We cannot ignore the spiritual and moral aspects of life which are basic to our culture and civilisation. Gujral Government of India was as keen as Clinton Administration to prove Indo-US ties, but it is essential that India does not sacrifice its national interests and protects its self-respect. If that can be ensured and if the United States gives up the policy of equating India and Pakistan, Indo-US relations can be improved and the two largest democracies can set an example of political and economic cooperation.

Indo-US relations received a serious setback when India exercised its nuclear option, conducted five nuclear tests, including one thermonuclear weapon in May 1998, and declared itself to be a nuclear weapon state. This annoyed the United States and other nuclear weapon states as also Japan. They (except France) refused to accept India as a nuclear weapon state. Instead, the US insisted that India must sign the CTBT. India's argument was that having announced unilateral moratorium on further tests India was following the spirit of CTBT without subscribing to the treaty which continued to be discriminatory. India told the world that China, in the north, was already a nuclear weapon state. She had allegedly helped Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons. Thus, there was a grave threat to India's security which compelled this country to exercise its nuclear option to be a deterrent.

In June 1998, India and the United States started the strategic talks to reach an agreement on the US demand of India signing the CTBT, and India's insistence on meeting its security requirements. Between June 1998 and January

2000 ten rounds of talks were held on the twin issues between US President Clinton's envoy Strobe Talbott and Prime Minister Vajpayee's representative Jaswant Singh. India made it clear that it would adhere to CTBT only if her security was ensured, and steps initiated for total nuclear disarmament.

Speaking in New York in September 1998, Vajpayee criticised the United States for its lack of appreciation and accommodation of India's national interests and concerns and called for restructuring of Indo-US relations. The Prime Minister criticised the "hypocrisy and hegemony" of the nuclear powers, and said that they had sought to perpetuate their hegemony through discriminatory, non-proliferation regime. Despite "similar political cultures" and absence of "conflict of interests", America had been reluctant to accept India as a responsible member of the international community.

The relations between the world's two largest democracies suddenly improved during and after the Kargil crisis. Credit for this development must be given (i) to Pakistan for having created a muddle in Kargil, and for having given the evidence that it did not have respect for treaties and laws and that it had been giving assistance and encouragement to cross border terrorism against India; (ii) to India having acquired nuclear weapons and its bold and courageous stand against discriminatory non-proliferation regime and the CTBT, and that India had the courage of conviction to announce unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and the doctrine of no-first-use; and (iii) to the Clinton Administration itself for having realised that India was soon going to be a power to be reckoned with and that Indian economy had become vibrant and stable that it could easily withstand not only economic sanctions but also the expenses in the Kargil war. Americans came to the conclusion that India could not be coerced; it could perhaps be persuaded.

India is a grateful nation. It appreciated the rational and practical response of the United States to the Kargil conflict and the role President Clinton played in defusing tension. A message to this effect was conveyed to the US administration by Mr. J.N. Dixit, former Foreign Secretary. Responding to the question 'After Kargil what' Mr. Dixit said that India should build on this new trend manifested in American policy and make this development a benchmark for taking bilateral relations off certain old grooves. It was noted by Mr. Dixit and Mr. N.N. Vohra, the former Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, that the US authorities had perceived the contrast between Pakistan's action in Kashmir and India's response which was necessary and unavoidable, yet it was restrained. While there still are differences in such areas as the non-proliferation agenda and the flow of technology, the defined objective of the United States now is to see the potentialities of expanded political relations with India. Americans also realise the strength of Indian economy. It was generally believed in both the countries that the issues relating to non-proliferation could be easily sorted out through negotiations which were resumed after the installation of new government in India in October 1999.

The meeting between India's Minister of External Affairs Mr. Jaswant Singh and Foreign Ministers of several countries on the sidelines of UN General Assembly session in September 1999 showed greater appreciation of India's position on various issues related to security, disarmament and arms control. A significant development was the refusal of the United States Secretary of State Mrs. Albright to accept Pakistani request to send a special envoy for Kashmir. The United States made it clear to Pakistan that it had absolutely no intention of any sort of mediation between India and Pakistan. This again is an achievement of Indian diplomacy.

There were clear indications of changing US attitude towards India by early 2000. The US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott acknowledged, in an exclusive interview with *The Hindu,* that nobody could deny that India had become a nuclear weapon-state (NWS) after its May 1998 tests. Talbott also acknowledged that India's security interests and concerns were not limited to the subcontinent only. The US agreed that it was India's sovereign right to ensure its nuclear security. Talbott accepted that India could sign the CTBT without destroying its nuclear weapons.

Another significant development in Indo-US ties has been America's acknowledgement that it favoured a "stable, secure, powerful and united India". This declaration assumed special significance in the background of military *coup* in Pakistan in October 1999 that brought in General Musharraf as Chief Executive, and deposition and arrest of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Strobe Talbott insisted that India and the United States would never be military adversaries, and that in future the two countries would cooperate with each other more effectively. US was keen on restoration of democracy in Pakistan, which was only partially done with the appointment of Jamali Government in 2003. The US Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT had indeed been a major setback to Clinton Administration, yet it hoped that the treaty would soon be ratified.

The United States argued that though its trade and political relations with China had considerably improved, yet the Tianenmien Square massacre could not be forgotten. Thus, the democratic and stable India occupied an important place in the US policy. The US acknowledged that despite friendly relations with Pakistan, for over 50 years, it must make all efforts for better and cordial relations with India. The time had come that tense Indo-US relations must be replaced by cooperative, friendly and cordial relations between two largest democracies. The initiative taken by President Clinton to improve and consolidate friendly ties with India, was likely to be pursued to its logical end by President George W. Bush who was inaugurated in January 2001. Both

India and the US were keen to end cross-border terrorism, and make the two largest democracies work together for peace and economic prosperity.

CLINTON'S VISIT TO INDIA

President Bill Clinton himself paid a visit to India in March 2000. This was first visit of a US President after 22 years. Once in India, Clinton established a warm and friendly rapport not only with Prime Minister Vajpayee but also with the whole lot of political leadership as well as common men and women. On the eve of his visit, External Affairs Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh had said that India and the United States must put behind them the 'wasted decades' of the Cold War and look for a new relationship in the 21st century, Mr. Singh said that the Clinton visit would help set the 'direction' of the new relationship. So it did. Mr. Clinton himself said that he was dreaming of this visit for years. Clinton said: "India's economy is one of the ten fastest ... in the world, its thriving high technology sector is one of the brightest spots in the new global economy". He added, "After 50 years of missed opportunities, its time that America and India become better friends and stronger partners. We should find common ground in opening the global trading system in a way that lifts the lives of rich and poor alike."

A new chapter was certainly added to Indo-US relationship during Clinton's visit to New Delhi. The two countries moved closer to each other in an attempt to find a framework to reduce Indo-Pakistan tension. Clinton declared: "You cannot expect a dialogue to go forward unless there is an absence of violence and a respect for line of control." The US endorsed India's position that there can be no resumption of talks between India and Pakistan till the latter abandoned violence on the LoC and created proper atmosphere. The US President emphasised this point in his address to our Parliament, and also during his brief stop over in Pakistan. He made it clear that boundaries cannot be altered by bloodshed. In this connection the US President put across four 'Rs'. These are *restraint* by both India and Pakistan, *respect* for the Line of Control; *renewal* of the Indo-Pak dialogue; and the *rejection* of violence.

At the end of their summit level talks between President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee a historic document, called 'Vision for the 21st century' was signed by the two leaders and released. Taking pride in being the two largest democracies, India and the US declared: "From vastly different origins and experiences, we have come to the same conclusions that freedom and democracy are the strongest bases for both peace and prosperity, and that they are universal aspirations, constrained neither by culture nor levels of economic development." The two countries pledged to be partners in peace, and shared a commitment to reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. They promised to work together to preserve stability and growth in the global economy, and to join in an unrelenting battle against poverty so that the promise of a new economy is felt everywhere and no nation is left behind." The Vision Statement went on to state that, "Today, we pledge to deepen the Indian-American partnership in tangible ways, always seeking to reconcile our differences through dialogue and engagement. Therefore, the US President and Indian Prime Minister should meet regularly to institutionalise the bilateral dialogue." While the two countries drew closer on several issues, they agreed to disagree on the nuclear question. While the US reiterated its belief that "India should forego nuclear weapons", India proclaimed its determination to "maintain a credible minimum deterrent".

Despite this one disagreement, India and the United States came closer to each other than ever before. After the Clinton visit, the two countries continued the process of further consolidating their friendship. One very encouraging outcome of Clinton's visit was the US reappraisal of its policy towards South Asia. Clinton clearly told Pakistan's Chief Executive that his country must create conditions for a dialogue with India, stop trying to "redraw" borders with blood, and that the United States was not going to mediate in the Kashmir dispute. Clinton clearly denounced terrorism. In a TV address to the people of Pakistan, Clinton supported the Lahore Process (initiated during Vajpayee's bus trip in February 1999), as the vehicle to resolve differences. He called upon the Pakistanis to "intensify efforts to defeat those who inflict terror". India, naturally, welcomed the tough message that Clinton gave in Islamabad. Clinton's visit had successfully raised high hopes, and the media even talked of "Clintonomania" that had hit the towns (New Delhi). While there was general enthusiasm in the media, there were reservations also. While C. Raja Mohan had said the objective was to create basis for sustainable and productive engagement between India and the US, P.R. Chari was of the view that assertions that Indo-US relations were normalising were decidedly premature. The US was unlikely to abandon its present nuanced policy towards India and, for that matter, China and Pakistan.

In a historic address to the members of Indian Parliament, President Clinton lavished praise on India and its achievements, emphasising the important political and social lessons it offered the world. He made a powerful, emotional, plea for nuclear restraint, saying that this was necessary for the sake of innocents, and yet he said that final decision (on nuclear weapon issue) must be taken by sovereign India. He also argued, in regard to Indo-US relations, that it was time to leave behind old suspicions and take fresh initiatives. He reminded that the US diplomacy had recently (1999) succeeded in "urging the Pakistanis to retreat behind the Line of Control in the Kargil Crisis". He also sought to dispel the Cold War period suspicion that the US did not want a powerful India. He said, "America very much wants you to succeed'. The Prime Minister Mr. Vajpayee responded by talking about India and the United

States as "natural allies". *The Hindu* wrote that, "Mr. Clinton proved to be a charming interlocutor", and came to the conclusion that while the greater momentum in Indo-US relations "is welcome and indeed necessary, its best expression would be found in deepening and expansion economic and cultural exchanges."

As India and the United State were busy, in mid-2000, building new partnership, Pakistan continued to talk of dialogue and yet supported *jehad*, and kept up encouragement to cross-border terrorism. One issue on which US remained silent is India's desire for a permanent seat in the expanded Security Council.

The year 2000 could be described as the period belonging to Indian diplomacy. As Kremmer wrote (May 1, 2000), "Gone are those shrill attempts to isolate India for the nuclear tests; Gone... are the demands for India to sign the CTBT or else; Gone too are the accusations that India has turned Kashmir into a nuclear flashpoint". Foreign diplomats and leaders began to say that the "nuclear issue is only one aspect of the relationship." One of the major critics of India's nuclear tests, and its veto on CTBT, was Australia. But, things changed very fast. As a journalist wrote, "Foreign dignitaries are racing past each other to get to the newly sanctified portals of South Bloc. Australia's foreign minister Alexander Downer, almost stepped on Clinton's toes..." He arrived while US President was still in India. India's Minister of External Affairs secured a promise of resuming the defence ties with Australia. Mr. Downer said in an interview, that independent of US-India relations, Australia sought closer links with India. "India" he said, "is the world's largest democracy, and we recognise its strategic importance in the Indian Ocean and its increasing importance as a global player."

GEORGE W. BUSH AND INDO-US RELATIONS

The Bush Administration rapidly befriended Pakistan after September 11, 2001, as its leader Parvez Musharraf promised to join hands with the US and its allies in the fight against Taliban and other elements in international terrorism. It is well-known that the Taliban were largely created by Pakistan, but George W. Bush needed Pakistan and the latter needed him to change the US attitude of Clinton period. After September 11, 2001, the US gave up the not-so-friendly attitude towards China. Like most other countries, India promised support to the US in its struggle against terrorism, reminding the US that India had been a victim of cross-border terrorism for over two decades.

For the first time in September 2002, the Bush Administration put India in the category of great powers, and, according to C. Raja Mohan *(Crossing the Rubicon)*, the US "suggested an Indian role in Asian balance of power and contrasted a positive approach towards India with a more critical one toward, China." The transformation in the US-India relations was based on the conviction that the US interest required a strong relationship with India. The then US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill declared in late 2002 that, peace within Asia was an objective that a transformed US-India relationship would help advance. Thus, both India and the United States began working to strengthen their relationship in various spheres. As Ambassador Blackwill said, "A strong US-India partnership contributing to the construction of a peaceful and prosperous Asia binds the resources of the world's most powerful and most populous democracies in support of freedom, political moderation, and economic and technological development."

The process that was initiated by Clinton and Vajpayee was carried forward by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush. The two leaders met in Washington D.C. in July 2005 and in March 2006 in Delhi. In 2005 the two leaders declared their resolve to transform the relationship of US and India "to establish a global partnership". As both are committed to values of human freedom, democracy and rule of law, the two countries will promote stability, democracy, prosperity and peace throughout the world." The two countries pledged to create an international environment conducive to promotion of democratic values, and to combat terrorism relentlessly. The pledge was also to support and accelerate economic growth through greater trade, investment and technology collaboration. They also resolved to strengthen energy security.

What was highly significant was the signing of an Indo-American Nuclear Agreement to separate India's civil and military nuclear facilities. The US Hoped that this would lead to prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (See Indo-US Nuclear Deal below).

Commenting on India as a rising global power, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice wrote (2006): "As a rising global power, India can be a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia and a strategic partner for the US as we meet the challenges of 21st century." Rice added, "America and India have so much in common... From the very beginning ... President George W. Bush wanted to make the transformation of US-India relationship one of our top priorities." She said that the US and India have indeed achieved this transformation. Rice argued that this is a "spirit of partnership between the people of India and the United States." 65,000 Americans living in India were attracted by its growing economy, and millions of people of Indian origin living in the US were not only helping in addition of wealth, but also helping enrich its character. This development of Post-Pokhran II period has indeed brought two democratic societies together.

Both the countries began working together to maintain peace and stability in the Indian Ocean. The former US Secretary of State Colin Powell had already highlighted Indo-US relations in the context of Indian Ocean, rather than China as a factor. However, Pakistan remained a major point of difference in the Indo-US relationship, though even in September 2003, President Bush was reported to have told Pakistani President Musharraf that he must ensure that all sources of cross-border terrorism against India operating from Pakistan were dismantled and terrorism stopped.

The strategic cooperation between India and the United States was manifested in joint exercises conducted by the two countries. The last of the three exercises was successfully conducted in October 2003 in the Indian Ocean.

However, the two countries held different views on the question of military action against Iraq in the summer of 2003. India, like Russia, France and Germany, was against any action without authorisation by the UN Security Council. Despite opposition by several countries, the US President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair went ahead with their military operations in which President Saddam Hussein was ousted, later captured and finally hanged. They failed to recover any alleged weapons of mass destruction. Later, when the United States requested India to send its troops to Iraq for stabilisation, India declined to do that till a specific UN call was made. Even then India would have to consider its security situation in view of continued Pak-sponsored cross-border terrorism.

Meanwhile, India and the United States were negotiating for nearly two years (since 2001) the signing of an agreement for "The Trinity". This would ensure cooperation in the areas of high technology trade, space launch and civilian nuclear industry. According to US Secretary of State Colin Powell, the "glide path" was ready by October 2003. The agreement when concluded would deal with a number of aspects including the problem areas. The US Secretary of State said in Washington:

> We have really structured a new relationship with the Indians and it is a quite strong and satisfactory relationship. There was a basket of issues that they (Indians) were always asking us about... we nicknamed it "The Trinity".

The Trinity was being seen as "glide path" for better Indo-US relations. The path would open up the transfer of high tech and open a new chapter in the bilateral relations. According to an Indian official, the agreement would create "a more comfortable and friendlier regime", even though the US restrictions on high tech exports to India would not be completely lifted. Writing in October 2003, Manoj Joshi (*The Times of India*) said that, "The agreement will enable India to access US civilian nuclear power, space and other high-technologies. In return, New Delhi will ensure that these technologies do not leak to third parties, or to India's military nuclear and missile programmes."

Another area of likely cooperation was the "Proliferation Security Initiative", or PSI. The idea mooted by President Bush in May 2003 moved rapidly with meetings almost every month. By October 2003, eleven countries were willing to participate in the agreement that would entitle the participants to search planes and ships, trains and trucks carrying suspect cargo. The searches would be to detect and seize and weapons of mass destruction or missiles that raise possibility of proliferation. The 11 nations participating in the PSI were the US, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Australia, Poland, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. It was expected China and Russia would also soon join the PSI scheme. Meanwhile, India was also examining the possibility of joining the PSI in the larger context of its non-proliferation policy. President Bush in his address to the UN General Assembly in September 2003 called upon the Security Council to "adopt a new anti-proliferation resolution." In Europe, the PSI was being hailed as a return to multilateralism by the US after its unilateral action in Iraq. India did feel the need to curb proliferation in its own national interest. For example, in 1999, India had seized a shipment of North Korean missile components on route to Pakistan. India required support of international community in checking threat to its security through proliferation. As C. Raja Mohan concluded, "The PSI is now proclaiming the right to interdict ships not merely in coastal waters but also on international waters, which traditionally guaranteed freedom of high seas."

INDO-US NUCLEAR DEAL

An agreement of far-reaching consequences was concluded between India and the United States, during Manmohan Singh's visit to the US, on July 18, 2005. The agreement known as Indo-US Nuclear Agreement aimed at separation of India's civil and military nuclear facilities and at US resuming civil nuclear cooperation that was suspended after our first test conducted in 1974. This agreement provides for civilian nuclear cooperation on India fulfilling certain conditions, and on US Congress approving changes in their domestic laws to enable the cooperation.

It was announced on behalf on the US that President George W. Bush committed himself to work to achieve "full civil nuclear cooperation with India" on the ground that "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other states." The main points in the deal were spelt out as under:

India will assume same responsibilities as other countries with advanced nuclear programmed, and that India agreed to:

- Identify and separate civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes and file an IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) declaration regarding its civilian facilities;

- Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards;
- Sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities;
- Continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
- Work with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty;
- Refrain from the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not have them and support efforts to limit their spread; and
- Secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The United States reciprocally promised that the Administration will:

- Seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and policies;
- Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India; and
- Consult with partners on India's participation in the fusion energy consortium ITER and support India's part in work to develop advanced nuclear reactors.

Two significant points must be highlighted. These are: (a) the United States refuses to accept India as a nuclear weapon state, and refers to it as a state with 'advanced nuclear technology'; and (b) India agreed to separate its military nuclear facilities from civilian facilities which are to be placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Both these points are contrary to the national interest of India. The critics in India justifiably object to this country not being described as a nuclear weapon state, which is the status this country had acquired and announced in May 1998. India, as Prime Minister Vajpayee had declared, is indeed a nuclear weapon state, whether the world recognises that, or not. In fact all the countries know that India possesses nuclear weapons, and that it would maintain only minimum nuclear deterrence. Vajpayee had also declared in 1998 that India would not conduct any more nuclear tests. Interestingly, this has been recognised by the Americans when they hoped India would continue its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing (see above). Secondly, why should India agree to separate its civil and military facilities? This was strongly criticised by former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in July 2005 soon after the Deal was signed.

During President Bush's visit to India in March 2006, separation plan was announced, ignoring the sharp criticism of the deal. Indian leadership appeared to be happy that the USA would cooperate with India's civil nuclear programme, and ensure supplies for this programme from 44-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It was agreed under the Deal that out of 22 thermal power reactors in India, 14 civilian units would be identified and placed under the IAEA safeguards beginning in 2006. The process in a phased manner would be completed by 2014. However, India would not place its prototype Fast Breeder Reactors under the IAEA safeguards.

The deal required certain changes in American domestic laws to permit civilian nuclear cooperation. This was approved by the US Congress in November, 2006 but it did not fully address India's concern. The law enacted by US Congress is known as Hyde Act.

Under the agreement US promised to sell nuclear materials and equipment to India and also to involve it in 'advanced' areas research. In an article titled "US, India Open Can of Nuclear Arms", leftist commentator Praful Bidwal wrote "... this could add a role for India in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor ... In return India would "assume the same responsibilities "and" acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology." This in effect means India as one of the nuclear weapon states, though the US is shy of admitting that India is a nuclear weapon state, but it treats us as such a state. India is sought to be brought into the non-proliferation regime even if it does not sign the NPT. Meanwhile a view was being expressed in India that it would be better to formally join the NPT rather than adhere to the Indo-US nuclear deal. India would be free to walk out of NPT, but cannot terminate its commitments under the Bush-Manmohan agreement.

Meanwhile, Russia and the US committed themselves to expand nuclear energy cooperation with India. Russia appeared to have fallen in line with the US Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a joint statement at St. Petersburg on the sideline of G-8, meeting in July 2006, "We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India." According to Secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, "Our civilian nuclear agreement is a critical contributions" to new US-India partnership.

Criticism of the Nuclear Deal: Former Prime Minister Vajpayee was the first to express concern at the separation of civil and military nuclear facilities. Former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh later told the *Times of India* that the Indo-US agreement was likely to be the only achievement of Bush in matters of foreign policy, but India should be conscious about it. He added, "The signal achievement of 1998 was to give India strategic autonomy", but if India's U.P.A. Government diminishes that autonomy or squanders its gains" then this could not be condoned.

Even defence analysts and scientists expressed concern at the deal and said in July 2006 that the Indian Government still had time to "rethink" about it.

They were of the opinion that the government was not paying sufficient attention to the "pitfalls and weaknesses" of the deal. According to defence analyst Bharat Karnad, "The kind of things mentioned in the Preamble of the deal has all things like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Iran Issue, which we cannot ignore." Former Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, P.K. Iyengar said, "It is now obvious that in spite of the exemptions to be approved by the US Congress, the American President will have to certify every year"... that he is satisfied with the behaviour and programmes of India in nuclear field..." He was of the opinion that it would cap India's strategic programme for a minimum credible deterrent. This was also the opinion of Siddharth Vardarajan, and was even echoed by the B.J.P.

The nuclear scientist Homi Sethna went to the extent of suggesting that India would be better off signing the discriminatory NPT because we "Will still be allowed to exit whereas the Indo-US deal will remain bound in perpetuity." Eight top nuclear scientists urged the Indian Parliament (August 2006) not to allow lowering of the flag of Indian sovereignty in regard to scientific research and strategic policy-making. The conditionalities proposed by US House of Representatives were aimed at limiting our freedom, and "to restrain in perpetuity our nuclear strategic (arms) programme." The scientists included three former Chairmen of India's Atomic Energy Commission H.N. Sethna, M.R. Srinivasan and P.K. Iyengar. Their view was that external (IAEA) safeguards should be limited only to the facilities imported by us not to all our civilian facilities. It would be contrary to our national interest to agree to the conditionalities propounded by the US Congress.

The 123 Agreement envisaged to implement the nuclear deal was being negotiated for over two years. It is called 123 Agreement as an agreement to supply nuclear fuel etc. is essential under Article 123 of US Atomic Energy Act. The hopefuls argue that it had taken 10 years for US-Japan 123 Agreement to be concluded after prolonged negotiations. India was not willing to accept conductionalities of the Hyde Act providing that US would stop civilians' nuclear cooperation if India conducted another test. Accepting this condition would be a compromise with India's sovereignty. In any case, India has a self-imposed voluntary moratorium on further nuclear tests. Secondly, India was not willing to accept the condition that it cannot reprocess the used fuel. In 2007, the agreement (123) and seeking approval of Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) were being awaited. India would seek safeguards from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only after conclusion of Agreement 123.

Chapter 12

India and the Soviet Union

INDO-USSR RELATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

When India attained independence, the Cold War had already begun and the world had almost become bipolar. The United States and the former Soviet Union had emerged as the Super Powers who led the two power blocs. India having decided to remain non-aligned, was looked upon with skepticism more by the Soviet Union than by the Western Bloc. However, pre-independence India had been favourably disposed towards the Soviet Union ever since Nehru was greatly impressed not only by the Russian Revolution of 1917, but also by the planned economic development brought about in the Soviet Union in accordance with the socialist ideology. Nehru had visited the USSR in 1927. He was head of Foreign Department of the Congress. Indian leadership was quite appreciative of the Soviet support to the cause of India's freedom. Nehru had tried, soon after independence, to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union as well as the United States. Indo-Soviet relationship had its roots, on the one hand in the struggle against Western imperialism and colonialism, and on the other hand in India's national interest. This growing friendship between India and the USSR was strongly resented by the United States which saw, in the emerging relationship, the Soviet attempt to spread communist ideology in South Asia.

The pro-Soviet and anti-West attitude can be summed up in Nehru's words written as far back as 1929. He had written:

> We have grown up in the tradition, carefully nurtured by England of hostility to Russia. For long years past the bogy of Russian invasion has been held up to us and has made the excuse of vast expenditure on our armaments ... The two countries today are too similar to be exploited and there can be no economic motive for Russia to covet India ... ordinarily Russia and India should live as the best of neighbours with the fewest points of friction.

The situation was completely altered after the Second World War. Britain, as a victorious ally, was indeed recognised as one of the Big Powers, but the real power had passed into the hands of the two Super Powers. Since, both

Britain and USSR were allies in the Second World War their pre-war rivalry had disappeared. But, as mentioned earlier, a new rivalry between USA and USSR came to stay. It is in this atmosphere of Cold War rivalry that India tried to develop friendly relations with both the power blocs.

After the attainment of independence, the relations between India and the Soviet Union could not develop along the lines envisaged by Nehru in his above-mentioned views. Certain tensions appeared in the Indo-Soviet relations largely because of Stalin's rigid approach implying that all those who were not communists were against the Soviet Union. Specially, India's decision in 1949, to remain a member of the Commonwealth, even after becoming a republic, caused irritation in the Soviet Union. Secondly, India's opposition to Pro-Soviet developments in Malaya also made Stalin unhappy. Thirdly, India's support to Greece against possible communist expansion caused bitterness in the Indo-Soviet relationship. Finally, India's decision to adopt the policy of non-alignment was not appreciated in the Soviet Union and interpreted as India's pro-western policy.

The manner in which relations between India and the United States had undergone ups and downs did not exactly happen with Soviet Union. Nevertheless, occasional changes in the warmth of Indo-Soviet relations were clearly visible. While India could not develop with the Soviet Union friendly relations as she would have desired during the life time of Stalin, Indo-USSR relations became very cordial during and after the Khruschev period. Commenting on Indo-Soviet relations in the post-Stalin era, M.C. Chagla had opined in 1971, that the Soviet Union proved to be our friend whenever India faced crises, and "a friend in need is a friend indeed." According to him, the Soviet Union had recognised the importance of India, and of Asia as a whole.

Prime Minister Nehru had made it clear to the Soviet Union that while remaining aloof from the Super Power conflict, and following the policy of non-alignment, India desired strong friendly ties with the USSR. There was similarity of views between the two countries on the questions of colonialism and disarmament, yet they did not see eye to eye on the policy of non-alignment. Nevertheless, the two countries cooperated with each other on several occasions. When India raised the issue of apartheid, then being practiced in South Africa, the Western countries put it off in the United Nations on the pretext that it was a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of South Africa. At that time, Soviet delegate Vyshinsky supported India and told the United Nations that the problem of racial discrimination was indeed an international issue, it did not pertain to domestic jurisdiction of South Africa. But, as mentioned earlier, Stalin felt that India's policy of non-alignment was actually a pro-capitalist policy. Perhaps, that was one reason why India's Ambassador to the Soviet Union Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit failed to meet Stalin even once during her one year stay in Moscow. At that time most of the leaders in India also had serious doubts about the policies of the Soviet Union.

India made consistent efforts to clear the misunderstandings of the Soviet Union. India was among the first few countries to have recognised the People's Republic of China within three months of the completion of communist revolution. The People's Republic of China was granted recognition by India on December 30, 1949. It proved that India believed in pursuing the policy based on principles and truth. A trade agreement was concluded between India and the Soviet Union in 1949 itself. It was provided in the agreement that the Soviet Union would import from India tea and raw jute. In return, the USSR was to export to India 20 lakh tonnes of wheat and maize. The agreement also, had a provision for exchange of technical experts. But many intellectuals and officials in India were not very happy about this provision of Indo-Soviet agreement. The then Union Home Secretary of India H.V. Iyenger had written to Foreign Secretary K.P.S. Menon that, this provision would provide a cover for Soviet secret service agents to come to India as technical experts, and destroy India's free economy. But, the Foreign Secretary assured him that no such thing was going to happen. Stalin died in 1953. A clear shift in his attitude was noticed before his death. India's recognition of Communist China, its ceaseless efforts to secure representation to People's Republic of China in the UN, its opposition to the conclusion of US-Japanese treaty in 1951, and the adoption of a free and fearless policy by India in the Korean War (particularly after the first phase) led Stalin to praise and appreciate India's position. Stalin gladly granted an interview to our Ambassador Dr. S. Radhakrishnan. Thus, by 1953 improvement in Indo-Soviet relations was clearly visible.

After the Korean crisis the relations between the two countries began to improve, though in the early phase of the crisis a serious tension had developed between India and the Soviet Union. When India accepted the Security Council resolution in June 1950 describing North Korea as the aggressor the Soviet Union adopted a hostile posture. But later, when India strongly criticised the United States, particularly General MacArthur, for having threatened China after penetrating deep into North Korea the entire communist world was appreciative of India's stand. Earlier, India's recognition of People's Republic of China and its anti-colonial stand in the UN had removed the prevailing misgivings in the USSR.

Khruschev and Indo-Soviet Relations: Indo-Soviet relations took a new turn after the death of Stalin in March 1953. Nikita Khruschev became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and he initiated limited liberalisation in the rigid policies of his predecessor, Stalin. In April 1954, as mentioned in earlier chapters, India and China initiated the famous five principles of *Panchsheel*, as basis of bilateral relations. The principle of peaceful co-existence was particularly appreciated all over. By 1955, many other countries had endorsed the principles of *Panchsheel.* Prime Minister Nehru paid a visit to the USSR in June 1955, and impressed the Soviet people by his effective advocacy of peaceful co-existence. A joint communique issued at the end of Nehru's visit referred to the commitment of both the countries to regulate their bilateral relations in accordance with *Panchsheel,* and that both India and the Soviet Union would cooperate with each other for mutual benefit and public welfare. Soviet Prime Minister Bulgarian and Communist Party General Secretary Khruschev paid a three-week visit to India in November 1955. This was an unprecedented event, as no Soviet Prime Minister had earlier gone abroad on a state visit. Nehru and the Soviet Prime Minister declared that all conditions necessary for bilateral trade and economic cooperation and development between India and the Soviet Union were made available on the basis of equality and mutual benefit addressing the members of Indian Parliament, Bulgarian said that, "We are willing to share with you our economic and scientific experiences". Assuring the Indians of Soviet help Khruschev said, "Whenever you need our help, you may call us from the top of the hills, we will immediately rush to your aid". The Soviet Union made it clear that it accepted the state of Jammu & Kashmir as integral part of India. Supporting the demand of liberation of Goa and its merger with the Indian Union, the Soviet leaders called upon Portugal to immediately leave Goa and other Portuguese colonial pockets. This led to increase in Indo-Soviet economic and cultural cooperation.

One area in which Soviet Union has solidly stood by India was in regard to India's dispute with Pakistan. The main dispute, namely, the question of Kashmir has stood in the way of normalisation of Indo-Pak relations for over fifty years (see Chapter 5). When in 1952 the issue of Kashmir came up in the Security Council as the Grahram Report was being discussed, the Soviet Union alleged that the Kashmir question was evading solution because of the interference by the Anglo-American Bloc which was supporting the imperialist policy of Pakistan. The Soviet Union had also opposed the sending of foreign forces to Kashmir. By 1955, Soviet Union had clearly taken a pro-India stand and declared unequivocally that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India. The two countries adopted the identical position on the Suez crisis in 1956 and condemned the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. However, later in 1956 itself, some misunderstanding developed between the two countries on the question of Hungary. India's half-hearted demand that the people of Hungary should be allowed to determine their future according to their own wishes and that the foreign forces (Soviet forces) should be withdrawn was greatly resented by USSR, though many critics in India opined that Nehru Government should have been more forthcoming in its criticism of the Soviet intervention in Hungary. As a matter of fact, when the question of Soviet intervention was debated in the UN General Assembly, and a resolution

condemning armed Soviet intervention in Hungary was put to vote, India had abstained. Thus India did not unequivocally condemn the Soviet action. What was most unfortunate was India's decision to vote in favour of the Soviet Union when a 5-Power resolution calling for free elections in Hungary was put to vote. In other words India, indirectly, supported the Soviet action. There was a strong reaction in India against our pro-Soviet stand in the United Nations. Prominent amongst the strongest critics of India's stand was Jayprakash Narain. Many critics demanded immediate recall of India's representative to the United Nations, V.K. Krishna Menon. Mr. Krishna Menon claimed that he had voted, against the 5-Power resolution, in support of the USSR on his own, because he had not received any instructions from the Government of India. However, Nehru's secretary denied this, and asserted that on Nehru's orders he himself had asked Krishna Menon to abstain. These clear directions were flouted by Menon. It is in this background that, as mentioned above, India half-heartedly and reluctantly called for withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. Even that was done in a vague language. However, relations between India and the Soviet Union continued to grow despite the Hungarian episode. In 1961, when India used its armed forces for the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese colonial rule, Soviet Union extended full support to India's position.

Soviet Union gave consistent support to India on the question of Jammu & Kashmir, and exercised veto in the Security Council on several occasions, in favour of India. Trade relations gradually improved between the two countries. The bilateral relations were further consolidated during 1960-65 period, though there were certain problems in 1962 when China waged a war on India's borders. Initially, the Soviet attitude was not very sympathetic to India. The official Soviet publication *Pravada* described the McMahon Line as an imperialist line. This was a clear support to the position taken by China. Not only this, the Soviet Union decided to postpone the promised supply of 22 MIG aircrafts. This caused some bitterness in the Indo-Soviet relations, but it was soon overcome. At the same time China was very unhappy with the USSR because the latter did not openly support China during the war.

The Cuban missile crisis also occurred in October 1962. The Soviet ships carrying nuclear missiles to Cuba were forced to return home because America had resorted to Cuba's blockade. If the Soviet ships were not ordered to return, there was every possibility of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet decision to recall its ships was bitterly criticised by China. Soviet Union, on the other hand, criticised China for its rejection of the Colombo Proposals (Chapter 6) to resolve the Sino-Indian problem. Soon afterwards, Soviet Union resumed military supplies to India which were suspended during 1962 Sino-Indian border war.

Indo-Soviet Relations during the Brezhnev Era: Prime Minister Nehru died in May 1964. He was succeeded by his trusted, low-profile colleague Lal Bahadur Shastri. In the Soviet Union also change of power had occurred. Khruschev had been over thrown in a "*party-coup*". Khruschev was at that time holding the twin offices of Prime Minister and General Secretary of the Communist Party. He was overthrown by a *troika* of three prominent party men. They were Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin. Khruschev was succeeded as Party General Secretary by Brezhnev. He became the most powerful leader. Kosygin became the Prime Minister, and Podgorny took over as Chairman of the Presidium, which means he became 'President' of the USSR. Brezhnev remained at the helm of affairs from 1964 till his death in 1983.

Indo-Soviet relations were consolidated during 1960-65 period. The Soviet involvement in the sub-continent increased considerably in 1965. By that time, relations between Pakistan and China had become warm and friendly, though Pakistan continued to be an active member of the American Bloc, and its military alliances such as SEATO. At the same time, Sino-Soviet conflict was widening, so much so, that the Chinese began describing the USSR as a revisionist power led by social reactionaries.

During 1965, the relations between India and Pakistan become so tense that a war appeared imminent in the summer on the question of the dispute regarding the Rann of Kutch. The war was avoided as the dispute was referred to arbitration. But President Ayub Khan of Pakistan was determined to seek military solution of the Kashmir problem. Since India had been humiliated by China in 1962, as the Chinese forces reached up to the plains of Assam, Pakistan now felt that in an Indo-Pak war, India would be very easily defeated. Pakistan made a desperate attempt to disturb peace in Kashmir by sending Pakistani troops in the civilian garb as "infiltrators". Since India effectively checked the nefarious designs of infiltrators, Pakistan resorted to a regular war. The war that took place in September 1965, and proved decisively that India had superior might, provided the occasion for open American support to Pakistan and Soviet support to India. During the war (details are explained in Chapter 5), Pakistan freely used American weapons including sophisticated patton tanks against India. Pakistan had even used some of the Chinese weapons. The Soviet Union played an important role in arranging the ceasefire through the Security Council, and later took the initiative to sponsor an Indo-Pak summit in its own territory at Tashkent in January 1966. The talks that were held at Tashkent between Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pak President Ayub Khan were also briefly joined by Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin. An agreement was concluded with the help of Soviet good offices at the end of the talks known as the Tashkent Agreement. The agreement formally ended the Indo-Pak war but provided for *status quo ante.* This was regarded by people in India as a climb down because Indian forces had to give up the Pak territories they had captured.

Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri died, of a massive heart attack, soon after signing the Tashkent Agreement. He had been insisting that Indian troops would not be asked to leave the territories that they had captured. But, Soviet mediation made Shastri agree to *status quo ante,* which meant going back to pre-war situation. The emotional Shastri could not withstand this provision, and died. In view of the sudden death of the popular war hero Shastri, the people's anger (against Tashkent Agreement) turned into grief. Shastri's successors decided to honour, and implement, the agreement. Critics described the agreement as an outcome of Soviet Union's diplomatic connivance with Pakistan. Soon afterwards Soviet leadership tried to free Pakistan of American Bloc, and bring it under its own influence. Pakistan President Ayub Khan was invited to the Soviet Union, and the USSR later offered to sell Soviet armaments to Pakistan. This offer made to Pakistan in 1968, caused annoyance in India. India lodged a protest with the USSR against its decision to provide armaments to Pakistan. In response to Mrs. Indira Gandhi's protest, the Soviet leaders gave similar assurances to India as were once given by the United States that the armaments supplied by the Soviet Union would not be used against India. India was not impressed by this assurance. But, in view of the fast changing international environment, the Soviet Union dropped the proposition to supply armaments to Pakistan. The Bangladesh crisis of 1971 brought India and the USSR so close that the critics began saying that India had given up the policy of non-alignment, and moved into the Soviet Camp.

The Bangladesh Crisis and Indo-Soviet Friendship: The crisis in Bangladesh was caused by the short sighted policy of Pakistani President Yahya Khan and his administration. Till 1971, the present Bangladesh was a province of Pakistan, and was called East Pakistan. Elections were held in December 1970 for Pakistan's central legislature, the National Assembly. The elections resulted in absolute majority of the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. Awami League was essentially a party of East Pakistan. In normal course, Mujibur Rehman, as leader of the majority party, should have been appointed Prime Minister of Pakistan. But, the President and leadership in West Pakistan did not want to allow Mujib to become the Prime Minister. It was reported that Z.A. Bhutto could not bear a person from East Pakistan to be Prime Minister of the country. The session of the newly elected National Assembly scheduled for March 1971 was postponed. Rather than being appointed the Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujib was arrested and detained in a West Pakistan jail.

A revolt broke out in East Pakistan which was ruthlessly suppressed by Yahya Khan Government. Hundreds of people were killed in the atrocities committed on the people. Millions of people from East Pakistan fled and came to India as refugees. India's economy was naturally affected by the influx of refugees. The United States turned down a request of Mrs. Gandhi to put pressure on Pakistan to normalise the situation, so that about 10 million Bangla refugees could go back home. Pakistan decided to wage a war against India on the basis of allegation that India was responsible for the unrest in East Pakistan, and the false propaganda that Indian troops were fighting as *Mukti Bahini* to defeat the Pakistani security forces. Pakistan had full support not only of the United States, but also of China. President Nixon of the United States had told Mrs. Gandhi that if a war broke out between India and Pakistan, America might intervene on the side of Pakistan.

Indo-Soviet Treaty, 1971: The war that was actually forced upon India by Pakistan in December 1971 resulted in clear victory of India. Pakistani forces surrendered unconditionally to Indian army on December 16, 1971. The decisive defeat of Pakistan resulted in the birth of an independent sovereign state of Bangladesh. When Pakistan was determined to wage a war, and was preparing for it, India was left with no alternative but to seek the help of the Soviet Union. It is in this situation, that India took the initiative and invited Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to visit Delhi. As a result of urgent consultations between Indian and Soviet leaders, a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed on August 9, 1971. It was signed by the Foreign Ministers of two counties Sardar Swaran Singh and Gromyko. The provisions of the Treaty, in brief, are mentioned below. But, the gist of the treaty was that both India and the Soviet Union would respect each other's policy, and work for peace in the world. The two countries agreed to hold periodic consultations, and not to enter into any alliance against each other. The two countries agreed to hold reciprocal consultations in case either India or the USSR was subjected to external aggression. The conclusion of Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship acted as a deterrent and neither the USA nor China intervened on the side of Pakistan. The treaty was concluded for a period of 20 years.

The main provisions of the treaty were:

1. The two countries solemnly declared that enduring peace and friendship shall prevail between them and their peoples. Each party (country) shall respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the other party and refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. They would continue "to develop and consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good neighbourliness, and comprehensive cooperation".
2. India and the Soviet Union declared "their determination to continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional ...."
3. They condemned "colonialism and racialism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination".

4. India affirmed that it respects the peace-loving policy of the USSR, and the Soviet Union respects India's policy of non-alignment.
5. "Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and security", the two countries pledged to "maintain regular contacts with each other on major international problems ..... by means of meetings and exchanges of views .... and through diplomatic channels.
6. The two countries would consolidate and expand economic, scientific and technological cooperation, as well as expand trade, transport and communications on the basis of "the principles of equality, mutual benefit and most-favoured nation treatment".
7. They would "promote further development of ties and contacts between them in the fields of science, art, literature, education, public health, press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports."
8. Both the countries solemnly declared that they would not enter into or participate in any military alliance directed against the other. Each of the parties "undertakes to abstain from any aggression against the other party and to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage" on the other party.
9. Both the countries undertook not to provide any assistance to any third party that is engaged in an armed conflict with the other country. In case of an attack, or threat of attack, on any of the two countries, both "shall immediately enter into mutual consultations ... and to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries".
10. Both the countries promised not to enter into any understanding, secret or public, with any other state or states that would be in conflict with the provisions of this treaty. Nothing would be done that might cause military damage to the other country.
11. The duration of this treaty was to be twenty years. Thereafter, it was to be automatically extended for successive periods of five years. Either India or the Soviet Union could terminate it after giving one year's notice to the other party.
12. It was provided that any difference of interpretation of the treaty provisions "will be settled bilaterally by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding."

This treaty of friendship stood test of the time. It is mainly because of provisions contained in Articles 8, 9 and 10, mentioned above, that it acted as deterrent and neither China nor the United States intervened on the side of Pakistan in the 1971 war. At the expiry of 20 years period for which it had been signed, in 1991 it was renewed for another 20 years. But with the disintegration of USSR late in 1991, the treaty became infructuous.

At the time of its conclusion in 1971, the treaty was universally appreciated. The Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko described it as a landmark for the two countries. Sardar Swaran Singh observed that the signing of the treaty represented an important milestone in the path of Indo-Soviet relations. The treaty was described by commentators as a document of great international importance contributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and elsewhere. The treaty, according to critics, was a violation of the traditional policy of non-alignment. But, it was the only alternative to the possible US intervention in support of Pakistan. Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan described it as "epoch-making event." Leader of the Opposition Atal Behari Vajpayee said, "I welcome this treaty because it has secured a friend for India; a friend who can be trusted and who will stand by us at the hour of need." The senior Congress leader K. Kamraj believed that this treaty would not only strengthen friendship between the two countries, but would also help us ensuring lasting peace in Asia and the world at large. Loknayak Jayaprakash Narain acclaimed it as a sure "guarantee of peace in Asia."

According to former diplomat K.P.S. Menon, the treaty was the outcome of a great friendship which had been steadily developing during the previous two decades. Former Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul went a step further and said that the treaty reaffirmed that the Indo-Soviet friendship was based "not on any transient factors, but on the long-term vital interests of the peoples of both the countries."

The Socialist Party gave the treaty a qualified support and said that, "some of the terms of the Treaty were fraught with dangerous possibilities". It was feared that the USSR might interfere in India's domestic politics at a later date, just as it had done in Chechoslovakia in 1968. The Swatantra Party leader, and a well-known parliamentarian Piloo Modi said that he did not find anything beneficial to India in the Treaty. However, one of its supporters, Usha Mahajani opined that India had no other option left. The United States media saw in it a success of Soviet diplomacy. The *Time* wrote: "There was no disguising that Washington was wounded—and the wound was largely self-inflicted. In its overriding pre-occupation with India's two greatest enemies, Pakistan and China, the United States simply left New Delhi nowhere to go but Moscow."

The main arguments of the critics of the treaty, within the country, were that: (a) it violated India's policy of non-alignment; (b) the treaty had turned India into a Soviet sphere of influence; (c) indirectly it would amount to be a military alliance in complete violation of the basics of non-alignment; (d) this treaty created a new obstacle in the path of normalisation of Sino-Indian relations; (e) Indo-US relations which were already strained would now become worse than ever before; and (f) the Indian Ocean was likely to become an area of strategic conflict between the Super Powers. Despite partial validity of these arguments, it could be argued in favour of the treaty that it did not actually go against the spirit of non-alignment. Professor Hiren Mukherji of the Communist Party of India opined that there was nothing in the treaty that went against the principles of non-alignment.

As expected, the Indo-Soviet Treaty proved to be an effective deterrent. The US did not intervene in Indo-Pakistan war. India was fully supported by the Soviet Union both inside the Security Council and outside it. India and the USSR cooperated with each other on the question of admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations. Later, an important agreement of scientific and technological cooperation was concluded between India and the USSR on October 2, 1972.

The conclusion of the 20-year treaty marked a change in India's foreign policy. It was the first political treaty concluded by India with one of the Super Powers. Rigidly speaking it was deviation from non-alignment, but it was a painful necessity because of threat posed to India by Pakistan and its supporters, the United States and China.

The Soviet Union was one of important aid givers for India's economic development. On the question of the demand for declaring the Indian Ocean as "Zone of Peace", the USSR generally supported India's position and shared India's concern. It only emphasised that it would not accept any so called inherent rights or superior position of one western power to dominate or police the Indian Ocean. Soviet Union was willing to make the Indian Ocean a "Zone of Peace" and for that purpose insisted that not only the American base at Diago Garcia should be closed down but all other foreign bases in the region must also cease to function.

The Indo-Soviet friendship was further consolidated during President Brezhnev's 5-day visit to New Delhi in 1973. At that time Moscow was pushing the proposal for an Asian Collective Security Pact and the Indo-Soviet economic relationship was entering some kind of a flat plateau and needed invigoration. At the end of the visit an economic agreement and an accompanying protocol were signed. The joint declaration signed by the Soviet President and Indian Prime Minister stressed security and freedom of Asian countries rather than military arrangements. They advocated growing economic cooperation and stressed the need to reduce tension in the area. It was decided that the existing projects set up in India with Soviet assistance would be expanded and new plants were to be established, both in industrial and agricultural sectors.

India conducted its first nuclear test at Pokhran in Rajasthan desert. This test was not aimed at production of nuclear weapons. It was meant for development of nuclear power for peaceful purpose. Therefore, it was fully supported by the Soviet Union. But, Pakistan and China bitterly criticised India for this test.

Janata Party Government and Indo-Soviet Relations: After the Allahabad High Court set aside Mrs. Gandhi's election to Lok Sabha, in June 1975, her government imposed internal emergency under Article 352(B) of the Constitution. Most of the opposition leaders and activists were arrested and detained without trial. Even some of her own party men like Chandra Shekhar and Mohan Dharia, along with Jayaprakash Narain and former Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai were also detained. The Soviet leadership fully supported this action of Mrs. Gandhi, while the western countries angrily condemned the anti-democratic steps. After about 19 months of emergency regime (June 1975-March 1977), Mrs. Gandhi's party was routed in the general election and Mrs. Gandhi lost her own seat in the Lok Sabha.

The Janata Party Government that assumed office under the leadership of Prime Minister Morarji Desai traditionally maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union. On the eve of the election, Janata Party leaders had emphasised, what they called 'genuine non-alignment'. This gave the impression that the new government would change its policy towards Soviet Union. But, no such thing happened. In fact, Indo-Soviet relations were further consolidated. Foreign Minister Vajpayee reaffirmed India's commitment towards friendly relations with the USSR. An agreement on shipping was concluded on March 31, 1977. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited India on April 25, 1977. He was accorded warm welcome. Three new agreements were concluded between the two countries. (1) the Soviet Union offered a credit of 285 crores roubles, on easy terms; (2) direct communication system was established between the two countries; and (3) provision was made for additional trade of the value of Rs. 160 crores during 1977-78. Prime Minister Desai and Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee visited the USSR in October 1977, and a number of other agreements of economic cooperation were concluded. A programme of Indo-Soviet cooperation in the fields of economic relations, trade, science and technology was finalised by the two countries in December 1978. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, during week-long visit to India in March 1979 said that the Soviet Union valued friendship with India, and respected its role influencing events at international level. Desai paid a return visit in June 1979. Desai and Soviet President Brezhnev emphasised Indo-Soviet cooperation on the basis of peace, internal security and peaceful co-existence.

Mrs. Gandhi's Second Tenure: The detente at the international level had reached a high water-mark with the signing of Helsinki Final Act in 1975. But the environment suddenly changed with the commencement of the New Cold War as a result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. This intervention was denounced by the West as Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but was described by the Soviet supporters as painful Soviet decision because the United States and Pakistan were threatening the Soviet-friendly Afghan regime. However, the Soviet intervention and military occupation lasting over eight years provoked serious internal crisis as hundreds of thousand of Afghan refugees went to neighbouring Iran and Pakistan and most of them began operating as rebels causing serious internal strife. Although India's general position had been that all foreign interventions must be condemned, India did not take a strong position against prolonged Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Meanwhile, after the fall of Janata Government, Mrs. Gandhi came back to power in January 1980. The soft line adopted by her was strongly criticised as compromise with the policy of non-alignment and clear shift towards the Soviet Union.

India had certainly tilted towards the Soviet Union. But V.P. Dutt, then a member of the Rajya Sabha, said the views of India against Soviet presence in Afghanistan were privately communicated to the USSR. However, India's image abroad certainly suffered because Mrs. Gandhi's Government did not condemn the Soviet intervention in neighbouring Afghanistan. V.P. Dutt's argument was that India was more worried about US-Pakistan joint action in regard to Afghanistan than the Soviet action. Indo-Soviet relations were certainly influenced by the massive American assistance being given to Pakistan. Thus, the Soviet Union agreed to provide India with military equipment worth about Rs. 1300 crores. The items to be supplied by the USSR to India included missile-equipped patrol boats, and air to air, and ground to ground missile rockets etc. Mrs. Gandhi later explained that India was not receiving any military assistance from the USSR because it did not believe in accepting such assistance. India had only concluded an agreement to purchase these items from the USSR. During Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to India in December, 1980, the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was not even mentioned. However Mrs. Gandhi and Brezhnev did express their concern over tension in South-West Asia. They reiterated their commitment to political solution of the problems respecting independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-aligned status of the countries of the West Asian region.

Bilateral Relations in the Post-Brezhnev Period: India was assured after the death of Brezhnev in 1983 that Indo-Soviet relations would continue to be cordial and friendly. Bilateral trade continued to grow. After Mrs. Gandhi's assassination in October 1984, India's leadership went into the hands of her son Rajiv Gandhi. In the USSR, after two short leaderships of Andropov and Chernenko, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985. Indo-Soviet relations were further consolidated during the period that the two countries were led by Rajiv and Gorbachev. The two countries had more or less identical views on most of the international questions. Rajiv Gandhi asserted a number of times that the Soviet Union had stood by India in all difficult, times. Therefore, Indo-Soviet friendship would be maintained at high level. Rajiv Gandhi went on a 6-day visit to the Soviet Union in May 1985. He was assured by the Soviet leaders that they were aware of India's anxiety caused by Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. Both the countries signed agreements for economic and technical cooperation whereby Soviet assistance to India was considerably increased. A new Soviet credit of Rs. 1160 crores was announced. It was also agreed that the USSR would provide assistance for a thermal power project of 840 megawatt capacity, and certain other schemes.

Gorbachev proposed to promote the idea of collective security for Asia originally initiated by Late Brezhnev. He admitted that it was not easy to give practical shape to this proposal, but then Helsinki Final Act (1975) had also faced monumental difficulties before it was finally concluded. Acknowledging India's important role in Asia, the Soviet leader said that, "We appreciate the contribution of India in strengthening international peace and security, and applaud India's contribution in promoting the role of Non-aligned Movement in this endeavour".

A significant Delhi Declaration was issued at the end of Gorbachev's Delhi visit. It was signed by Rajiv Gandhi and Gorbachev. On his arrival in India Gorbachev had warned that if Indo-Pak disputes were not amicably solved then it could lead to serious consequences. He had expressed the hope that, like India, Pakistan would also behave like a good neighbour. Another significant announcement was made by him. He said that the USSR would not attempt to improve relations even with China at the cost of Indo-Soviet friendship.

Ten-point Delhi Declaration was, according to Rajiv and Gorbachev, an effective step in the direction of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The Delhi Declaration contained the following expectations, namely: (1) peaceful co-existence should be the universal basis of international relations; (2) human life should be given highest priority; (3) non-violence should be the basis of cooperative living; (4) fear and mistrust should be replaced by the environment of mutual trust and cordial relations; (5) political and economic rights of peoples of different countries should be recognised and respected; (6) the amount of money being spent on armaments should be usefully utilised for social and economic development; (7) proper atmosphere should be ensured for all round development of the individual; (8) the material and intellectual capabilities of mankind should be ulilised for finding the solution of the problems faced by the international community; (9) the 'balance of terror' should be replaced by international peace and security; and (10) effective steps should be taken for comprehensive disarmament so that the world can be free of nuclear weapons and may follow the path of non-violence.

In addition to this forceful Delhi Declaration, an economic protocol was also signed by India and the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the USSR agreed to give a long-term credit of Rs. 2883 crores on nominal interest for renewal of certain old projects and starting of some new projects. Cultural festivals were organised in the two countries since 1988 for better cultural exchanges. Several artists promoted the feeling of universality and equality.

Soviet President Gorbachev paid another highly successful visit to India in the end of 1988. During that visit, massive credit of Rs. 6000 crores was announced by the Soviet Union for development projects in India including the projects for power generation. Besides, six other historic agreements were concluded by the two countries. Briefly, these agreements provided for elimination of double taxation; an assistance of Rs. 640 crores was to be made available for the Vindhyachal thermal power project; upgradation of technical and cultural cooperation; additional credit, at concessional rate of interest, of Rs. 350 crores for power projects; assurance of Soviet assistance for two nuclear power projects of 1000 megawatt each in Tamil Nadu; and cooperation in all areas of meteorology and communication system for peaceful use of outer space. Besides, India and the Soviet Union agreed to initiate a number of long-term projects in economic sphere.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was, as mentioned earlier, renewed in 1991 for a further period of 20 years. This was a proof of sustained ties between the two countries, and, in a way, brought India under the Soviet nuclear umbrella. The Cold War had ended at the end of 1989, but a new environment had been created in the Soviet Union by various reforms initiated by Party General Secretary Gorbachev. Meanwhile, in India power was transferred from Rajiv Gandhi led Congress Government to a minority Janata Dal Government. After a brief period of lack of warmth, Prime Minister V.P. Singh paid a visit to the USSR in 1990. This renewed the warmth in the bilateral relations. The Soviet position on Kashmir was reiterated. It was decided to renew the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, and it was decided to continue till 1995 the rupee-rouble trade arrangement. Thus, Indo-Soviet relations showed mature and stable friendship.

During 1990-91, India generally supported the position taken by the Soviet Union in the Gulf crisis. India, like the Soviet Union, had decided to further consolidate relations with the PLO and yet initiated steps to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. A minor irritant was noticed when Chandra Shekhar Government allowed refuelling facilities to US war planes flying towards the Gulf during the war.

The year 1991 saw numerous changes in the erstwhile Soviet Union and, what were known as its satellite states in Eastern Europe. Communism collapsed and democratic governments were installed one after the other in most of the East European countries. In the Soviet Union itself the reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev had tremendous impact on the society and the people aspired for and got full democratic rights. In a country that had totally controlled economy and politics for 70 years, *Perestroika* and *Glasnost* gave a new shape to the Soviet economy and politics. But the reforms also led to the end of monopoly of power of the Communist Party and introduction of multi-party democracy. An attempt in August 1991 to overthrow the reformist Gorbachev and restoration of communist power miserably failed. During the period of crisis in the USSR, India made a serious error by commenting that it would deal with the new government in USSR because overthrow of Gorbachev by the hardliners was the internal matter of that country. When the *coup* failed and Gorbachev came back to power, India faced a very embarrassing situation.

'The Soviet Union suddenly disintegrated in December 1991 and the mighty state of USSR was replaced by 15 Republics. Russian Republic was recognized by the international community as the successor state of USSR. At the time of disintegration, a loose union of erstwhile Soviet Republics was created and called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). India has maintained friendly and cooperative relations not only with Russian Federation but also the other Members of CIS.

INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS: POST-1991

The Russian Federation, under the Presidentship of Boris Yeltsin, assured India that it would endeavour to follow the policy of friendship and cooperation that had been pursued by the USSR for decades. However, the Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation that had been renewed only a few months earlier virtually lost its value because the USSR ceased to exist. President Yeltsin had to contend with the internal threats to his position both from extreme right and extreme left. In this situation Russian decided to follow a cautious foreign policy seeking friendship both with the western bloc and the non-aligned group. It is in this background that Russian leadership indicated in 1992 three main trends in Indo-Russian relationship. These were: Firstly, proponents of 'traditional ties' pleaded for policy based on continuity. Secondly, there were exponents of building new types of relations, devoid of any ideological preconception as was the case in past. Thirdly, there were blind supporters of the US course, intending to give strategic character to the US-Russian relations and thus keen to overlook the value of Indo-Russian ties. For a better part of 1992, the traditional warmth in the bilateral relations was not very visible. But the visit of President Yeltsin to India in 1993 went a long way in dispelling the misgivings of the recent past. During the visit Yeltsin had prolonged negotiations with Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. President Yeltsin's firm and unwavering support to India on the question of Kashmir was highly appreciated in this country, and his refusal to extend the military and technical assistance to Pakistan was received as pleasant news. Russia and India pledged to cooperate with each other in political and economic fields and Russia agreed to continue with the supply of spare parts for Indian defence equipment.

Earlier, in February 1992, a political commentator Ovchinnikov, in an article published in *Pravada,* had warned that Russia should not ignore tried and trusted friends like India, while seeking new alliances and friendship with

Western Powers. Russia, he warned, must not give the impression that India had been relegated to a secondary position.

After the end of Cold War, the long-term relations of India and the Soviet Union had become identical. According to Ovchinnikov, both the countries were interested in multi-polar world order. In the economic sphere, Indo-Soviet interdependence was still intact. India would need for a long time to come Russian technology and machinery, and Russia would have to import several consumer goods from India. Russia, like India, was interested in a new and restructured economic world order.

Post-Cold War Russia's economy was in a very chaotic condition. That was one reason why it was moving closer to the United States. Some of the critics in Russia were of the firm opinion that Western countries, especially the United States, were not so much interested in democratisation of Russia, as of ensuring its lasting poverty. They wanted to make Russia permanently dependent on the West. The Group of 7 (G-7) highly industrialised countries made lot of noise in 1992-93 in favour of Russia, but they were not willing to give aid to overcome its economic problems. Russia was subsequently admitted to the elite Group of 7, making it G-8. Therefore, it was generally believed in the USSR that even if India was only a developing country Russia must not make any compromise with its commitment to India, simply because it was seeking help from the United States.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin's 1993 visit to India helped remove the doubts that had arisen in Indo-Russian relations. Whereas some of the comments made in Russia had indicated that once again Russia was seeking to move closer to Pakistan, Yeltsin's 1993 visit made it clear that Russia was in no mood to give up its trusted friend. Yeltsin reiterated that Russia fully supported India's Kashmir policy, and said that his country was not going to provide any military or technical assistance to Pakistan. The renewal of 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty (in 1991) had already affirmed Soviet commitment to respect India's territorial integrity and her security. Another outcome of this visit was that as a result of an agreement on rupee-rouble parity, India's credit burden was reduced by about 30 percent. A military and Technical Cooperation Agreement was also signed during the Yeltsin visit. This ended the uncertainty about supply of armaments for the use of Indian security forces.

President Yeltsin publicly declared that Russia would provide technological assistance to India for the manufacture of Kroyogenic engines for the use of India's peaceful outer space research programme. But, America pressurised Russia to withhold the promised assistance. This created doubts in the minds of Indian people about the real intensions of Russian leadership. During Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Russia in 1994 these doubts could not be cleared. Commenting on Prime Minister Rao's visit Sumit Chakrabarti wrote that, during Yeltsin's 1993 visit to India it appeared that Russia was following the policy of equidistance between India on the one side and China and the West on the other. But, in 1994, it became evident that having discarded the policy of equidistance, Russia was once again moving closer to India. Russia appeared keen on mutual friendship with India. Even if there were areas of disagreement, such as signing the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), yet there were many more areas of identity of views. Even in the field of economy management Russia was inclined to agree more with India's policy of mixed economy based on co-existence of public and private sectors, rather than America's pure capitalist market economy. Thus, cooperation with India was desirable both in political and economic spheres. Russia gave up the policy of depending only on the United States. It was evident from fast growing friendship between Yeltsin and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

During the period 1994-96 several high-level visits were exchanged between the two countries. These included Narasimha Rao's visit to Russia in June-July 1994, when the two countries agreed to take necessary measures to remove the bottlenecks in the bilateral trade. However, the former Foreign Secretary of India J.N. Dixit argued, that "Indo-Russian relations were characterised by Russia deliberately creating distances between itself and India during the period between 1991-94". Dixit's argument was that immediately after the end of the Cold War, Russia had reduced its geo-political identity to that of "a European entity rather than a Eurasian entity." Russia believed that its future prosperity and influence lay in forging a close alliance with the United States and Western Europe. By early 1997, the new Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov had adopted a more practical approach. Russia's attempts to get entry into the G-7 (Group of 7 highly industrialised countries) had not yet been successful, and insufficient economic inputs from the west to the Russian economy had resulted in the Yeltsin Government re-examining the Russian priorities. Though the basic pro-West orientation of Russian foreign policy remained unchanged, Russia moved closer towards India, Pakistan, China and Japan. Russia had been concerned about the increasing influence of the United States in the Commonwealth of Independent States which she wanted to resist. Meanwhile, the United States was determined to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to include several East European countries. NATO expansion was forcefully opposed by Russia, but it did not' succeed. Eventually, President Yeltsin himself signed a NATO-Russian Pact in May 1997 providing for closer association of Russia with NATO which would expand right up to the borders of former USSR.

An Indo-Russian summit was held after a gap of three years, in March 1997 when Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda visited Moscow and had extensive discussions with President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin. The visit turned out to be a high water mark and several agreements were signed at the conclusion of these talks. These included the agreements for the avoidance of double taxation, cooperation and mutual assistance in customs, plant protection and plant quarantine and an extradition treaty. An agreement for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, a consular convention and an agreement for physical culture and sports were also signed. In addition to these agreements the Russians also agreed to assist India in expanding its nuclear capacities for peaceful purposes. For that purpose, Russia agreed to sell two atomic reactors of 1,000 MW each at the cost of nearly Rs. 17,000 crores. Russia also agreed to an integrated and long term defence supplies cooperation programme with India. According to J.N. Dixit, these transactions were beneficial for India in general terms, but he raised two questions. Firstly, the Russian atomic reactors would cost 3 to 4 billion dollars. He asked whether it was practical and justifiable for India to go in for such expensive new reactors. Secondly, he doubted if the continuing excessive dependence on Russia for defence supplies was conducive to India's long-term interest. During the talks, President Yeltsin assured Deve Gowda that his country supported India's claim to the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. He also expressed keenness to cooperate with India in hydro-electric energy and in the military field; of particular interests to India was Yeltsin's declaration that Russia had imposed a ban on the sale of armaments to Pakistan.

The net outcome of India-Russia summit of March 1997 was that Russia moved closer to India after the fact that she had been cheated by western powers because neither it was till then given the full membership of G-7, nor did Bill Clinton agree, a few days earlier at Helsinki, to stop his efforts for expansion of NATO. At the conclusion of the Gowda-Yeltsin talks President Yeltsin said, "We have been friends for many decades, and we remain friends". He declared that India was a stabilising force in the region. According to the Russian media the foreign policy of that country had definitely swung eastwards. Yeltsin's remark on Russian T.V. that his summit with Clinton "was the most difficult in my memory" was in sharp contrast with his tone on relations with India.

Commenting on the outcome of the Deve Gowda-Yeltsin summit of March 1997 Sidharth Varadarajan summed up the position in the following words:

> Relations between India and Russia (or the erstwhile Soviet Union) have gone through three distinct phases in the past .... During the Stalin years, the USSR preferred to keep its distance from India as it considered Nehru's India to be a reactionary state beholden to Britain and the US. From Khruscheve till early years of Gorbachev, on the other hand, relations were warm with close economic and military ties ... the end of the Cold War and a prolonged period of economic anarchy brought with it a certain cooling of relations between Russia and India with Yeltsin tending to follow the US lead. But now, with US-Russian relations entering a new and potentially unstable phase, Moscow is anxious to renew its friendship with New Delhi.

It was in pursuance of this new policy that Russia sought the hand of Indian friendship and concluded the above mentioned agreements. According to Muchkund Dubey, a former Foreign Secretary, the Indo-Russian relations which had undergone severe strain after the disintegration of USSR were now given a new dimension. According to Dubey, "Russian leaders have clearly indicated that they want to restore their relationship with India to its earlier high pedestal and that they continue to regard India as a major factor for security and stability in Asia". C. Uday Bhaskar spoke a word of caution when he said that India must cautiously evolve a long-term strategic partnership with Russia. This new entity it must be remembered, is not the Soviet Union. Professor Zafar Imam, also pleaded for caution in evolving the revival of warm Indo-Russian relations. He said that the reason for Yeltsin's interests in India "is directly linked to the bad experience he had with Bill Clinton at Helsinki and also to the general disenchantment with the West in the past five years". He added, that it stems from a genuine reappraisal of Russian foreign policy. The realisation of Russia that it had erred by placing too much reliance on the West and ignoring India has much to do with its present initiatives. However, Russia continued to seek closer cooperation with the West, and at the G-7 meeting at Devnen in June 1997 Yeltsin was invited to participate and Clinton gave him a big welcome. The media described the new development as the emergence of G-8 or Group of 8.

Thus, it appeared in mid-1997 that the relations between India and Russia for the first time in the post-Cold War period were poised for the revival of the traditional Indo-Soviet friendship, even as Russia would like to move closer to the United States also.

Traditional friendship between India and Russia was clearly evident during, and after, the Kargil conflict. The conflict gave a new momentum to emerging strategic partnership between Russia and India. From the very beginning of the Kargil crisis Russia firmly supported India, and urged Pakistan to withdraw the infiltrators from the Indian side of LoC. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued three statements condemning Pakistani intrusion and calling for restoration of sanctity of the LoC as a first step towards bilateral dialogue. While most of the countries supported Indian position and appreciated restraint shown by this country, Russia was the only major power which categorically described the State of Jammu & Kashmir as an Indian State. According to Professor Grigory Bondarevsky, a leading Russian expert on Asia, "Russia's strong and unequivocal support for India throughout its two-month-old conflict with Pakistan in Kargil goes to show that this country is perfectly serious about its declared goal of building a strategic partnership with India."

India appreciated the support of the entire international community on its stand in Kargil. But, Russia deserved special appreciation because that was one country which vehemently condemned the Pakistani infiltration and

denounced Islamabad's action as invasion. Russia consistently opposed internationalisation of the Kashmir problem, and explicitly referred to the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore Declaration as the only bases of resolving all issues between India and Pakistan. Russian support was gratefully acknowledged by India. According to Professor Bondarevsky, "The conflict in Kashmir has wider implications for the region; it signals a new onslaught of Islamic fundamentalism, which poses a threat not only to India, but to Russia and other countries, including China," Besides, Russia agreed to give India its latest weapons, that it had not yet given/sold to any other country. This goes to prove continuing friendship between the two countries, and proves that Russia regards India as its strategic partner. Boris Yeltsin announced his resignation as Russian President on the last day of 1999. He was succeeded by his Prime Minister Vladmir Putin.

Indo-Russian relations continued to be strengthened by Putin and Vajpayee governments. President Putin paid a highly successful visit to India in October 2000. The two countries chalked out steps to set their bilateral relationship on a new footing, reworking past agreements on bilateral cooperation. Putin and Vajpayee signed the overreaching declaration on strategic partnership. This was in addition to 10 other agreements signed by the two countries setting out the building blocks for further cooperation. President Putin "breached the long standing international nuclear blockade against India by committing Russia to expand atomic energy cooperation with India."

The consolidation of Indo-Russian relationship was reflected in the declaration of strategic partnership signed by Putin and Vajpayee. It committed the two countries to "non-participation in any military, political or other alliances or associations or armed conflicts directed against the other side, or in any treaties, agreements or understandings infringing upon the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or national security interests of the other side."

Besides, strategic partnership and trade and cultural cooperation, the two countries also pledged to fight international terrorism. Addressing the Indian Parliament, Putin said that India was as much a victim of "terrorist international" in Kashmir as Russia was in Chechnya. Condemning terrorism, he said that it was often the same individuals, the same terrorist organisations who were conducting the terrorist act from "the Philippines to Kosavo including Kashmir, Afghanistan and Northern Caucasus". Prime Minister Vajpayee described terrorism as one of the major challenges and pledged to fight it at all levels.

NEW WARMTH IN INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in New York and Washington D.C., Russia, like India, fully supported international struggle to defeat terrorism, though neither of the two countries contributed troops to the US-led coalition.

Meanwhile, as indicated above, Putin's emergence as President of Russia had heralded a positive phase in Indo-Russian relations which, for some time had come under strain when Yeltsin had tried to befriend the West even at the cost of warmth in Russian relations with India. Russia had refused to apply sanctions against India after Pokhran II. By 2001, Russian policy in regard to India's nuclear programme had become very cooperative. It was based on the premise that, as Raja Mohan opined (*Crossing the Rubicon*), "India was already a nuclear weapons power and denying it advanced" technologies in the name of preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons made no sense." Moscow decided to sell the enriched uranium to India in 2001, ignoring its western criticism in this regard. Both Russia and France argued that the restrictions against nuclear technology transfers must be relaxed. During his visit to India in 2000, President Putin visited the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre at Trombay, and the two countries moved ahead in cooperation in nuclear sector. During his next visit to India, in December 2002, Putin reaffirmed the Russian commitment to expand nuclear cooperation with India by selling additional nuclear reactors, but, he said, this would be within the framework of Russian obligations in the nuclear field.

By December 2002, when Putin paid another visit to India, both countries had clearly expressed themselves in favour of a multi-polar world. India was trying to normalise relations with China and further improve relations with the United States. Even border dispute between India and China was being dealt with by special representatives of two countries named in June 2003 during Vajpayee's China visit. They were required to examine the question from political perspective. At the same time, Russia was engaging not only China for further cooperation, but even Pakistan. Putin was of the opinion that despite these efforts India and Russia could continue to strengthen their cooperation, including strategic and nuclear cooperation. Putin had said in December 2002 on the eve of his visit to India that, "The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the ideological foundation of our state. The communist ideology no longer dominates in Russia." He said that Russia did not any more consider the United States as an enemy or opponent. The US was now a partner of Russia. Therefore, he had said that, "So, we welcome the fact that India is developing its relations with all countries, including the US."

Earlier, when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee went to Russia in November 2001, the two countries had issued a declaration condemning international terrorism and they had also issued a joint statement on strategic issues, calling for the establishment of a new "cooperative security order." The two countries were laying the foundation of a world order based on multi-polarity. During his December 2002 visit to India, Putin and Vajpayee signed a Delhi Declaration to enhance strategic cooperation and set up a joint working group on combating terrorism. The two countries committed themselves to strengthening economic, scientific and cultural cooperation. Both the countries opposed double standards in fighting terrorism. They favoured strengthening the United Nations' central role in promoting international security in a multi-polar world.

Later, both Russia and India deplored unilateral military action taken under the leadership of the United States in March 2003 against Iraq, without authorisation by the Security Council, for "regime change" and recovery of alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Earlier, both Russia and France had refused to support a UN Security Council resolution moved by the US, UK and Spain for military action against Iraq, without waiting any more for the weapons inspectors to complete their work.

Russia has been promoting the idea of greater cooperation between India, China and Russia in the interest of regional security and world peace. Every year since 2001, the Foreign Ministers of the three countries have been meeting in New York on the sidelines of the sessions of the UN General Assembly. This trilateral cooperation, or, as the media described, "the strategic triangle" will go a long way in promoting all-round cooperation, and may go an extra mile in sorting out the border dispute between India and China.

Indo-Russian friendship was demonstrated in May 2003 also when Prime Minister Vajpayee was invited, as one of the 40 world leaders, to participate in the festivities connected with the 300th founding of the city of St. Petersburg. The bilateral dialogues that Vajpayee then had not only with Putin but also with President Bush of the US and the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao were indicative of the increasing role of India in the new emerging world order.

The warmth in Indo-Russian relations has been maintained and sustained. The annual meetings between the Russian President and Indian Prime Minister appeared to have been institutionalised. At the end of their meeting in 2005, President Putin and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called for a multilateral approach to address contemporary challenges. They said, "Multilateralism is an instrument to work towards the objective of a multi-polar world." Both sides emphasised the need for comprehensive reforms in the UN system. The Russian Federation reaffirmed its support to India "as a deserving and strong candidate for the permanent membership in an (expected) expanded UN Security Council." However, President Putin was not enthusiastic about "tools" such as Veto power enjoyed by P-5 to be modified or expanded.

Trade between two countries continued to grow. Russia stood firmly with India in its fight against terrorism caused by externally supported militancy as in cases of bomb blasts in Delhi in 2005, and serial bombing in Mumbai in 2006.

Chapter 13

From Non-Alignment to Nuclear India

INTRODUCTION

There are two important factors that come to one's mind the moment a mention of India's foreign policy is made. These are: the vital role that Jawaharlal Nehru played in the formative years of our foreign policy; and the policy of non-alignment, initiated by Nehru and followed by over 100 countries in course of time. This policy later developed into a movement. Non-alignment has been recognised as India's major contribution to international relations. Prime Minister Nehru was his own foreign minister for 18 years after independence. The policy formulated under his leadership is even today the basic policy of India, with marginal and essential modifications. We have discussed in this book India's relations with its immediate neighbour and the two main big Powers, during the first 60 years (1947-2007) of its existence as a sovereign nation. It is proposed to briefly analyse the essential points of India's foreign policy, in this chapter. With a view to highlight the role of the personality of foreign policy maker, an attempt will be made in the following pages to examine India's foreign and security policies and our relations with other countries with reference to various Prime Ministers that India has had since 1947. The evolving role of India in the global politics and its predominant position in South Asia will also be briefly analysed.

The role of personality in the formulation of foreign policy has been increasing in the post-Second World War period all over the world. Joseph Frankel had described, in 1963, the role of personality as a valid and important subject of historical analysis. That was Joseph Frankel's view in the context of western countries. In the context of India, Harish Kapur opined that in a country where institutions had not fully developed, the role of personality was certainly decisive. Kapur gave three arguments in support of his views. *Firstly,* the foreign policy making institutions are either not fully developed, or they are not effective. In India, the civil servants, secret services and the Parliament do

not effectively influence the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers. *Secondly,* Indian society is essentially religious by nature, and the people tend to worship the man on the top. His decisions, particularly in the realm of foreign policy, are generally not challenged by the people. According to Harish Kapoor, this is a powerful feature of our Hindu psyche. *Thirdly,* it is argued that most of the Indian people do not understand the finer points of foreign policy. All these three factors have restricted the foreign policy making to the Prime Ministers, the Foreign Ministers and senior officers of the foreign service. It is true that in early years, Nehru's charismatic personality did not permit any challenge to his views. But, this view cannot be held valid, as a general argument, 60 years after independence. The level of people's political education has certainly gone up; the role of public opinion has become effective; the media has come to play an important role in influencing the policy makers, and personality cult has definitely declined. Thus, even if the top leader still has important role in foreign policy making, he cannot be said to have monopoly in this respect.

Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64): There were many outstanding personalities in Nehru's Government. Nevertheless, they generally left the foreign policy exclusively in the hands of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's office did not possess any statutory power. Nehru's secretary Mathai himself wrote that its members were "only gatherers and conveyors and, in short, mechanics men ... Nehru's foreign policy was rarely criticised by any prominent leader during his tenure. Foreign policy was exclusive forte of Nehru."

India's international prestige had rapidly risen till nearly 1956. India had opted to stay off the Cold War and follow the policy of non-alignment. This policy is, even 60 years later, still the foundation stone of India's foreign policy. Initially, non-alignment was viewed with suspicion by both the Power Blocs; but gradually they came to realise its utility. India's role during the Korean War was generally appreciated; and India played a vital role in enabling the disputants to reach an amicable settlement, in respect of Indo-China in 1954. The Declaration of *Panchsheel* jointly made by India and China in 1954 was also warmly welcomed by several countries. India, under Nehru, was considered to be the pioneer of the policy of peaceful co-existence. Non-alignment and peaceful co-existence are two major contributions of India and its first Prime Minister. These principles have been analysed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4.

The Conference of Afro-Asian countries held in 1955 at Bandung (Indonesia) was not only convened largely on Nehru's initiative, but after the Bandung Conference India began to be recognised as a leading power amongst the non-aligned nations. The manner in which Nehru opposed colonialism enabled India to occupy an important place in the Third World countries. During the Anglo-French attack on Egypt, as part of the Suez crisis, India bitterly criticised the aggression. This made India popular as a vehement opponent of imperialism in Asia and Africa, and champion of independence of the countries that were still under foreign colonial rule. Commenting on this role of India, Palmer and Perkins had written that, India was the main organiser of Afro-Asian Group in the United Nations, and had "now become its recognised leader" also. But, in 1956 itself India did not clearly condemn the Soviet armed intervention in Hungary. So much so, that India's representative in the United Nations, V.K. Krishna Menon voted with the Soviet Bloc, in the General Assembly, to oppose the 5-Power resolution calling for free elections in Hungary. This gave setback not only to India's anti-imperialist image in the world, but (Chapter 12) Nehru Government was strongly criticised within the country also. According to Noorani, Hungarian crisis was the first occasion when Indian public opinion exercised a check on the government in the matters of foreign policy. Perhaps, India acted the way that it did because the USSR was a consistent supporter of India in the Security Council, on the question of Jammu and Kashmir.

Friendship with China had become an important pillar of India's foreign Policy. But as P.D. Kaushik wrote, China's clever tactics after 1959 put Indian leaders in a state of confusion. At the initiative of Nehru, Nasser and Tito, the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) was established in 1961 at the Belgrade Conference of 25 non-aligned countries, but many countries adopted the policy of ignoring India's stand in the context of India-China conflict. After a long wait, Indian army had to take action in December 1961, and it liberated Goa from the Portuguese colonial rule. This action was fully appreciated within the country, and it was described as a success of India's foreign policy. But, according to Kaushik, this action was a setback to India's reputation as a Gandhian and peace-loving country. The then US President, John F. Kennedy, who was normally sympathetic to India, was very unhappy at India's military action in Goa. He curtly told India's Ambassador in Washington:

> Mr. Ambassador, India could have taken over Goa fourteen years ago; it was yours. What you have done now any self-respecting country would have done then to assert its sovereignty. But you should not have preached morality for fourteen years. You had no business to indulge in the holier-than-thou attitude when you are just like any other nation. The reason why people are criticising you is because they have seen a Minister coming out of a brothel. They are happily clapping that he is like any other normal human being.

This was indeed a very bitter and uncalled for criticism of India's action, by the President of the United States.

India's foreign and defence policies became virtually ineffective when China committed aggression on India in 1962. Most of non-aligned countries did not openly support India in the hour of its humiliation (see Chapter 6). They remained as much neutral in the Sino-Indian border war as they were in the US-Soviet Cold War. Even though China did not succeed fully in its designs on India, yet it succeeded in damaging India's position as leader of the Afro-Asian countries. China could not terrorise India to establish any legal claim on parts of our territory. Nevertheless, it amounted to complete failure of India's diplomacy. Nehru had never expected an aggression by China. The moral and material assistance provided by Britain and the United States in the context of Sino-Indian conflict, moved Pakistan closer to China. Pakistan did not expect any western assistance to India. By rejecting the Colombo Proposals, China disheartened the non-aligned nations as their peace proposals were not acceptable to the Chinese. Nehru got the worst shock of his life. He could not recover from it, and died a heart-broken person within two years. Countries like Indonesia deserted India and became friendly with China. India's prestige reached an all-time low in the wake of humiliation of the winter of 1962. India was now considered a weak country. Encouraged by India's defeat in 1962, Pakistan decided to have an armed conflict with India in 1965. However, Indian soldiers proved far more superior and Pakistan was virtually defeated.

Unfortunately, Nehru Government did not adopt any clear defence and security policy. Nehru was of the view that India did not need a defence policy as such. He was of the opinion that India was not going to face any serious security risk. He had once opined that India's police was sufficient for its security needs. Thus, Nehru's view and his policy were largely responsible for India's humiliation in 1962.

It was not easy for India to recover from the setback of 1962. The fact is that nothing is worse than a military defeat for any country's prestige. The country loses the capability of influencing the policies of other countries. President Kennedy had rightly opined that, "Victory has many fathers, defeat is an orphan." As mentioned earlier, even the non-aligned countries did not support India in its war with China. Harish Kapoor has said that, "India was paid back by her 'friends' in the same coin—the coin of non-alignment." A number of Afro-Asian countries who were effectively supported by Nehru in the past, even they were now scared of the Chinese might. Rather than supporting India, they stood by as silent spectators. A big question mark was put on Nehru's foreign policy—particularly his policy of non-alignment. The very foundation of India's policy was shaken by the unexpected reaction of the non-aligned, and the instant support and assistance by the West. *The Indian Express* went to the extent of commenting in 1962 that in the world divided between the communists and anti-communists, there was actually no place for the neutral nations. It is said that Nehru, like a sculptor, created and directed India's foreign policy — Non-alignment is his legacy. But, by 'sacrificing' Tibet, and having total faith in the sincerity of China, he committed a serious mistake that had far-reaching consequences. The question of autonomy of Tibet has remained undecided even 60 years after India's independence. Nehru's idealism on Kashmir is another example of a legacy that has constantly remained a major problem and a constant source of conflict in India-Pakistan relations.

Lal Bahadur Shastri (1964-66): Lal Bahadur Shastri had lived in poverty and had risen from the grass root level. He was a seasoned politician. He was humility personified, and did not have even a distant connection with corruption. But, in matters of foreign policy, his knowledge was negligible. He was one of the most trusted colleagues of Nehru. During Nehru's illness that led to his death, Shastri was made Minister without Portfolio. His duties included attending to the files sent by Foreign Office for the Prime Minister's consideration. Shastri had been abroad only once. That was in 1963 when he had gone to Nepal. On account of his very limited experience of foreign affairs, one of his first actions on assuming the office of Prime Minister was to appoint a full-time Foreign Minister. Sardar Swaran Singh who was appointed Foreign Minister, proved to be a very capable diplomat. He was extremely patient, and a wonderful negotiator. He proved to be an asset to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. The second action that the new Prime Minister took was the establishment of the Prime Minister's Secretariat. L.K. Jha was made head of the P.M. Secretariat. During Shastri's tenure as Prime Minister, most of the decisions were taken by the Foreign Minister, Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's Secretariat.

India's foreign policy, during Shastri's brief tenure of 18 months, proved to be more realistic than before. In the post-Nehru period, India not only had to manage a hostile China but had also to deal with the growing US support to Pakistan, and also the emergence of 'Pindi, Peking, Jakarta Axis'. This was a new anti-India combination of Pakistan, China and Indonesia. Shastri regime had to devise India's foreign and security policies in the background of US-Pak friendship, and the Axis.

While Nehru had concentrated on relations with big and the Super Powers, as also promotion of non-alignment, Shastri laid greater emphasis on India's neighbours, and friendly relations in South Asia. He initiated a move to secure big Powers' nuclear umbrella for India. But, Shastri had to first handle the problem of Rann of Kutch (a dispute with Pakistan) in 1965, and later in the same year had to face a war imposed by Pakistan. Shastri allowed a free hand to the armed forces to devise proper strategy. This made it possible for India to humble Pakistan in the 22-day war in September 1965. India's armed forces had been rapidly modernised after the Sino-Indian War of 1962. India's victorious success in the 1965 war certainly helped raise the morale of the people and the forces, and improved India's declining international prestige. But, India could not regain its pre-1962 role in international affairs. Pakistan was fully supported in the war in 1965 by the United States as well as China. Pakistan openly used against India not only the US weapons given to her to contain communism, but even certain armaments given by China.

Soviet Union had been openly supporting India on the question of Kashmir. But, a slight shift became visible in the Soviet attitude after the Indo-Pakistan War. The Tashkent meeting between Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan was held at the initiative of Soviet Premier Kosygin. While, apparently the USSR was neutral, yet indirectly it tried to move closer to Pakistan. Shastri had insisted repeatedly that India would not accept the *status quo ante,* that is, to go back to the pre-war situation. But, at Tashkent he was made to sign an agreement that provided for withdrawal of the two armies to the positions held by them before the war. This hurt the emotional Shastri. He died within a few hours of the signing of Tashkent Agreement. Soviet Union, despite India's protest, began negotiations for sale of armaments to Pakistan. This was resented by India.

Prior to the commencement of India-Pakistan war, President Johnson had hurt India's national pride by asking Shastri to postpone his scheduled visit to the United States. Thus in early 1966, India's foreign policy was faced not only with an unfriendly America, hostile China and Pakistan, but even USSR that was seeking closer ties with Pakistan.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi (1966-77): After Shastri's sudden demise, Nehru's daughter Indira Gandhi was elected leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party, and she became the Prime Minister. Nehru had given political training to his daughter, and Shastri had included her in his cabinet. Mrs. Gandhi strengthened the Prime Minister's Secretariat, and it soon became an important centre of foreign policy-making. Mrs. Gandhi had a small group of people including L.K. Jha, G. Parthasarthy, B.K. Nehru and D.P. Dhar. This group was even more effective than Mrs. Gandhi's Foreign Ministers. According to Harish Kapoor, the entire foreign policy formulation was informally and secretly done by these gentlemen. The intelligence service was divided into two parts. Domestic intelligence, as before, remained the concern of Intelligence Bureau, but external intelligence was entrusted to an autonomous Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the Cabinet Secretariat. It was placed under direct control of the Prime Minister. In her first eleven year tenure as Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi took final foreign policy decisions in her discretion. Most of the traditional institutions lost their importance. For example, the decision to conclude the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in 1971 was taken on the advice of a very small group of advisors. The Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet learnt of the treaty when its draft had already been finalised. The Cabinet itself was taken into confidence on the day the treaty was to be signed. Similarly, such important decisions, as providing assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka against violence by leftist youth in 1971, to explode the nuclear device in 1974, Sikkim's merger with India in 1975, and initiation of the process of normalisation with China in 1976, were largely taken personally by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

After assuming the office of Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi devoted some time to consolidating her position and isolating elders like Morarji Desai, S. Nijalingappa and K. Kamraj. After the Congress split of 1969 Mrs. Gandhi moved closer to the Left and took the help of the communists. Her massive victory in the 1971 Lok Sabha election gave her the opportunity to concentrate all powers in her hands. During the same year (1971) an Indian aircraft was hijacked by certain Pakistani agents. Later, the unprecedented Bangladesh crisis brought an influx of about one million Bangla refugees to India. This put a severe strain on India's economy. As Indo-Pakistan relations deteriorated and both China and the United States pledged support to Pakistan, India was virtually isolated. It was in this background that India was left with no alternative but to 'compromise' with rigidity of non-alignment and decided to sign the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. Thus, assured of Soviet help (if needed) India faced the Pakistani challenge with courage and determination, and inflicted a crushing defeat on her as Pakistan Army surrendered unconditionally in East Pakistan. India created history by helping Bangladesh emerge as a sovereign state. By delaying recognition of Bangladesh, before the war, and by not giving open support to the *Mukti Bahini,* India turned its confusion into Pakistan's confusion. The critics of Indo-Soviet Treaty described its signing as a step taken in panic. It was also alleged that by signing the "unequal treaty" India had made itself dependent on the Soviet Union. But, history proved the correctness of Indira Gandhi's decision. India's image as a major non-aligned nation was indeed adversely affected. But it was actually a significant diplomatic victory.

Pakistan lost the war and Bangladesh was born in 1971. The Shimla Agreement concluded in 1972 was described as victory of Indira Gandhi's diplomatic skill. The Agreement signed by Z.A. Bhutto and Indira Gandhi provided that in the western sector both India and Pakistan would vacate the territories taken by them. But, the question of return of Pakistani Prisoners of War (POWs) (mostly taken in Eastern sector) was put off till 1973. Bangladesh was finally recognised by Pakistan in February 1974. India tested its nuclear device in May 1974 which panicked Pakistan. Nevertheless, three agreements were concluded between India and Pakistan in September 1974 dealing with communications and related to travel facilities. India fired its first satellite *Aryabhatt* in the outer space in April 1975. This made India, so to say, the sixth nuclear nation (though its nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes), and the ninth space power.

At the time of India's recognition of Bangladesh in December 1971, Pakistan had snapped its diplomatic ties with India by way of protest. Although the process of normalisation of relations was begun in 1972 with the signing of Shimla Agreement, it was completed only on July 24, 1976 when the two countries re-established their diplomatic relations.

India's relations with the Soviet Union were generally cordial during Mrs. Gandhi's tenure, but they were fairly unfriendly with the United States. Although Mrs. Gandhi had paid a state visit to the United States, after assuming office, in 1966 itself, and President Nixon came to India in 1969, yet the US not only supported Pakistan on the question of Bangladesh, but even prompted China to adopt a hostile posture towards India. India and the Soviet Union concluded in October 1972 an agreement for scientific and technical cooperation.

Mrs. Gandhi continued to follow the policy initiated by Shastri Government for improving friendly relations with India's neighbours. India's role in the emergence of Bangladesh was certainly vital. We have explained in Chapter 7 that during Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Dhaka in 1972, a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation was concluded between India and Bangladesh. The two countries tried to resolve the issue of Farakka barrage in 1975. But, after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the creator of Bangladesh, on August 15, 1975 the successive governments of Bangladesh tried to internationalise the Farakka question by raising it in the UN General Assembly. Several efforts were made to improve the Indo-Nepalese relations also. An agreement was concluded between India and Sri Lanka in March 1976 that demarcated the maritime boundary between the two countries, thus ending an outstanding dispute between the two neighbours. This reduced the tension between them. Also in March 1976, the boundary demarcation maps between India and Burma were signed by the two countries. However, some separatist elements of North-East have been acquiring weapons from across the Burmese border.

It was under Mrs. Gandhi's leadership in 1976 that India and China, after a gap of 14 years, raised the level of their diplomatic relations, and exchanged ambassadors. Mrs. Gandhi sent China expert K.R. Narayanan (who later became President of India, in 1997) to China as India's ambassador. India had signed an agreement with Indonesia in August 1974 demarcating their maritime boundary. Mrs. Gandhi consistently supported Arab countries in the West Asian dispute. No diplomatic relations were established with Israel. Closer economic cooperation between India and Iran was initiated when the two countries signed a treaty in 1974; and in 1975 an Indo-Kuwait Agreement was concluded. India's cooperation with East European countries was also encouraged during Mrs. Gandhi's tenure. But, Mrs. Gandhi failed to restore the unquestioned status of India as a non-aligned nation. The 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty had confirmed India's pro-Soviet policy.

During her second tenure as Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi presided over the NAM summit held in New Delhi. But, she did not openly condemn the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.

Morarji Desai (1977-79): Mrs. Gandhi and her party lost the Lok Sabha election held in March 1977. She was succeeded by the elder statesman Morarji

Desai as head of the Janata Party Government. Most of his long experience as a politician and administrator was limited to domestic affairs and financial matters. Personally his knowledge of foreign affairs was limited. Harish Kapur has gone to the extent of saying about Desai that, "… he had no vision of the outside world, no perception of the international configuration of forces, and no framework to go by, except for a very fixed opinion … that India had never been genuinely non-aligned." Desai was of the opinion that India's policy was unnecessarily pro-Soviet, and in order to bring about a balance it was essential to improve relations with the United States. Therefore, he took two important decisions. Firstly, he appointed a well-known foreign policy expert Atal Behari Vajpayee as the Foreign Minister, and foreign policy decisions were generally left to him. Secondly, the role and importance of traditional foreign policy institutions like the Foreign Ministry and the foreign service officials was enhanced. When Vajpayee was in the opposition, he and his party the Jana Sangh, were very critical of Indira Gandhi's policies. Her anti-Israel and Pro-Arab policies were particularly criticised. But, after taking over as Foreign Minister, Vajpayee made no basic change in these policies. Vajpayee described it as the policy of "continuity and national consensus". He expressed full faith in non-alignment and promised to make it 'genuine'. Desai Government laid emphasis on better relations not only with the United States, but also the Soviet Union and tried to improve and consolidate friendship with India's neighbours.

During Desai's Prime Ministership, both he and the Foreign Minister paid several visits to America, the USSR and several other countries. The US President Mr. Carter, British Prime Minister Callaghan, the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, Shah of Iran and President of Afghanistan were among many foreign dignitaries who visited India and worked for better bilateral relations. Indo-Soviet friendship was further consolidated. But, Desai plainly told Carter that India would not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whether America gave enriched uranium for our Tarapur nuclear plant, or not. Vajpayee visited Pakistan and Indo-Pak ties were improved to the extent that President Zia-ul-Haq admitted that the bilateral relations of India and Pakistan were never as good as during 1977-79. When, in 1991, Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came to New Delhi to attend Rajiv Gandhi's funeral, be invited Vajpayee to his hotel room and told him: Mr. Vajpayee I have never met you before, but I can say with full confidence that Indo-Pak relations were the best "wben you were the Foreign Minister of your country".

Vajpayee paid a visit to China in February 1979. This was the first visit by an Indian Foreign Minister since the 1962 war. But, during his visit to China, the Chinese attacked neighbouring (Communist) Vietnam. Vajpayee cut short his visit and returned borne by way of protest against attack on a fellow non-aligned country.

In November 1977, India concluded an agreement with Bangladesh on the sharing of Ganga waters, from Farakka. This agreement included several concessions by India to Bangladesh, and was criticised, among others by former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In February 1978 India and Nepal signed treaties for trade and transit. The two countries pledged to cooperate in checking illegal trade on the border. An agreement regarding Salal Hydro-electric scheme was signed with Pakistan in April 1978. A tripartite agreement between India, Indonesia and Thailand concluded in June 1978 permanently demarcated maritime boundaries of three countries in the vicinity of Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Thus, during the brief tenure of Desai Government significant achievements were made in the realm of foreign policy. But, in a blistering attack on Desai's foreign policy, Ved Pratap Vaidik wrote that the so-called policy of "continuity and national consensus" was actually a strange combination of deaf, blind and physically handicapped. He argued that though Janata Government claimed to pursue genuine non-alignment yet neither the Desai Government could turn a blind eye to the necessity of Indo-Soviet friendship, nor any significant agreement could be reached in the Indo-American bilateral relations. This criticism was indeed much too harsh.

Charan Singh (1979): Consequent upon a split in the Janata Party, Desai resigned and Charan Singh took over as Prime Minister on July 28, 1979. He never faced the Parliament as Congress withdrew its outside support, he resigned. After his dismal performance in the Lok Sabha election, he was succeeded by Mrs. Gandhi on January 4, 1980. Charan Singh, the caretaker Prime Minister had hardly any knowledge of international relations. The only NAM Summit in which Indian Prime Minister was absent was held at Havana during his tenure. The only question in which Charan Singh took an unequivocal stand was in regard to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He rushed to Delhi, in the midst of election campaign, in December 1979, called the Soviet Ambassador and told him clearly that India stood for immediate Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Indira Gandhi's Second Tenure (1980-84): Mrs. Gandhi got a clear mandate in the election held following split in the Janata Party. She maintained her old foreign policy priorities. During her second mandate not only Foreign Office and the Prime Minister's Office, but even her son Sanjay Gandhi became important part of foreign policy making. The *detente* which had replaced the seriousness of Cold War after the Helsinki Conference of 1975, received a major setback in 1979 with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The New Cold War had originated with Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan. The United States used Pakistan as a refugees and training camp for Afghan rebels who were not prepared to submit themselves to the Soviet authorities. America asked the Soviet Union to keep away from the Gulf region. Thus, the New Cold War had come to the threshold of India. It was in India's national interest that both the Super Powers should have stayed away from Afghanistan. But, neither Indira Gandhi Government could ask the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan, nor it could stop American aid to Pakistan. Soviet President Brezhnev visited India in December 1980. But, India did not put any pressure on him in regard to Afghanistan in the name of traditional Indo-Soviet friendship.

The small island called Diago Garcia situated in the Indian Ocean was transferred by the British Government to the United States in 1968, before granting independence to Mauritius (of which Diago Garcia was a part). The United States established in Diago Garcia a nuclear weapon equipped major naval base. In reaction to this, the USSR also established its presence in the Indian Ocean, where it took up large scale naval patrolling. In December 1980, there were 32 US Warships and 13 smaller vessels for their assistance in the Arabian Sea region of the Indian Ocean. This included two large aircraft carriers. There were 14 French and 2 British warships, and one Australian aircraft carrier in the Indian Ocean around that time. The Soviet Union had 13 warships in the region and they were provided air cover by 17 aircrafts. The Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean had seriously threatened the security of India and other littoral states of the region. They pleaded for declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Mrs. Gandhi, during her second tenure had to face serious internal disturbance on account of militancy in the border State of Punjab. She visited America, and tried to create world public opinion against foreign assistance and training being given to the militants. President Reagan of the United States, like his predecessor, tried to pressurise India to sign the NPT. India was repeatedly told that the supply of enriched uranium for Tarapur would be stopped, by way of punishment, if India did not sign the NPT. In view of this, India initiated negotiations with France for the supply of fuel (uranium) for Tarapur plant. An agreement to this effect was finally concluded during French President Mitterand's visit to India in November 1982. France promised immediate supply of lighter enriched uranium. It was also agreed that after its use as fuel, India would itself re-enrich the uranium. Thus, as a result of Indira Gandhi's successful diplomacy the crisis related to fuel supply for Tarapur was amicably resolved.

Mrs. Gandhi continued the policy of normalisation of relations with China, first initiated by her in 1976 and later pursued by Desai Government. Mrs. Gandhi met Chinese Prime Minister Hua Guo-feng, on the occasion of Yugoslav President Tito's funeral in Belgrade in May 1980. This was the first informal meeting of the Prime Ministers of two countries since the Nehru-Chou contacts. After prolonged efforts, both formal and informal, it was agreed to initiate a dialogue on the question of Sino-Indian border dispute. This decision was formally announced during Chinese Premier's visit to India in June 1981. The two Prime Ministers had another informal meeting during the North-South summit held at Cancun in October 1981. A special Indian emissary R.N. Kaw was sent to Peking with comprehensive proposals for the solution of border dispute. Kaw went to China in October 1984, just before the assassination of Indira Gandhi.

Rajiv Gandhi (1984-89): Rajiv Gandhi, the elder son of Mrs. Gandhi, an M.P. for just four years, was appointed by President Zail Singh to succeed his assassinated mother. Until his younger brother Sanjay's death in a plane crash in 1980, Rajiv had nothing to do with politics. He was till then an airlines pilot, had no administrative experience, and no political ambition. Luck made him the Prime Minister. Rajiv had hardly ever spoken on foreign policy before taking over as the Prime Minister. But, being a member of Nehru-Gandhi family he did have some knowledge of foreign affairs. Once in office, Rajiv took greater interest in foreign policy than in domestic affairs. He adopted the "diplomacy of travel", and established personal contact with many world leaders. Rajiv went on 48 foreign visits during first four years of his Prime Ministership — a record for any Prime Minister.

Analysing Rajiv Gandhi's impact on foreign policy, Harish Kapoor mentioned five important factors. First, it was the personal factor. His interest in foreign affairs was "free from any ideological influences". According to Sengupta, he did not "find himself in conflict with any world power". He carried himself very well with other world leaders, and according to Kapoor, he was "dazzled by the world of diplomatic summits and all the glamour that went with it". Second factor was institutional. He had very little confidence in the bureaucracy. He felt that it was incapable of seeing the larger picture. Shortly after he came to power, as many as 25 secretaries to the government were shifted in one major single reshuffle. Later, the way Foreign Secretary A.P. Venkateswaran was publicly and summarily dismissed was most depressing. The Foreign Secretary had a strong personality and was known for fearless expression of his views. He would even stand up to oppose the Prime Minister. For example, he had emphatically shot down Rajiv Gandhi's plans to propose an alternate NPT which would permit India to keep her nuclear options open. Third Rajiv was "individualistic and impulsive" in character. He had convinced himself that the job of everyone in civil service was merely to carry out the decisions of the executive. He was inaccessible. He was guided only by a small group of advisers that surrounded him. Fourth, was the political factor. He had such a massive majority in the Lok Sabha that he was not bothered about any criticism. During his 5-year tenure he changed 5 Foreign Ministers and 7 Ministers of State for Foreign Affairs. Thus, most foreign policy decisions were virtually taken by himself. Last, was the nature of his policy. Like Lal Bahadur Shastri, he emphasised on the relations with South Asia. India's basic goal, according to critics, appeared to be to dominate in South Asia. The position began to change by 1986 when several scams came to light, and Rajiv's main interest shifted to retaining his power.

Rajiv Gandhi's individualistic attitude is reflected in his China Policy. For some time, he showed no interest in normalisation of relations with China. Despite Foreign Ministry's insistence and positive signals from China, he initially turned down the proposal of a visit to China. On the other hand, he accepted the "Forward Policy" suggested by the armed forces. When the troops began moving forward in 1986 for the security of Tawang, the Sino-Indian tension suddenly developed. Even 'diplomatic exchanges' took place between the two countries. But, Rajiv and his advisers saved the situation by recalling the troops.

Rajiv Gandhi was of the view that prior to Sino-Indian summit, it was essential to have ministerial-level talks. Rajiv asked P.V. Narasimha Rao, the then Minister of Human Resource Development, to prepare a proposal in this respect. But, when having prepared a proposal, Rao began talking to the Prime Minister the latter cut him short by saying that he himself wanted to go to China for talks with Chinese leaders. Thus, Rajiv personally took charge of all foreign policy issues. When Rajiv Gandhi actually visited China, he was given a very warm welcome, and the elder statesman Deng Xiaoping emphasised the need for strengthening the traditional Sino-Indian ties.

One major point of difference was noticed by the observers between Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv. Both used to take final foreign policy decisions themselves. But, while Mrs. Gandhi patiently heard the views of others and carefully examined the suggestions of Foreign Ministry, Rajiv was not ready to listen to others but took impulsive decisions.

Rajiv's two foreign policy decisions deserve special mention. First related to Maldives. When a *coup* was attempted to overthrow President Abdul Gayoom, Rajiv Gandhi almost immediately rushed the Indian armed forces and saved the authority of the President. The *coup* attempt was foiled. The second decision was impulsive, and it badly failed. It related to prolonged ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. In an attempt to help solve the conflict, Rajiv visited Sri Lanka and signed an agreement with President Jayawardene (see Chapter 7) in 1987. Accordingly, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to Sri Lanka. Thousands of Indian soldiers were sent as part of IPKF. They failed to restore peace between the Tamils and the Sinhalese but hundreds of Indian soldiers were killed or wounded in clashes with militants. The Rajiv-Jayawardene Accord was opposed by a powerful section of Sri Lankan population. The IPKF was withdrawn, without any achievement, by the government that succeeded Rajiv Gandhi.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi played an important part in promoting economic cooperation, in South Asia. This was done with the active assistance of repeatedly changed Foreign Ministers. The seven-nation South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was set up at a summit held at Dhaka on the initiative of Bangladesh in 1985. This regional organisation (see Chapter 10) was established by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Maldives. The second SAARC summit was held in 1986 at Bangalore under the Chairmanship of Rajiv Gandhi. It aims at promotion of regional economic cooperation in South Asia. India, being the largest country in the region has a major role in the rapid development of the organisation. The decision taken in 1997 to establish a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by 2001 would greatly promote the regional cooperation.

V.P. Singh (1989-90): The 1989 Lok Sabha elections returned a hung Parliament. The Janata Dal leader V.P. Singh took over as Prime Minister in a minority government. He was supported from outside by the BJP and the CPI(M). But, this Government lost power just 11 months later when BJP withdrew support. V.P. Singh had very limited knowledge of foreign relations. He was a soft-spoken person, and had come to power on the anti-corruption mandate. The V.P. Singh Government, like the earlier Desai Government, gave due respect to the views of Ministry of External Affairs. The Foreign Minister I.K. Gujral functioned more or less independently, and often did not take even the Prime Minister into confidence. For example, during the Gulf crisis, Gujral on his own decided to visit Moscow, Washington and Baghdad. The Prime Minister was informed shortly before the Foreign Minister was due to leave on tour. This was an unusual decision. Similarly, Gujral took his own decision to go to Kuwait for safe evacuation of the Indians. But, by his decision not to side with either the US or Iraq during the Gulf crisis, V.P. Singh had created a situation of indecisiveness. Commenting on this situation, Gautam Adhikari wrote that India appeared to play in the centre of the field and to fire goals on both the sides.

The Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan met in July 1990 in an attempt to initiate dialogue for normalisation of their bilateral relations. Efforts were also made to improve ties with Bangladesh. South Africa's prolonged colonial rule over Namibia was a blot on the face of a decolonised World. After a bitter struggle, South Africa bowed before the world public opinion, and Namibia was granted independence on March 21, 1990. India was represented on this occasion by a multi-party delegation headed by Prime Minister V.P. Singh. India sought to establish cordial relations with the newly independent Namibia. V.P. Singh visited Moscow in July 1990. During this visit a Moscow Declaration, signed by V.P. Singh and Gorbachev, was issued. It was said in the Declaration that no external interference in the internal affairs of India would be tolerated. Meanwhile, IPKF was recalled by V.P. Singh Government from Sri Lanka.

Chandra Shekhar (1990-91): Following the pattern of Charan Singh, Chandra Shekhar became Prime Minister after the fall of V.P. Singh Government. He led a small group of 54 members of Lok Sabha who had split the Janata Dal. Chandra Shekhar Government was supported by Rajiv Gandhi-led Congress (I) from outside. He could not take any major foreign policy decision during his short tenure. Chandra Shekhar clearly condemned Iraq for annexation of Kuwait. He allowed refuelling facility on Indian airports to the US war planes heading towards the Gulf during the 1991 war. Chandra Shekhar sent a delegation to China to initiate discussions for resumption of border trade. The Prime Minister established personal contact with his Pakistani counterpart Miar Nawaz Sharif, and decided to visit Nepal to discuss the bilateral relations.

P.V. Narasimha Rao (1991-96): Narasimha Rao had opted out of the parliamentary elections held in May-June 1991. But, following Rajiv Gandhi's assassination in May 1991, Rao became the Congress President, and later the Prime Minister. He led a minority government and kept himself busy arranging a majority, which was managed in due course after splits in certain parties. Rao had far better knowledge of foreign affairs than many of his predecessors. He not only had vast administrative experience in various fields, but had worked as Foreign Minister twice (for some time) in the Governments headed by Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. Narasimha Rao formulated and directed India's foreign policy based on significant contribution from his Foreign Ministers and inputs from the Ministry of External Affairs. Rao emphasised the relevance and utility of non-alignment even in the post-Cold War World. He not only reiterated India's continued commitment to non-alignment, but he stated at Tokyo in 1992 (see Chapter 4) that even after the collapse of a bipolar world, non-alignment meant the nation's "right of independence and development." Rao described it as the basis of India's independent foreign policy. During Rao's Prime Ministership, several rounds of Secretary-level talks were held between India and Pakistan, but without any positive outcome. Separatist and disruptive elements in India received constant encouragement from Pakistan. Therefore, no progress could be made in the process of normalisation of Indo-Pakistan relations. Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto did not spare any opportunity to internationalise the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan was also harping on "violation of human rights" by India.

Rao Government did not slacken the efforts for normalisation of relations with China. The Prime Minister of China Li Peng visited India in December 1991, and the two Prime Ministers promised to promote mutual cooperation. Rao and Li Peng admitted that border dispute was the main hurdle in the normalisation of Sino-Indian relations. Prime Ministers Rao and Li Peng had an informal meeting during UN Security Council Summit in 1992. Narasimha Rao paid a visit to China in 1993. It was then decided to put the border dispute (for some time) on the ice, and endeavour was made to resolve other bilateral disputes. Rao and Li Peng decided that the two countries would maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control. Thus, steps for improvement of Sino-Indian relations were initiated, keeping the border issue on the back burner.

H.D. Deve Gowda (1996-97): Lok Sabha elections held in the summer of 1996 once again produced a hung Parliament. The Government of single largest party BJP, under the leadership of Atal Behari Vajpayee failed to secure a vote of confidence, and resigned after just 13 days. A loose coalition of 13-parties came into existence, called itself the United Front, and its leader H.D. Deve Gowda became Prime Minister. He was at that time Chief Minister of Karnataka; as such he was not even a member of Parliament. He had no knowledge of international affairs. But I.K. Gujral as Foreign Minister took upon himself the entire responsibility of foreign affairs. Gujral initiated a policy which soon came to be known as the "Gujral Doctrine". Gujral's policy was based on the perception that as the largest country in South Asia, it was India's duty to improve relations with all the neighbours even if it meant giving concessions and going out of the way. By way of implementation of the Gujral Doctrine (see Chapters 3 and 5), India unilaterally offered several concessions and facilities to Pakistani tourists coming to India. But, unfortunately Pakistan did not make any return gesture. Foreign Secretary-level talks were resumed and it was decided to hold dialogue both at political and administrative levels.

One of the main issues at the background of Sino-Indian differences had been the opportunity provided by India, since 1959, to Dalai Lama to stay in India, though without carrying out any political activities. During a meeting of Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) at Rome in November 1996, Deve Gowda had informal talks with Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng. He assured the Chinese leader that Dalai Lama would not be allowed to carryon any political (meaning anti-China) activities on Indian territory. In fact, there was no occasion for giving such an assurance. Soon afterwards, President of China, Jiang Zemin visited India, and the two countries signed a highly significant Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (see Chapter 6). It provided, without reference to the border issues, for several steps to improve bilateral relations and generate mutual confidence.

Gujral Doctrine was also applied when India and Bangladesh concluded a 30-year agreement for the sharing of Ganga waters. This agreement (see Chapter 7) provided for long-term sharing of water and Bangladesh was allowed slightly more share than even the 5-year agreement concluded in 1977 had allowed.

I.K. Gujral (1997-98): A crisis was caused by the withdrawal of Congress (I) support to minority government led by Deve Gowda. His Government resigned in may 1997, and a "new" U.F. Government under the Prime Ministership of I.K. Gujral assumed office. It was essentially the same government, with only the change of Prime Minister. Gujral retained the Foreign Ministry with himself. He proceeded to work in accordance with the Gujral Doctrine. He had been a diplomat and foreign minister in two earlier governments. But, he had no grass root support. His intellectual background and experience of foreign affairs stood in good stead, though once again Congress (I) withdrew support from his government, and Lok Sabha was dissolved in December 1997. Gujral remained caretaker Prime Minister pending elections in March 1998.

Gujral led Indian delegation to SAARC summit held at Male (Maldives) in May 1997. He had a cordial meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on that occasion. Both the Prime Ministers promised to work for normalisation of Indo-Pak relations. It was also decided to continue the Foreign Secretary-level talks. Later, the two Foreign Secretaries met and decided to set up eight working groups, including one on Kashmir, but in subsequent meetings no progress was made, and no working groups were constituted till the end of 1997.

Prime Ministers Gujral and Nawaz Sharif had another meeting in September 1997 at the UN during the 52nd General Assembly session. Both countries described the meeting as very useful, but no progress was made for setting up the working group for Kashmir. Pakistan has been talking of "plebiscite", and ascertaining the "wishes of the people of Jammu & Kashmir". In the opinion of India this question should now be out of the way. India believed that bilateral and regional economic cooperation should get the highest priority, and confidence building measures must be initiated.

A significant meeting took place between Gujral and US President Clinton in September 1997 at the United Nations. The Indo-US bilateral cooperation was emphasised. Meanwhile Clinton clearly told Nawaz Sharif that the US had no intention of mediation between India and Pakistan, and that the two countries must try to resolve their disputes through bilateral talks. This was for India a welcome change in US policy. Clinton had told Gujral that US was keen on consolidation of Indo-US relations. Meanwhile Prime Minister Gujral gave a call in the UN General Assembly for an international plan to eradicate terrorism. He expressed the hope that India, the world's biggest democracy, would be given a permanent seat in the restructured Security Council.

Atal Behari Vajpayee (March 1998-May 2004): The mid-term election held in early 1998 once again resulted in a hung Lok Sabha. This time Atal Behari Vajpayee, leader of BJP, the single largest party, became Prime Minister in a coalition of over 15 parties. On the eve of assuming office the Alliance had issued an agreed Agenda for Governance which included exercise of nuclear option. Vajpayee had been a Member of Parliament for about four decades. Most of this time he was in the opposition and generally spoke on foreign policy. He had vast knowledge of foreign affairs and diplomacy. He had held the office of the Foreign Minister in the Desai Government (1977-79) and acquitted himself very well. On a number of occasions he had gone to the United Nations as an Indian delegate for the General Assembly sessions. He had led the Indian delegation to the Conference on Human Rights in 1995, during Narasimha Rao's Prime Ministership. After assuming office as Prime Minister he retained the Ministry of External Affairs (for some time) though he often took the help of Jaswant Singh, an ex-Army Officer, and ex-deputy leader of BJP in Lok Sabha and a very articulate negotiator. Vajpayee Government, though often troubled due to coalition politics, took a bold decision in conducting five nuclear tests in May 1998, and declared India to be a nuclear weapon state. Vajpayee initiated fresh dialogue with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and boldly asked America to develop India-US relations on the basis of equality. He initiated dialogue with France for better relations, as France was one nuclear power that appreciated India's nuclear policy and its threat perception.

Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee had said that India wanted to see a prosperous and friendly Pakistan. That would benefit not only India, but the entire subcontinent. Vajpayee Government endeavoured to follow the policy of improving India-Pakistan relations, particularly after it returned to power consequent upon the 1999 Lok Sabha elections. The Minister of External Affairs Mr. Jaswant Singh actively assisted Mr. Vajpayee in building sound relations not only with Pakistan, but all the major powers also. There was strong anti-India reaction in all the five nuclear Powers and Japan when this country conducted five nuclear tests at Pokhran in May 1998. But, Vajpayee insisted on India maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrence, and follow the policy of no-first-use while remaining committed to a nuclear-weapon free world.

With a view to improve relations with Pakistan Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Lahore (Pakistan) in February 1999 in the inaugural run of Delhi-Lahore Bus service. The visit was universally acclaimed. India and Pakistan issued the famous Lahore Declaration. But, even before the ink was dry on the Declaration, Pakistan launched a disguised aggression against India when its troops in civilian clothes and mercenaries and militants occupied the heights in excessive cold conditions in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir on our side of the Line of Control. Maintaining restraint, brave Indian troops and the air force vacated Indian territory from the enemy during May-June 1999. Mr. Vajpayee received brickbats for complete failure of intelligence to detect the arrival of Pakistanis, and bouquets for having got Indian territory fully vacated from Pakistan.

India has come to occupy an important place in the comity of nations during over half a century of its existence as a sovereign state. Without giving up the policy of non-alignment and without compromise with the principle of peaceful coexistence, India was keen on better regional understanding, and cooperation in accordance with the Gujral Doctrine. India has persistently refused to sign the NPT (of 1968) and CTBT (of 1996). This proves that India can withstand the combined pressure of all the other five nuclear powers.

The nuclear India, under Vajpayee's leadership, moved ahead to improve bilateral relations with countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey on the one hand, and Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Australia etc. on the other. Vajpayee worked hard to strengthen ties not only with the Islamic world and the western nations, but also moved ahead with his "Look East" policy. Vajpayee's visits to several South East Asian countries went a long way in strengthening relations with these countries.

India's "Look East" policy originally initiated by P.V. Narasimha Rao was pushed ahead by Vajpayee. Within a short period of three years he had visited seven of the South East Asian countries, and held two India-ASEAN Summit meetings. Vajpayee Government negotiated free trade agreements and anti-terror conventions with several of these countries. Vajpayee put India on road to being a great power. This was recognised by US President Bush himself. Vajpayee demonstrated India's independence and strength when India deplored the US–led attack on Iraq; India later refused to send its troops to Iraq on the request of US—it wanted the full involvement of the United Nations; it refused to talk to Pakistan till it ceased to promote cross-border terrorism; and it actively promoted the cause of developing countries at the Cancun Conference of WTO in 2003 by insisting on reduction of subsidies to the farmers by the developed countries.

Dr. Manmohan Singh (May 2004): Dr. Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister at the head of Congress-led coalition of several parties and with outside support of from left parties. Dr. Singh did not exhibit any interest in foreign policy. Himself an eminent economist, Singh gave foreign portfolio to a former career diplomat Natwar Singh. In the light of Wolker Committee charges against Natwar Singh, he reluctantly resigned. Dr. Manmohan Singh kept foreign affairs with himself, but left actual management of the department to Foreign Secretary. He later appointed senior Congress leader Pranab Mukherjee as the Foreign Minister. Dr. Singh vigorously carried out the peace process with Pakistan, but the continued cross-border terrorism, with finger of suspicion pointing towards Pakistan, the process could not be effectively pursued. Dr. Manmohan Singh worked hard to improve relations with China, maintain cordial relations with Russia and SAARC members. A significant 'achievement' was signing the Indo-American Nuclear Agreement in July 2005 providing for resumption of civilian nuclear cooperation by the US with India, and Indian agreeing to separate civil and military nuclear facilities. Meanwhile, soon after assuming office as Prime Minister Dr. Singh had declared India to be a responsible nuclear state.

The nuclear deal concluded in 2005 and separation plan agreed to in 2006 were subject was to seek safeguards from International Atomic Energy Agency. But, before that a formal treaty, called 123 Agreement, had to be singed both by India and the US. This was necessary because Article 123 of relevant US law provided for an agreement that would take care of US policy of non-proliferation. Despite several rounds of talks between India's Foreign Secretary and US Assistant Secretary of State, differences between the two countries could not be resolved till mid-2007. Dr. Manmohan Singh had assured India's Parliament that all concerns of the country would be addressed before 123 Agreement was concluded. Thus, by June 2007, the nuclear deal had not been formalized into a binding law.

Foreign Policy of India

V N Khanna

The book has been prepared primarily as a textbook for university students. The thrust here is on the fundamental values cherished by our founding fathers in the arena of international relations. Effort has been made to analyse these values and examine as to what extent they have actually been implemented. India maintains friendly relations with most of the countries and plays an active role in various international and regional organizations. The policy that has been consistently pursued has led to India emerging as an important player in international politics.

The present edition of the book has been updated to the time of signing a nuclear deal with the US for civilian nuclear cooperation, and the successful conclusion of a binding agreement with it. The edition also discusses the attempts at improving its relations with China and Pakistan during the last three years, and what led to China's recognition of Sikkim as an integral part of the Indian Union, Afghanistan's joining the SAARC, invitation to India for attending the meetings of G-8, and strengthening of the NAM. These and many other such developments pertaining to India's foreign policy have been carefully updated, incorporated and analysed.

V N Khanna retired as Reader in Political Science at Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi. In his long career spanning more than four decades, he has been involved with student development activities and was, for some time, the Principal of his college. He participated in cooperative teaching in Political Science at the University of Delhi for a long time. He is a member of the International Political Science Association and a life member of the Indian Political Science Association. He is also associated with a number of other academic bodies. His areas of interest include Comparative Politics and International Relations. He has authored several books and attended a number of workshops, seminars and conferences.

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